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Khaksar Movement Weekly “Al-Islah’s” Role Toward Freedom

By Nasim Yousaf

“The publication of Al-Islah gave a fresh impetus to the [Khaksar] movement which spread to other regions such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran [as well as Bahrain, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Yemen, and some countries of Europe]”.
— *Times of India, August 08, 1938*ⁱⁱ

Introduction

After taking over the rule of India from the last Mughal Emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar, in 1858, the British created a well-structured political, economic, social, civil, and defense system in the country. Accomplice Indians partnered with the British colonizers, allowing the British to succeed in establishment of the system installed in India. The natives who served the rulers’ agenda were rewarded in various ways, e.g. through prestigious titles, position of power, or land holdings. With a well devised strategy, a tiny British population (of less than 100,000ⁱⁱⁱ) ruled millions.

The masses, ignorant of British strategies, fantasized about freedom yet without subsequent action. Muslim and non-Muslim leaders failed to organize people to a degree which would pose a real threat to the British Raj, but rather they adopted passive methods which did not put even a small dent in foreign rule. Realizing the weaknesses of the nation and its leaders, Allama Mashriqi, a revolutionist, launched *Al-Islah* weekly (newspaper) in 1934. Using *Al-Islah* as medium to connect to his people, Mashriqi succeeded in raising a large, very well-knit, and dedicated Private Army — the Khaksar Tehrik^{iv} (Khaksar Movement). By 1946, the Tehrik had five million^v uniformed Khaksars, millions of supporters in India, and devotees growing rapidly in many foreign countries.

Founder's Mission

Allama Mashriqi's^{vi} mission was to demolish British rule in India with the help of his Private Army. He was also looking beyond the borders of India and as such the Khaksar Tehrik's ideology was promoted in other parts of world. Its virtuous doctrine was to bring justice, peace, and unity of the human race and to lead mankind to higher goals (scientific development, exploration of the universe, other discoveries and inventions, etc.). The establishment of the Khaksar Tehrik's branches, distribution of *Al-Islah* in various countries, and the 14 point decree that Mashriqi issued clearly speaks of his global aims. Some points from the decree include:

"We Khaksars stand, by eliminating all sectarian feelings and religious bigotry through our virtuous and beneficent deeds (but keeping religion intact), for the creation of an egalitarian, tolerant and dominant order which will ensure proper treatment and well being of all communities and the basis of which will be virtue, piety, struggle and supreme justice."

"Khaksar has as his objective authority over the entire world and attainment of collective and political supremacy of his nation through piety and virtuous deeds."

"Khaksar believes that he can attain supremacy in the world through his good conduct and fair dealings with every other community, not by any other means. These moral magnanimities are mentioned almost in every religious book."

Al-Islah played a vital role in spreading Mashriqi's ideology; as a result, the Khaksar Movement spread very fast in India and its influence spread to several different parts of the world.

About Al-Islah

The word *Al-Islah* is an Arabic word which means the process of treatment and rehabilitation. The name speaks for itself that the weekly was started to re-build the astray nation. Its aim was to awaken the masses to rise against British rule and seek the independence of British India. In 1936, *Al-Islah* wrote "freedom is not limited to ending up in jail or simply withstand the beating"^{vii}, it lies in the "sacrifice of life, property and the spirit to fight"^{viii}.

The first edition of the *Al-Islah*, an Urdu language weekly, appeared on November 23, 1934^{ix} from Khaksar Tehrik's Headquarters based in Icchra, then a suburb of Lahore (Punjab) in British India (now in Pakistan). *Al-Islah* was registered under registration number L- 3446 in Lahore. Allama Mashriqi and many erudite persons contributed to the said weekly. Mashriqi's contribution was not only in the shape of columns/critique, but he also regularly answered^x questions received from the public and followers on various topics. Over the course of its publishing, *Al-Islah* editors included Dr. Muhammad Iqbal^{xi}, Chaudhry Shah Deen Aslam^{xii} (Salar-e-Awwal^{xiii}), Professor Sultan Bakhsh^{xiv}, and Abdul Rehman Malik^{xv}.

In different times, various printers were used to print the weekly, namely Hijazi Printing Press^{xvi} (Lahore), Nagina Press^{xvii} (Lahore), Muslim Press^{xviii} (Lahore), Expert Litho Printing Press^{xix} (Lahore), Nami Press^{xx} (Lahore), Ittehad Press^{xxi} (Lahore), Mohammadi Press^{xxii} (Lahore), Indian Printing Works^{xxiii} (Lahore), and Punjab National Press^{xxiv} (Lahore). Throughout, *Al-Islah* was printed on basic newsprint.

Al-Islah was typically comprised of twelve pages with three columns; if needed, the number of pages was increased. The price of the weekly in 1946 was two annas^{xxv}. From 1934 to early 1940 and then in 1946, it appeared from Lahore (during the period it was banned, it intermittently appeared at different times from different cities such as Delhi, Calcutta, and Aligarh). Every six months^{xxvi}, archives of *Al-Islah* were nicely bound in hardcover in order to maintain records collectively, so that everyone would have access to its previously published editions.

Al-Islah was not like any customary weekly or tabloid, rather it was a revolutionary journal. Furthermore, it was free from publishing exaggerated and sensational material. Contributors followed the *Al-Islah*'s publishing guidelines (which appeared periodically^{xxvii}) to promote the Khaksar Tehrik's ideology and objectives. The incorporated pieces encouraged character building, brotherhood, action, sacrifice^{xxviii}, and a soldierly life^{xxix}; without these features, Mashriqi could not conceive an uprising in the country and the emergence of a strong organization capable of toppling the Government. The weekly was clean, sober, and literary in its content.

Al-Islah was well-acclaimed and the praise came from people of various sections of life including the editors of contemporary newspapers.

For example, the Editor of *Paisa Akhbar*, Ghulam Qasim,^{xxx} wrote: “On the publication of such a superb quality paper [*Al-Islah*], kindly accept my deep and heartfelt congratulations. This paper, in the era of modern journalism, is magnificent and unprecedented”^{xxxii} (translation from Urdu).

Watan, Lahore wrote: “After a long await, Allama Mashriqi’s newspaper, ‘*Al-Islah*’, has finally appeared. We welcome it from the core of our heart. It is absolutely uncontaminated and has emerged with purpose of life. God may let it meet its aspirations. We pray to God that it should reach every Muslim. What a great newspaper; it is a champion for the reform of the Muslims.

‘*Al-Islah*’s’ able editor deserves gratitude from the entire Muslim community of India for presenting comprehensive and admirable articles...”^{xxxiii} (translation from Urdu).

Other journals, namely the *Paigham*^{xxxiii} (Haripur, Hazara District, NWFP), *Mashriq*^{xxxiv} (Gorakhpur, Utter Pradesh, U.P.), *Tarjuman*^{xxxv} (Peshawar, NWFP), *Paisa*^{xxxvi} (Lahore), and *Intikhab*^{xxxvii} (Lucknow, U.P.), also sent messages of praise^{xxxviii}.

Throughout its existence, *Al-Islah*’s sobriety and high-minded and literary standards were well-regarded. It represented one of the best types of journalism in Urdu in South Asia and had set a standard and new trend in publishing. It is for this reason that in a short span of time, the weekly established itself and was well-liked by the Khaksars and people from all walks of life. The subscribers of *Al-Islah* were in British India and abroad.

Al-Islah — An Official Gazette of the Khaksar Tehrik

Al-Islah weekly also served as an Official Gazette and was a source of prime connection between *Idara-e-Aliya* (Khaksar Tehrik Headquarters) and the Khaksars all over India and abroad.

Al-Islah published *Idara-e-Aliya*’s orders^{xxxix}, announcements, notices, appointments, the Khaksar Tehrik’s ideology (24 principles^{xl} and 14 point decree^{xli}), etc. It also published the Khaksar Tehrik’s program^{xlii} as well as full-

fledged structure^{xliii} of the Tehrik explaining, for example, the design of the Khaksar uniform, dimensions of the Khaksar flag, layout of the Khaksar camps, instructions on military drill, and even sources of purchasing *belchas* (a spade, symbol of the Khaksar Movement, carrying of which was mandatory for all Khaksars).

From time to time, *Al-Islah* also released orders by the Headquarters for holding mock-wars^{xliiv} and/or Khaksar Camps^{xliv} and the designated locations for these activities^{xlvi}. After the events, post-camp activity reports^{xlvii} were often published for the consumption of the Khaksars and to encourage others to become part of the Movement. Apart from publishing orders, and if considered necessary to exert pressure on the Government, *Al-Islah* published instructions to Khaksars in India and abroad to send resolutions, memos, letters, telegrams, etc. to the Government to accept the Khaksar Tehrik's demands. If required, the weekly also published endorsements received by the Headquarters on Khaksar demands.

In addition, to inform the public and the Khaksars about Mashriqi's activities, *Al-Islah* published Mashriqi's programs^{xlviii} and tour itinerary (including some of Mashriqi's letters^{xlix}). *Al-Islah* also disseminated the travel program of the Khaksar leaders in advance^l. Apart from this, *Al-Islah* included reports on the spread of the Khaksar Movement in various cities. For example, it published news items on the launching of the Khaksar Tehrik in Sirinagar^{li}, Karachi^{lii}, Dera Ismail Khan^{liii}, Bahraich^{liv}, Wazirabad^{lv}, Hoshanabad^{lvi}, Rangoon, and Calcutta.

Additionally, *Al-Islah* separately published publicity materials, such as booklets, brochures, flyers, and Khaksar activity albums, entitled *Khaksar Camp*^{lvii} or *Camp Number*^{lviii} (to prevent the spread of the Khaksar Tehrik, in 1938, the postal service created unnecessary hurdles for Khaksar albums to be mailed^{lix}). The albums showed pictures of uniformed Khaksars proudly performing their military activities, including mock wars.

Al-Islah — Other Contents

Al-Islah also encompassed literature and published intellectually driven essays. The main topics included history^{lx}, politics^{lxi}, and religion^{lxii}.

In order to create an army of soldiers to topple British rule, *Al-Islah* included pieces which encouraged a soldierly life^{lxiii}. *Al-Islah* published motivational

articles and stories of gallantry^{lxiv} (as an example even of non-Muslims^{lxv}). To awaken the public, it also published material pertaining to the Muslims' downfall^{lxvi}.

Al-Islah aimed to spread Allama Mashriqi's message and published his public addresses^{lxvii}, editorials, commentary, critiques, and pieces of writing. It also included speeches of Khaksar leaders, such as Barrister Mian Ahmed Shah^{lxviii}, Mir Walayat Ali (Salar-e-Akbar Hyderabad Dakan)^{lxix}, Haji Rahim Bakhsh (Salar-e-Akbar Rangoon)^{lxx}, Bashir Ahmed Siddiqui (Nazim-e-Alah NWFP & Punjab)^{lxxi}, Raja Sher Zaman (Salar District Rawalpindi)^{lxxii}, Shah Din Aslam (Salar-e-Awwal)^{lxxiii}, Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung^{lxxiv}, Raja Muhammad Sarfraz Khan^{lxxv} (Member Punjab Legislative Assembly and Salar-e-Alah), Khan Habibullah Khan^{lxxvi} (Salar Jalandhar^{lxxvii}), and Pir Bakhsh Khan (Member^{lxxviii} NWFP Legislative Assembly)^{lxxix}.

To reform the nation, *Al-Islah* also published stories that encouraged high values, honesty, and good character. It regularly printed accounts of Khaksars' community services^{lxxx} for the people of all races; such services were meant to unite the nation and promote nation building. It also included reports on other good deeds of the Khaksars. In one example, in Peshawar, Khaksars voluntarily controlled traffic for the smooth flow of a funeral procession. In another example, in Amritsar, Khaksars provided community service to earthquake victims of Quetta; they also remained awake the whole night guarding the victims' baggage.^{lxxxi} *Al-Islah* also reported on Khaksars' salutes and guards of honor presented to Muslim and non-Muslim leaders, some of whom are as follows. To **Muslims**: Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar^{lxxxii}, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan (Punjab Premier)^{lxxxiii}, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan^{lxxxiv}, Dr. Khan Sahib^{lxxxv}, His Highness Mehtar of Chitral Nasir-ul-Mulk^{lxxxvi}, and Pir Elahi Bakhsh^{lxxxvii} (Revenue Minister, Sind and Salar-e-Alah, Larkana^{lxxxviii}). To **Hindus**: Mahatma Gandhi^{lxxxix}, Jawaharlal Nehru^{xc}, Chaudhry Bihari Lal (Member Legislative Assembly^{xc}), and Chakravarti Rajagopalachari (Chief Minister of Madras and First *Indian* Governor General of post-partition India after Lord Mountbatten).

Other subject matter of the *Al-Islah* included:

- Anti-sectarianism
- Significance of *belcha*^{xcii} (spade)
- Public suggestions^{xciii}

- Current affairs (particularly of the Muslim world^{xciv})
- Khaksar men and women's pledges^{xcv}
- Debates of the Khaksar Tehrik in the Legislative Assemblies^{xcvi}
- Government actions^{xcvii} and restrictions on Khaksar Tehrik
- Appeals to the Government^{xcviii}
- Progress on Khaksar demands/appeals to the Government^{xcix}
- Khaksar Tehrik's demands from the Government (e.g. to start a broadcasting station^c, to allow Government servants^{ci} to join the Khaksar Tehrik)
- Support and criticisms^{cii} of the Khaksar Tehrik
- Repudiation on concocted media stories^{ciii} against Mashriqi or the Khaksars
- Special/miscellaneous instructions to Khaksars (e.g. to display Khaksar flags at conspicuous spot of their premises)
- Denouncement of Mullahs^{civ} who promoted communalism and sectarianism
- Exposés on leaders^{cv} whose policies were injurious to unity and/or freedom^{cvi}

British India Awakened

Al-Islah (and its related publicity material) played a major role in establishing 4,000-6,000^{cvi} Khaksar Movement offices in India and creating a well-disciplined and dedicated Private Army of 5 million Khaksars^{cvi} in British India. The creation of such a large army in itself speaks of India's awakening. The Khaksars roused the nation to seek freedom through their soldierly activities (e.g. parades in uniform, mock wars, and holding of training camps) and their active outreach to the public (e.g. meetings, speeches, and lectures).

Al-Islah also inspired Mashriqi's followers, and as a result, many daily newspapers and weeklies were born supporting the Khaksar Tehrik's ideology. Examples include the *Al-Mashriqi*^{cxix} from Peshawar, *Awaz*^{cx} daily from Karachi, *Piyam-e-Ithad*^{cx} (Message of Unity) from Abbottabad, *Jihad*^{cxii} from Calcutta, *Mujahid*^{cxiii} from Rangoon, *Khaksar*^{cxiv} from Rangoon, *Akhuwat*^{cxv} from Peshawar, *Tarjuman*^{cxvi} from Gujrat, *Paigham*^{cxvii} from Haripur, Hazara District, NWFP, *Iqbal*^{cxviii} from Rawalpindi, *The Radiance*^{cxix} weekly from Aligarh (not to be confused with the current *Radiance*, Delhi), *Al-Islah*^{cxx} from Rangoon, and *Khaksar*^{cxxi} from Burma in Burmese language^{cxxii}.

In addition, many Indian leaders were encouraged by the Khaksar Tehrik. In 1938, Gandhi suggested the creation of a task force of uniformed volunteers under the name of Peace Brigade. In the same year, Dr. Sir Gokal Chand Narang sought inspiration from the Khaksars and stated that “Arya Samaj [another volunteer movement] should emulate the Khaksar Tehrik”^{cxviii}. The All-India Muslim League also formed the Muslim National Guards in 1938. In April (05) 1939, Sardar Partap Singh (Member Legislative Assembly) announced the forming of “Punjab Kissan Fauj”. The Punjab Congress Socialist Party also planned to form its own army (National Militia)^{cxvii}. In April (09) 1939, a public gathering was held at which Professor Ranga referred to Khaksars and other organizations and explained the importance of such volunteer organizations. Over these years, many other volunteer movements copying the Khaksars came up, including Mahabir Dal, Ram Sena, and Arya Samaj.

Khaksar Influence beyond British India

Al-Islah played a vital role in spreading Mashriqi’s ideology beyond British India; as a result, the Khaksar Movement not only spread very fast in India but its influence reached different parts of the world, i.e. *Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Bahrain, Burma, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, as well as some countries of Europe*^{cxv}. Khaksar Movement offices were opened in many countries and people came forward to join the Khaksar Tehrik and/or to support Mashriqi’s ideology. In 1939, monthly *Khaksar* was also launched in Nairobi (Kenya) in Urdu, English, and Gujrati^{cxvi}. These examples are enough to understand the Khaksar Tehrik’s influence^{cxvii} in many regions and they speak of Mashriqi’s accomplishments.

Ban on Al-Islah

Toward the end of 1939 [during the dispute between the Khaksars and Government of United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh, U.P.) over the Shia-Sunni riots^{cxviii}], the British came to know about the Khaksars’ militant ability. The Khaksars’ power could be gauged by when they challenged the British authority in the United Provinces, and the Congress Ministry in the said province was forced to resign; the British Governor of U.P. (Sir Harry Graham Haig) had no choice but to sign an agreement with the Khaksar Tehrik at Mashriqi’s terms^{cxix}. Lord Linlithgow (Viceroy of India) became worried, and on November 13, 1939,

he wrote a secret letter to Haig in which he stated "...I regard it [Khaksar Tehrik] myself as having quite dangerous potentialities..."^{cxxx}.

The Khaksar Tehrik-U.P. Government agreement at Mashriqi's terms proved to be a test for Mashriqi which showed him that British rule could be toppled and that he must move swiftly on his plan of ending British rule. Therefore, Mashriqi immediately issued a *directive* (to provincial heads of the Khaksar Tehrik) published in *Al-Islah* to increase Khaksar strength by 2.5 million^{cxxxi} by June 15th, 1940.

The Khaksar Tehrik's strength and upswing? in the country, along with the Movement's influence spreading fast outside India through *Al-Islah* and other means, created alarm for the rulers. The Secretary of State for India, Lord Zetland, wrote (on March 09, 1940, 10 days before ban on *Al-Islah* and the Khaksar Tehrik) to Linthgow: "It certainly looks as if, we were to withdraw our control from India"^{cxxxii}. The Khaksar power compelled the rulers to devise strategies to maintain their control over India; as a step, they began working closely with Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Mahatma Gandhi, and other non-Khaksar leaders.

Under this state of affairs, the continuance of *Al-Islah* became a grave menace for the Government; as such the main communication line between the Khaksar Headquarters and the Khaksar Tehrik branches in India and abroad had to be cut-off. The Government of Punjab, under whose jurisdiction *Al-Islah* fell, was given a signal to take immediate action against the weekly.

Based on these instructions, the Punjab Premier, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan (also a key member of the All-India Muslim League) issued the order for action; Punjab Police raided Mohammadi Press in Lahore on February 22, 1940 and confiscated copies of the *Al-Islah*. The Punjab Government also demanded a security of Rs. 1,000^{cxxxiii}. Mashriqi, sensing the ban, made alternate arrangements and started publishing *Al-Islah* from Delhi^{cxxxiv}.

Soon after, the Governor of Punjab's Provincial Fortnightly Report (dated second half March 1940)^{cxxxv} reported that an issue of *Al-Islah* (March 08/15, 1940) was published from Delhi; this brought the matter to the attention of authorities in India and London. However, the Governor of Punjab (Sir Henry Duffield Craik) comforted the Viceroy of India (Linlithgow) in a letter to him dated March 18, 1940; Craik wrote that his Government was taking appropriate action against the

Al-Islah^{cxxxvi}. Moreover, according to the said letter, the Punjab Government had asked the Chief Commissioner of Delhi to take action against the weekly^{cxxxvii}.

On March 19, 1940, a uniformed contingent of 313 Khaksars paraded in Lahore in protest against Government actions. To stop this march, police opened fire and 200 or more Khaksars (as per Khaksar and other credible sources; the Government's official figure is in the 30s) were brutally killed. On this day of the historic Khaksar massacre, the Khaksar Tehrik and *Al-Islah* were banned by the Government of Punjab. On the same day, Mashriqi was arrested^{cxxxviii} and police raided the Khaksar headquarters in Icchra (Lahore) and Khaksar houses and confiscated *Al-Islah* and other material. Thereafter, a full campaign was launched and Khaksar offices across the country were raided and a large number of copies of *Al-Islah*, pamphlets, flyers, posters, and other materials were confiscated. *This action was taken at a time when Mashriqi was at the verge of toppling British rule and in his head he had set mid-1940 as the deadline*^{cxxxix cxl}.

News of the Khaksar massacre and Mashriqi's arrest spread across India and abroad via print media and radio stations. *The ban had a very positive effect on the demand for freedom.* The British were extremely anxious and they continued to develop strategies to maintain their rule and continued to work with non-Khaksar leaders.

Soon the Chief Commissioner of Delhi also imposed a ban on publishing the weekly. The Khaksars then attempted to publish it from Sind; as evident through the Punjab Governor's letter dated April 03, 1940 which states that *Al-Islah* was to be published from the Sind Province. However, the Sind Government also did not allow this. *Al-Islah* was moved to Calcutta^{cxli} and publishing began there in July 1940. The Governor of Punjab (Craik) wrote to the Governor of Bengal (Sir John Arthur Herbert) to stop its publication, but the Khaksars managed to continue to print it (it is yet not known for how long it kept appearing). The *Al-Islah* also began appearing from Aligarh (United Provinces now Uttar Pradesh)^{cxlii}. Meanwhile, under continued Khaksars' resistance, the Punjab Government lifted the ban; however Mashriqi remained behind bars in Vellore Central Jail.

In June 1941, the Central Government came after *Al-Islah*, and its publication was forbidden and the Khaksar Tehrik was banned *throughout India*. The media (newspapers and radio stations) broadcasted the Government ban in India and in many other countries. Government actions against the Khaksar Tehrik (i.e. the

March 19th massacre and the 1941 ban) were known in many regions of the world, and this generated negative feelings among people in countries which were under Imperial rule. The Government of India, Home Department sent a secret coded telegram on June 09, 1941^{cxliii} to the Secretary of State for India (Lord Amery) (in response to telegram of June 06, 1940). It reported on the measures taken thus far, such as:

- A Communiqué banning Khaksar Tehrik had been sent to London, Basra, Cairo and Jerusalem with a brief account on the Khaksar Tehrik
- Some Provincial Governments had been requested to arrange statements from well-known Muslims in support of Government actions
- Provincial advisors and censors had been “warned to watch press reactions” and not to pass anything that went against the Government. Press advisors would make contact with editors, if required
- Arrangements had been put in place to gather “press reaction” and “helpful press comment.” The first batch of such comments had been sent to All India Radio, London, BBC Arab Broadcasting, Jerusalem, Basra, and Cairo. All India Radio had been cautioned about German broadcasts as well as their own radio transmissions in Persian and Pushtu
- Reuters had been briefed on reporting about the Khaksars
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The telegram also stated that the Hindu press may approve or stay quiet, whereas the Muslim Press was unimportant.

The Home Department of the Government of India also sent another secret coded telegram (June 23, 1941) to the Secretary of State for India (Amery), which stated that the publishing of *Al-Islah* from Aligarh (U.P.) had been “suppressed”^{cxliv}. These steps were taken to cut off the communication lines and cripple the Khaksar Movement in order to secure British rule which had been threatened by the Khaksar Tehrik. Linlithgow later wrote (May 26, 1943) to all Provincial Governors; he stated that he had always felt that the Khaksars are “potentially, a most dangerous organisation”^{cxlv}. The suppression of *Al-Islah* and the all-India ban on the Khaksar Tehrik continued to fuel the freedom movement and it became indispensable for the British to continue seeking the support of non-Khaksar Indian leaders.

The ban on *Al-Islah* continued (until 1946), even after Mashriqi was released from Vellore Central Jail (January 19, 1942^{cxlvi}), (with his movements restricted to Madras Presidency^{cxlvii}, province of British India) and even after the ban on the Khaksar Tehrik and Mashriqi’s movements was lifted in December 1942. Printers

were warned that if they published it, their businesses would be heavily fined or even closed down. Hurdles were created to prevent its re-publishing, including not releasing the supply of newsprint. A Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab (dated January 30, 1943) stated that Mashriqi was continuing his efforts to reinstate *Al-Islah* and Dr. Muhammad Ismail Nami was put in charge of the newspaper. However, it was reported that the newspaper had been unsuccessful in securing the needed paper supply. Such oppressive methods were actually working against the British and their rule was coming to an end. Meanwhile, endeavors continued and efforts were made to publish *Al-Islah* from Karachi (Sind)^{cxlviii}. A Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab (dated May 01, 1943) stated that plans for the publication of *Al-Islah* from Karachi had been completed. However, it is not known whether the weekly was ever published from Karachi.

Republishing of *Al-Islah* was prevented in order to crush the Khaksar Movement. However, the authorities failed, because the Khaksar Tehrik developed alternate methods, such as publishing of pamphlets, flyers, brochures, and booklets. In addition, *Ihsan* (Lahore)^{cxlix}, *Iqbal*^{cl} (Rawalpindi), the *Zamindar*^{cli} weekly (Lahore^{clii}), and *The Radiance*^{cliii} weekly (Aligarh) were used to publish Allama Mashriqi and the Khaksar Tehrik's messages. *Al-Askariat*^{cliv} (Lucknow) was also started in April 1943. "In Bombay, another Khaksar newspaper '*Sultan*' (Bombay) was re-started in July 1944"^{clv}.

In the meantime, pressure on the Punjab Government was maintained by the Khaksar Tehrik to issue permission to re-start *Al-Islah* from Lahore. Finally, after a long struggle, the Government submitted. In 1946 (the exact date of re-publication is not known), a new registration Number L-5124 was issued and *Al-Islah* again began appearing from Lahore.

