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Pakistaniaat: A Journal of Pakistan Studies

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On Improving Social Sciences Education in Pakistan*

By Asad Zaman

Introduction

Many authors have lamented the state of social sciences in Pakistan (e.g. Nadeem-ul-Haque (2007) or Inayatullah *et. al.* (2005)). The HEC has also taken note of the lack of significant research, shortage of suitably trained faculty, and created a Committee for Development of Social Sciences and Humanities to find remedies. However, before rushing to solutions, I believe we must take time out for an accurate diagnosis. It has happened all too often that impatient activists have not taken out sufficient time to pause for diagnosis, and have ended up administering the wrong medicine in their haste.

Why is the state of social sciences going from bad to worse in Pakistan? A simple answer, often given, is that there is no money in it. The argument goes as follows: our best and brightest students traditionally chose to study Engineering and Medicine, because these professions offered the best prospects. When MBA's and Computer Sciences started to pay, degrees in these areas also became popular. When Social Scientists start earning well, we will get more enrollments and attract better faculty, and generally improve the state of affairs. Those with market-oriented views, especially popular among economists, believe that market prices are socially optimal. That is, low wages for social science means that social sciences are not very valuable or productive for society. If this is so, then there is no problem to fix. We should not invest resources in areas that are not very productive or valuable. Several prominent educationists have expressed the sentiment that developing countries cannot afford to waste resources on philosophy, literature or soft sciences – these luxuries can only be afforded by the rich. We must concentrate on science, technology, infrastructure etc. as the route to riches.

This diagnosis suggests that we treat the problem with benign neglect. This is not only naïve, but dangerously wrong. In fact, the poor health of the social sciences is an extremely serious problem, solving it is a high priority issue, and our approach to the solution will significantly impact the future of Pakistan. At the same time, the problem is complex and multi-dimensional, and solutions will require coordinated efforts on several fronts to succeed. In *Education in*

Pakistan, Qureshi (1975) described the historical process, which led to rote-learning, and a meaningless education system aimed only at getting jobs, rather than advancing learning and creating the thrill of advancing the frontiers of knowledge. In this short article, it is not possible for me to discuss all of these various dimensions. Instead I focus on just one aspect, namely the extent to which we should borrow from Western social sciences to improve the state of affairs in Pakistan.

Western Universalism

During the historical phase called ‘the Enlightenment’ of the West, the idea that all societies follow the same trajectory was born. The West was the most advanced and developed of all societies. Other societies were primitive and under-developed. As these other societies matured and grew, they would follow the same stages that were followed by the West, and eventually become like modern Western societies. Early thinkers like Comte (1855), and more recent ones like Rostow (1978), described the stages in growth from primitive society to modern ones in a ‘logical’ sequence. This set of ideas is called “Western Universalism.” The term ‘developing country,’ which has replaced ‘under-developed country’ also reflects this idea; see Wallerstein (2006).

Social science is the study of human experience. It attempts to find patterns displayed, and commonalities in human interactions in small and large groups. The idea of Western universalism suggests that the Western experience is relevant for all of humanity – any patterns and commonalities of European history will eventually be found in all societies as they develop. In this case, even though social science developed in the West, it can be universally applied to all societies.

Substantial evidence has emerged that Western Universalism is wrong. All cultures are not essentially the same as primitive Western cultures, nor do they all follow the same development trajectories. The attempt to fit all societies onto the European pattern leads to clearly recognizable biases known as “Eurocentricism.” Many aspects of the European experience are unique to Europe and were not (and likely will not be) experienced by other societies (and vice-versa). Insights of social science based on these particular European experiences are peculiar to the West and cannot be generalized to other societies. Many authors have documented problems and errors resulting from Eurocentricism; see for example, Hodgson and Burke (1993), or Marglin (2007). Mitchell (2002, p. 7) writes that “The possibility of social science is based upon taking certain historical experiences of the West as the template for a universal knowledge.” This means that social science as developed in the West is Western Social Science, and we

cannot safely borrow insights from the West to apply to our society, which has an entirely different history, and entirely different set of potential future trajectories.

There are many peculiarities and quirks of European history that have impacted on the development of social science in the West. I focus on some of the important divergences below. My goal is not to provide a deep analysis of the Western experience, but merely to establish that it differs significantly from ours. To the extent that this experience impacts on Western formulation of social science, we cannot profitably learn from it, and must formulate an understanding of history based on our own experiences.

Western Transition to Secular Thought

Violent religious conflict, and disenchantment of key intellectuals with religion led to the emergence of secular thought in Europe. A brief history is given in Pannenberg (1996), while McGee (1948) gives a detailed history for Britain. Instead of religious principles, society was to be organized using reason and factual knowledge. One problem that immediately emerged was that values could not be derived from facts and logic, as Hume recognized early. At the same time, rules and regulations were essential for a society to function. There were many attempts to find a secular basis for morals; for example *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* by Adam Smith, and *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* by David Hume. Among many approaches, a prominent solution was the “social contract,” a set of rules which all members of a society agreed to live by (though this agreement was not formal and explicit, and the rules were also not written down or even clearly articulated). The ‘rule of law’ and a state empowered to enforce the law became the substitute for morality as given by religious rules. Current European political thought is firmly based on the social contract.