The paper once again resumed its publishing activities with even more vitality. It reported on anything that would end British rule in India. For example, events and activities such as the Khaksars' involvement in the Indian Royal Naval mutiny^{clvi} in Bombay, the Azad Hind Fauj [Army] Conference^{clvii} called by Mashriqi, government actions to suppress the Khaksar Movement^{clviii}, activity on the induction of released soldiers^{clix} into the Tehrik, welcoming of Major General S.D. Khan into the Khaksar Tehrik^{clx}, promotion of *The Constitution of Free India, 1946 A.C*^{clxi}, the historic Khaksar Camp (November 07-10, 1946^{clxii}) and mock war in Peshawar, and Mashriqi's speeches including his revolutionary speech at this camp to 110,000 people^{clxiii}.

By this time, *Al-Islah* had completed its mission and Mashriqi, once again, moved forward with his plans to overthrow British rule in India; this is evident from Mashriqi's written proclamation (December 01, 1946):

“Idara-i-Aliya [Khaksar Headquarters] shall soon issue an order that in the entire India, four million [sources quote a range from 4-5 million members] Khaksars, side by side with hundreds of thousands rather millions of supporters shall march simultaneously... This moment shall dawn upon us very soon and that is why it is being ordered that a grand preparation for this historical day should commence immediately... so that British can clearly witness the day of India's freedom...”^{clxiv}

Publishing of such news and this announcement did not go unnoticed and the British sensed that a revolt was forthcoming. Hence, shortly thereafter, in February 1947, the British Prime Minister (Clement Attlee) made an announcement that power would be transferred no later than June 1948. In March of 1947, Mashriqi ordered the assembly of 300,000 Khaksars in Delhi on June 30, 1947 – this was his final effort to topple the British Government and to keep India united. The British understood Mashriqi's intention and moved swiftly. Before the assembly of the Khaksars could take place, Lord Mountbatten's partition plan was announced on June 03, 1947.

The next day (June 04), the Viceroy met with Gandhi and discussed his plan; following the meeting, Gandhi expressed his acceptance^{clxv} of partition. The Viceroy also told Jinnah to accept the plan; Jinnah then held a meeting with the All-India Muslim League on June 09, and the plan was accepted without much resistance^{clxvi}. Similarly, on June 14, Gandhi pleaded the case for partition in front of the All-India Congress Committee and the plan was accepted. Meanwhile, Mashriqi was stabbed^{clxvii} on June 09th, the day the Muslim League accepted the plan; this was done to prevent Mashriqi's final effort to keep India united. The Muslim League and Jinnah, the Congress, and Gandhi refused to form a united front against the British as repeatedly proposed by Mashriqi.

It is clear that Mashriqi's efforts and his Khaksar Tehrik and *Al-Islah* awakened the nation to seek freedom. Ultimately, Mashriqi could not keep India united, as vested interests of the All-India Muslim League, Indian National Congress and Gandhi, and the British came into play. In a hurry, power was transferred to political parties that were suitable to the rulers, and India was partitioned — hence, Pakistan and India emerged.^{clxviii}

After partition, Pakistan and India's history was written from the perspectives of the All-India Muslim League and the Indian National Congress (and Gandhi), respectively. On the other hand, *Al-Islah* and Mashriqi's pivotal role was buried.

Conclusion

The *Al-Islah* weekly's successes^{clix} cannot be undervalued; the awakening brought about by *Al-Islah*, along with Mashriqi's preparations to overthrow British rule, forced the British to transfer power. If the *Al-Islah* had not helped to raise a massive Private Army and the rulers had felt no threat, they would not have even spoken to *non-Khaksar leaders* and certainly would not have considered transferring power. India's resources were too lucrative and could have helped the British pay off losses from World War II. For reasons such as this, the British were maneuvering and coming up with proposals to maintain their hold over India. When the time came for the British to exit, it was not in the interest^{clxx} of the British, Jinnah, Gandhi, and the Congress to keep India united and the nation was divided. Those who accepted partition failed to understand Mashriqi's vision, and the base realities of the post-partition state of affairs endorse his farsightedness.

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ⁱ List of countries is taken from various sources:

Dr. Mohammed Siddiq Khan's letter to Akhtar Ali Qureshi in Bahrain. British Library, India Office (London). IOR R/15/2/168 or IOR NEG 8897, pp. 25-26

For Burma, Persia (Iran), Saudi Arabia: Mashriqi stated "We have branches outside India in Burma, in Persia, as well as in Arabia." Mashriqi's Presidential Address on the opening day of the All-Faiths Conference at Indore, India (April 18-21, 1938)

For Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran: IOL L/1/1/629, p. 61

For Yemen: *Al-Islah*, May 05, 1939, p. 01

For Burma, Ceylon, Bahrain, South Africa: speech delivered by Khan Bahadur Shaikh Fazl-i-Haq Piracha (Member Central Legislative Assembly) in the Central Legislative Assembly Debates on September 23, 1942

Source for holding Khaksar camps in Rangoon (Burma), Aden (Yemen), Kabul (Afghanistan), Cairo (Egypt), Nairobi (Nigeria): Mashriqi's directive in *Al-Islah*, January 1939

ⁱⁱ Source for quote: IOL L/1/1/629, p. 61. Year (1938) is approximated as it was illegible in the source.

ⁱⁱⁱ Yousaf, Nasim. "Allama Mashriqi the Great - A Hero of All Times" http://www.allamamashraqi.com/images/Allama_Mashriqi_the_Great_-_A_Hero_of_All_Times.pdf

^{iv} The Movement was founded in 1930.

Al-Islah, December 08, 1939, Vol. 06, No. 49, p. 06

Al-Islah, February 15, 1946, Vol. 09, No. 06, p. 08

Al-Islah, February 08, 1946, Vol. 09, No. 06, p. 08

^v Five million in British India. *Al-Islah*, December 01, 1946

^{vi} Allama Mashriqi's biography was published (for the first time) on November 23, 1934 in the first edition of *Al-Islah* dated November 23, 1934 (*Al-Islah*, October 18, 1935, p. 02). It was written by Raja Muhammad Sarfraz Khan from Chakwal (Punjab). Sarfraz Khan was a Lawyer and Member Punjab Legislative Assembly. Sarfraz Khan joined the Khaksar Tehrik on October 16, 1935 and was appointed Salar-e-Alah on the same date (*Al-Islah*, October 25, 1935, p. 08). The biography of Mashriqi was later published intermittently in *Al-Islah*, such as the *Al-Islah*, August 30, 1935, p. 09-11, *Al-Islah*, October 18, 1935, p. 02, and *Al-Islah*, May 19, 1939.

^{vii} *Al-Islah*, April 03, 1936, p. 08, column 02 (top) (translation from Urdu)

^{viii} *Al-Islah*, April 03, 1936, p. 08, column 02 (top) (translation from Urdu)

^{ix} *Al-Islah*, June 14, 1935, Vol. illegible, No. 23, p. 03, column 01

Al-Islah, November 15, 1935, Vol. 02, No. 44, p. 01, column 03

^x For example in:

Al-Islah, August 14, 1936, p. 02-03

Al-Islah, August 21, 1936, p. 02, column 01

Al-Islah, February 19, 1937, p. 07, column 02-03

^{xi} *Al-Islah*, January 11, 1937, p. 01

Al-Islah, July 02, 1937, p. 12

^{xii} *Al-Islah*, February 11, 1938, p. 01

^{xiii} *Al-Islah*, August 27, 1937, p. 10

^{xiv} *Al-Islah*, January 11, 1946, p. 01

^{xv} *Al-Islah*, January 17, 1946, p. 01

^{xvi} *Al-Islah*, March 19, 1937 (last page)

^{xvii} *Al-Islah*, July 02, 1937, p. 12

^{xviii} *Al-Islah*, February 11, 1938, p. 12

^{xix} *Al-Islah*, April 08, 1938, p. 12

^{xx} *Al-Islah*, June 17, 1938, p. 12

^{xxi} *Al-Islah*, December 09, 1938, p. 07

^{xxii} *Al-Islah*, November 03, 1939. On February 22, 1940, police raided Mohammadi Press, Lahore, which used to print *Al-Islah*.

^{xxiii} *Al-Islah*, January 11, 1946, p. 01

^{xxiv} *Al-Islah*, August 23, 1946, p. 12

^{xxv} *Al-Islah*, January 11, 1946, p. 01

^{xxvi} *Al-Islah*, December 06, 1935, p. 05

Al-Islah, July 08, 1938, p. 06, column 01

^{xxvii} For example the policy appeared in *Al-Islah*, April 03, 1936, p. 08

^{xxviii} *Al-Islah*, March 19, 1937, p. 08

^{xxix} *Al-Islah*, March 26, 1937, p. 05

Al-Islah, May 21, 1938, p. 05

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- xxx *Al-Islah*, April 03, 1936, p. 02
- xxxii *Al-Islah*, April 03, 1936, p. 02
- xxxiii *Al-Islah*, April 03, 1936, p. 02
- xxxiv *Al-Islah*, April 03, 1936, p. 02
- xxxv *Al-Islah*, April 03, 1936, p. 02
- xxxvi *Al-Islah*, April 03, 1936, p. 02
- xxxvii *Al-Islah*, April 03, 1936, p. 02
- xxxviii *Al-Islah*, April 03, 1936, p. 02
- xxxix For example in:
- Al-Islah*, April 03, 1936, p. 01
- Al-Islah*, April 24, 1936, p. 01
- ^{xi} *Al-Islah*, August 30, 1935, p. 08
- Al-Islah*, April 03, 1936, p. 03
- Al-Islah*, October 22, 1937, p. 06
- ^{xli} *Al-Islah*, October 22, 1937, p. 05-06
- ^{xlii} *Al-Islah*, July 05, 1935, p. 05-06
- ^{xliii} *Al-Islah*, December 06, 1935, p. 03-10
- ^{xliv} *Al-Islah*, August 06, 1937, p. 16
- ^{xlv} *Al-Islah*, August 06, 1937, p. 16
- ^{xlvi} *Al-Islah*, February 14, 1936, p. 04
- Al-Islah*, August 21, 1936, p. 12
- Al-Islah*, December 09, 1938, p. 07-10
- ^{xlvii} *Al-Islah*, November 01, 1935, p. 12
- Al-Islah*, April 24, 1936, p. 07
- Al-Islah*, August 28, 1936, p. 07
- Al-Islah*, September 10, 1937, p. 01, column 01
- Al-Islah*, September 10, 1937, p. 04
- ^{xlviii} Mashriqi's tour program of Punjab province. *Al-Islah*, July 05, 1935, p. 02, column 03
- ^{xlix} For example:
- Mashriqi's telegram to Governor of NWFP. *Al-Islah*, November 13, 1936, p. 12, column 03. *Al-Islah*, November 20, 1936, p. 06, column 02
- Mashriqi's reply to Raja Mehmoodabad. *Al-Islah*, November 12, 1937, p. 01, column 02
- Mashriqi's reply to Pir Bakhsh Khan (Member NWFP Legislative Assembly). *Al-Islah*, December 24, 1937, p. 02, column 02
- ⁱ *Al-Islah*, December 03, 1937, p. 19
- ⁱⁱ *Al-Islah*, September 13, 1935, p. 08
- ⁱⁱⁱ *Al-Islah*, June 11, 1937, p. 07
- ⁱⁱⁱⁱ *Al-Islah*, June 11, 1937, p. 06
- ^{lv} *Al-Islah*, June 11, 1937, p. 07
- ^{lv} *Al-Islah*, June 11, 1937, p. 07
- ^{lvi} *Al-Islah*, June 11, 1937, p. 06
- ^{lvii} *Al-Islah*, April 17, 1936, p. 01
- Al-Islah*, October 28, 1938, p. 07
- Al-Islah*, November 11, 1938, p. 05
- ^{lviii} Sixty pound art paper was used to print the *Khaksar Camp* (Photo Album). It was bounded in hard cover and title (front and the back) stamped in gold print. It was shipped in a box to avoid creases or any other type of damage. In 1938, the album's price was two rupees four *annas* (Indian currency) with regular mail; for a V.P. Parcel (payment collected upon delivery), the price was two rupees nine annas and two rupees sixty annas if purchased through a commission agent (*Al-Islah*, October 28, 1938, p. 07). The album was very popular and it was sold to a large number of Khaksars and others (various editions were published). Khaksars were directed to show the album to people in India and in foreign countries to enlighten them about Khaksar military activities as well as Khaksar aims. It encouraged additional enrollment into the Khaksar Movement and the results were astronomical.
- ^{lix} *Al-Islah*, December 02, 1938, p. 06, column 01
- Al-Islah*, December 16, 1938, p. 07
- ^{lx} For example:
- "A Look at the Downfall of the Muslims" *Al-Islah*, April 17, 1936, p. 05, 06, 11
- "Nations' Downfall Lies in Disunity" *Al-Islah*, April 24, 1936, p. 06

A story of Joan of Arc under the title “A Brave Woman of France” *Al-Islah*, April 03, 1936, p. 10
 About Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar’s trial *Al-Islah*, May 17, 1946, p. 05
^{lxi} For example: “Islam and Government” *Al-Islah*, September 13, 1935, p. 02
^{lxii} “Christianity & Islam” *Al-Islah*, July 05, 1935, p. 10
Al-Islah, February 07, 1936, p. 07-10
Al-Islah, October 23, 1936, p. 11
Al-Islah, December 04, 1936, p. 11
Al-Islah, March 05, 1937, p. 05
Al-Islah May 14, 1937, p. 07
^{lxiii} *Al-Islah*, May 29, 1936, p. 07
Al-Islah, October 02, 1936, p. 10
Al-Islah, March 26, 1937, p. 05
^{lxiv} *Al-Islah*, May 08, 1936, p. 09
^{lxv} It published a story of Joan of Arc under the title “A Brave Woman of France” *Al-Islah*, April 03, 1936, p. 10
^{lxvi} *Al-Islah*, April 17, 1936, p. 05
Al-Islah, September 04, 1936, p. 06, 10
Al-Islah, February 22, 1937, p. 10
^{lxvii} *Al-Islah*, January 10, 1936, p. 05
Al-Islah, August 14, 1936, p. 05
Al-Islah, October 02, 1936, p. 07
Al-Islah, March 26, 1937, p. N/A
Al-Islah, August 20, 1937, p. 05-07
Al-Islah, August 27, 1937, p. 07-09
^{lxviii} *Al-Islah*, January 29, 1937
Al-Islah, November 12, 1937, p. 05
^{lxix} *Al-Islah*, August 21, 1936, p. 05
Al-Islah, March 26, 1937, p. 09
^{lxx} *Al-Islah*, April 09, 1937, p. 03
^{lxxi} *Al-Islah*, August 13, 1937, p. 10
^{lxxii} *Al-Islah*, April 01, 1938, p. 07
^{lxxiii} *Al-Islah*, August 27, 1937, p. 10
^{lxxiv} On August 01, 1937, Nawab Jung participated in a Khaksar Camp in Hyderabad Deccan (held from July 30-August, 1937). He was wearing Khaksar uniform (*Al-Islah*, August 13, 1937, p. 03) and held a spade on his shoulder. Information about the date of the Camp is taken from *Al-Islah* May 09, 1937, p. 11. At this Camp, Nawab Jung made a speech, which appeared in *Al-Islah* on October 01, 1937, pp. 07-08.
^{lxxv} See endnote 5 for more information on Raja Muhammad Sarfraz Khan.
^{lxxvi} *Al-Islah*, August 12, 1938, p. 05. In Pakistan, Habibullah Khan held important political positions such as Federal Interior Minister (late President Muhammad Ayub Khan’s regime), Chairman Senate (late Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s regime), and Acting President of Pakistan (when President Fazal Ilahi Chaudhry went abroad for medical treatment).
^{lxxvii} *Al-Islah*, September 24, 1937, p. 05
^{lxxviii} *Al-Islah*, June 04, 1937, p. 12
^{lxxix} *Al-Islah*, August 27, 1937, p. 09
^{lxxx} *Al-Islah*, February 12, 1937, p. 02-03
Al-Islah, September 17, 1937, p. 04
Al-Islah, September 23, 1938, p. 03 to 14

One of the functions of the Khaksars was to provide community service regardless of religion, sect, caste, color or creed. Social service performed by the Khaksars included volunteer firefighting, clearing standing water, providing financial help to the needy, laying to rest the unclaimed deceased, helping widows, providing assistance during natural disasters, helping to solve missing children cases, clearing blocked drainage systems, etc. (*Al-Islah*, June 28, 1935, Vol. illegible, No. 25, p. 04) (Also see *Hindu*, May/June 1935). They saluted Muslim and non-Muslim leaders sending the message that we are one and there is no disunity amongst Indians. The Khaksars used to send reports on the services they performed. Such services were published in *Al-Islah*, not only to inform about Khaksar activities but to encourage the public to adopt community service. The idea was to unite Muslims and non-Muslims whose unity had been ruptured by the British in order to maintain their rule.

Community service was also a method of teaching and directing the nation toward self-reliance and nation building; it was an important and practical step to guide a nation which lacked such concepts as there was no prior trend amongst the citizens across India of serving fellow citizens on a *daily* basis. To encourage this trend, *Al-Islah* regularly

published news about such services. Community service also helped the Khaksar Tehrik to grow (see *Al-Islah*, August 06, 1937, p. 09).

^{lxxxix} *Al-Islah*, June 14, 1935, Vol. illegible, No. 23, pp. 09, 11

^{lxxxix} *Al-Islah*, January 22, 1937, p. 08

^{lxxxix} *Al-Islah*, August 26, 1938, p. 05

Al-Islah, November 25, 1938, p. 01

^{lxxxix} *Al-Islah*, April 23, 1937, p. 03

^{lxxxix} *Al-Islah*, August 13, 1937, p. 11

^{lxxxix} *Al-Islah*, December 30, 1938, p. 11

^{lxxxix} *Al-Islah*, December 09, 1938, p. 12

^{lxxxix} *Al-Islah*, April 01, 1938, p. 01

^{lxxxix} *Al-Islah*, May 13, 1938, p. 04

^{xc} *Al-Islah*, August 14, 1936, p. 09

Al-Islah, August 21, 1936, p. 06

^{xc} *Al-Islah*, August 26, 1938, p. 12

^{xcii} *Al-Islah*, July 26, 1935, p. 05

Al-Islah, February 22, 1937, p. 12

^{xciii} For example: Letter from Rangoon (Burma), *Al-Islah*, February 14, 1936, p. 02

^{xciv} *Al-Islah*, July 05, 1935, p. 01

Al-Islah, January 10, 1936, p. 01

Al-Islah, April 17, 1936, p. 01

Al-Islah, August 28, 1936, p. 01

^{xcv} *Al-Islah*, February 05, 1937, p. 02-03

Al-Islah, March 05, 1937, p. 11

^{xcvi} Debate in NWFP Legislative Council. *Al-Islah*, November 15, 1935, p. 27

Resolutions. *Al-Islah*, January 08, 1937, p. 01

^{xcvii} For example:

The North West Frontier Government was not pleased with Mashriqi and many of the Khaksar activities; as such the NWFP Government imposed restrictions in the 1930s. *Al-Islah*, January 01, 1937, p. 01

At a Khaksar Camp (March 26-28, 1937) in Delhi, Mashriqi and the Khaksars were arrested. *Al-Islah*, April 09, 1937, p. 12, column 02

^{xcviii} Bashir Ahmed Siddiqui (a Khaksar leader) appealed to the Governor of NWFP (Now Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) to remove restrictions on the Khaksar Tehrik. *Al-Islah*, March 19, 1937, p. 11

^{xcix} *Al-Islah*, March 04, 1938, p. 05

Al-Islah, April 08, 1938, p. 06

Al-Islah, May 13, 1938, p. 05

^c *Al-Islah*, December 31, 1937, p. 42

Al-Islah, January 28, 1938, p. 07

^{ci} *Al-Islah*, November 19, 1937, p. 12

^{cii} A letter from Tattha (Sind), *Al-Islah*

^{ciii} *Al-Islah*, September 24, 1937, p. 11

Al-Islah, December 31, 193, column 03

^{civ} *Al-Islah*, March 12, 1937, p. 12

Al-Islah, August 27, 1937, p. 07

^{cv} Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah:

Al-Islah, June 07, 1946, p. 03

Al-Islah, June 07, 1946, p. 05

Al-Islah, June 21, 1946, p. 05

Al-Islah, June 28, 1946, p. 05

Al-Islah, July 05, 1946, p. 05

Mahatma Gandhi and Indian National Congress:

Al-Islah, August 02, 1935, p. 06

Mashriqi's public address on the negative politics of All-India Muslim League and the Indian National Congress. *Al-Islah*, November 22, 1946, p. 05

^{cvii} *Al-Islah*, June 17, 1947, p. 11, column 03

^{cviii} Different figures have been quoted in books/documents.

^{cviii} Through *Al-Islah*, Mashriqi created a model in the shape of the Khaksar Tehrik in which men and women adopted positive traits and habits such as strict discipline, unity, service before self, dedication to the cause, honesty, and sense of

sacrifice. The Khaksar Tehrik inculcated among the Khaksars the virtues of self-respect, self-honor, and self-pride. It instilled among the members a sense of tolerance, equal treatment, community service, and respect for all, regardless of religion, color, class and, creed. The model became an example of equality, justice, and accountability. Without *Al-Islah*, the creation of Khaksar Tehrik model would have been impossible.

The amazing part is that there was no formal academy/institution or even a building where Khaksar training was held. Public places, open areas, and playgrounds were used. Another noticeable feature is that the Khaksars performed all activities with no remuneration in mind. They spent their own funds to purchase uniforms and equipment and devoted time on a daily basis; in case of travel to participate in Khaksar Camps, they bore travel and food expenses and left their professional/personal work behind for the Tehrik's activities, an unprecedented phenomenon witnessed in the history of South Asia. The credit for this goes to the leadership and organizational skills of Mashriqi as well as the contents of *Al-Islah*.

^{cix} *Al-Islah*, December 24, 1937, p. 02, column 01

Al-Islah, December 31, 1937, p. 38

^{cx} *Al-Islah*, March 11, 1938, p. 09

Al-Islah, December 09, 1938, p. 15, column 03

^{cxii} *Al-Islah*, March 03, 1939, p. 01

^{cxiii} *Al-Islah*, March 03, 1939, p. 01

^{cxiiii} Mashriqi's letter to Shah Muhammad Zaman (Salar) who launched daily "Mujahid". *Al-Islah*, February 05, 1937, p. 09, column 03. *Al-Islah*, December 09, 1938, p. 15

^{cxv} *Al-Islah*, May 09, 1937, p. 02

^{cxvi} *Al-Islah*, August 05, 1938, p. 08, column 02

^{cxvii} *Al-Islah*, December 24, 1937, p. 32, column 02

Al-Islah, December 31, 1937, p. 38, column 03

^{cxviii} *Al-Islah*, December 24, 1937, p. 32, column 01

^{cxix} A Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab dated April 03, 1943

^{cx} In February, 1941, the *Radiance* weekly was started from Aligarh, U.P.

Yousaf, Nasim. *Government of British India on Allama Mashraqi and Khaksar Tehreek (Movement): A Select Chronology; A descriptive timeline of the correspondence of the Secretary of State, Viceroy of India, Provincial Governors, and high officials, intelligence reports, and other events (Focal Period: 1930s and 40s)*. AMZ Publications (USA), p. 277

^{cxii} *Al-Islah* in Burmese language is published in Rangoon. *Al-Islah*, July 31, 1936, p. 06

^{cxiii} *Al-Islah*, July 31, 1936, p. 06

Al-Islah, September 18, 1936, p. 03, column 01

^{cxv} *Al-Islah*, July 31, 1936, p. 06

^{cxvi} Dr. Sir Gokal Chand Narang's (Ex-Minister in the Punjab Government) speech at Lahore. *Al-Islah*, December 02, 1938, p. 10

^{cxvii} IOR L/P&J/8/678, pp. 110-3

^{cxviii} See endnote 1

^{cxix} *Al-Islah*, August 11, 1939, p. 13

^{cx} There might even be more journals following Khaksar ideology, however, for now, I have only traced the ones mentioned in this piece.

^{cxii} Yousaf, Nasim. *Hidden Facts Behind British India's Freedom: A Scholarly Look into Allama Mashraqi and Quaid-e-Azam's Political Conflict*. AMZ Publications (USA), pp. 55-70

^{cxiii} Governor of U.P.'s (Haig) letter to Linlithgow, Viceroy of India, dated November 08, 1939

^{cxiv} IOL MSS EUR F125/102, pp. 99-100

^{cxv} The Governor of Punjab's Provincial Fortnightly Report for the First Half of June 1940. IOL L/P&J/5/243

^{cxvi} Muhammad, Shan. 1973. *Khaksar Movement in India*. Delhi, India: Meenakshi Prakashan, p. 49

^{cxvii} On February 19, 1940, a security of Rs. 1,000 was demanded from Mohammadi Steam Press, Lahore, which printed the *Al-Islah*. IOL L/P&J/5/243, Governor of Punjab's Provincial Fortnightly Report for second half February 1940 enclosed in Craik's, Governor of Punjab, letter to Linlithgow, Viceroy of India, March 09, 1940.

^{cxviii} An issue of *Al-Islah* (March 08/15, 1940) was published from Delhi (after being banned in Lahore). IOL L/P&J/5/243, Governor of Punjab's Provincial Fortnightly Report, second half March 1940

^{cxix} IOL L/P&J/5/243

^{cx} IOL MSS EUR F125/89, pp. 34-6

^{cxii} IOL MSS EUR F125/89, pp. 34-6

^{cxiii} He was kept in Vellore Central Jail.

^{cxiv} On January 14, 1939, Mashriqi issued an important directive to Khaksars all across India and abroad. According to this order, the Khaksar Tehrik would achieve its final objective (the freedom of British India) by 1940.

In *Al-Islah* of January 1939, Mashriqi issued an order to hold Khaksar Camps, from December 27-31, 1939, in various cities, namely Lahore, Peshawar, Karachi, Calcutta, Quetta, Lucknow, Hyderabad, Deccan, Delhi, Mysore, Jaipur, Indore, Rangoon (Burma), Aden (Yemen), Kabul (Afghanistan), Cairo (Egypt), Nairobi (Nigeria), and so on. Mashriqi asked Khaksars to assemble in as large a number as they could, under the command of their respective City Salar (City Commander) and Provincial Nazim-i-Ala (Provincial Commander). After the said camp, a Central Camp of All-India Khaksars would be held at suitable place (place of the event was not disclosed); the Khaksar Tehrik would be brought to its final objective. *Al-Islah*, January 20, 1939, Vol. 06, No. 03, pp. 07-08

^{ext} On December 01, 1939, Mashriqi established a parallel Government in British India. According to details published in *Al-Islah* (see reference below), the country was divided into 14 provinces (with a center at Lahore) and the names of provincial commanders were announced. Each commander (called Hakim-e-Ala) was ordered to ensure that his power was comparable (*Al-Islah*, December 29, 1939, p. 06) to that of the British Governor in his respective province. For instance, commanders were to have their own warfare equipment and other paraphernalia. A directive was also issued to augment Khaksar strength by enrolling 2.5 million new Khaksars across India by June 15, 1940. (*Al-Islah*, December 24, 1939, Vol. 06, No. 47, p. 05) Efforts to this end were taken immediately and startling results were witnessed.

Also see:

- *Al-Islah*, November 17, 1939, Vol. 06, No. 48, p. 05
- *Al-Islah*, December 01, 1939, Vol. 06, No. 48, pp. 03-06
- Also listen to veteran Khaksar leader Sher Zaman's (author of several books on Mashriqi and the Khaksar Tehrik) video recorded interview by the National Archives of Pakistan; extracts are available on www.youtube.com

^{exh} On July 08, 1940, the Director of the Intelligence Bureau (Home Department, Government of India) wrote a secret letter to the Political Agent in Bahrain. The Director listed the addresses of people in Bahrain who were to receive copies of *Al-Islah* (published from Calcutta). He stated that packets containing copies of the paper were stopped by the censor in Karachi. He also stated that the Government was considering taking action against the newspaper, which had recently started publication from Calcutta. IOR R/15/2/168, p. 34

^{exxi} Professor Karrar Hussain's (in Pakistan, he became Vice Chancellor, Baluchistan University) *Khutba* was published in *Al-Islah*. *Al-Islah*, Aligarh, May 23, 1941, Vol. 23, No. 03

^{exxii} IOL L/P&J/8/680. IOL L/I/1/629, p. 18

^{exxiv} IOL L/P&J/8/680

Yousaf. *Government of British India...*, p. 302. See endnote 118 for full title.

^{exlv} Yousaf. *Government of British India...*, p. 355. See endnote 118 for full title.

^{exxvi} Yousaf Nasim, *Pakistan's Freedom & Allama Mashriqi: Statements, Pakistan's Freedom & Allama Mashriqi: Statements, Letters, Chronology of Khaksar Tehrik (Movement), Period: Mashriqi's Birth to 1947*. AMZ Publications (USA), p. 232

^{exxvii} Under British rule, most of south India was integrated into a region called the Madras Presidency. In 1956, the Madras Presidency was disbanded and Tamil Nadu was established.

^{exxviii} "Addendum To The Note On The Khaksar Movement" Microfiche: MF-2658, Roll-16, National Archives of India, p. 06

^{exlix} "Addendum To The Note On The Khaksar Movement" Microfiche: MF-2658, Roll-16, National Archives of India, p. 01

^{cl} "Addendum To The Note On The Khaksar Movement" Microfiche: MF-2658, Roll-16, National Archives of India, p. 06

^{cli} A Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab dated September 11, 1943

"Addendum To The Note On The Khaksar Movement" Microfiche: MF-2658, Roll-16, National Archives of India, p. 06

^{clii} Started by Maulvi Siraj-ud-Din (father of Maulana Zafar Ali Khan), a retired Postmaster. Syed, M.H. *Encyclopedia of Modern Journalism and Mass Media*, p. 274

^{cliii} "Addendum To The Note On The Khaksar Movement" Microfiche: MF-2658, Roll-16, National Archives of India, p. 07

^{cliv} "Addendum To The Note On The Khaksar Movement" Microfiche: MF-2658, Roll-16, National Archives of India, p. 06

^{clv} "Addendum To The Note On The Khaksar Movement" Microfiche: MF-2658, Roll-16, National Archives of India, p. 07

^{clvi} *Al-Islah*, March 08, 1946, p. 03

^{clvii} *Al-Islah*, August 14, 1946, p. 05

^{clviii} News about the arrest of Khaksar Salars (Khaksar leaders). *Al-Islah*, May 17, 1946, p. 03

^{clix} *Al-Islah* reported that slides were shown in the Poona cinema, inviting released army personnel to join the Khaksar Fauj (Army). They stated "The only way to independence of India is Hindu-Muslim unity. Read Khaksar Constitution." Slides also stated "If you wish to attain global rule, become pious and one." These slides were made in English, Urdu, and Marathi. (*Al-Islah*, October 25, 1946, Vol. 09, No. 42, p. 05).

In addition, flyers and pamphlets were distributed to induct released soldiers after the end of World War II.

^{clx} *Al-Islah*, August 16, 1946, p. 05

^{clxi} Prepared under the guidance of Mashriqi. *Al-Islah*, March 08, 1946, p. 06

^{clxii} *Al-Islah*, December 01, 1946

^{clxiii} *Al-Islah*, November 15, 1946

^{clxiv} Mashriqi made this proclamation on December 01, 1946 at 10 p.m. Printed by Punjab National Press (Lahore) under the auspices of Abdul Rehman Malik Printers & Publishers and released from Icchra (Lahore) (translation from Urdu)

^{clxv} Gandhi stated "You should not feel sorry at heart that India is to be divided into two." Gandhi's speech at a prayer meeting on June 4th 1947. *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*. Volume 95. Pp. 203-05

^{clxvi} The Muslim League meeting was a mere formality. Not much opposition or speeches were allowed and the Mountbatten Plan was accepted in a "hush-hush" manner. Jinnah did not allow attendees to resist the Plan.

^{clxvii} *The Canberra Times*, Australia, June 11, 1947

^{clxviii} Upon acceptance of partition by the All-India Muslim League, Indian National Congress and Gandhi in June 1947, Mashriqi found no reason to continue with *Al-Islah* and the Khaksar Movement. As such, Mashriqi with a very heavy heart announced the disbandment of both. *Al-Islah's* last issue came out on June 30-July 04, 1947. After the creation of Pakistan, *Al-Islah* (Lahore) was published in English. *Al-Islah* (Lahore) in Urdu is still periodically published by the Khaksar Tehrik (Icchra, Lahore, Pakistan).

^{clxix} The *Al-Islah* also helped to achieve Allama Mashriqi's mission of inculcating unity, strict discipline, tolerance, equality, self-less service, and most importantly, from the independence perspective, a strong spirit among millions to not rest until freedom was secured.

^{clxx} The British wanted to leave behind a weak region that would be dependent. Jinnah wanted to emerge as the Founder of Pakistan. The Congress and Gandhi were for the first time getting a major portion of India for their community as a separate country.

Suited Up in the Compositional Realm of Morrison, Walker, Wright, Ellison, and the ‘The Artist Formerly Known as Prince’: Identity, Belonging, and Acceptance in Hanif Kureishi’s The Black Album

By Dr. Lillie Anne Brown

In the introduction to his novel The Rainbow Sign (1986), Hanif Kureishi introduces himself to the reader as a “Londoner born to an English mother and Pakistani father” (9). Kureishi’s father, Rafiushan, he claims, “came to England from Bombay in 1947 to be educated by the old colonial power” (9). Kureishi maintains that his (own) childhood was filled with cousins, aunts, and uncles, whom he saw as “important, confident people” (9). His relatives frequently took him, in taxis, to hotels, restaurants, music houses, and other places of interest during his growing-up years in London. The taxi rides, he professes, were fun and exciting, and he greatly anticipated the trips outside his neighborhood. In The Rainbow Sign, he recounts childhood incidents where his Pakistani heritage became a dominant focal point in his life. Although Kureishi has claimed that the novel is fiction, the work can be construed as a semi-autobiographical narrative of Kureishi’s life.

Kureishi’s primary school years were full of unsettling experiences. He recounts how, when he was nine or ten years old, “a teacher purposefully placed some pictures of Indian peasants in mud huts in front of me and said to the class: ‘Hanif comes from India.’ I wondered: did my uncles ride on camels? Surely, not in their suits. Did my cousins, so like me in other ways, squat down in the sand like little Mowglis, half naked and eating with their fingers?” (9). “In the mid-1960s,” writes Kureishi, “Pakistanis were a risible subject in England, derided on television and exploited by politicians. They had the worse jobs, they were uncomfortable in England, and many of them had difficulties with the language. They were despised and out of place” (9). Although Kureishi’s father worked at the Pakistani embassy and earned a sizeable income, which in turn allowed the family to live comfortably, Kureishi suffered enormously during his primary school years.

Kureishi contends that because the representation of Pakistanis was so brazenly exploited in all forms of public visibility, he set in motion an ultimate denial of his Pakistani heritage from the beginning of his awareness of these very prominent images: “I was ashamed. It [his heritage] was a curse, and I wanted to

be rid of it. I wanted to be like everyone else. I read with understanding a story in a newspaper about a black boy who, when he noticed that burnt skin turned white, jumped into a bath of boiling water” (9). In his youthful naiveté, Kureishi pondered such an act in an effort to rid himself of what he perceived to be a vile image. He elected instead, however, to forego such extreme thinking and to seek less dramatic recourse. That such a horrific tale nestles itself into a child’s consciousness and rears its head years later in literary recollection speaks to the author’s unresolved childhood reflection of himself as well as his standing in society. It is this writer’s contention that Kureishi, still conflicted about the primitive depiction of his Pakistani heritage, endeavors to work through the boiling waters of his early days as he comes to terms with the difficulties of a childhood wrought with pain and suffering.

When Kureishi was in primary school, he recounts in The Rainbow Sign, one particular instructor, regardless of the lesson at hand, always spoke to him in an acerbic manner, articulating a “Peter Sellers” Indian accent. Another lecturer refused to identify him by his birth name, calling him, to the absolute delight of his young classmates who chuckled uncontrollably, “Pakistani Pete” instead. In retaliation of the teacher’s offensive names, Kureishi refused to call the instructor by *his* name, using the lecturer’s nickname instead. The daily play-on-names inevitably led to trouble for Kureishi. As a defense mechanism to alter—as well as avert—the daily occurrences, he constantly argued with instructors, escaped school by leaping over walls and manicured hedges, and enjoyed his new-found liberties away from the source of his pain and embarrassment. Eventually, however, his wayward behavior led to numerous detentions and suspension from school. Dismissal, according to Kureishi, “played into my hands, this couldn’t have been better” (9).

The word games engaged between Kureishi and his instructors proved to be an early introduction to the power of verbal discourse. They also became a way of antagonizing authority figures. Most of all, however, the dual exchanges became, according to the novelist, the genesis of his teacher-student relationship, teaching him how to converse intelligently about issues of significance with persons in positions of authority. He learned, he says, to gauge the strength and capacity that exists between the powerful and the powerless, and how to establish and maintain academic and scholarly relationships.

With a childhood friend, who later became the central figure in the film My Beautiful Laundrette (1986), Kureishi roamed the streets of London, becoming a reputable thief on the one hand and a lover of literature on the other. In the duality of these self-associations he immersed himself in films, hid in the woods and read what he terms “hard books.” It is perhaps this interesting and mixed academic, social, and cultural beginning—this diametrically opposed

behavior—that accounts for the eclectic text of The Black Album, Kureishi's 1995 novel which emerged six years after a fatwah, an open invitation to murder, is issued against fellow writer Salman Rushdie for his (Rushdie's) polemical text, The Satanic Verses (1988). Kureishi's rather brash and risqué narrative of life among British Muslims of Pakistani origin, functions, in this reader's eyes, under the banner of quasi-intellectualism, tempered radicalism, and an identity crisis bordering on his own sense of despair, feelings of insecurity, and issues of "belonging."

Kureishi presents a level of quasi-intellectualism in the novel by scripting a text of sundry characters that are similar to his earlier emotional longings, looking for love, acceptance, and identity in all the wrong places. There are, in this tale of crises, vestiges of Kureishi's early years on the streets and in the schools of London. In remembering his childhood restlessness and semi-ruthlessness, Kureishi makes an appeal for acceptance and a need to fit in as well as an imploration and resolution to the perennial question: Who am I? This self-interrogation of identity transports itself undeniably into the framework of the text, where the author weaves an inquiry into English, Pakistani, and Muslim cultures.

With the exception of Shahid Hassan, the novel's young Pakistani protagonist whose background contains, according to critic K. Anthony Appiah, "a modicum of Pakistani cultures, not Muslim piety" (The New York Times Book Review, 42), the misguided and misdirected figures in Kureishi's text can be described as destitute, desolate, and void of substance. Despite constant pop culture references throughout the novel regarding the substance and meaning of the compositions of (primarily American) musical artists of the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, there is scant emotional bearing evident within the central figures who act impulsively and oftentimes with an immediate and intense will to forge ahead despite the known and absolute consequences of their actions. Even though Kureishi's projection of his adolescent life upon his fictional constructs is a compelling and brave inclusion in the novel, critic Tom Shone comments that The Black Album "isn't a novel at all, it's a play with extended bits of scenery . . ." (Times Literary Supplement, 21). The "play," as Shone sees it, is replete with a cast of memorable figures who are, in their most significant roles, reduced to sociological stereotypes. "Old habits," asserts Stone, "die hard" (21).

Shone further argues that the characters' dialogue is constrained and their performances are confined to singular dimensions. The narrative structure, he maintains, is restricted:

The Black Album is set in 1989—something of an understatement, in fact, given its feverish attempts to date-stamp itself: the Fatwah, the homeless, portable phones, the collapse of the Eastern bloc, the

birth of the “rave” scene, all queue up obediently to receive their due. Kureishi doubtless thinks he is bringing the recent past to pollute life, but he succeeds merely in flattering it into a cardboard backdrop. “Rusted and burned-out cars” litter the streets, maybe left over from the set of his petulant anti-Thatcherite film, *Sammy and Rosie Get Laid*; while, all around, swarm people whose eyes burned with blame and resentment. (Shone 21).

Shone’s reference to the condition of the cars and the “people whose eyes burned with blame and resentment” alludes to Kureishi’s reference of the resentment shown him by his teachers during his years as a student in London’s schools. Kureishi and his “kind” were, in his (Kureishi’s) vision, to blame for much of society’s decay. While he may have been present and accounted for in the literal sense, he was still invisible in the eyes of many. Shone’s allusion is an apt metaphor for Kureishi’s view of himself in the presence of others.

Shahid Hassan, who struggles to create an identity for himself while torn between his own Asian heritage, is a Pakistani residing in Kilburn, a multi-cultural district in London. He attends an unpolished and unrefined two-year institution where the racial make-up is comprised primarily of black and Asian students. The bleak and uninviting landscape of the school does not offer an environment conducive to structured academics. It is through the character of Shahid, however, that the reader is introduced to the sights, sounds, and hip-hop happenings of London and to the primary reason for his presence in the city, which is to learn and “discuss . . . the meaning and purposes of the novel, for example, its place in society...” (*The Black Album* 28).

Shahid’s need to discuss the general purpose of a literary work is, perhaps, the defining theme of Kureishi’s own work. Shahid’s departure from his comfort zone—going in search of the novel’s “place in society”—presents him with the advantage of intellectual uplift:

. . . at home he still had a few school friends, but in the past three years had lost interest in most of them; some he had come to despise for their lack of hope. Almost all were unemployed. And their parents, usually patriotic people and proud of the Union Jack, knew nothing of their own culture. Few of them even had books in their house—not purchased, opened books, but gardening guides, atlases, *Reader’s Digests*. (35)

Early in *The Black Album* the reader is invited into the private quarters of Shahid and into the cultural mix of the tenants of the building where he lives. Kureishi

carefully sets the tone with which the central figures will perform, on cue, to his narrative drum roll: “The many rooms in the six-floor building were filled with Africans, Irish people, Pakistanis, and even a group of English students. The various tenants played music, smoked dope, and filled the dingy corridors with the smell of bargain aftershave” (9). Kureishi presents an intoxicating setting.

He offers, in addition, “a protagonist who sees absolutely no contradiction between reading, writing and raving, and demonstrates this synergy in the course of the novel by alternately snorting cocaine off and vomiting over his Penguin Classics, and then writing reams of jagged prose that expressed him, like a soul singer screaming into a microphone” (*Times Literary Supplement* 20). It is this early performance, the “vomiting over his Penguin Classics,” which foreshadows the novel’s representative act of literary censorship: the book burning of Salman Rushdie’s *The Satanic Verses*. It is also the performance that foreshadows references to Prince Rogers “Prince” Nelson, ‘The Artist Formerly Known as Prince.’

The introductory chapters of *The Black Album* set up the cast of fictional constructs to whom Shone refers. A lively and thoroughly vibrant group, the assemblage, in addition to Shahid, who curiously resembles Kureishi’s early reality as one who desperately seeks acceptance among his peers, includes Deedee Osgood, a much too hip college professor whose marriage to a stuttering pedagogue is empty and unfulfilled. It is important to note that Kureishi has crafted a minor figure in the novel whose articulation is not proficient and whose language skills are compressed in relationship to the professor’s. What the absence of articulation suggests is that Kureishi is engaging the literary word games he experienced with authority figures, and as he does so, reverts to his childhood issues of status and identity. Bart Moore-Gilbert argues that Kureishi elects to use the romantic genre *Bildungsroman* because it “presents identity as a developmental, unstable and shifting process” (*The Literary Encyclopedia* 148).

Deedee Osgood fosters her own moments of self-absorption: She enjoys the company of dark-skinned men, wraps herself in a blanket of security by sucking her thumb in private and believes that because she can readily identify pop musicians and reel off a litany of the works of best-selling African American authors without hesitation, she is a force to be reckoned with. Her sense of superiority to her darker-skinned students represents everything that Kureishi holds in contempt. Kureishi’s inclusion of Osgood represents the author’s ongoing conflict to exorcise the cultural and ethnic demons which still rest within his psyche. The teacher-student memories of Kureishi’s past haunt him, and it is the free-spirited Osgood who presents the image of that unforgiving past. As a kind of literary retribution for the negative academic experiences of his youth, he constructs Osgood in an unfavorable light.

The professor loosens her scholarly and personal inhibitions with her students, shelters Shahid, and allows him to embrace the full and unrestrained expansion of her flights of liberalism, teaching him—by example—to soar to heights beyond his cultural, sexual, political, and academic imagination. He is, at first introduction, an enthusiastic student of the professor’s ‘forward-thinking’ cultural studies program. In addition to her “freedom of instruction” (38) lectures, wherein she ventures from one topic to another on a moment’s notice, Shahid’s peers are also served grandiose portions of African American music from the pop culture icons of 1960: Sylvester “Sly” Stone, whose signature compositions, “I Want to Take You Higher” and “Everyday People” can very well serve as the professor’s personal anthems. Her repertoire also includes references to rock legend Jimi Hendrix and rock and roll recording artist “Lil’ Richard,” whose mascara-streaked face and processed hair predate ‘The Artist’s’ musical performances and stage attire by more than four decades. The colorfully outlandish performer George Clinton, “pilot” of the 1970s multi-member recording group “Mothership Connection,” also finds a place in Osgood’s daily lectures. While she intersperses references to popular icons in her talks, Shadid, according to Moore-Gilbert, “increasingly questions whether her syllabus does not itself provide a covert means of excluding minority students from the high, cultural canon” (148).

Even though the inclusion of various pop icons dominates her teachings, it is the music of ‘Prince,’ whose 1994 album The Black Album serves as the title of Kureishi’s novel, that advances her pseudo-scholarly interests in the classroom more prominently than other creative artists’ work. While two of the album’s musical compositions, “Strange Relationship” and “If I Was Your Girlfriend,” reflect the social performances of Kureishi’s central figures in the novel, the album’s genre comprises a blend of funk, soul, pop and funk rock. Osgood sees herself as a participant in the genre of her musical references, and her classroom lectures are necessary acts she feels compelled to bring to her students.

Deedee is, to Shahid, a performer perfectly cast in her own public role as an unbound, artsy professor. K. Anthony Appiah maintains that “. . . there is never any doubt that Hanif Kureishi is an enthusiast of the imagination” (42). Marchelle Har Kim argues that “Deedee . . . expands Shahid’s horizons in the classroom and in the bedroom, challenging him to live unbound like the rock/funk icon formerly known as ‘Prince’” (245). Although Deedee “always stimulated him [Shahid] to think” (145), there is not copious evidence of the “expansion” of Shahid’s intellect in terms of “traditional” classroom experiences as this expansion relates to Deedee’s academic and intellectual presentations. Beyond the streets and dance floors of the city, the steamy London bars, and Shahid’s and Deedee’s respective

flats where each retires after episodes of partying, there does not exist a serious or intellectual discourse between the two.

The professor's surname, "Osgood," is purposefully oxymoronic. She is *not good* in the academic tradition of what, historically, constitutes the intellectual performances of a college professor. She is the reality of what a young, idealistic college student might *wish* an instructor to be: professorially and intellectually "good" in terms of a knowledge-based discipline, but not "good" in a professional, academic sense. It is in the assignment of Osgood's last name that Kureishi conjoins an identity with his central figure. The name assignment replicates Kureishi's early London years of name-calling, invisibility, and vulnerability. Shahid is to Osgood as Kureishi was to his primary instructors.

In the classroom, lectures by Osgood are cursorily presented and glossed over. There are few inquisitions from students who sit stoically passive, and the professor offers no critical arguments and engages in little scholarly debate for their benefit. Commenting on the heavy doses of sexual banter and the escapades engaged between Shahid and Osgood, Appiah calls the mere chronicling of the adventures between student and professor "childlike" (42) and their inclusions in the novel unsubstantial and immature for, apparently, a writer of Kureishi's stature. Appiah further suggests that a more substantive inclusion of literary theory should substitute for the over-abundance of sexual scenes present in the novel. The engagements between professor and student are an inconsiderable reflection of Kureishi's banter with his former instructors.

Despite referencing poet Maya Angelou in the novel, there is scant evidence that Kureishi is knowledgeable of the writer's oeuvre to the extent that justifies mention of the writer's memoir I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings (1969) beyond its use as a calling card for the reader. While he occasionally cites Angelou, he relishes the establishment of a sound and just literary camaraderie with the African American writer. By including Angelou's name alongside other prominent writers (by way of the half-lectures offered by Osgood), "intellectual inclusion" emerges as Kureishi's singular objective. An unwavering need for acceptance by figures larger than himself harkens back to his days as a schoolboy when he was belittled, mocked, and shunned by those in authority. That he was interested in literature during his youth advances the notion of his choice of writers in this later work.

Michelle Har Kim contends that 'Prince,' the artist, "scores" (*The Nation*, 245) in Deedee's lectures "right up there with [Richard] Wright, [Ralph] Ellison, [Alice] Walker, and [Toni] Morrison" (245), four writers of African American literature. The absence of a scholarly engagement with any of the writers or discussion of a single one of their texts suggests that grouping writers' works—without theoretical arguments, thematic issues, writing styles or critical

analysis—is Kureishi’s foremost objective. Walker’s literary works are unnamed throughout The Black Album, and Morrison’s expansive oeuvre remains anonymous. While The Black Album addresses on a linear level the topic of Muslim faiths, the reference to Wright’s Pagan Spain (1957), without commentary regarding Wright’s intellectual journey to Spain during the regime of Francisco Franco, suggests that Kureishi’s aim is to offer a cursory intellectual claim without putting forth a critical argument for the inclusion.

Readers are left to ponder specific texts of Kureishi’s references, including Ellison’s signature literary work Invisible Man (1952) as well as his (Ellison’s) compilation of essays, Going to the Territory (1986). Morrison’s novel Song of Solomon (1977), and her collection of essays Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination (1992), which addresses the racial politics of American literature as it relates to the inclusive teaching and recognition of African American literature, might also be among Kureishi’s allusions. From what list of Walker’s, Ellison’s and Morrison’s texts is a reader to make a determination of reference? Kureishi does not provide the reader with the literary differentiations. Although each of Wright’s, Morrison’s and Walker’s literary compositions is thematically dissimilar, each work addresses issues of identity, belonging, and acceptance on a level with which Kureishi is familiar. His sense of kinship and an identity affiliation with the writers is grounded in their shared experiences of alienation, rejection, and cultural disenfranchisement, and he appeals for acceptance through writers he deems to be of his social and cultural history. Through the voice of Riaz, Kureishi labels authors as “yarn-spinners who have usually groveled for acceptance to the white elite so they can be considered ‘great’ authors. They like to pretend they are revealing the truth to the masses. . . .” (194). Kureishi’s literary posturing, as evident in Riaz’s comment, governs The Black Album.

In some ways Deedee Osgood is a figure akin to Roby Penrose, the university professor in David Lodge’s Nice Work (1988). While Penrose, a feminist, specializes in the industrial novel and women’s narrative voices, she is also liberal in her performances outside the classroom. Unlike Osgood, however, she takes her duties and responsibilities as a university lecturer more seriously. Osgood’s seminars are, in essence, informal “talks” presented under the guise of scholarship. Her talk on “America” is a condensed view of America’s racial intolerance during the 1950s and 60s, centering on a few significant events that occurred during the tumultuous days of segregation in the Deep South. She conveniently abbreviates her lectures to a few choice incidents surrounding a few well-known facts of the Jim Crow era:

. . . around the time of Presley, Negroes couldn’t even see a film in downtown Washington, their own state capital.

Miscegenation was illegal in half the country. Fifteen-year-old
Emmet Till was lynched in 1955 for whistling at a white woman.
[Her voice modulated with emotion as she spoke of King,
Cleaver, Davis, and the Freedom Riders.] (36)

To Shahid's credit, the history lesson, the "living, breathing history of struggle" (36) piques his interest, and he questions himself in the context of this new-found knowledge. "How," he asks, "had he lived so long without this knowledge? Where had they kept it? Who else were they concealing it from?" (36). Shahid's inquiries suggest that he endeavors to understand the social and political dimensions of the world in which he lives as well as the historical and cultural framework in which he has been deprived of knowledge.