There are two major weaknesses of social contract theories. One is that there is no absolute basis for morality. Whatever the society agrees as the social contract becomes moral. Premarital or extra-marital sex, pedophilia, slavery, bull-fighting, boxing, putting out contracts for assassination, torture, etc. may all be considered moral or immoral according to majority vote. The second weakness is that there is no inner compulsion on anyone to follow the rules. Unlike the moral code, which is binding on individuals by God, and must be followed regardless of whether or not someone is watching, the social contract is to be enforced by the law, the courts and the government. The realization that the social contract is all that stands between a civilized and human society and reversion to barbarism – one cannot assume any standards for human moral conduct mandated by religion – led to greater respect for artificial, variable, incomplete and often incorrect rules embodied in the code of law. The establishment of the ‘rule of law’ in European

states did provide a secular basis for regulating states and was a tremendous achievement. However the weaknesses of the social contract can be illustrated by noting that in the Western judicial system, justice is an incidental byproduct of a mediated struggle between opposing interests. An excellent discussion of the ethical issues is given by a panel of lawyers in “A Case of Competing Loyalties” in *Stanford Magazine* Fall 1983 (p38-43). All lawyers on the panel agreed that a lawyer defending a male client known to him or her to be guilty of rape, nonetheless had the responsibility to destroy the reputation of the female victim if this was the best possible defense. All agreed that the Western criminal defense system was an adversarial process with artificial boundaries, and not a pure search for truth.

Emergence of Social Sciences in the West

Manicas (1989) and Gordon (1991) have both written books on different aspects of the history and philosophy of social sciences. These provide substantial details on European history and how it has influenced the emergence of social sciences. One aspect of this history is Newton’s discovery of gravitation, which was universally admired. Many attempts were made to follow his methodology of using one law (or an economical set of principles) to explain a large and diverse set of phenomena. Economics came closest to this goal in setting up selfishness as the single motive which drives humans, and using this to explain all economic phenomena. Mirowski (1989) has written on how economics was self-consciously modeled on physics. Recent investigations of behavioral economics show that this simplification of human behavior is too extreme, and fails to adequately explain many phenomena; see, for example, Camerer (2003) or Kagel and Roth (1995). Attachment to the mathematical methodology has led to increasing formalism and decreasing relevance in modern economic theory. Blaug (1998) cites a leading editor of an economic journal, who stated that “.. few economists ask themselves what are the crucial economic problems facing society.” In political science, historical and qualitative approaches which recognize the complexity of human behavior have been marginalized. The dominant approaches use mathematical approaches based on ‘rational actor’ models and threatens the earlier classical approach with extinction. In recent dialogue and controversy, documented in *Perestroika* by Monroe (2005), political scientists have pleaded for a live and let live approach, to allow both traditions to survive. Slavish imitation of Western methodology would lead us to reduce humans to selfish automata, and would reduce our understanding of human behavior instead of being illuminating about our society.

Western disenchantment with religion led them to develop a theory of knowledge based solely on facts and reason – this has been labeled ‘empiricism’ or ‘positivism.’ Superficially, this seems like a very attractive proposition; what else is there, apart from facts and reason, on which to base knowledge? Deeper exploration, carried out in the West, leads to several difficulties. One difficulty is that values or social norms cannot be derived from facts and logic. On the other hand, conduct of social policy requires such norms, to differentiate between the good and the bad and to conduct policy to achieve the good and avoid the bad. Efforts of social scientists to be “scientific” have led to hidden moral values which permeate Western formulations and frameworks for social science. These implicit and unexplored background values are often in conflict with traditional values in Pakistan. Foucault’s views on this problem have been articulated as follows: “modern human sciences (biological, psychological, social) purport to offer universal scientific truths about human nature that are, in fact, often mere expressions of ethical and political commitments of a particular society. For a specific example, values implicit in the apparently sterile mathematical and value-neutral framework of economics have been exposed in Nelson (2001), Wilber (2003) and Blaug (1998). In Pakistan we can avoid this confusion and conflict, and base social science directly on openly acknowledged and commonly agreed upon Islamic values. But to do this would require formulating social sciences in a way different from that of Europe.