For all of Kureishi's literary posturing, The Black Album's most prominent inclusion is Rushdie's The Satanic Verses (1988), although it remains tactfully unnamed, as does the author's identity, throughout the novel. Kureishi fails to inform the reader much more about Rushdie's Midnight's Children (1981), a tale centered around India's transition from British colonialism to independence, or The Satanic Verses. While one can argue that there is strength in the unnamed, the political intensity of Rushdie's novel might also be the driving force behind Kureishi's concealment of the title. It can also be argued that Rushdie's text, the centered voice of the book-burning scene in The Black Album, is the performance of literary defiance in the Kureishi text.

Riaz Al-Hassan, the self-appointed Muslim leader, seeks, as does Shahid, a solidarity with his peers, but his efforts to de-center the Rushdie text meets resistance from Shahid who believes in the importance of voice. K. Anthony Appiah asserts that Kureishi "handles the whole business of The Satanic Verses with a pantomime of tact: neither Mr. Rushdie nor the book is ever mentioned by name. Instead, as in mimicry of the procedures of censorship, every reference is by indication" (42). Riaz's exclamation that "the mind of the author is what informs us" (39) is countered by Shahid's contention that "free imagination, looking into itself, illuminates others" (194). It is an argument that Deedee Osgood might find dually challenging, in accordance with Shone who contends that the professor's "highest recommendation of a book is that it made her brain bounce" (20).

The professor's claim that 'The Artist' is "half everything" (129) is cause for her own self-examination and understanding of her own identity. I contend that Deedee Osgood does not know who she is, and is in search of herself. The lecturer's image of 'The Artist' reflects not only her own public image but her own private issues as well. If Osgood acknowledges her claim of 'The Artist's' representation, then she must also acknowledge that she, too, is "half everything"

(12), not only because she is the result of a union between a man and a woman, but also because she must recognize herself outside the realm of her own oneness. While she might be on a journey of self-discovery, her attraction to Shahid seems governed primarily by his exotic identity which, in a sense, represents, according to Moore-Gilbert “a subtle form of racism which aligns her liberal multiculturalist attitudes with, rather than against, the more obvious kinds of discrimination which the text anatomises” (148).

Marchelle Har Kim asserts that Deedee “and other postmodern types encouraged their students to study anything that took their interest from Madonna’s hair to a history of the leather jacket. Was it really learning or only a diversion dressed up in the latest words”? (The Nation 245). As Shahid questions the politics of his own beliefs as well as the ideas represented by the constricted vision of Riaz and his following, he increasingly confronts his own consciousness as he seeks answers about who he really is: “These days everyone was insisting on their identity, coming out as a man, woman, gay, black, Jew—brandishing which features they could claim, as if without a tag they wouldn’t be human” (102). As for Shahid:

One day he could passionately feel one thing, the next day the opposite. Other times provisional tales would alternate from hour to hour, sometimes all crashed into chaos. He would wake up with this feeling: Who would he turn out to be on this day? How many warring selves were there within him? Which was his real self? Was there such a thing? How would he know when he saw it? Would it have a guarantee attached to it? (157)

The tone of The Black Album combines sorrow, disorder, and sarcastic wit—mirrored images of the inner struggles of lost souls living on the fringes of their own fears and insecurities. While Kureishi’s commentary of London’s youthful current reveals that he remains connected to the plight of the masses and is indeed cognizant of mainstream city culture, the work also speaks to urban plights that plague many cities. The novel (as does “The Artist’s” musical composition) records scenes of social decay and souls gone astray as well as it dually reflects the author as an enthusiast of literature and the imagination. Janet St. John affirms that although Kureishi writes with “sensitivity” (Booklist, 40) and is a “valid commentator of our time . . . the novel’s tone speaks of a real lack of identity of who and what to believe in” (4). As Shahid contemplates defection from the rigid doctrine of beliefs of the Riaz-ites, the followers of Riaz’s principles, the contemplation may serve as an indicator that he may not be so

inclined to dismiss the idea of what identity really means and what it means to “belong.”

Kureishi does, however, challenge Shahid to extend his imagination beyond his horizons, “to imagine and investigate in spite of barriers . . . away from the authorities toward the margins, where you see things that are usually lost on minds that have never traveled beyond the conventional and the comfortable” (234). In truth, there is a specter of discomfort and insecurity. Although Kureishi permits a semblance of fundamentalist and racial theories to filter through the characters of Shahid, Riaz, and Deedee Osgood, discussions of race and religion are abbreviated in the novel. Marchelle Har Kim declares that discussions are “. . . elusively uncritical, and superficial interrogations of Muslim fundamentalism” (245).

It is evident in The Black Album that Kureishi, the novelist, and Shahid, his alter-ego, are enthusiasts of—and enthusiastic about—literature, advocates of the printed word, and fervent believers of the unbridled imaginations that give depth, structure, and meaning to life. The book-burning scene at the end of the novel, an act of censorship, temporarily shifts the focus of Shadid’s beliefs, forcing him to re-evaluate the significance of the book’s purpose as well as presenting him with an opportunity to recognize a voice not his own. Although the protagonist, still, at the end of the novel, appears to be lost and in search of himself, his partial reconstruction allows him to begin to see beyond himself as he seeks to explore past the boundaries, conventions, and judgments of the larger culture. Even though jagged reflections of his life may sometime appear in lieu of the whole, the core of who he is, where he belongs, and what constitutes acceptance, the center remains a less distrustful reality as he moves toward direction and control of where his beliefs lie within the framework and consciousness of his own being.

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India-Pakistan: Failed in the Field and Across the Table

By Amit Ranjan

Whenever India and Pakistan engage into bilateral dialogue, questions are raised as to how long they will continue discussions or if they can resolve any their myriad of conflicts. The two countries could resolve their dispute through dialogue but lack the political will to do so. The Indus Water Treaty of 1960 and the 1988 agreement to exchange nuclear data every year are among the positive developments, but lack of trust continues to compromise progress.

T.V. Paul conceptualizes the relationship between India and Pakistan as an “enduring rivalry.” Rivalries are conflicts between two or more states that last more than two decades with several militarized inter-state disputes punctuating the relationship in between and are characterized by a “persistent, fundamental and long term incompatibility of goals between two states” which “manifests itself in the basic attitudes of the parties toward each other as well as in recurring violent clashes over a long period of time.”¹ The root cause of India-Pakistan’s rivalry is the territorial claim and counter-claim over the states of Jammu and Kashmir. To be precise, the problem is not over Hindu dominated-Jammu because its demography gives it a rightful status to be part of India. The source of tension is the conflict over the Kashmir valley. As long as this problem persists, their relationship will not improve. Both countries have tried to achieve a solution through various means such as wars, multilateral dialogues, mediation, and bilateral negotiations but failed to achieve anything concrete. The aim of this paper is to focus upon the mistakes committed by India and Pakistan while negotiating Kashmir issue. It will take into account the bilateral dialogues only and not the United Nations (UN) led multilateral dialogues. It will also highlight the reasons for failure of bilateral talks. In this paper the word Kashmir represents

1 Paul, T.V. (Ed.). (2006). *The India Pakistan conflict: an enduring rivalry*. New Delhi: Foundation Books. Citing Zeev Maoz and Ben Mor, T.V. Paul, defines “enduring rivalry” as (i) an outstanding set of unresolved issues (ii) strategic interdependence between the parties (iii) psychological manifestations of enmity and (iv) repeated military conflicts. All these four characteristics are present in Indo-Pakistan conflicts therefore it fits to the concept of “enduring conflicts.” Both India and Pakistan are not ready to get out of this conflict.

the Kashmir valley.

Status of Kashmir

Mother of all conflicts, or what my PhD supervisor Prof. Uma Singh calls the “core” issue² between India and Pakistan: Kashmir. Administratively, Jammu and Kashmir are split into three parts, and at present are under the administrative control of India, Pakistan, and China.³ Due to prolonged conflict between India and Pakistan over the status of Jammu and Kashmir since 1947, various other minor disputes have erupted and remained unresolved, such as the demilitarization of Sichuan and the demarcation of the Sir Creek estuary. The Kashmir issue prohibits India and Pakistan from reaching consensus on what would normally be routine matters. The two countries in past have settled a few issues through mediation and arbitration process, such as the sharing of trans-border river water from the Indus River System in 1960 and the demarcation of the border between them in Rann of Kutch. Rann of Kutch remains stable, but in 1960 emerging voices in both countries scraped the successful treaty on IWT.

In order to resolve the Kashmir issue the two countries have even engaged in three total wars (in 1947, 1965, and 1971), one limited war (in 1999), and number of war-like situations (in 1987, 1999, and 2002), and mediation by the United Nations and bilateral dialogues failed to change the status. There were moments in 1954, 1963, 1972, and 2007 when it is believed that both countries could have resolved the conflict. But due to deliberate or inadvertent reasons those opportunities were missed. At present the stalemate over Kashmir between India and Pakistan is same as it was in 1948, with no sign, at least in near future, of any improvement.

Genesis of Kashmir conflict

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- 2 Singh, U. (2001). Kashmir: the ‘core issue’ between India and Pakistan. In Sahadevan ,P. (Ed.), *Conflicts and peacemaking in South Asia* (pp. 214). New Delhi: Lancers Book.
 - 3 There is a great deal of controversy over the border demarcation or land transfer agreement between China and Pakistan in 1963. In his autobiography *Friends Not Masters* Ayub Khan writes that it was the Chinese who transferred landmass to Pakistan rather than the opposite. For India it was an attack on its sovereignty because India considers the entire Jammu and Kashmir its own territory and the area under Pakistan occupied territory. Due to that demarcation agreement China found a foothold in Kashmir. Due to its rising assertive power, in future it may demand to be a party to any sort of territorial resolution formula of Kashmir issue.

Conceptually, conflict is actual or perceived opposition of interests, understandings, and values. It explains various aspects of social life such as social disagreement, conflicts of interests, and fights between individuals, groups and organizations.⁴ It exists when incompatible goals develop between persons, groups, or nations.⁵ India and Pakistan have different interests, understandings, and values as far as Jammu and Kashmir are concerned. For India, secularism is the guiding principle and it wants Jammu and Kashmir to maintain its secular credentials; while for Pakistan, which was formed in the name of religion, Kashmir is important to complete the promises made to it at the time of partition of India. Due to this incompatible goal the conflict persists and no party wants to compromise. Hence, the Kashmir dispute is an ideological, rather than a territorial,⁶ dispute. Strategically, both countries have their own reasons to claim this territory. Pakistan's insistence on Kashmir was asserted by General Ayub Khan as "our (Pakistan's) communication, our rivers and even the cease-fire line in Kashmir one and all are sufficient factors to indicate that our neck is in grip of others..."⁷ For India, having Kashmir means having difficult terrain under its possession, which could deter the foreign enemies from launching conventional attacks.

To resolve the Kashmir issue India and Pakistan started with a war in 1947, afterwards they engaged into two total wars (in 1965 and 1971), one limited war (in 1999), and a few war-like situations (in 1987,1989,2002 etc). The reasons for all these wars and tensions are same those for the first one in 1947⁸: the existence of competing ideological forces on the subcontinent, irredentism on the part of the Pakistani leadership and anti-irredentism maintained by India, the strategic location of Kashmir, and, finally the lack of sufficient institutional arrangements by the British to ensure an orderly transfer of power. All these reasons are still intact, except for the last one. After coming into existence as two sovereign states the onus was on India and Pakistan to look out for institutional arrangements to resolve the Kashmir issue, but they failed.

4 Druckman, D. & Diehl, P.F. (Eds.), (2006). *Conflict resolution (vol. I)*. New Delhi: Sage Publications.

5 Deutsch and Coleman (Eds.). (2000) *The Had Book of conflict resolution: theory and practice*. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.

6 Bilkenberg, L. (1998). *India-Pakistan: The history of unsolved conflicts (vol. II): Analyses of some structural factors*. Campusvej: Odnense University Press.

7 As quoted from the *Dawn* by Razvi, Mujtaba (1971). *Frontiers of Pakistan*. Karachi: National Publishing House.

8 Ganguly, S. (1986). *The origins of war in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani conflicts since 1947*. London: Westview Press.

Historically, in 1846 under the Treaty of Amritsar the British sold the beautiful valley of Kashmir to the Hindu Dogra ruler, Gulab Singh. As Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, he was able to include Kashmir as the “jewel” among his other territorial possessions, which included Jammu, Ladakh, Baltistan, and numerous hill states, and through this treaty people of different linguistic and cultural traditions were all brought under the jurisdictions of one ruler. Dogra rulers had also set up British residency in Jammu and Kashmir and, like all other princely states, had been supportive to the colonial rule.⁹

At the time of partition of India in 1947, when the Princely states were forcibly told by Lord Mountbatten that they had only two options: either to join India or Pakistan, Maharaja Hari Singh, grandson of Gulab Singh, could not decide about which side he should join.¹⁰ He was a Hindu ruler with the majority of his subjects professing Islam. Unlike other places, this state was not affected by the partition’s communal killings. The prime aim of the Muslim population from the valley, a long-sought goal, was to get rid of the authoritarian rule of Maharaja Hari Singh. Under leadership of Sheikh Abdullah, Kashmiris were fighting for that cause. Sheikh was in favor of remaining with India. Due to Hari Singh’s political stubbornness Kashmir remained “independent” for two months. In October 1947, backed by certain officers of Pakistan army like then Col Akbar Khan, tribesmen from Pakistan’s North-West Frontier invaded the state.¹¹ Maharaja Hari Singh finally agreed to join India. His decision was contested by Pakistan on the basis of the state’s majority Muslim population. The newly formed United Nations declared a ceasefire after Pandit Nehru launched a formal complaint against Pakistan. As a result of that war, one-third of the former princely state is administered by Pakistan, known as “Azad” Jammu and Kashmir¹² and the Northern Areas (now Gilgit-Baltistan), while two-thirds, known as the state of Jammu and Kashmir is administered by India (this includes the regions of Ladakh, Jammu and the Kashmir valley).¹³ The ceasefire line has remained the *defacto* border and was renamed Line of Control (LoC) in 1972. India’s complaint against Pakistan’s “aggression” in the United Nations Security

9 Schofield, V. (2010). *Kashmir in conflict: India, Pakistan and the unending war* (1st South Asian ed.). London and New York: I.B. Tauris.

10 *ibid*

11 Nawaz, S. (April-June 2008). The first Kashmir war revisited. *India Review*, 7(2), 115-154.

12 This one-third also includes the area under the possession of China due to border transfer agreement of 1963 between China and Pakistan.

13 Schofield, V. (2010). *Kashmir in conflict: India, Pakistan and the unending war* (1st South Asian ed.). London and New York: I. B. Tauris.

Council turned a dispute between two countries into an issue that demanded international attention.¹⁴ The UN and its appointed mediators have come out with various recommendations and have fully supported the idea of plebiscite, so that the people themselves could decide their future. But that plebiscite was never held because firstly, as a prerequisite, Pakistan was required to withdraw its forces from the territory that they had occupied. Secondly, it was clear that the Indian government only agreed to hold plebiscite at a time when it was confident that the majority would confirm union with India. In the event, Pakistan's reluctance to vacate the territory it had occupied gave India a chance to renege on its commitment to hold a plebiscite; the *de facto* division of the state that India and Pakistan had achieved militarily was therefore neither reversed nor confirmed.¹⁵

As the problem of Kashmir was not resolved in initial years the two countries faced each other in war to resolve the issue. In all three wars Pakistan was humiliated because of the superior conventional military power of India. But despite these defeats, Pakistan has never given up and follows Boulding's logic that "when there is a power asymmetry in relationship, conflict may escalate as the disempowered party seeks to redress grievances against the more powerful party."¹⁶ Despite being a weak power in comparison to India, Pakistan has engaged India in various battles. After 1990 Pakistan adopted a covert war policy and started supporting insurgents and militants in order to bleed India. This situation has led to escalation of violence in the valley and also escalation of tensions between the two countries.

Bilateral Negotiations

As Hans J. Morgenthau has pointed out, "nations in resolving their differences...have always had a choice among three alternatives: diplomacy, war, and renunciation... [but] modern technology...has destroyed this rational equality...There is no longer safety in renunciation or victory in war...Only we are left with diplomatic negotiation."¹⁷ Following this logic, since the 1950s India and Pakistan have tried to use diplomatic channels to resolve Kashmir issue between them.

From 1947 to 1971 the United Nations appointed mediators tried to find a mutually accepted formula to settle the Kashmir issue but this global institution failed in its attempt. The ongoing Cold War, which ended with the disintegration

14 *ibid*

15 *ibid*

16 Boulding, K. (1990). *Three faces of power*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

17 Morgenthau, H. (1948). *Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace*. New York: Alfred. A. Knopf.

of the former USSR, was one of the major reasons that the UN failed in its effort to resolve this issue. Pakistan joined the US-sponsored regional security arrangements in 1954-55 to obtain military equipment and weapons to strengthen its security, primarily from India. India moved towards the former USSR. In 1955 the former Soviet leadership accepted the India's position on Kashmir. It used two vetoes in the UN Security Council, in 1957 and 1962, to stall the draft resolutions on Kashmir.¹⁸ Besides the multilateral approach the two countries also interacted bilaterally during that period. But after the 1971 Bangladesh war the two countries formally agreed at Simla that instead of using the office of the United Nations they would engage bilaterally in order to resolve Kashmir issue.¹⁹ Since that time, and also before 1971, their bilateral engagement has yielded not even incremental results.

For the first time in 1953, the two nations sought to resolve the dispute on a bilateral basis. Hopes for quick settlement were raised with the election of Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra in 1953, as it was believed that he might adopt a more tractable position on the Kashmir issue. Shortly after his election he met Pandit Nehru in London at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference. After this interaction, they met in New Delhi. The second meeting produced a joint communiqué that affirmed the desire of both parties to settle the dispute without resort to force, to hold a plebiscite to ascertain the "wishes of the people," and to appoint a plebiscite administrator. Informally, the negotiators also agreed that the plebiscite administrator should be someone from a small Asian nation rather than Admiral Chester Nimitz of the United States. Talk continued till 1955 with a brief halt but it finally stopped when then-Governor General Ghulam Mohammad fell ill and was replaced by Iskander Mirza.²⁰ Unlike Ghulam Mohammad, Iskander Mirza was not ready to make any compromise on Kashmir issue. He was backed by the religious fundamentalists and also by the Pakistani army. He was responsible for introduction of military rule in Pakistan. Thus, the Pakistani hawks halted the prospects of achieving a solution on Kashmir in 1954.²¹

18 Askri-Rizvi, H. (2007). Kashmir: Islamabad's new approach to Kashmir. In W.P.S. Sidhu, et al (Ed.), *Kashmir new voices new approaches* (pp. 137-153). New Delhi: Viva Books.

19 Schofield, V. (2010). *Kashmir in conflict: India, Pakistan and the unending war (1st South Asian ed.)*. London and New York: I.B. Turis.

20 Ganguly, S. (1986). *The origins of war in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani conflicts since 1947*. London: Westview Press.

21 Jalalzai, M. K. (2000). *The foreign policy of Pakistan: An overview (1947-2000)*. Lahore: Khan Book Company.

Though the talks came at halt with appointment of hardliner Iskander Mirza as President of Pakistan, the good gestures made during this period bore results. The two countries had softened their stances on Kashmir, realizing that they had to settle down with their areas and not desire occupation of each other's parts of Kashmir. Addressing a public meeting in New Delhi on April 13, 1956, Pandit Nehru said "I am willing to accept that the question of the part of Kashmir which is under you (Pakistan) should be settled by demarcating the border on the basis of present ceasefire line. We have no desire to take it by fighting."²² Also, as a result of that talk the two countries mutually agreed to discuss the issue of trans-boundary water sharing from Indus River System (IRS). The talk started in 1952 and after eight years of rigorous talk, mediated by the World Bank representative, Pandit Nehru and General Ayub Khan at Karachi finally signed a treaty in 1960. The two countries are still honoring this treaty, with some difficulties.

In the second half of 1950s Pandit Nehru was busy giving a shape to the Non-Aligned Movement and dealing with China, so he paid scant attention towards exploring new chances to engage Pakistan over Kashmir. The 1962 Sino-India war and defeat of India had changed whole equation in south Asia. The south Asian countries found a new supporter in form of China. Also, India lost the aura of a powerful and a regional hegemon. After its defeat in 1962 war with China, India turned towards United States and the United Kingdom for its military build up so that it could face challenges in future. In return for arms assistance the United States and United Kingdom wanted India to reach an agreement with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue on terms extremely favorable to Pakistan. This expectation was conveyed to the Indian government during the Harriman-Sandys' mission, which visited India in December, 1962. The two men who led the joint mission were Averell Harriman, a former US ambassador to the former USSR, and Duncan Sandys, a member of the British House of Commons. Though under considerable pressure, Nehru stood his ground and refused to give in to the demands of the mission.²³

In 1963, once again, Pandit Nehru took an initiative to resolve the Kashmir issue. His decision was surely influenced by the Harriman-Sandys mission goal. He wanted the Kashmir solution on his terms and conditions rather than to be under dictate from the US or UK. Hence he made a last effort that was duly supported by General Ayub Khan. The two countries held five rounds of

22 Jammu and Kashmir Dispute (A paper produced by the CPI (M) New Delhi p-21) as quoted in Razvi, M. (1971). *The frontiers of Pakistan*. Karachi: National Publishing House.

23 Ganguly, S. (1986). *The origins of war in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani conflicts since 1947*. London: Westview Press.

bilateral dialogue between them, primarily to address the Kashmir issue. The talks were held in India and Pakistan. Sardar Swarn Singh represented India while Z. A. Bhutto represented Pakistan. The first round was held at Rawalpindi on December 27, 1962. These discussions were more realistic than some of the earlier ventures in direct Indo-Pakistani negotiations over the future of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Pakistani side considered solutions other than plebiscite seriously. India is said at one point to have offered to cede to Pakistan all of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which Pakistan held at the time, along with some small tracts of additional territory in Kashmir Province and Poonch so as to straighten out the border, marking first time India had proposed to transfer to Pakistan *any* land which Pakistan actually held in the disputed State. Pakistan, however, refused (probably as a bargaining position; what Pakistan really wanted was the bulk of the Vale of Kashmir plus Indian acceptance of both Azad Kashmir and Pakistan control over the Northern Areas) to accept any partition scheme which did not give it the entire Chenab valley in Jammu (cutting the Pathankot-Srinagar road), although Pakistan was prepared to give India temporary transit rights through Jammu so as to be able to continue contesting Ladakh with the Chinese. India had no difficulty in rejecting this suggestion, seeing it as a merely temporary answer to its view of the problem of the Northern Frontier.²⁴ Unfortunately, the six rounds of talks proved to be a vain exercise and both sides blamed the other for not reaching a solution. In 1964 during his last days Pandit Nehru sent Sheikh Abdullah to Pakistan to have a dialogue with the Pakistani leadership and look out for a breakthrough but unfortunately his visit was cut short due to death of Pandit Nehru in May 1964.

After the death of Pandit Nehru, Lal Bahadur Shastri became prime minister of India. In 1965 the two countries engaged in a second war. The war ended with defeat of Pakistan and signing of truce agreement at Tashkent. The government of former USSR took up this initiative. There they re-affirmed their obligation under the UN charter not to resort to force and to instead settle their disputes through peaceful means. Both sides also agreed that all armed personnel of the two countries would be withdrawn by no later than February 25th, 1966, and both sides would observe the cease-fire terms on the cease-fire line.²⁵

After maintaining silence on border for five years, in 1971 the two countries engaged once again in war, the last major conventional war between them, over the question of Bangladesh (then East Pakistan). After, the two countries signed Simla Agreement on July 2nd 1972, in which they agreed to

24 Lamb, A. (1993). *Kashmir: A disputed legacy 1846-1990*. Karachi: OUP.

25 Tashkent Declaration, January 10, 1966.

settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them. Pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side would unilaterally alter the situation nor would both prevent the organization, assistance, or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations.²⁶

After the war India could have bargained and settled the Kashmir issue on its own terms but failed to do so because of certain backdoor and open diplomacy. Prior to Simla, Sajjad Zaheer and Mazhar Ali Khan, editor of *Dawn*, who had worked together in pre-partition days as fellow activists of the All India Student Federation, encouraged by their fellow-traveler P.N. Haskar met in London in the third week of March 1972 to discuss the terms of possible agreement between their two national leaders. Khan told his Indian comrade that humiliation of Bhutto at Simla would encourage the military and Islamic forces. They discussed everything and prepared a tentative proposal of the agreement to be signed at Simla. Also he was requested to not mention Kashmir issue at all in the declaration as this would open a Pandora's box. Khan reported on these talks directly to Bhutto, while Zaheer conveyed them via P. N. Haskar to Mrs. Gandhi.²⁷

At Simla the two sides agreed that both sides should respect the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971 without prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side would seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Also both sides further undertook to refrain from the threat of the use of force in violation of this line.²⁸ Here, for the first time, the two countries also decided that they would resolve the issue bilaterally. But President Bhutto did not keep this promise. Soon after his return from Simla, addressing the Pakistan National Assembly, he argued that if bilateral negotiations failed, Pakistan could approach the UN for settlement of the Kashmir issue.²⁹ Afterwards, Pakistan once again started raising this issue at various multilateral forums like Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), the UN, etc.

Positively, after the historic Simla pact, Z.A. Bhutto initiated a number of other agreements regarding trade, shipping, cultural exchange, and travel. And

26 Simla Agreement, July 2, 1972.

27 Guha, R. (2007). *India After Gandhi: The history of the world's largest democracy*. London: Picador.

28 Simla Agreement, July 2, 1972.

29 Rizvi, H. A. (1993). *Pakistan and geostrategic environment: A study of foreign policy*. London: MacMillan Press.

people-to-people level interaction began. But these things had short life spans and in 1978, during General Zia's time, when trade delegation from India arrived in Islamabad to review the trade agreement signed in 1975, the Government of Pakistan declined to renew this treaty. The Pakistan Government restricted all trade with India at the government levels and declined to open land routes (other than Wagha) as stipulated in the visa and travel agreement of 1974.³⁰

From 1972 to 1989 the Kashmir issue remained in background of various other developments, and there was no serious use of "K" word by the leadership of India and Pakistan. That does not mean that from 1972 to 1989 the two countries were having detente period. They engaged in different forms of war and looked out for application of various strategic techniques to check the other. The developments in these years still impact the current India-Pakistan relationship.

In 1974 India conducted "Peaceful Nuclear Explosion" (PNE) which changed the military equation in the subcontinent and Pakistan also started looking out for its own bomb to deter India. In 1984, amidst Pakistan's objection and allegations for violating the Simla, India captured strategic locations on the Siachen glacier. India claimed that the area beyond NJ9842 was non-demarcated and unmarked,³¹ so it had not violated the Simla agreement, which was for maintaining status quo in terms of the borderline. In reaction, Pakistan too captured few heights from its side and thus the difficult terrain of Siachen glacier was militarized. Since 1986 they have concluded many rounds of bilateral dialogue to de-militarize this glacier but nothing concrete has come up.

In early 1980s, the Sikh militancy in India was at its pinnacle, demanding a separate state called Khalistan. As a result, Mrs. Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards. India found that this militancy received support from Pakistan. The militancy was seen as a "final push" by Pakistan to detach both Kashmir and Punjab from India.³² In order to teach a lesson to Pakistan the Indian military carried out a war exercise in 1987, with codename Brasstack, at border with Pakistan in Rajasthan. Pakistan responded with its own exercise and an army formation named *Saf-e-Shikan* near the Punjab border.³³ The situation became

30 Jalalzai, M. K. (2000). *The foreign policy of Pakistan: An overview (1947-2000)*. Lahore: Khan Book Company.

31 Sahni, V. (2001). Technology and conflict resolution In Sahdevan, P. (Ed.), *Conflicts and peacemaking in South Asia*. (pp. 238-271). New Delhi: Lancers Book.

32 Bajpai, K. P. et al. (Ed.). (1995). *Brasstacks and beyond: Perception and management of crisis in South Asia*. Urbana-Champaign: Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security, University of Illinois.

33 Hagerty, D. T. (1998). *The consequences of nuclear proliferation: Lessons*

tense—war seemed certain—but things changed after diplomatic moves and interference by the USA and the former USSR. Later on, to ease tension, Prime Minister Juneja spoke with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on telephone. Then, on February 19th General Zia traveled to India to watch the India-Pakistan cricket match at Jaipur. He used that occasion to meet Rajiv Gandhi and signaled his country's peaceful intentions.³⁴ The crisis finally ended. A few months after the operation Brasstacks, an interview of A.Q. Khan by Kuldip Nayyar was published in *Observer*, where it was revealed that Pakistan had an untested nuclear bomb.³⁵ The news made New Delhi cautious of a major conventional weapon engagement with Pakistan. In 1989 Pakistan carried out its own Brasstacks-like war exercise named Zaib-e-Mobin, but unlike the former it did not lead to major military movement or tensions between the two countries.

In 1988, amidst all hysteria, two next-generation heads of state—Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto—from the two political families, carrying political legacy, met at Islamabad. They signed the nuclear non-attack agreement that Rajiv Gandhi and General Zia had verbally concluded three years earlier.³⁶ Various other CBMs were discussed upon but by and large the Kashmir issue was kept away from the discussion table.

One of the major turning points in the entire history of Jammu and Kashmir was the eruption of terrorism in the Kashmir Valley. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), led by Amanullah Khan and founded amongst the Mirpuris in Birmingham (UK),³⁷ was the first militant group to become active in the valley. JKLF was for merger of two sides of Jammu and Kashmir together to set up an independent country as a buffer between India and Pakistan. After the JKLF many Pakistani-sponsored groups were introduced to the valley to instigate rebellion and fight a proxy war against the Indian state in the valley. The recruits of these groups were mainly the Talibs, who had nowhere to go after being dumped by their masters after the end of Afghanistan war in 1989. Some of them operated with the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen while others joined al-Badr and al-Omar.

from South Asia. London, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

34 *ibid*

35 Ganguly, S. (2002). *Conflicts unending: Indian-Pakistan tensions since 1947*. New Delhi: OUP.

36 Hagerty, D. T. (1998). *The consequences of nuclear proliferation: Lessons from South Asia*. London and Massachusetts: MIT Press.

37 Samad, Y. (2007). Pakistan from minority rights to majoritarianism. In Gyanendra Pandey & Y. Samad (Eds.). *Faultlines of nationhood* (pp. 118). New Delhi: Roli Books.

The most powerful of the groups that emerged in 1993, following the consolidation of a number of smaller groups, was Harkat-ul-Ansar. Unlike many indigenous insurgent groups, members of these organizations lacked any blood-soil relationship with Kashmir, so they were far more prone to engage in rape and violence.³⁸ The Pakistani Army and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) took advantage of the Afghan war veterans' enthusiasm for Islamic causes and facilitated their involvement in Kashmir by providing weapons and briefings for military activities in Indian side of Kashmir.³⁹ Once the violence took its root in the valley the Indian government turned the valley into a virtual cantonment, in order to flush out these militants. And since then the proxy war between Indian security forces and militants has been going on.

Although the foreign fighters started the process later many locals joined the terror groups in large numbers. The youths who joined these groups were mainly unemployed and alienated due to policies of state and union government. The killings of innocents became common thing due to imposition of Armed forces Special Powers Act. With the valley turning into a cantonment the people lost the democratic rights previously enshrined in the Indian constitution. They wanted to take revenge for the injustice done to them by state agencies and so opted for the violent path. Most of the recruits of the pro-Pakistani groups were the political leaders and workers of the Muslim United Front (MUF) who were deceitfully defeated in 1987's rigged assembly elections by the National Conference candidates. One of the MUF candidates was Syed Salauddin and Yasin Mallick was his polling agent.⁴⁰ Both are now heading a pro-Pakistani group.

As the valley came into the grip of terrorists the blame game between the two countries began. Replying to India's blame for being responsible for these disturbances, Islamabad responded that it provided only diplomatic and moral support to "freedom fighters."⁴¹ In 1990 the two countries were on the verge of war over the issue of terrorism. The statements of leaders and army chiefs as well as the news analysis of journalists confirmed that both have had a usable nuclear

38 Jalalzai, M. K. (2000). *The foreign policy of Pakistan: An overview (1947-2000)*. Lahore: Khan Book Company.

39 Askri-Rizvi, H. (2007). Kashmir: Islamabad's new approach to Kashmir. In W.P.S Sidhu et al (Eds.), *Kashmir new voices new approaches* (pp. 137-153). New Delhi: Viva Books.

40 Bose, S. (2003). *Kashmir: The roots of conflict*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

41 Hagerty, D. T. (1998). *The Consequences of nuclear proliferation: Lessons from South Asia*. London, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

bomb in their possession. Timely interference by the USA changed the situation and pacified both parties.⁴² In 1998 both tested their nuclear weapons and overtly declared themselves nuclear countries, which has given a nuclear angle to conflicts between the two countries. Now it became clear that the two could not afford to repeat the mistakes of going to war over each and every petty issue but must engage in dialogue once again. In 1999, through diplomacy, India's centre-of-right government under Atal Behari Vajpayee engaged Pakistan. He himself journeyed to Lahore where he met his Pakistani counterpart Mian Nawaz Sharief and signed the Lahore Declaration on February 21st, 1999.

The Lahore Declaration reaffirmed India and Pakistan's commitment to find a peaceful resolution to the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. Each side pledged to "take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict."⁴³

But the ink of the declaration was barely dry when the Kargil misadventure took place. Pakistani-army backed terrorist groups wanted to repeat the actions of 1947 in order to capture the state through force. Unlike Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief, Army Chief General Pervez Musharaff wanted to gain superiority in any decision making process and so he took the initiative to put a full stop on the peace process started with Lahore bus diplomacy. During the Kargil war there was a fear generated and expressed by global media that the nuclear weapon could be used.⁴⁴ But fortunately it did not happen. Pakistan's nuclear weapons deterred the Indian government from escalating the fighting either across the LoC in the Pakistani side of Kashmir or across the international border of Pakistan.⁴⁵ This was the first time that this had happened since the defacto border was drawn between the two countries. The nuclear optimists, who believe that nuclear weapons act as a deterrent, celebrated this situation. Nuclear weapons were also a factor in stopping India from launching a war against Pakistan in 2002, after the attack on Indian Parliament by Pakistani-trained terrorists.⁴⁶

42 *ibid*

43 Lahore Declaration, 1999

44 Levy, A., & Scott-Clarke, C. (2007). *Deception Pakistan, the United States and the global nuclear weapons conspiracy*. PA: Atlantic Books.

45 Hagerty, D. (2010). The Kargil War: An optimistic assessment. In S. Ganguly & Paul S. Kapur, Eds.), *India, Pakistan and the bomb: Debating nuclear stability in South Asia* (pp. 100-116). California: Columbia University Press.

46 Swami, P. (2010). A war to end a war: The causes and consequences of the

After two assassination attempts executed by the jihadist groups, General Musharaff understood the gravity of situation. His tone became conciliatory towards India and he hinted that he was willing to drop Pakistan's long-standing demand that a plebiscite be held in Kashmir under the 1948 UN resolution to determine its status as long as India was equally forthcoming.⁴⁷ His views were accepted and he was invited for a bilateral talk in India. His move at Agra was closely watched by both hardliners and peaceniks, often with contrary agendas. The Jamat-i-Islami and Islamic militant groups had warned him not to deviate from a single point of the Kashmir agenda.⁴⁸ Even India was under pressure to have dialogue with Pakistan on Kashmir issue. The leaders from two countries met at the historic "city of love" Agra but at that time too nothing was gained. As usual both sides blamed each other and the issue of Jammu and Kashmir remained undecided. The Hindu right wing dominated cabinet failed its liberal face, then PM Atal Behari Vajpayee, to take the dialogue to a conclusive end.

Post September 9th 2001, the US-led NATO attack on Afghanistan changed the politics of sub-continent. In order to gain success in its mission the US wanted cordial relationship between India and Pakistan. Under pressure once again the two sides started preparation for formal dialogue. The back channel diplomacy was used to prepare the environment for talk. In April 2003, then Prime minister Vajpayee's principal secretary Brajesh Mishra and General Musharraf's top political aide held several rounds of talks in London, Dubai, and Bangkok to explore avenues to begin a peace process.⁴⁹ Meanwhile, in 2004 the Congress-led UPA democratically replaced the BJP-led NDA government. Dr. Manmohan Singh, the new Prime Minister, vowed to improve bilateral relationship with Pakistan. In 2006 at the sidelines of the NAM summit in Havana, they accepted that terrorism is a major source of concern and promised to set up Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism (JATM), engaging the intelligence officials from two countries to deal with this menace.⁵⁰ But like all other things

2001-2002 India Pakistan crisis. In S. Ganguly. & Paul S. Kapur, (Eds.), *India, Pakistan and the bomb: Debating nuclear stability in South Asia* (pp.-144-161). California: Columbia University Press.

47 Hussain, Z. (2007). *Frontline Pakistan: The struggle with militant Islam*. London: Penguin/Viking.

48 General on mission, *Newsline*, July 2001 as cited in Hussain, Z. (2007). *Frontline Pakistan: The struggle with militant Islam*. London: Penguin/Viking.

49 Interview with foreign ministry official as cited in Hussain, Z. (2007). *Frontline Pakistan: The struggle with militant Islam*. London: Penguin/Viking.

50 Daulat, A.S. & Durrani, A. (2011, July 14). India-Pakistan Intelligence

this is also yet to happen.

Afterward, the heads of state met few times on the sidelines of multilateral forums and conferences. Writing on the development between the Congress-led UPA government and General Musharraf's regime on Kashmir issue, former Foreign Minister of Pakistan Khurshid Mohammad Kasuri stated that in 2007 India and Pakistan had almost reached to an accepted solution on the status of Jammu and Kashmir.⁵¹ He had not delved into the depth of the issue and did not state the probable formula on which the two countries agreed. During his time as president of Pakistan General Musharraf came up with various ideas to address and resolve the issue of Kashmir dispute but the Indian political establishment did not accept his formulas. As things were going well between the two countries and the leaders were meeting, though on sidelines of international forums, Pakistan-based terrorist groups carried on unfortunate mayhem in Mumbai. Prior to the incident in Mumbai the Samjhauta Express bomb blast was carried out by the newly set up Hindu terror group Abhinav Bharat. These incidents halted further progress of dialogue between the two countries. Both India and Pakistan showed concern for these activities, filing charges against the culprits. The case is currently sub judice in Panchkula court.⁵²

After the Mumbai mayhem, dialogue did not resume until 2010, when, followed by a meeting between foreign secretaries of two countries, foreign ministers held dialogue in New Delhi and Islamabad. At Islamabad the two foreign ministers shamefully fought with each other in front of media but that fiasco did not deter Pakistani Prime Minister from accepting India's invitation to cricket World Cup semi-final match between India and Pakistan. Cricket diplomacy once again opened negotiations between the two countries. In July 2011, youngest and the first women foreign minister of Pakistan, Mrs. Hina Rabbani Khar, paid a visit to New Delhi for bilateral dialogue.

Why Have Negotiations Failed?

India and Pakistan's negotiations have not been systematic and structural. There are four different stages of negotiations:⁵³

1. Ripeness of the Dispute: In the absence of ripeness, negotiations may not only

Cooperation. *The Hindu*.

51 As stated by Khurshid Mohammad Kasuri during his interaction with *Times of India* & Jang Groups Aman Ki Aasha; on 23 April, 2010. Statement published in *TOI* on 24 April 2010.

52 News in *The Times of India*; dated 18 July, 2011.

53 Misra, A. (2010). *India-Pakistan: coming to terms*. New York: Palgrave McMillan.

be counterproductive, but they may also lead to disappointment for all sides, which may in turn cause the dispute to further deteriorate. Citing Richard Hass, Ashutosh Misra writes “Ripeness will often determine the success of those diplomatic efforts. Whether negotiation will succeed or fail hinges on the shared perception by the disputants that an accord is desirable, the existence of leadership on all sides that is either sufficiently strong to sustain a compromise or so weak that a compromise cannot be avoided, a formula involving some benefits for all participants and a commonly accepted diplomatic process.” This ripeness is absent in India-Pakistan talks because the two countries are not willing to make compromises.

2. Pre-negotiation: Citing Harold Saunders, Misra writes pre-negotiation has two key purposes: *defining the problem* and *developing a commitment for negotiations*. These lead the parties to the third stage: *arranging the negotiations*. Prenegotiation is useful in presenting leaders with an opportunity to assess how negotiations might unfold without actually entering into them. This is also referred to as the *diagnostic stage* because in this stage leaders try to diagnose the risks and benefits of following the path to negotiation. India and Pakistan have engaged at this level several times but still failed to conclude their dialogue. They have actively pursued backstage diplomacy since 1971. The result is promises that are never implemented.

3. Negotiation: In this stage the parties will negotiate and discuss all aspects of the dispute(s) on the basis of the information and data gathered and exchanged in the previous stage of prenegotiation. Negotiation is a process of defining and reducing alternative positions until a unique combination acceptable to all parties is reached. The success of the negotiation process depends on whether it can be transformed into a positive-sum situation that in terms of net gains benefits all parties and makes them feel better off than they did before entering the negotiation. Factors that have a decisive influence on the success of any negotiations are: stability of the government, nature and vision of the leadership, composition of the negotiation team and their level of autonomy in decision making, and the relationship away from the table and venue of negotiations.

4. Agreement. Successful negotiations finally reach the fourth stage, the stage of the signing of the agreement. It is also possible that negotiations may end without having an agreement and therefore will resume on a later date or be scuttled for a long time. The only agreement of mutual benefit to both parties that still survives between India and Pakistan is the Indus Water Treaty of 1960. The rest of their agreements came to an end with the eruption of problems.

The major problem between India and Pakistani negotiators is that whenever the two sides meet to discuss Kashmir issue they are unprepared to trust one another. Other than in 1963, step-by-step negotiations have never occurred. The two

countries are unable to trust each other to cooperate and instead persist in competing with each other in an exploitative fashion.⁵⁴ Unfortunately, there is an enormous trust-deficit between these two countries. India-Pakistan is under influence of Saheli syndrome:⁵⁵ whenever these two countries politically engage with each other, they talk about everything good and make various promises, generating hysteria and high expectations. But the moment that they finish their political engagement, once again they start blaming and counter-blaming each other for all their internal problems. Then again after an interval they politically engage with each other and things occur in same fashion. This cycle has kept up since 1950s. Due to this behavior they have failed to maintain continuity in their bilateral dialogue and reach a conclusion on even a single issue. But still they cannot stop themselves from doing this exercise because they are geographically entwined.

There are two existing paradigm of Negotiation practiced by the Realists and Liberals respectively. The bargaining approach focuses primarily on states as represented by a group of negotiators who have specific national interests to be achieved. Generally these interests are assumed to be fixed and unitary and diplomat's task is to try to maximize those national interests that can be achieved. They issue threats and promises concerning rewards and punishment, which are in turn made credible by demonstrating that the states have sufficient capabilities to

54 Axelord, R. (1980). Effective choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 24(1), 3-25.

55 In an ideal situation a girl named Saheli (meaning friend) and her friend behave in a particular way. One day they will spend good time together which will make both to think that, now, they have become good friends. But next day over some petty issue he or she will get irritated and stop any sort of communication between them. Things improve after a couple of days, when one of them takes the initiative and re-starts the communication process. As a result, once again both of them have a good time together. Then again after a while they stop talking. Things go on like this in their relationship. Despite all this they cannot afford to say a final good bye to each other because they like each other. Similarly, India and Pakistan have a good relationship, but then they will start fighting again and even go to war, then back again to the negotiating table, promising a good relationship in the future. And the cycle of this relationship has continued unchanged since the 1950s. They too, like Saheli and her friend, cannot afford to stop interactions and engagements between them. This is not because, like Saheli and his friend, they cannot part from each other; rather, whether they desire to do so or not they are destined to live together, forced to continue their turbulent negotiations.

carry out the punishments and rewards and by establishing a track record that demonstrates commitment to implement threats and promises: they forgo agreements that will produce benefits greater than the status quo or their next best alternative to an agreement if their potential competitors are perceived to be gaining more than they from the agreement. They will enforce the implementations of agreements including a unilateral right to renounce and violate an agreement for international institutions in verification and enforcement.⁵⁶

By contrast, problem-solving approaches to international negotiations are generally associated with a more liberal or institutionalist stance on international relations theory. The general argument of this perspective is that the goal of negotiation is to solve common problems that parties face and to try to find solution to those problems that will benefit everyone. A metaphor frequently employed by Roger Fish is that this perspective views negotiations not as a situation in which the two parties sit on opposite sides of the table facing off against one another but rather where both sit on same side of the table facing common enemy: the problems that need to be solved.⁵⁷

The India-Pakistan dialogue, whenever they get time to negotiate, is based on zero-sum game where one wants to gain at the cost of the other. This situation leads nowhere, terminating dialogue in middle of negotiations. Each blame the other for the failure of communication, while in reality both are equally guilty. Any problem-solving dialogue must be based instead on positive-sum approach, where the two countries must compromise by acknowledging each other's concerns and demands. By making these kinds of adjustments the dialogue partners can halt the rise of war-like situations. Dialogue is also a process which takes time and in which continuity is must. Problems must be discussed repeatedly before any conclusions are reached, as in the Indus Water Treaty—the only successful treaty between them—that was negotiated and discussed for eight long years before it was signed in 1960. The first step to resolve any form of conflict is to manage the conflict-resolution process itself, yet this is nearly impossible when the two countries have such a poor relationship. Both have failed to even manage problems, which has resulted in continuous tension and dispute. In addition to the above factors that have led to decades-old Kashmir issue still lingering, there are pro-active political and non-political groups in both countries who are against any sort of India-Pakistan rapprochement. Their interests are well

56 Hopmann, P. T. (1955). Two paradigms of negotiation: Bargaining and problem solving. In *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*: 542(1995), 24-47.

57 *ibid*

served by the political tensions between the two countries. In Pakistan the main culprits are the Pakistani Army and Pakistan-based terrorist organizations, while in India the Hindutva group influences policy-making processes related to Pakistan. These groups have provided constant barriers to any breakthrough on the Kashmir issue.

The army is an omnipresent institution in Pakistan, controlling both domestic and foreign policies even during the democratically elected civilian regimes. The involvement of the military in public realm, is indicated by the induction, in 1948, of military officers in civilian administration. Pakistan's participation in the security alliances with the Western block during the Cold War further strengthened the capacity of the military. In 1958, General Ayub Khan carried out the first direct military intervention in Pakistan. It is believed that since 1952-53 he was prepared to constrain the political leadership in order to protect the military's institutional interests.⁵⁸ Afterwards, Pakistan has been destined to stay under the military rule, with a stopgap arrangement of civilian political leadership. Different constitutional measures adopted by the military consolidate its institutional presence and keep the political institutions in check so that they won't grow stronger. The military has come to identify itself with the state rather than seeing itself as just one key components of a constitutional state.⁵⁹

Due to its institutional interests the Pakistani army has always foiled the attempt by the democratically elected government to have some serious dialogue on Kashmir. Although during the military rule in 1963 and 2007 India and Pakistan undertook to resolve this problem, they failed. In order to establish itself and retain its institutional interests, the military will not let the problem die down easily. Since 1989, the military's association with the Pakistan based terrorist groups, who are fighting proxy war in Kashmir, is well-known fact. So, until this institution makes up its mind, Pakistan won't be in a position to have any form of a solution or compromise on the Kashmir issue.

The process of Islamization, or, better, Sunnisation, in Pakistan started under General Zia. The state began to invest in strengthening various Sunni institutions and opened a large number of *madarsas*. Pakistan's military and its elite intelligence wing, the ISI, undertook much of this effort.⁶⁰ Since that time the

58 Aziz, M. (2008). *Military control in Pakistan: The parallel state*. Oxon: Rutledge.

59 *ibid*

60 Nasr, S.V.R. (2000). Islam the state and the rise of sectarian militancy in Pakistan. In Christophe Jafferlot (Ed.) *Pakistan: Nationalism Without Nation*. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers.

radical forces have gained footholds in Pakistan. Gradually they took over the Pakistani state and become a major player in Pakistan's internal and external policy-making processes. They have their hidden agenda to keep the Kashmir issue alive in order to fulfill their self-interests. They have sympathizers in almost every political and non-political institution of Pakistan, keeping them in the forefront to stop any sort of solution of Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan. From time to time they declare jihad on India and now also issue *fatwas* against the liberal Pakistani elites and commoners. Sensing the growing threat from them in 2004 the Pakistani establishment launched an attack on them. In 2004 Musharaff pledged to prevent the use of the territory under Pakistan's control to support terrorism in any manner. It was first direct commitment of this nature since the Pakistani-backed armed insurgency in Kashmir began in 1989.⁶¹ Presently, the Pakistani state faces challenges from these elements. Earlier they were under the control of Pakistani army, which used to regulate them, but now it seems they are out of its control.

The army still contains members who have sympathy towards the causes of Islamic terrorists. In June 2011, the army was forced to investigate Brigadier Ali Khan for his ties to the militants of Hizb-ul-Tahir, a radical organization that seeks to establish a global caliphate and thinks that its mission should begin from nuclear Pakistan.⁶² Unless this umbilical chord is destroyed the situation in Pakistan will remain same.

In India, Rashtriya Swyam Sevak Sangh (RSS) and its family are the main Pakistan bashers. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, a political ideologue of RSS and founder of Jan Sangh (re-christened the Bhartiya Janta Party in 1980) was a powerful advocate for the accession of the entirety of Jammu and Kashmir in India. He participated in anti-Sheikh Abdullah processions when the Sheikh was vacillating from his position to pass the accession treaty by the newly constituted Jammu and Kashmir assembly.⁶³ He died in prison in Srinagar. BJP has always been against any relaxation towards Kashmir and represents Hindutva politics in India. Ironically, Atal Behari Vajpayee, the a liberal face of BJP, is the most respected political leader in the valley. He was first to announce a unilateral ceasefire and invited the Kashmiri groups to have a dialogue in New Delhi. He went to Lahore and signed the Lahore declaration with Nawaz Sharief. In Agra

61 Hussain, Z. (2007). *Frontline Pakistan: The struggle with militant Islam*. London: Penguin/Viking.

62 Hudobhoy, P. (June 25-July 8 2011). Pakistan army divided it stands. *Economic & Political Weekly*, XLVI (26 & 27) 67-71.

63 Schofield, V. (2010). *Kashmir in conflict: India, Pakistan and the unending war* (1st South Asia ed.). London & New York: I. B. Tauris

too he and Musharaff were ready on certain formulae to resolve bilateral conflicts.

Besides BJP other political groups too, which are not under the tutelage of the RSS, have strong positions on Kashmir issue. Strong anti-Pakistan elements have a presence in almost all political parties and institutions, which forces them to not make any sort of compromise on Kashmir issue. The Indian bureaucracy does what their political masters tell them to do, so they cannot do anything to build or destroy the political relationship with Pakistan. Privately they may express their consent or dissent but professionally they have to carry out order of the political executives.

The next hurdle is the Indian media, which often behaves irresponsibly when it comes to dialogue with Pakistan. In Pakistan and India the local languages, other than English newspapers and visual media (even they start favoring hawkish things but less than the non-English language papers), always project Pakistan in bad light. Self-proclaimed experts on Pakistan create negative public opinion. During the Mumbai carnage the media declared war and created public opinion in favor of military strike on Pakistan, without understanding the gravity of situation and need of the hour.

What's Ahead?

Sixty-four years of mutual animosity have passed and it seems that more years will go by while these two countries refuse to either learn from history or make it. If they choose to do so, they could learn from various Kashmir-like situations existing in the past between various countries and examine the way those nations resolved their conflicts. One great example is Germany-France's rivalry over the occupation of coal and iron-ore rich Alsace-Lorraine.⁶⁴ For many years, both countries fought wars to establish control but after the end of Second World War they realized the futility of these wars. Now, nobody knows the exact

64 Alsace-Lorraine as a territory was created in 1871 by the Prussian empire.

This is a coal and iron ore rich area bordering Germany and France. Until the first World War this territory was under control of Germany but the Treaty of Versailles gave this territory to France. Due to being coal and iron rich area the Allied Powers wanted to keep this area away from Germany so that it could not re-emerge as a powerful country and pose threat to the world peace. But it was recaptured by Hitler and was under Germany's control until the end of second World War. Afterwards it was under possession of France. The conclusion is that afterwards Germany and France have never been at war or have any confrontation over the status of this territory. They understood the futility of the war exercise. The European Union too played a significant role in maintaining peaceful atmosphere in Europe.

political position and situation in Alsace-Lorraine.⁶⁵ Are India and Pakistan, who have already lost many precious lives over Kashmir issue, waiting for one more disastrous war to resolve this issue? The leadership must learn from this example and take steps to resolve this contentious issue.

Besides, in India and Pakistan there are also Kashmiri people who have different ideas about their territory. In both sides of Kashmir open and underground movements for a separate state have been going on for a long time. With imposition of AFSPA, and other draconian laws, the Indian Kashmir has turned into a cantonment and peoples' voices are suppressed. This has ignited strong separatist movement in Kashmir, which has kept growing since 1990.

In the Pakistani side of Kashmir one underground movement demands the creation of a state that includes Indian and Pakistani Kashmir but not Ladakh, a second group wants to include the Gilgit-Baltistan-Ladakh areas, and another seeks the creation of "Balwaristan" and wants statehood for Baltistan, Gilgit, and Dardistan.⁶⁶ This region has been under the tight control of Islamabad, which used to decide the head of the region. To address this issue in 2009 the Government of Pakistan passed an amendment called Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) order and now the local people shall elect the majority of members of the assembly.⁶⁷

Further, the two Kashmirs blame India and Pakistan for trade related and communication problems. At present trade takes place twice a week on a barter basis due to absence of banking facilities and is restricted to twenty-one items. Traders cannot meet each other. Those on the Indian side are in worse condition because of a twenty-one year ban on international dialing from Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan. Hence the traders have to depend upon relatives from third country for trade.⁶⁸

Talking about an independent Kashmir is easy but it's not a viable idea. Given the India-Pakistan stake on this territory it's just impossible that the two countries could agree to create a buffer state between them. If, ideally, they agreed to do so then a Pandora box will be opened and many more regions from the two countries would start to demand independence. This policy is based on

65 Amitabh Matoo in a seminar at School for International Studies, Jawahar Lal Nehru University, New Delhi.

66 Cohen, S. (2005). *The idea of Pakistan*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

67 Subramaniam, N. (2009, September 15). Gilgit-Baltistan Autonomy Packages win few friends. *The Hindu*.

68 Joshua, A. (2011, July 19). Cross LoC trade and peace building. *The Hindu*.

Kantian and Cobban's logic that countries having trade relations do not go to war. Though this logic failed and the two World Wars and many others happened this theory still managed to unite Europe, ASEAN, etc. by making them to resolve conflicts and disputes between the member states. India and China have systematic and territorial disputes, also from time to time the Chinese face charges of water diversion or territorial invasion etc., but still they share positive relation on various fronts and are likely to cross the target of \$100 billion trade by 2015. Of course it takes time to reach agreements but the outcome of peace is highly preferable to the current state in Kashmir. For the border dispute in India and China there is a Joint Working Group and in 2003 they appointed special representatives. Every year this high profile group meets in each other country to discuss the border issue and the two countries are cooperating in other sectors.⁶⁹

Though at times some acrimony does erupt it is managed. They set up JWG on trade and commerce, supported by a Joint-Business Council that represents the business interests of the non-state and non-governmental sector in both India and China.⁷⁰ In energy sector, on January 12th 2006, during the visit by India's petroleum and natural gas minister Mani Shankar Aiyer to Beijing, an agreement was reached whereby ONGC Videsh Ltd and China's national Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) would place joint bids for promising energy project in other countries. Prior to this agreement, in 2005 India and China made a bid and got oil and gas fields in Syria.⁷¹ Another major institutional arrangement that India and China have come to terms with includes a trade agreement on the avoidance of double taxation between the two countries. Finalized in 1996, these terms put in place: (a) double taxation avoidance mechanisms; (b) provision of Most-Favored Nation (MFN) status extended to one another's sea borne trade commodities; and (c) combating the smuggling of narcotics and arms.⁷² Learning from Sino-India, Pakistan and India can even set up committees to look into various conflicts and in meantime engage each other economically, socially, and culturally. Due to various similarities, like common language, culture and history, and food habits—and also suffering from same kind of problems—it's easy for them to cooperate, if they want to, of course.

Conclusion

69 Athwal, A. (2008). *China India relations: Contemporary dynamics*. London: Routledge.

70 *ibid*

71 Vardarajan, S. (2006, January 24). India, China, and Asian axis of oil. *The Hindu*.

72 Athwal, A. (2008). *China India relations: Contemporary dynamics*. London: Routledge.

To conclude, India and Pakistan must know two facts: that they cannot afford another war and that they have to stay together because geography cannot be changed. So, why not stay peaceful and make both countries prosperous? Sixty plus years of rivalry have brought disaster to both countries. Due to their constant political and military tensions extra-regional players are very active in this region and dictate their terms over the policy-making process in these two countries. In order to resolve the Kashmir problem bold decisions must be made by the policy makers but frankly the political institutions and people from both countries are not ready to accept any form of compromise with their constructed archenemy. Exchanging territories is impossible so in that case let a *defacto* border to be turned into a *dejure* border. This suggestion has been given by many people in private, and even the ruling class from both countries accept the fact that this would be the best solution to resolve the long standing impasse over the Kashmir issue. These governments must build relationships in other areas such as trade, commerce, etc. and put this issue in political cold storage. The effect of extending their relationship into other fields will surely dilute the jingoistic feeling among the people from both states and they may then be ready to accept adjustments and compromises on Kashmir issue.

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Economic and Cultural Relations Between Pakistan and the Soviet Union During Ayub Khan's Period

By M. Iqbal, Falak Sher, Rehmat Ullah Awan and Khalid Javed

Ayub Khan imposed martial law in October, 1958 and took power into his own hands as the head of state. He depended on the Western Block, especially the USA, in his early period. He provided a Peshawar airbase for the USA to use for U2 spy aircraft over the Soviet Union's military centers.¹ Pakistan and the USA signed an agreement of mutual cooperation in April, 1959. It was more important than the SEATO and CENTO pacts, because the USA regarded, as vital to its national interest and to world peace, the preservation of independence and integrity of Pakistan.²

At that time, the Soviet leaders were extremely perturbed by this development and threatened Pakistan with dire consequences if Pakistan allowed its territory to be used against the Soviet Union.³

The most serious situation appeared on May 3rd, 1960, when an American aircraft was shot down by the Soviet Union. The Americans initially claimed that it was an "unarmed U2 weather plane piloted by a civilian" which took off from Adana Air force base in Turkey. But the real facts came to light when American pilot Francis Gary Powers was captured alive and told the real facts to Soviet Union⁴. On 7th May, 1960 President Khrushchev of the Soviet Union stated that it was from Pakistani territory near Peshawar that the U2 plane had taken off. He said: "Do not play with fire, gentlemen, we have red marked Peshawar on the map of Pakistan."⁵

Ayub Khan, who was on a visit to England at that time, was informed about the Soviet warning, in which Peshawar was marked by a red circle. Ayub Khan replied: "Soviet threats are nothing new to us". If the Soviets would attack Pakistan now, we would not be alone. It would mean a world war." Ayub Khan returned from England on 17th May, then he gave a statement in a press conference that Soviet planes had been flying over Pakistan for some time. He also remarked that these harsh things of life have to be faced.⁶ Ayub Khan did not feel threatened from the Soviet Union's harsh statement because at that time he had the full support of the USA.

Thus the Soviet Union adopted a hostile attitude toward Pakistan. Two months after the U2 incident over the Soviet Union, President Khrushchev personally visited Kabul and openly supported Afghanistan's claim for Pukhtonistan and also promised to provide transit facilities.⁷ The Afghanistan Government followed the Soviets blindly. On 11th August, 1960 Pakistani Foreign Minister Manzoor Qadir noticed that Afghan troops had entered with a few tanks on the western border (Bajaur) and had also organized nearly 7000 reservists.⁸ On 23rd-24th of September, 1960 Afghan lashkar (Army) once again crossed into Pakistan territory, but returned when the Pakistani Army received orders from Ayub Khan to destroy Afghani machine gun and mortar positions.⁹ A question arises here: why did the Afghanistan Government obey the Soviet Union in its offer against Pakistan (despite being a Muslim country) as far as its raising of the Pukhtonistan issue is concerned? A possible answer to this question is that at that time Afghanistan was mostly depending on the Soviets for food and economic support. At least the Soviet Union's hostility toward Pakistan met rapid resistance, when Afghan forces returned in their barracks as a result of the Pakistani forces' strong action.¹⁰

After some time, the Soviet Government offered Pakistan credit and technical assistance for oil exploration. Pakistan accepted this offer. This agreement was signed on 4th of March, 1961. Under this agreement, the Soviet government agreed to provide Pakistan with 120 million rubles or \$30 million payable over a period of twelve years. It was also decided that the Soviet government would provide technical assistance and equipment for oil exploration in Pakistan. As a result, a Russian team consisting of six members reached Pakistan in May, 1961 for exploration of oil and natural gas¹¹.

In May 1962, the Soviet government agreed to provide fighter planes for the Indian air force and also other military and economic aid. Thus the Pakistani Government started to protest against the Soviets and the United States for providing large scale military assistance to India. Pakistan feared that military assistance to India would be used against Pakistan's territory.¹² The real fact was that India, after partition, depended on Soviet and US military assistance. She adopted the policy of non-alignment after partition, but Pakistan adopted the policy of alignment with the west only. Actually, both countries (US and Soviet Union) provided much military and economic aid to India as a counterweight to China. Another reason was that when India was defeated by China in the 1962 war, both major powers of the world provided large scale aid to India. Ayub Khan changed his Foreign Policy, feeling threatened that aid could be used against Pakistan.¹³

At the same time as the Pakistani ambassador went to England to attend the UN General Assembly session, the Soviet Union's President came to the Pakistani ambassador and expressed his desire to visit his country. At his request he visited the Soviets in June, 1963 and met President Khrushchev and foreign minister Gromyko. On his return, he announced in London that now the Soviet Union wanted to establish close relations with Pakistan in the field of economic and other spheres.¹⁴

According to S.M. Burke: "The Soviet Union's wish to cultivate better relations with Pakistan suited Pakistan's new line of independence in foreign policy, but owing to a greater backlog of suspicion, Soviet-Pakistan relations improved more than Sino-Pakistan relations".¹⁵ So Pakistan received the Soviet offer of friendly relations, and Ayub Khan also started a bilateral policy; after the Sino-Indo war Ayub considered that US military aid to India was a great threat against Pakistan's integrity. At that time Ayub Khan was seeking good relations with her neighboring countries China, India and the Soviet Union.

During this phase the Soviet Union agreed to sign a barter agreement with Pakistan on 30th August 1963. According to that agreement "Pakistan would provide raw jute worth 50 *Lakhs* (5 million) to the Soviets and the Soviets would supply the railway sleepers, valued at one *Caror* (10 million) to Pakistan"¹⁶. Mr. Naik, Joint Secretary of the Soviet Union, said that agreement to bigger deals was in the near future. He also remarked at a news conference that the Soviet Government would provide railway sleepers under the barter agreement at 60 to 70 percent less than the international price. Mr. Kosygin's opinion was that Pakistani jute traders were the best in the world. The Soviet Union delegation assured Pakistani Minister Ijaz Ahmad that the Soviets also desired to work with Pakistan for manufacturing jute goods, cotton textiles and shoes in exchange for Soviet machinery.¹⁷ That was the second time both countries concluded a barter agreement, the first was signed eleven years before, in 1952.

After two months of this, Pakistan and the Soviet Union again signed an air agreement in Karachi when G. Loginov (Chief of the airlines) came to Pakistan and showed his desire that agreements would help for better understanding and more cooperation between Pakistan and the Soviet Union.¹⁸ That agreement proved fruitful when the Soviet Union showed her willingness to solve the Kashmir problem first, but the Soviets did not carry through on this promise when they vetoed about Kashmir in UN Security Council on 13th May 1964, coming down on the Indian side and also granting 140 million dollars for Indian military and defense requirements.¹⁹

Although Ayub Khan reminded both superpowers (USA and Soviet Union) that granting aid to India was a great threat to Pakistan, neither country would yield an inch and it was proved true in the war of 1965. However, Pakistan and the Soviet Union signed, on 11th June 1964, an exchange program for one year in the field of cultural and scientific cooperation. According to that agreement, Pakistan would send graduate students for higher education to the Soviet Union. The Soviet government also agreed to increase quotas for Pakistani students in higher education. A few days later the Soviet government provided an \$11 million loan in the form of a barter agreement.²⁰

In September 1964, a Pakistani delegation under the leadership of Fazal Qadir Chaudhary, a prominent National Assembly leader, visited Moscow. In a welcoming speech, Ivan Spiridonov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, described this visit as a confirmation of the desire to achieve better understanding and expand all round cooperation between the two countries.²¹ During this phase from 1962-1964, Ayub Khan mostly depended on the Soviets and China and maintained good relations with both major powers of Asia. However, the USA did not like Ayub's taking steps in the direction of the Soviet Union and China, and also warned him against relationships with them, but Ayub Khan did not accept this. Thus at first the USA sanctioned Pakistan and stopped aid to the Dhaka air base which was being built with US cooperation. At that time Ayub Khan was busy receiving aid from all the major powers for the national program of green revolution for the prosperity of the Pakistani people.²² When the USA stopped Pakistani aid, Ayub saw on the side of the Soviets and China the possibility to complete projects which had already begun, and at least he succeeded in getting aid for this from the Soviet Union and China .

In January 1965, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto visited the Soviet Union. His main aim was to establish friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto talked with the Soviet leaders on the future of Pak- Soviet relations. Bhutto put stress on the solution of the Kashmir issue with the help of the Soviet Union. Bhutto also showed his desire to the Soviet leaders for economic and military assistance. The Soviet Government delivered the following statement:

“We are sure the visit, of the Pakistani foreign minister in the direction of Soviets, would expand and strengthen the relations between the two countries.”²³

President Ayub Khan visited the Soviet Union, the first time, on 3rd April, 1965. He assured Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin of the earnest desire of his government and the people of Pakistan to establish close and friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Ayub thanked Mr. Kosygin for his warm welcome. Ayub Khan said, "Soviet Union is our next door neighbor with which Pakistan had close friendly connections in the past".²⁴ However, after some time, these connections were cut off. He assured that he now came to re-establish good relations once again. Mr. Kosygin showed his hope that Ayub's visit would be useful for strengthening the friendly relations and mutual cooperation between the two countries. Premier Kosygin praised Ayub's fruitful activities and policies in Pakistan. Ayub showed that his meeting with Kosygin was largely successful.²⁵

During Ayub's visit, Pakistan and the Soviets signed many agreements in the field of trade, economic cooperation and cultural exchange. Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto signed the agreement on behalf of Pakistan under which the five year old Pak-Soviet agreement on oil exploration was extended for another five years. The Soviet government also agreed to provide a further loan of 50 million dollars to Pakistan for oil exploration and purchase of industrial machinery. Mr. Nikolai Patolichev, Soviet Minister for Foreign Trade, signed the agreements on trade and economic protocol while Mr. Ramonosky signed the accord on cultural exchange on behalf of the Soviet Union. Mr. Patolichev said that Soviet experts to Pakistan would mainly have need of machinery and equipment for the development of Pakistan's industry and agriculture. The Soviet government also agreed to provide 15 *Crores* for the economic development of Pakistan, that aid provided to Pakistan for agriculture and other machinery at 2.5% interest and deferred payment for 10 years.²⁶

Ayub's visit brought many changes, created a friendly atmosphere between the two countries and the misunderstandings of the last seventeen years were finished. Ayub said to President Kosygin: "We are more than satisfied with our mutual meetings"²⁷. He hoped such meetings would be continued. He also suggested that President Kosygin visit Pakistan. On his return, he told a press conference that Pakistan's success in establishing friendly ties with the Soviet Union and China had greatly strengthened the cause of peace and stability throughout Asia. Ayub's view was that his visit opened a new, hopeful chapter in Pak-Soviet relations. He said "we should now make every endeavor to maintain friendly relations with our great neighbors"²⁸.

That visit was immediately reflected in Moscow's posture of neutrality towards the Indo-Pakistan "mini war" over the Rann of Kutch in April-May 1965. On 8th May 1965 the Soviet news agency TASS called upon both India and Pakistan "...not to weaken each other, and expressed the hope that India and Pakistan would solve their differences through direct negotiations".²⁹

As the result of Ayub's visit to the Soviet Union, both countries concluded another agreement for cultural exchanges. It was signed on 5th June, 1965. This agreement was to exchange scholars, scientists, artists, sportsmen and also the exchange of music records, radio and TV programs. So during Ayub's period Pakistan signed many pacts with the Soviets. During the signing ceremony of this cultural agreement, S.K. Romonovsky, the Soviet Cultural Minister said: "that many Pacts between two countries would help towards better understanding among the people". Then Pakistan also got a Rs. 1.5 *Crore* loan from the Soviets for the purchase of machinery and airport construction.³⁰

When full war started between India and Pakistan on 6th September 1965 the Soviet Union adopted the policy of neutrality. The Soviet Union showed hope that both countries would avoid the war. During the Indo-Pak war Kosygin first sent a message to Shastri and then to Ayub on 4th September 1965 to withdraw their troops from the borders. On 14th September 1965, the Soviet Union also condemned the inflammatory statement, presumably from China, which was designed to derive advantages from the exacerbation of Indian-Pakistani relations, appealing officially to the two states for a cease fire. After the end of the war, the Soviet Union offered to mediate a solution. Consequently, Pakistan accepted Kosygin's invitation on 11th November 1965, to meet with Shastri at Tashkent on 4th January 1966.³¹

On 4th January 1966, leaders of both countries (India and Pakistan) gathered around the table of Tashkent. Mr. Kosygin wanted peace and stability in South Asia and this was the main reason for Kosygin's policy of neutrality during the Indo-Pak war of 1965. Mr. Kosygin's efforts proved fruitful when both countries agreed to the Tashkent Accord on 10th January, 1966.³²

After Tashkent, Pak-Soviet relations continued and another barter agreement was signed between the two countries on 10th January 1966. According to that agreement, Pakistan provided 85,000 tons of rice to the Soviet Union and imported tractors, agriculture machinery and construction equipment.³³

After this, President Ayub Khan disclosed in a press interview that the Soviets had granted dangerous weapons and arms aid to India alone. So the Soviet government agreed to also sell arms to Pakistan in June, 1966. After that the Pakistan delegation, under Air Marshal Noor Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Air Force, visited the Soviet Union. On his return, he said: “We succeeded in developing very rapidly seeds of mutual confidence and understanding between us”.³⁴ But after one month Mrs. Indira Gandhi paid a visit to Moscow in July, 1966, and she announced that the Soviet Union had not concluded any agreement with Pakistan on the supply of arms.³⁵ Therefore, Pakistan could not get any type of arms supplies from the Soviets.

The increasing warmth in the political relations between the Soviet Union and Pakistan helped in the growth of cultural ties between the two countries. Yu Kuzin, Deputy Head of Soviet Foreign Relations said: “the year 1967 was particularly rich in cultural contracts, between the two countries.” For example, Pakistani dance troupes visited their country and presented many performances. Hence Pakistan succeeded in the field of festivals of Pakistani culture in Dushanbe, the Capital of Soviet Tajikistan.³⁶

Ayub Khan visited the Soviet Union again on 25th September, 1967 with Foreign Minister Syed Sharif Uddin Pirzada, and the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, M.M. Ahmad. Ayub Khan talked with President Kosygin about peace in the south region and also non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.³⁷ The Soviet government agreed to increase aid for Pakistan up to 100 million rubles for the economic development of Pakistan and showed keenness to collaborate in all fields of economic development. Ayub Khan said in Moscow that the Kashmir dispute is a source of serious tension in Asia. We want to live in peace and want stability in Pakistan, which is only possible after the solution of the Kashmir issue.³⁸

Ayub Khan dedicated his autobiography “Friends not Master” to President Kosygin and said:

“We are grateful for the economic and technical assistance which the Soviet Union is giving to us, and which has helped us in the establishment of a large area of understanding between the two peoples. You would be happy to note that we have made good use of economic assistance that your country has extended to us.”³⁹

In the beginning of 1968 Ayub Khan informed the USA authorities that the Badaber base agreement that was going to expire in 1969 would not be extended further. Ayub’s reaction pleased President Kosygin and he visited Pakistan for the first time on 17th April 1968. He was welcomed by President Ayub and the Pakistani masses with cordial manner. During his visit President Alexi Kosygin said: “that relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union are very good indeed and we should want more and more to strengthen and better them”.⁴⁰

The Soviet President’s visit in April 1968 was the first of its kind and was of outstanding significance. It brought about not only great economic and cultural cooperation between two countries but also closer political relations between them. Kosygin agreed to the granting of aid for a steel mill, a nuclear power plant and also economic aid on a broad range of development projects. During the time of Kosygin’s reception, Hafeez Jalanderi, an aged poet and the composer of Pakistan’s National Anthem sang out a poem, comparing Kosygin’s visit to the coming of the dawn, which would bring self determination and justice to the Kashmiri people. Kosygin enjoyed the amusing poetry, but remained silent on this issue.⁴¹ President Kosygin said:

“There were many forces in the world which did not want to see friendship growing between the Soviets and Pakistan”.⁴² He said the last night of his visit to Pakistan: “Pakistan would achieve great success in all spheres under the leadership of president Muhammad Ayub Khan.”⁴³

In June 1968 General Yahya Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, visited Moscow to finalize the type of military hardware to be purchased.

So Pakistan succeeded in receiving helicopters, transport vehicles and spare parts from the Soviet Union.⁴⁴ The Washington correspondent of *The Hindu* enviously noted that Pakistan had become the first country in the world to get such supplies from all three major powers.⁴⁵ Although Ayub Khan was successful in terms of his achievements on many horizons but it was late in 1968 and 1969 when a long protest was started against Ayub Khan's government by different political parties prevailing at that time along with Pakistani masses and students who were also demanding the resignation of Ayub from the Presidency. Soviet President Kosygin visited Pakistan in early 1969 and remarked about Ayub Khan's Government in these words:

“How can the Pakistanis not appreciate such a good man, who has done so much to improve Pakistan-Soviet Relations” He accepted that Ayub's pro Tashkent policy had become a veritable mill stone around his neck.”⁴⁶

Conclusion

During Ayub Khan's period all the world was preoccupied with the Cold War. At that time both the major powers (Soviet Union and USA) were trying their best to control important Asian countries under their own monopoly. In his early period Ayub Khan started a pro-American policy and took some appropriate action against the Soviet Union when he provided a Peshawar airbase to the USA for US aircraft to collect information regarding military centers in Asia. Ayub Khan's activity was not liked by the Soviet Union and neighboring China. It was proved true when the U2 incident occurred and damaged Pakistan's reputation in the world. After this, when the Sino-Indian war started, Britain and the USA granted more and more aid to India against China. Although Ayub Khan's government got much aid from the USA and did not want to lose its friend, the granting of US aid to India was a great threat to Pakistan, and was proved true when India used that arms supply against Pakistan in the war of 1965. Thus Ayub Khan based the policy of friendly relations with neighboring major powers, the Soviet Union and China. So under his government, Pakistan signed many pacts with the Soviet Union and China for the betterment and prosperity of Pakistani masses. During this period (from 1958 to 1969) Ayub Khan completed many projects with the aid of the Soviet Union. Ayub's Khan friendly relations with many nations of the world remained successful. During his whole era Ayub Khan was busy, serving all major powers granting aid in industrial and agricultural projects for the Pakistani masses' prosperity and he succeeded in his aim. That was the reason, under Ayub Khan's leadership, why Pakistan had good success in every field and he provided basic structure to the Pakistani nation for the first time in the landmark history of Pakistan after partition.

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Light Verbs and Noun Verb Agreement in Hunza Burushaski

By Piar Karim

This paper introduces the concept of Light Verbs and Noun Verb Agreement in Hunza Burushaski from a native speaker's perspective by a student of linguistics in preparation for a future detailed study on the complex verb predicates and the general interaction of various types of verbs with six noun classes which produces a very complex notion of verbs in Burushaski. Burushaski is linguist isolate spoken in Gilgit-Baltistan region of Pakistan. This fascinating language has three distinct dialect groups in Hunza, Nagar and Yasin. This paper introduces two new concepts: light verbs and six noun classes in Burushaski that have not been discussed in the previous researches.

Light Verbs

Burushaski like Persian has probably the smallest lexicon of single word verbs or simple verbs. A limited set of more than 15-20 Light Verbs (LV) form an infinite number of verbal constructions in Burushaski. These LV can be combined with an open set of preverbal elements (PV), which results in intricate complex verb constructions. Light Verbs can be intransitive like:

1. a.	//čai	ɬayaar	*man	-imi//
	[čai	ɬayaar	*man	-imi]
	tea	ready	become	-3MSG

The tea has become ready

or transitive verb like:

b.	//je-e	buk	mo-	*ɬ	-am//
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[ʃa-a	buk	mo-	*t̪	-am]
1-ERG	neck	3FSG	-do-	1MSG

I hugged her.

Basing itself on Butt & Geuder's proposal of light verbs, this paper will introduce the LV verbal notion in Burushaski. The unique characteristic of Burushaski Verbal system is its dominant use of LVs to express verbal notion. English simple verbs are expressed with complex verbal predicates in Burushaski.

1. karim-e	xarc	e-	*t̪	-imi
karim-ERG	clap(onom.)	3SG-	do	3M.SG

Karim do clap.

Karim clapped.

2. karim-e	ʃamini	gar	e-	*t̪	-imi
karim-ERG	last.year	marriage	3SG-	do.	3MSG

karim last.year. marriage do

Karim married last year.

Butt & Geuder (2004, p35) observe, "Light Verbs serve the purpose of structuring event concepts. To this end, they are reduced to an entirely schematic meaning. The crucial difference between light verbs and auxiliary verbs is that, with light verbs, the schematic information is applied in order to structure a lexical content (namely the full verb), not in order to express a grammatical meaning as is the case with auxiliaries. So if there were a gradual development by which light verbs are becoming semantically weaker over time, this would not mean that they are becoming more grammatical. We would just arrive at a more coarse-grained structuring of event concepts".

I will follow the general strategy for light verbs that Butt and Geuder adopt "linked to the main full verb reading via analysis under which light verb usages are considered to be an instance of polysemy" (2004, p25). This study will shed more light on the light verbs because in case of Burushaski the light verb combines with other verbs to form complex predicates as in the case in Urdu. In

addition to that, the elegant affixes for subject and object on the light verb will be considered a very useful tool to explore the grammatical function of LVs in this language.

One of the noteworthy features of the Burushaski language, similar to Persian verbal system, is its predominant use of light verb construction (LVC) to express verbal notions. LVC in Buruskaski are formed by a LV in conjunction with a nominal element, and an adjective. The most frequently used light verbs are [eṭas], “to do” [manaas] “to become” Below are some Light Verbs (in italics) and (PV) (in lower case), which I have collected from first ever published Burushaski Urdu Dictionary by Burushaski Research Academy (2002 to 2006). The use of light verbs in Burushaski is so pervasive that one would be surprised if one did not see a light verb construction on any single page of the dictionary. This construction is always seen with loan words. For example:

3. [mobile Ø-*yan -imi]

mobile 3SG-take-3MSG

He bought cell phone

4. [in-e p^hon e- *ṭ -imi]

3-ERG phone 3SG- do -3MSG

He called/made a phone call.

A brief list of Burushaski Light Verbs

salaam *e-ṭ-imi* greeted 3-do-3MSG He greeted him.

mađat e-ṭ-imi	help 3-do-3MSG	He helped him.
duro <i>man-imi</i>	work become-3MSG	The work completed
ḍaṅ ni-mi	sleep go-3SG	The sleep disappeared.
yuniqiş yeec-imi	bad see-3MSG	He looked down upon him
čaya-ce <i>ḍuun-imi</i>	talk-COM hold-3MSG	He started talking
p ^h oon-e ring ḍi-imi	p ^h one-GEN ring come-3SG	The phone rang.

It is interesting to note the with these Light Verb constructions in the lexicon, Burushaski native speakers construct a whole meaning and the meaning of the whole is never a function of the meaning of its parts. For instance the LV [yanas] individually means taking or carrying something but when it is used with [p^hone yanimi] “He bought the phone”, or [hiles yanimi] “he carried the boy” a novel meaning is constructed every time the verb is added with a different (PV).

Noun Verb Agreement

Burushaski has six noun classes i) [bay] ¹ ‘paired class’ human male, ii) [bo] ‘paired class’ human female, iii) [bi] ‘paired class’ ‘animals and in-animate solid objects’, iv) [bila] paired class’ for inanimate objects which can change shape like tree and book v) [bila] ²unpaired class ‘liquids, verbal nouns’ and vi) [bica] unpaired class ‘non-countable nouns like [ṭk] ‘sand’ , [šakar] ‘sugar’. Below is the example of six noun classes in Burushaski.

i). Bay paired class			ii). Bo paired class			iii). Bi paired class		
SG	PL	Gloss	SG	PL	Gloss	SG	PL	Gloss
hiles	hilešo	boy	ḍasin	ḍasiwanc	girl	huk	hukay	dog
hir	hir	man	gus	gušinanc	women	buš	bušoŋo	cat

¹ I will use term ‘paired class’ which can occur in singular/plural pair

² I will use ‘unpaired class’ which do not occur in singular/plural pair.

ačo	ačokoon	my brother	ayas	ayastaro	my sister	šapik	šapikuc	bread
aļa	aļacaro	my father	ami	mamacaro	my mom	đan	đayo	stone
iv). Bila paired class			v) Bila unpaired class		vi) Bica unpaired class			
SG	PL	Gloss	SG	Gloss	PL	gloss		
ɬom	ɬomičan	tree	mamu	milk	bras	rice		
ha	hakičaŋ	home	čhil	water	ɬik	sand		

Burushaski verb is packed with information and different kinds of verb agreement are found in Burushaski with their corresponding noun classes. In first section, I will show how verb root agrees with its corresponding noun classes. In second section, I will talk about subject/agent referent on verb in suffix position. Finally, I will talk about object referent on verb stem in prefix and suffix position.

Verbs root with corresponding noun classes

Burushaski noun classes play a very important role in verb morphology. The verb root is classified into two concrete morphophonological forms depending on the noun class in the referent. There are two kind of verb root [ɣ] and [š] in Burushaski for the verb ‘eat’ in English. The verb stem [ɣ] for [bi] paired class [š] for [bila] paired or unpaired class in the referent. Below is the example:

1. (a) [ja-a han šapik-an ³**ɣ-iy-am*
 1SG-ERG one bread-SG *eat-3SG-1SG*
 I ate one bread.
-

³ I will use * for verb stem

But, [giyal] ‘soft bread’ is [bila] paired noun class.

(b)	//je-e	giyal-an	<i>*š-e-am//</i>
	[ja-a	giyal-an	<i>*š-e-y-am]</i>
	1SG-ERG	soft.bread-IND	<i>eat-3SG-1SG</i>

I ate soft bread.

Here are more examples of verb roots

Gloss	Bsk Verb stem	Noun	Gloss	Class	Example with gloss
wash	[yaaltɿ]	[p ^h arcin]	hat	[bi]	ja-a p ^h arcin ø-yaaltɿ-am 1-ERG hat 3SG-wash-1SG I washed the hat
wash	[baalt]	[laqpis]	handkerchief	[bila]	ja-a laqpis baaltɿ-am 1-ERG handkerchief wash-1SG I washed handkerchief
count	[ghan]	[huyes]	cattle	[bi]	jaa huyes u-ghan-am 1-ERG cattle 3PL-count-1SG I counted animals.
count	[chan]	[tɔm]	trees	[bila]	jaa tɔm i-chan-am 1-ERG trees 3SG-count-1SG I counted trees.

Subject/Agent Suffix

Burushaski verb stem marks subject/agent in suffix position. Below is the paradigm to show suffixal subject agreement with person/number and class. The subject/agent mostly is [bay] and [bo] class nouns. In a few cases the subject/agent can be [bi] class, but never [bila] or [bica] class.

Person	Burushaski sentence	Gloss	Meaning	Subject Suffix
1SG	[ja-a şapik ş-iy-am]	1-ERG bread eat-3SG-1SG	I ate bread	-a
2SG	[un-e şapik ş-i-ma]	2-ERG bread eat-3SG-2SG	You ate bread	-a
3MSG	[in-e şapik ş-i-mi]	3M-ERG bread eat-3SG-3M.	He ate bread	-i
3FSG	[in-e şapik ş-i-mo]	3F-ERG bread eat-3SG-3F	She ate bread	-o
3 [Bi]	[hukan-e ʈin ş-i-mi]	dog-ERG bone eat-3SG-3 _[Bi]	Dog ate bone	-i
1PL	[mi-i şapik ş-i-man]	1PL-ERG bread eat-3SG-1PL	We ate bread	-an
2PL	[ma-a şapik ş-i-man]	2PL-ERG bread eat-3SG-2PL	You ate bread	-an
3PL	[uw-e şapik ş-i-man]	3PL-ERG bread eat-3SG-3PL	They ate bread	-an

Object Suffix and Prefixes

Unlike the suffixal agreement which marks the referent subject explicitly, the marking of the object on verb is rather complicated because of the six different noun classes in the language and its position on the verb. In most of the cases the object referent is marked in prefix position of the verb, but there are cases where the object referent is also seen on suffix position of the verb like [in-e baalt-an ş-i-mi] ‘3MSG-ERG apple-IND eat-3SG-3MSG’ ‘he ate an apple’ and [in-e baalt-ik ş-u-mi] ‘3MSG-ERG apple-PL eat-3PL-3MSG’. I will present a paradigm below to show the object referent prefixes and suffixes in correspondence with different noun classes with example sentences.

Noun Class		Verb	Gloss	Object Prefixes
Bay/Bo	1S G	[in-e a -yaalt _ɬ -imi] 3SG-ERG 1SG-wash-3SG	He washed me.	a-
	2S G	[ine gu -yaalt _ɬ -im-i] 3SG-ERG 2SG-wash-3SG	He washed you.	gu-
	3M	[ine ∅ -yaalt _ɬ -im-i] 3SG-ERG 3M-wash-3SG	He washed him	i-: ∅/_y
	3F	ine mu -yaalt _ɬ -imi 3SG-ERG 3F-wash-3SG	He washed her.	mu-
	1PL	ine mi -yaalt _ɬ -imi 3SG-ERG 1PL-wash-3SG	He washed us	mi-
	2PL	ine ma -yaalt _ɬ -imi 3SG-ERG 2PL-wash-3SG	He was you.pl.	ma-
	3PL	ine u -yaalt _ɬ -im-i 3SG-ERG 3PL-wash-3SG	He washed them.	u-
[Bi]	SG	ine p ^h arcin ∅ -yaalt _ɬ -imi 3SG-ERG 3SG-wash-3SG	He washed a hat.	i-
	PL	ine p ^h arcimuc u -yaalt _ɬ -imi 3SG-ERG 3PL-wash-3SG	He washed hats.	u-
[Bila] paired	SG	ine laqpis baalt _ɬ -imi 3SG-ERG wash-3SG	He washed handkerchief.	none
	PL	ine laqpišij baalt _ɬ -imi 3SG-ERG wash-3SG	He washed handkerchiefs.	none
[Bila] unpaired	SG	[in iskil baalt _ɬ -imi] 3SG-ERG wash-3SG	He washed his face.	none

[Bica]unpaired	PL	in-e gatəŋ baalt̪imi 3SG-ERG wash-3SG	He washed clothes	none
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We have seen above that some verbs appear to lack prefixal agreement with [bila] ‘paired class’ [bila] ‘unpaired class’ and [bica] ‘unpaired class’. However, this is not always true. The salient feature with these classes is that there is singular prefixal agreement with these noun classes. In sentence 2 (a) [p^hiti] ‘bread’ is a [bi] paired class noun, the prefix [e-] changes to [o-], when the noun class becomes plural [p^hitimuc] ‘breads’ in sentence 2 (b). But, in sentence 3 (a), [ɖuro] ‘work’ is a [bila] paired class, the prefix [e-] does not change in sentence 3 (b) with [ɖuroyɪŋ] “a lot of work.”

2. a. [in-e p^hitiy-an ɖ̪-e-s-man-um-o]

3F-ERG bread-IND x-3SG-TRAN-make-3F

She made a bread.

b. [in-e p^hiti-muc ɖ̪-o-s-man-um-o]

3F-ERG bread-PL x-3PL-TRAN-make-3F

She made bread.

3. a. [in-e ɖuroy-an ɖ̪-e-s-man-um-o]

3F-ERG work-IND x-3_[bila]-TRAN-make-3F

She completed a work.

b. [in-e d̪uro-iŋ-ik d̪-e-s-man-umo]

3F-ERG work-PL-IND x-3_[bila]-TRAN-make-3F

She completed some work.

Conclusion:

It is very clear from the data presented above that Burushaski verb morphology (inflectional and derivational) is extremely complicated. Previous literature on Burushaski has classified nouns into four classes and there has been no reference of light verb construction, which has led to misunderstanding and confusions in the linguistic analysis of the language. This paper proposes six noun classes and notion of light verb as a separate syntactic unit. These notions will contribute to lexical semantics and will help to analyze the morphology and syntax of Burushaski more precisely and elegantly in the future research.

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Pakistan: Beyond the 'Crisis State'

Reviewed by David Waterman

Pakistan: Beyond the 'Crisis State.' Maleeha Lodhi, ed. London: Hurst and Company, 2011. 391 pages. ISBN-13: 978-1-84904-135-5.

Maleeha Lodhi, as the editor of *Pakistan: Beyond the 'Crisis State,'* has managed to assemble some of Pakistan's most influential academics, writers, economists and policymakers in one volume, designed to give an insider's perspective on Pakistan's "crisis" from diverse angles, and more importantly, to suggest solutions regarding Pakistan's obvious potential for a better future. The book is not a collection of conference proceedings, but rather the product of a virtual conference in cyberspace, discussing themes of "governance, security, economic and human development and foreign policy [...] what binds all the distinguished contributors is their belief that Pakistan's challenges are surmountable and the impetus for change and renewal can only come from within, through bold reforms that are identified in the chapters that follow" (3).

The first few chapters concentrate on Pakistan's history and the sense of a Pakistani identity, now that the country has existed in very concrete terms for sixty-five years or so. Ayesha Jalal suggests that Pakistan's path toward a national identity for its heterogeneous people has been interrupted, as its history has been co-opted for "political and ideological reasons" (11). Pakistan's position vis-à-vis India, militant Islam and 9/11 are all important factors in the equation as well. Akbar Ahmed recalls Jinnah's role not only in the founding of the nation, but his continuing legacy in terms of an equilibrium between Islam and the State; Jinnah's thoughts are in large part gleaned from his speeches and letters, as he left no monograph before his death (23). Mohsin Hamid, author of *Moth Smoke* and *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* (filming for the movie has apparently begun), assumes his mantle of engaged journalist in an essay entitled "Why Pakistan will Survive." His argument is best summed up as follows: "we are not as poor as we like to think" (41), highlighting Pakistan's strength in diversity, and in economic terms, Hamid suggests that something as simple as a coherent, fair tax code could allow the nation to concentrate on schools and healthcare, while cutting the strings of American aid and its corresponding intervention in Pakistan's affairs. Maleeha Lodhi's own chapter is a detailed overview of contemporary history, calling attention to political asymmetry, clientelist politics and borrowed growth

as well as security concerns and regional pressures on national unity; ultimately she calls for a “new politics that connects governance to public purpose” (78).

The essays then move into more political themes, and the first among them discusses the army as a central element of Pakistani political, and indeed corporate, life. Shuja Nawaz argues that while the army has historically been a significant power broker, the generation of commanders from the Zia and Musharraf eras is about to retire, thus promising the possibility of change, including the realization that “counterinsurgency operations are 90 per cent political and economic and only 10 per cent military” (93). Saeed Shafqat also discusses the political role of the military, saying that while elections are of course essential to democracy, more attention needs to be paid to the rule of law and the incorporation of cultural pluralism (95), never forgetting the role of various elites within the process; he suggests that the emergence of coalition politics is a hopeful sign. Islam’s role in politics is the focus of Ziad Haider’s essay, tracing its evolution from Jinnah’s comments through the Munir report, Islamization under Zia and Talibanization to the “This is Not Us” movement (129) and the hope that moderate Islam represents the future of Pakistan. A chapter entitled “Battling Militancy,” by Zahid Hussain, continues the discussion, tracing the development of jihadist politics given the situation in Afghanistan.

The focus then shifts to economic policy, beginning with Ishrat Husain’s insistence that economic policies cannot remain sound without solid institutions behind them; he cites the long-term nature of economic progress, while successive governments seem interested only in short-term horizons (149-150). Meekal Ahmed follows the Pakistani economy from the early sixties and periods of relative health, through Ayub Khan’s era, also a time of economic stability, which changes under Bhutto and his nationalization programs, and since then has gone from crisis to crisis, both the government and poor IMF oversight bearing a share of the blame. Competitiveness is the key concept for Muddassar Mazhar Malik, who reminds us that Pakistan is “open for business” despite many challenges to overcome, citing economic potential, natural resources and strategic location as strong points (201). Ziad Alahdad then shifts the focus to energy, a sector in crisis which then has an enormous impact on Pakistan’s economy, all of this in a country with abundant natural energy resources; a more coherent exploitation of Integrated Energy Planning would be part of an overall solution (240).

Strategic issues then occupy several chapters, beginning interestingly with education as part of the formula, as advanced by Shanza Khan and Moeed Yusuf, who suggest that politically-neutral education is the foundation not only of

economic development but also the means to resist violent extremism by building expectations and supplying hope, especially for the young. Pakistan of course possesses nuclear weapons, and Feroz Hassan Khan asks the question, wondering if its nuclear capability has allowed Pakistan to focus itself on other priorities, in other words averting wars rather than fighting them, to paraphrase Bernard Brodie, cited in Khan's essay (268). Munir Akram's essay, "Reversing Strategic 'Shrinkage,'" highlights Pakistan's current challenges: the Pakistani Taliban's attacks in KP and large cities; Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan; Balochi alienation; economic stagnation; energy crises; growing poverty, all of which have contributed to "a dangerous mood of national pessimism," according to Akram (284). Afghanistan occupies Ahmed Rashid's attention, as it has for over thirty years now; he critiques strategic claims that have become worn with time, such as the need for strategic depth for Pakistan (although the notion of 'strategic depth' changes when a country becomes a nuclear power), or India's desire (among other countries) to gain influence in Kabul (314-315). The final essay, "The India Factor," culminates the volume by tracing the tumultuous relations between the two nuclear-armed neighbors, the bumpy road to peace, the effect of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, all within the context of peoples who have not forgotten the trauma of Partition and the secession of East Pakistan. In spite of the obstacles, Syed Rifaat Hussain lists many of the promising agreements that have been reached or are in progress, an encouraging sign and a reminder that good relations are beneficial to both nations.

Human development, Maleeha Lodhi remarks in a concluding note, must be Pakistan's priority, and is within reach, as all of the contributors to the volume insist. Lodhi summarizes thus: "Electoral and political reforms that foster greater and more active participation by Pakistan's growing educated middle class will open up possibilities for the transformation of an increasingly dysfunctional, patronage-dominated polity into one that is able to tap the resilience of the people and meet their needs" (350). *Pakistan: Beyond the 'Crisis State'* is a fine piece of work, written by specialists for an audience of intelligent non-specialists, and achieves its objective admirably. Maleeha Lodhi has succeeded remarkably in her edition of this gathering of clear-sighted experts, who never lose sight of Pakistan's potential beyond its current challenges.

“Your losses travel with you”: Syed Afzal Haider’s cosmopolitan Bildungsroman, *To Be With Her*

Reviewed by Hillary Stringer

To Be With Her. Syed Afzal Haider. San Francisco: Weaver’s Press, 2010. 250 pages. ISBN 978-0-9843776-1-9.

Syed Afzal Haider’s debut novel, *To Be With Her*, traces the journey of a young man perpetually on the move: from India to Pakistan as a young child during the partition; to Stillwater, Oklahoma, for college; then to Chicago for work; and, finally, home again, where Ramzan Pervez Malik, or Rama, must decide between old love and new. “You can leave places,” young Rama thinks as he gazes at the night sky from the boat that takes him away from Pakistan for the first time, “but your losses travel with you” (Haider 81). Rama’s Bildungsroman unfolds in, what Bruce Robbins calls, “actually existing cosmopolitanism [...] a reality of (re) attachment, multiple attachment, or attachment at a distance”(3). Rama’s cosmopolitanism allows him to see America as both a land of “freedom” and entrapment, since “only in America do they have factories that make products that they use to pack other products”(Haider 112). “Packed” in much the same way as other American “products,” Rama can no longer return home the same young man that he was when he left. His relationship with his homeland, his Pakistani fiancée, and his family is uncertain, and he must decide if “home is where the heart is buried,” (247) or if, as he tells his sister, “it is not the end of the world. In fact, it is the birth of a new world for all of us” (245).

To Be With Her explores the trajectory of places lost and found as Rama comes of age both at home and abroad. Some of his “losses” are those typical of the Bildungsroman—innocence, naiveté, and ideals—while others are the product of his exposure to “real” American society, which is not like the movies he watches, but instead a place where “*prejudice [is] based on the color of one’s skin*”(103 emphasizes in original). Haider filters Rama’s growing disillusionment through Rama’s encyclopedic knowledge of American cinema, enacting the argument that “we are connected to all sorts of places, causally if not always consciously, including many that [...] we have perhaps only seen on television—including the place where television itself was manufactured”(Robbins 3). Even before Rama travels away from his native India and Pakistan, he journeys into the world via the silver screens of the Majestic Cinema near his home. Young Rama, who sees “life as a movie,” fashions himself as “a good guy, a main character, a

matinee idol, leading man material” (Haider 9). Rama plans to study abroad in order to seek his fortune as a college-educated engineer while maintaining a relationship with his girlfriend, medical student Leila. Though Leila tries to break things off—“this movie is over,” she tells him (65)—and correctly predicts that his journey to America will divide them, Rama convinces her to stay with him. Leaving for America, Rama tells his family that he wishes to wed Leila and they happily accept his choice. “I don’t mind living in exile,” he tells his college crush, Lisa, “but I would like to die at home”(125). Multiply attached, Rama still views his homeland as a place he must inevitably return to.

Haider frames the narrative of Rama’s “journey,” “education,” and “home,” by referencing *Gone with the Wind* at the beginning and end of the novel. This reference evokes the scene of Scarlett O’Hara clutching the dirt of her beloved “Tara” in her fist, swearing that she will re-make her life on the scorched earth left to her by the Yankee soldiers. The (home)land represented by this earth suggests that a single, essentialist identity is possible within the narrative of the film (and the American South). But this simple explanation is quickly belied by Rama’s actual experience of American racism. The adult Rama looks back at the injustice behind the American culture industry: “The year I was born, 1939, *Gone with the Wind* (220 min., Technicolor) won the Oscar...but more importantly, Hattie McDaniel was the first black actress to win an Academy Award...Hattie McDaniel and her escort were seated at a table in the back, near the kitchen”(9). The charmed life of the big screen is undercut by the realities of American work, which he finds tedious, and the “available” American women (goris), who he finds confusing and unlike Leila.

At first, Rama can fill pages with his devotion to the symbol of his home(land), Leila, who waits patiently in Pakistan and sends him letters on pink scented stationary. But the longer he spends in America, the less he finds to say to her, or to anyone. He begins to “learn all the great American phrases” such as “no kidding” or “you know,” and soon he is “shrugging my shoulders like ‘the natives’ without even knowing it” (113). On a date with the beautiful Alice in Chicago, Rama pretends to be his lady-killer roommate, Latif. He longs to “hold her in my arms and kiss her like Burt kissed Deborah in *From Here to Eternity*”(122). But by the end of the date, “I didn’t even tell her my name”(122). Through silencing Rama, Haider demonstrates the impossibility of simply slipping unscathed into the “Roman” lifestyle of America.

It isn’t until he meets Sabina, a fellow “outsider” who holds multiple and conflicting identities—Jewish but often passing as “white” and a jealous espouser of “free love”—that Rama is able to (re)attach in America. Sabina is the

“unknown that my heart craved in this foreign country”(152). Though she loves Rama as well, Sabine pushes him outside of his comfort zone and forces him to acknowledge his connection to the world around him, stating that “war is a global issue [...] not a local one” (177). Rama visualizes his attraction to Sabina not in American movie terms, but in the Hindu tale of Rama, his namesake, and Rama’s wife Sita. This cosmopolitan assemblage of multiple cultures, faiths, and continents “is a scene from a movie I always wanted to see but hadn’t yet been made” (141). Re-writing the script of the love stories he has spent his life watching, Rama now becomes the “protagonist” that he wants to be. It is only with Sabina that Rama can begin to puzzle out who he is and speak freely about what he wants. He is now the actor, not the acted-upon: “for once I’m at peace. There are no background noises. I’m not asking any questions”(145).

At the end of the novel, when Rama is on a flight back to America—and Sabina—he dreams of work-shopping his own autobiography. His book, unlike *Gone with the Wind*, is said to have “too many unexplained moments in it”(248). Rama knows that he shouldn’t take this as a compliment, but he does, recognizing that “*if I observe a moment of silence for every place I have left, for everyone who is gone and everyone absent [...] I’ll never speak again*”(248 emphasizes in original). The act of speaking, of telling a story that doesn’t begin or end like a movie, is his triumph. Haider allows Rama to accept his losses without categorizing or finalizing them, to exist both at home and abroad as an actual(ized) cosmopolitan thinker and man.

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Islam Versus Western Media, Literary World and Society

By Shamenaz Bano

This is the age of globalization, and in this global world, media plays a vital role and it has a great impact on the society. And as we are now more inter-connected with each other around the world than before, we are more familiar with the events and incidents taking place around the globe than before. We are aware of the happenings of the world because of media. But it is not that media all the time shows the right or clear picture of any fact. Today is the age of embedded journalism and media is greatly affected by this trend. Now we receive news depending upon personal interest. And Western Media takes more and more advantage of it. They only show the fact relevant to their own interest.

Western Media has associated the word ‘terrorism’ with Islam and given it a name as ‘Islamic Terrorism’. Are they not able to see the presence of Non-Muslim terrorist groups rather than the Muslim terrorist groups? There are example of many events, incidents and anti- social activities around the world, which has been regulated by the groups which are Non-Muslims.

The meaning of the word, ‘Jihad’ coined by Western Media is- killing of the Non-Muslims by the Muslims for the sake of religion, which is totally wrong interpretation. The word ‘Jihad’ literally means to strive, to raise your voice again injustice and tyranny. It also means, exerting one’s utmost power contending with an object of disapprobation, and this is of three kinds, namely (1) with a visible enemy (2) with Satan, and (3) with one’s self.

The Holy Quran teaches that when a war breaks out, it should be waged in such a way as to cause the least possible amount of damage to life and property, and hostilities should be brought to close as quickly as possible.

Even some terrorist and miscreant groups have wrongly interpreted the meaning of the word ‘Jihad’ according to their own vested interest, which is wrong. They are doing many wrong things in the name of religion which they should not. If any individual or any group does anything wrong then the whole community should not be blamed. According to Quran:

“They commit a gross sin, then say, we found our Parents doing this and God has commanded us to do it.” says ‘God never advocates sin.’

‘Are you saying about God what you do not know?’¹

Like all the religion of God, Islam ‘submission’ in English promotes peace, love, harmony and brotherhood among the people. Actually the word ‘Islam’ in addition to meaning ‘submission’ (to God) is also derived from the Arabic word ‘Salaam’ (peace). The Muslims (submitters) greet each other by Salaam (Peace be upon you). “How can a religion in which people greet each other by conveying the message of peace, can promote violence?

Many people think that Islam encourages suppression and subjugation of women. Moreover, Western Media shows all the incidents relating ‘mistreatment of women’ in a more comprehensive way. They also popularized that all the rules and regulations regarding the subjugation of women is written in Quran, the holy book of Muslims. The Quran is addressed to all Muslims, and for the most part it does not differentiate between male and female. Man and woman, it says “were created of a single soul,” and are more equal in the sight of God. Women have the right to divorce, to inherit property, to conduct business and to have access to knowledge.

In marriages, Islam insists on the free consent of both, the bride and groom. So girls forced to marry strangers against their will could even be deemed illegal under religious laws. The Act of banning girls from school is forbidden in Islam, which the Taliban should know. Islam on the other hand encourages all Muslims, irrespective of gender to seek knowledge from cradle to grave, from all possible sources.

The veiling of Muslim women is a more complex issue in the Islamic World. People have different opinions, views and logic regarding it. Certainly, the Quran requires them to behave and dress modestly— but these restrictions apply equally to men. Only one verse refers to the veiling of women, stating that the Prophet’s wives should be behind a hijab when his male guests converse with Him.

People have different notions regarding, polygamy in Islam which Quran endorses up to the limit of four wives per man. The Prophet, of course, lived at a time when continual warfare produced large numbers of widows, who were left with little or no provision for themselves and their children. In these circumstances, polygamy was encouraged as an act of charity. Needless to say, the widows were not necessarily young women, but usually mothers of many

¹ The Sacred Text of the Muslims.

children, who came as part of the deal. Polygamy is no longer common, for various good reasons. The Quran states that:

Wives need to be treated fairly and equally—a difficult requirement even for a rich man. Moreover, if a husband wishes to take a second wife, he should not do so if the marriage will be to the detriment of the first.²

So, in a way all the rules and regulations regarding veiling of the women, polygamy or any such were because of the need of the time, which has no relevance in the present time. At that time women were weaker so they needed protection but now, women can defend themselves. Now, the women belonging to any caste, community or any country are strong enough to defend themselves.

There is an anti-Islamic wave in the Occidental world and country like America is a shelter of all un-Islamic activities and miscreants. So because of this, a film like 'Slumdog Millionaire' has bagged 8 Oscar Awards. Danny Boyle, inspired by Vikas Swaroop's novel- *Question and Answers*, directed the film. But there is no Muslim main character in the novel. Thinking in mind the fact that anything against Islam will be a hot cake in the Western World, he has characterized all the Muslim Characters in the novel depicting the juvenile criminalization. He is very well succeeded in his attempt and the outcome is that, 'Slumdog Millionaire' won 8 Oscar Awards and many other prizes in the world, which no Indian has ever dreamt because Indian Films are hardly selected in the international awards and functions. What about Classic films like— 'Mother India' and 'Do Beegha Zameen'. Even if we see in the new era, then there are some very good and remarkable films like— 'Lagaan', 'Border' and 'Rang de Basanti'. Although they were selected but they haven't won any prizes or awards in the international arena. Then what is the significance of these awards and prizes? It seems clear that they like the criticism of the Third World countries or their religion?

This anti-Islamic wave is also utilized by many writers like- Salman Rushdie, Taslima Nasreen, Ayaan Hisri Ali and now Khaled Hosseini. Salman Rushdie can be termed as pioneer in term of criticizing Islam through writing. He has started a trend which has been followed by many others. Born in Bombay (now Mumbai), he went to a school there but later completed his

² In the Sacred Text of the Muslims.

schooling and other education in England. After graduation he went to Pakistan in 1964, where he worked in a television as a copywriter for an advertising agency. After that he returned to England and started writing. He published his first novel, *Grimus* in 1975. His second novel and the most prestigious, *Midnight's Children* was published in 1981. It won many awards and prizes including the distinguished Booker Prize for fiction. In 1993 it was even judged fit for 'Bookers of Bookers, the best novel to have won the Booker Prize for fiction in the award's 25-year history. Though he wrote many novels and a children's book, his fourth novel, *Satanic Verses*, led to accusations of blasphemy against Islam and demonstrations by Islamists groups in India, Pakistan and the world over. He was banned by the Islamic World and a *fatwa* was issued on him by the orthodox Iranian leadership on 14th Feb 1984. As far as he is concerned, he is more British than Muslim? How can he write about Islam when he does not know anything about it? Or he can even be called as Anglicized Muslim.

Taslima Nasreen is the most controversial and the most radical female writer of the Indian sub- continent. Being born in a country like Bangladesh, which is socially and economically very backward, she was deprived of all kinds of freedom in her childhood and youth. Living in such a place, she has been a witness to the miserable condition of the society; she has a great agitation for that, which she has reflected in her writing. Though her writing career started in 1977, but she became famous the world over with her fourth novel, *Lajja*, which came out in February 1993. It is a documentary novel about the precarious existence of the Hindu minority in Bangladesh especially in the aftermath of the destruction of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, in India, by the Hindu fundamentalists on Dec 6, 1992. The Muslim mob in Bangladesh took their revenge on Hindu minority there. Her documentary novel, *Lajja*, is a protest against the torture on the minority community of Bangladesh.

It is good that she protested against the injustice done to the minority community in her country. It is good on the humanitarian ground but it is the people who are wrong and not the religion. Religion does not teach people to maltreat or kill anybody on the basis of any kind of differentiations or for the sake of it. Rather it teaches people to love with all human beings irrespective of caste, creed and color. So, she should criticize people and not the religion.

Khaled Hosseini, an Afghani writer based in America has established himself internationally because of his criticism of the Islamic World. He is an Americanized Muslim because he has little knowledge of his religion. In his novels, *A Thousand Splendid Suns* and *A Kite Runner*, he has portrayed the atrocities of the Taliban in Afghanistan. We, Muslim all over the world condemn

Taliban but what about the destruction done by the American forces on Afghanistan, why is he not able to depict that? If he is unbiased then why he is not able to portray the impact and effect of United States on Afghani people and their country?

Though Khaled Hosseini was born in Kabul, Afghanistan in 1965 but he completed his schooling and other education in United States and he still lives there. In 2003, he released his debut novel, *The Kite Runner*, which became a bestseller, selling in more than almost 48 countries. In 2006, he was named as goodwill envoy to UNHCR, the United Nations Refugees Agency. It is so because of the popularity of his novel. His second novel, *A Thousand Splendid Suns* was released in May of 2007. In 2008, the book was the best novel in the UK (as of April 11, 2008), with more than 700,000 copies sold. Currently it is published in 40 countries. The books written by Hosseini are so popular in the West because of his criticism of Islam.

Ayaan Hisri Ali is a Somalian born African Muslim, who lives in Netherlands. She is a Dutch writer, activist and a politician. She is the internationally renowned author of her memoirs, *The Caged Virgins* and *Infidel*. Ali published *Infidel* in 2007, her autobiography that details Ayaan's life from childhood to her current years in America. She is living under the shadow of a fatwa issued by Islamic fundamentalists for her anti-Islamic views. She is a critic of Islam and she has reflected this in most of her writings. She has received death threats for her controversial writings and views on Islam. Ali is a controversial political figure and very much admired in the West. Being an African still she has a successful career in the politics of Netherlands because of her anti-Islamic views and ideas. In the West she is considered champion of free speech and a political superstar. But she is disowned by her own father and expelled from her family which considers her a traitor.

Among all these writers, the one common thing is that, they are living in West and they have patronized by the Western Countries because they are criticizing Islam. They are often getting Awards, Prizes and Honours. Though, being exiled from their own countries they have been patronized by the Western world, which is providing them a permanent refuge. All these writers want to reform Islam but with the negative approach. They should see the examples of Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Mahatma and many other social reformers who have reformed the Hindu society by abolishing many unjust age-old customs and traditions without criticizing the Hindu religion.

But there's a strong movement now developing in the Third World, in Africa and in India and Pakistan and elsewhere, where people from the Third World are becoming increasingly more resistant to any critical portrayals of them, whether it's the Islamic Community or whether as with, say, Naipaul's, *Among the Believers* or with Rushdie's *Satanic Verses*, where they reacted strongly to it, or whether it's the Parsi Community or whether it's the West African's— they are saying, “ Why are our own people criticizing us?” Bapsi Sidhwa thinks on this question:

There is a distinction to be made between those who have been brought up in the West writing and those who are writing within their countries do tend to be more critical. It almost appears sometimes that they're pandering to the Western world, reinforcing the stereotypes the Western world would like to see reinforced and perhaps feel they can't do it themselves would prefer somebody else to do it for them. And here again the question of trust comes up. For one thing, writers who are writing from outside their part of the world are using English as a medium. They are writing in a different language from that of the native person they are talking about, and these people feel that they have to wait and see, “are these people to be trusted because they are writing in a foreign language?” Very often the trust, they find, is misplaced. I do find that each writer has to develop trust within his or her own country individually... Then, of course, there's this whole new body of writers who live in England, let's say, or perhaps in France, who writes about their countries, be it Africa, Be it in the Subcontinent, and their way of presenting things, their whole slant on the world and their part of the world, because they're living in a foreign country and they've adopted another country, does change. It somehow alters. There's less compassion. There is less realism, and they start seeing their backgrounds the way the West has been seeing them. They see them through almost pitiless glasses, not tempered with tolerance and compassion. They paint the whole image with the faults and the better points, and they bring out

a human fabric, the condition of people there in its entirety, rather than just one aspect.³

Although there is an East–West conflict in the world, still there are examples of many people in the East who though belonging to the West have served there. In the East there is the big example of Mother Theresa, who despite being born in Yugoslavia has given her entire life serving to the poor and the destitute in India.

Freedom of expression is necessary for every individual but it should not hurt the religious or any kind of sentiments of any. Any writer writing in East or West should respect the feelings of other people. They should tend to write such things that can unite people and it should not discriminate on any basis or bring hatred in the minds of people. Same is the case with media also because pen works better than the sword.

We should build a world free from all kinds of prejudices of caste, creed, religion, gender or East–West conflict. A world where there is love and compassion for every individual irrespective without any discrimination. Because humankind is grater than anything in this world.

“There is no religion, greater than the religion of humanity.
And that no service is greater than the service of mankind.”

³

Feroze Jussawalla and Reed Way Dasenbrock, eds *Interviews with Writers of the Post-Colonial World* (Jackson and London University, Press of Mississippi, 1992) p. 207.

A Tribute to the Legendary Singer Pathanay Khan

By Waqar Haider Hashmi

Disclaimer: The article is based purely on the personal views of the author as it is difficult rather impossible to fully grasp and convey the essence of the multi-dimensional spiritual experience. Therefore, references are given wherever possible to substantiate the comments.

Give me wine to drink and tell me it is wine.
Do not give it to me in secret, when it can be given openly...¹

(Let my eye see it and my hand touch it and my palate taste it and my nose smell it: and yet there remains one sense to be gratified, i.e., my hearing: tell me, therefore, this is wine, that my ear may feel the same delight as my other senses do.)²

I should properly introduce Pathanay to the readers before highlighting the dimensions that inspire me in his adaptations of the mystical soul-elevating singing.

Ghulam Muhammad, a Seraiki (an ethnic group of Southern Punjab) folk singer who became popular with the name of 'Pathanay Khan'³ was born in 1926 in a small village situated in the heart of Thal Desert near Kot Addu, Muzaffargarh, Punjab. The name, 'Pathana' (in the Thal region 'Pathana' symbolizes love and valor) was given to him by his mother, which is now written as 'Pathanay.' He sang mostly Kafis (a classical form of Sufi poetry) and ghazals (a popular poetic form in Indo-Pak sub-continent consisting of rhymic couplets and a refrain, with each line sharing the same meter). He is called the 'Flower of Rohi'⁴ and his singing style symbolizes a 'whirlwind.'⁵ During his singing career he won a total of 79 awards including the Preidential Pride of Performance Award (1979), PTV Millennium Award, Khawaja Ghulam Farid Award, Rohi Award, Thal Award.⁶ His reverence for Baba Ghulam Farid is widely acknowledged.⁴ He died at the age of 74 and was laid to rest in his native town Kot Addu in the year 2000.

Even though Pathanay sang many a classic Kafi, but among general public in Pakistan his arguably most popular hit is Baba Ghulam Farid's 'Mehnda Ishq Vi

Toun (You Are My Love and Everything)' in which the revered Sufi poet artistically and eloquently highlights his experience of seeing the reflection of God in everything he ponders over or lives through. Here Baba Ghulam Farid uses different veils as mediums to visualize God and as a mechanism to shed light on the intricate relationship between micro-cosmic and macro-cosmic views of the universe in Sufi philosophy.

There are 46 lines rendered by Pathanay of this Kafi no. 132⁸ in which the 'Beloved' is compared with 112 different things (causes & effects continuum) including love, friend, religion, faith, hope, Kaaba, spirit, heart, soul, sorrow, happiness, reason for joy, cause of efforts, grandeur, beauty, understanding, Rohi (a place in the Seraiki belt of the Punjab province), and Cholistan (a desert in Punjab) etc. The swirling highs and lows of the mystic thought wrapped in divine love are smoothly conducted by Pathanay in his perceptive rendition and at times one feels that he is conveying the esoteric meaning of spiritual dimensions touched delicately by the great Sufi poet merely by outwardly singing the lyrics.

Baba Bulleh Shah's passionate, moving and expressive 'Menda Ranjhan Hun Koi Hor (Now Someone Else is My Beloved)' was perfected by Pathanay Khan and his rendition of this Kafi is enriching and enthralling as usual. The main theme of the Kafi is transition or departure of soul from 'worldly love (Ishq-e-Majazi)' towards and into 'true love (Ishq-e-Haqiqi).' Baba Bulleh says:

Arsh Munawar Bangaun Millian,
Sunian Takht Lahore...

(From the gleaming heavens the call for prayer was made and it was heard at the throne of Lahore – Seat of Baba Bulleh Shah's spiritual teacher/master Inayat Shah.)

Pathanay portrays the high spiritual alleviation when he says 'Arsh (heaven)' with authority and grace and the beauty and magnificence when he says 'Munawar (brightly lit)'; and he stresses on 'Bangaun Millian (prayers were called)' as the prayers are traditionally called in Punjabi style in order to invite people to come to prayers with devotion and commitment. Such attention to details is a clear evidence of Pathanay's class. It is not possible to tell whether in this verse Baba Bulleh Shah is pointing out at his connection to mysticism through his teacher Inayat Shah or was it some sort of experience he came across earlier during his mystic endeavors.

My favorite, Shah Hussain's 'Ghous Charakhra', revolves around the relationship of the body, the spirit and the soul. One of the oldest known forms of the spinning wheel, the 'Charkha' (in Urdu & 'Charakhra' in Punjabi) is a small, portable, hand-spun wheel, which is ideal for spinning cotton yarn and other fine short-staple fibers, though it can be used to spin other fibers as well.⁹ Shah Hussain symbolizes 'Charakhra' with the body and the force that spins the soul with the spirit. The twists and turns demonstrated by Pathanay become so absorbing that it is hard to separate music from lyrics and thoughts. It seems that all ingredients of this masterful mix of art piece were made for each other as they intermingle so sublimely. The combination of all the elements; the lyricist, singer, lyrics and music is such harmonized that it seems the wheel of existence is actually spinning. 'Charkha' says 'Sain Sain (Lord Lord)' like an ecstatic whirling dervish who is experiencing the profundity of annihilation.

Hur Dam Naam Sambhal Sain Da,
Taan Tu Athar Theewain.

(Always protect the name of the Lord so that you become pure.)

Another testimony to Pathanay's singing prowess is when he recites this verse by stressing the element of care on 'Sambhal (protect)' and purity on 'Athar (pure)' in order to truly convey the real meaning to the listener. Pathanay ends this Kafi with a subtle concluding note which gives a feeling of a feather gently twisting and turning in air and later settling down on a boat floating in serene sea waters after a storm.

Another masterpiece Kafi sung by Pathanay is Baba Bulleh Shah's 'Waje Allah Wali Taar (Allah's Wire Strums)' in which Bulleh explains different stages of self purification and mortification in this Kafi. It contains advice, caution and admonition for those who opt to tread upon the path of mysticism. At the time of creation all souls were pure and 'nafs (impure human desire)' transmit impurity into it. It was departure from 'Khair (virtue)' that made the soul go astray. Pathanay adeptly captures the different moods portrayed in the Kafi and sings the divine decree 'Kun Fa Yakoon (Lord Almighty says 'Be and it is!')' in a befitting manner in style and grace. The synchronization of the ode of life to the tune of divine love is subtly demonstrated by Pathanay. 'Empty is the heart which does not understand love & fool is the one who does not recognize love', softly sings Pathanay while articulating Bulleh's philosophy.

There is an exhaustive list of Pathanay's hits and commenting on each one of them is beyond the scope of this brief treatise. Pathanay's voice was just perfect

Waqar Haider Hashmi

for mystical singing and as far as I am concerned, I can safely say that all the Sufi music I ‘travel through’, listening to Pathanay’s renditions of immortal work of the great Punjabi spiritual masters, is like coming ‘home.’

History in Fiction / Fiction in History

By David Waterman

The research center Spaces/Writings of the University of Paris West Nanterre La Défense (10) organized a study day on Friday 4 November, the first in a series addressing the theme of History in Fiction / Fiction in History.

Kamila Shamsie was the guest of honor, invited to discuss her novel *Burnt Shadows* which was translated and published in French by Buchet-Chastel with the title *Quand blanchit le monde*.

Quoting from the invitation: The Pakistani writer Kamila Shamsie is the recipient of both a rich literary heritage and prestigious awards. Her fifth novel, *Burnt Shadows* (Bloomsbury 2009, *Quand blanchit le monde* 2010) is ambitious in the amplitude of its historical setting (from Hiroshima to 11 September) and in its geographical space (from Japan to North America, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey), as well as in its intrigue which links the ‘Kipling’ game with ‘Rushdie’ magic and is remarkable in its sensitivity to sounds and foreign terms. This multigenerational novel plunges us into the postcommunist world by means of two friends whose destinies are connected – the Pakistani Raza Ashraf and the American Harry Burton, and delivers a message of peace thanks to the central character and exceptional woman, Hiroko Tanaka.

Kamila Shamsie was introduced by Geetha Ganapathy-Doré, Associate Professor at the University of Paris 13, accompanied by the French publisher Marc Parent. Following was a discussion animated by Corinne Alexandre-Garner, Associate Professor at the University of Paris 10 and Cécile Oumhani, Associate Professor at the University of Paris 12.

Some of the points highlighted by Ms. Shamsie regarding the development of *Burnt Shadows*: the fact that the bombing of Hiroshima was terrible, but worse yet was the decision to drop a second bomb three days later; the South Asian nuclear tests of 1998; people finding themselves on the wrong side of history; how the details of history become part of the fictional story; doing extensive research on the where and when; the refusal to be voyeuristic or to aestheticize

David Waterman

violence; how she writes to understand rather than contribute something to the world; how the State can be deceived by an act of imagination; and finally, that it takes more than Babel, more than polyglots, to make things work.

Many thanks to the organizers, and especially to Kamila Shamsie for coming to Paris and participating in the seminar.

Jinnah's Typewriter

By Shadab Zeest Hashmi

Your typewriter has been found
in a tangle of seaweed

clacking over the waves of the Arabian Sea
in sand-grit staccato

for sixty odd years
churning the same speech

first in the key
of partition trains rattling
with the dead
then the massacre of '71
the "hunter-killer"
MQ-nines

The sea
smooth as carbon paper
clones a speech with every wave:
Unity, Faith, Discipline

What was spilled
came back as hardened coral:

Each time a still-birth

Your typewriter keeps time
with the beggar-women
sobbing
by the shore

Fatima Jinnah Enters her Brother's Study

By Shadab Zeest Hashmi

In your study
a large shadow spun of thought

What the camera will catch:
a lizard between window slats
curtains sighing
their dusty sighs
on fine porcelain
mother of pearl inlay
and ivory-handled things
Then rain slanting in
on leather trimmed
gilt-edged things

The camera will feed on nonsense
while the shadow stretches
long waking hours filled with work
hanging in corners

between the lips of monsoon-sagged
maps
half rolled

holding
but a wish

The invocation

By Rizwan Akhtar

*Oh Thou whose home is every melancholy heart
I have brought other homes too just for thy sake.
(Faiz Ahmad Faiz)**

Men wear self-patronising smiles
and starched white clothes
in running waters wash
their furling beards

the heart is their prayer mattress
arteries clogged with straws
here and there foreheads brush
the blood-pumping edges tremble
the rind-crusts skin throbs

finger indexing upwards
he dances to the Arabic lilt
the azan makes its way
through streets of Lahore

in the dusty horizon
the cloudy peripheries
(cast by the twilight)
diminish
he collapses on the footsteps
with melancholic ease
someone acknowledges
his refusal
to join the congregation

eliminated from the ranks
his beggarly patched body
cudgelled and cursed
laughingly he asks for 'more' ...

evening touches

the Badshahi masjid*
the fragrance from the relics*
travels out of the arched openings
the moon forgets its shadow
on the cave's spidery mouth
he picks the footprints silently.

* literal translation of the couplets taken from the last poem of Faiz Ahmad Faiz from *Nuskha Hai Wafa-Kulliyat e Faiz* (Oeuvre). It is a *naat* written in Persian. The *naat* in Urdu is written in praise of Muhammad (pbuh).

*allusion to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) relics preserved in the Badshahi Masjid

*the mosque commissioned by the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb in 1671 and completed in 1673 in Lahore.

Recent Pakistan-related Texts

Compiled by David Waterman

Ahlstrand, Kajsa and Goran Gunner. *Non-Muslims in Muslim Majority Societies: With Focus on the Middle East and Pakistan* [Paperback]. Lutterworth Press (November 15, 2011). 174 pages. ISBN-13: 978-0718892449.

Ahmad, Jamil. *The Wandering Falcon* [Hardcover]. Riverhead Hardcover (October 13, 2011). 256 pages. ISBN-13: 978-1594488276.

Armajani, Jon. *Modern Islamist Movements: History, Religion, and Politics* [Paperback]. Wiley-Blackwell; 1 edition (December 27, 2011). 248 pages. ISBN-13: 978-1405117425.

Clark, Sharri R. *The Social Lives of Figurines: Recontextualizing the Third Millennium BC Terracotta Figurines from Harappa (Pakistan)* (American School of Prehistoric Research Monograph) [Hardcover]. Oxbow Books (November 30, 2011). 512 pages. ISBN-13: 978-1842174555.

Cohen, Stephen Philip. *The Future of Pakistan* [Paperback]. Brookings Institution Press (November 8, 2011). 325 pages. ISBN-13: 978-0815721802.

Connah, Roger. *The Rest is Silence: Zahoor Ul Akhlaq - Art and Society in Pakistan* [Hardcover]. Oxford University Press (November 24, 2011). 350 pages. ISBN-13: 978-0195474725.

Farwell, James P. Foreward Joseph D. Duffey. *The Pakistan Cauldron: Conspiracy, Assassination & Instability* [Hardcover]. Potomac Books Inc. (October 31, 2011). 304 pages. ISBN-13: 978-1597979825.

Gale. *Major Companies of Asia and Australasia: South Asia - Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka* [Library Binding]. Graham & Whiteside; 14 edition (December 20, 2011). 690 pages. ISBN-13: 978-1860997006.

- Hussain, Altaf. *My Life's Journey* [Hardcover]. Oxford University Press (October 27, 2011). 250 pages. ISBN-13: 978-0199063413.
- Husain, Irfan and Stephen Philip Cohen. *Fatal Faultlines: Pakistan, Islam and the West* [Paperback]. Arc Manor; First edition (November 15, 2011). 256 pages. ISBN-13: 978-1604504781.
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- Khan, Imran. *Pakistan: A Personal History* [Hardcover]. Bantam Press (October 25, 2011). 400 pages. ISBN-13: 978-0593067741.
- Khan, Riaz Mohammad. *Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity* [Hardcover]. The Johns Hopkins University Press; 1 edition (July 19, 2011). 400 pages. ISBN-13: 978-1421403847.
- Langah, Nukhbah Taj. *Poetry as Resistance: Islam and Ethnicity in Postcolonial Pakistan* [Hardcover]. Routledge India; 1 edition (November 11, 2011). 296 pages. ISBN-13: 978-0415501460.
- Marsden, Magnus, Editor. *Islam and Society in Pakistan: Anthropological Perspectives* (Oxford in Pakistan Readings in Sociology & Social Anthropology) [Hardcover]. Oxford University Press (November 2011). 500 pages. ISBN-13: 978-0195479577.
- Mass, Leslie Noyes. *Back to Pakistan: A Fifty-Year Journey* [Hardcover]. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers (September 15, 2011). 236 pages. ISBN-13: 978-1442213197.
- Matthew McCartney. *Pakistan - The Political Economy of Growth, Stagnation and the State, 1951-2009* (Routledge Studies in the Growth Economies of Asia) [Hardcover]. Routledge; 1 edition (September 20, 2011). 254 pages. ISBN-13: 978-0415577472.
- Mir, Amir. *Talibanisation of Pakistan* [Paperback]. Biteback Limited (November 3, 2011). 464 pages. ISBN-13: 978-1849541275.

- Misra, Ashutosh and Michael E. Clarke, Editors. *Pakistan's Stability Paradox: Domestic, Regional and International Dimensions* [Hardcover].
Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series (October 28, 2011). 240 pages. ISBN-13: 978-0415619486.
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Routledge; 1 edition (December 29, 2011). 176 pages. ISBN-13: 978-0415688345
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- Roy, Arundhati, Pankaj Mishra, Hilal Bhat, Angana Chatterji and Tariq Ali. *Kashmir: The Case for Freedom* [Paperback].
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- Schmidt, John R. *The Unraveling: Pakistan in the Age of Jihad* [Hardcover].
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- Siddiqui, Omar, Editor. *Environmental Stress in Pakistan and U.S. Interests* [Paperback].
Nova Science Pub Inc (October 2011). ISBN-13: 978-1614702245.

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Wolpert, Stanley. *India and Pakistan: Continued Conflict or Cooperation?*
[Paperback]. University of California Press; 1 edition (November 1,
2011). 144 pages. ISBN-13: 978-0520271401.