Demarcation of social sciences into different fields and setting up of boundaries between different fields was also the outcome of particular historical processes in the West. Manicas (1989) has given details of competing traditions, and how accidents of history led to the dominance of one school of thought over others. He has also suggested that as a whole, the ‘wrong’ set of ideas have gained prominence in the social sciences, and major difficulties in understanding the world and human interactions have emerged as a result. Many have echoed his call. As a simple illustration, consider the field demarcation between psychology and economics. Economists refuse to consider the issue of how wealth and material goods affect the sense of satisfaction, well-being, contentment or happiness that people experience, on the ground that these questions belong to the realm of psychology. They consider it as part of their profession to only consider how people can become wealthy. Recent inter-disciplinary investigations have revealed that attitudes towards wealth, methods by which it is acquired, as well as interpersonal dispositions, can play an extremely important role in determining the satisfaction obtained by pursuit of wealth. Lane (2001) and Layard (2005) have documented how vast increases in wealth in Western societies have failed to increase contentment, satisfaction and sense of well-being. This has extremely

serious consequences for economics – if the determined effort being made to increase GNP and wealth has detrimental consequences for human welfare, then what is the point of it all? At the very least, economists must pay attention to these issues, to ensure that the pursuit of wealth has a point in terms of increasing human satisfaction. Recently, the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences (Wallerstein 1996) reported on the need to change the methodology, approach and field boundaries in Western social sciences. It made specific recommendations for different fields based on a detailed analysis.

This situation creates an opportunity for us. There is substantial inertia in Western academia that ties them to conventional approaches. Since we have no investment in past approaches, we are free to “leapfrog” (like the Japanese did in the steel industry) and adopt new approaches to the subject matter. Blaug (1998) has written about the dominance of overly mathematical and irrelevant research produced by economists in USA and Europe, and how moving back towards relevance is difficult because of institutional structures that promote such research.

The Fragmentation of Knowledge in the West

A major problem that affects social sciences acutely is the ‘fragmentation of knowledge.’ This has some relation to the previous issue discussed – artificial discipline boundaries prevent the synthesis of useful information because different pieces lie in different disciplines. Vartan Gregorian (1993), the president of Brown University, discusses many of the problems created by this fragmentation:

specialization, instead of uniting human beings into a general community of values and discourse, has by necessity divided them into small and exclusive coteries, narrow in outlook and interest. It isolates and alienates human beings. Social relations, as a result, cease to be the expression of common perceptions and common beliefs; they are reduced to political relations, to the interplay of competitive, and often antagonistic, groups. Specialized education makes our students into instruments to serve the specialized needs of a society of specialists.

It is generally thought that the fragmentation of knowledge has been caused by the explosion in the quantity of knowledge. There is so much knowledge that no one can know all of it and hence unify it. This is a misconception. From the earliest times, specializations in medicine, architecture, agriculture, philosophy, etc. have been known and recognized as necessities. The presence of an occasional exceptional individual who could know it all (or have broad spectrum knowledge) is neither necessary nor sufficient for the unity of knowledge.

In fact, knowledge is unified by purpose. Having a sense of the broad outlines of human endeavor, and how it serves the human race, one can have an idea of how his/her efforts fit into this big picture. Current conceptions of science militate against this unity. Economists claim their discipline is “positive.” As scientists, they can only assess and explain the factual consequences that will result from different types of economic policies. Judging which policy is better or worse is a normative act, which should be left to policy makers. This type of insulation and fragmentation (which has nothing to do with the explosion of information) has disastrous consequences. If policies enrich a few and impoverish many, or damage the environment and profit the multinationals, or lead to debt and starvation in poor African countries, the economist has nothing to say about it in his status as a scientific economist. The physicist who works round the clock to produce an atom bomb claims that he is not responsible for how it is used. A biologist has discovered high yield varieties of rice, which could feed the whole world. However, distribution, publicity, pushing for policies for adoption etc. are not within his specialty. Instead, if a multinational hires him for developing a variety that is not fertile (so that it will be able to sell new seeds every season), he will do the work for a salary, and not ask whether this development will be harmful to the interests of humanity as a whole.

With increasing secularism, and the basing of knowledge on facts and reason alone, norms and values came to be regarded as unscientific. The glue of the common purpose of service of humankind binds the strands of knowledge together. The idea that life arose by an accident and will perish in another accident denies all purpose to human existence and dissolves this glue, leading to the fragmentation of knowledge. Bertrand Russell (1903), a leading philosopher and architect of dominant modern worldviews has expressed himself poetically on this issue as follows:

That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of Man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins -- all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm

foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built.

Abandonment of Mission of Character Building

Reuben (1996) writes, "Late nineteenth century colleges had the explicit goal to build character and promote morality (understanding of duties to family, community, country and God) while at the same time contributing to the advancement of knowledge. These two goals proved to be incompatible." In a historical process traced by Reuben, universities tried many different methods for character building before finally abandoning the goal and turning purely to the pursuit of knowledge. This historical study of development and evolution of Universities in the USA is an illuminating book, which contains many useful lessons for structuring higher education in Pakistan.

Religious organizations were responsible for founding and funding the vast majority of colleges in the USA. Sectarian promotion policies were seen to lead to loss of academic excellence, and slowly abandoned in favor of tolerance. This policy of tolerance created a dilemma for promotion of morality. With faculty of differing religious views, character building and morality could not be promoted on the basis of a common religious platform. Instead, morality was bound to the "scientific method," on the basis of the perception that: "teachers who did research would impart their enthusiasm to students. In addition, they would also impart the scientific values of unbiased observation, openness, tolerance, sincerity and commitment to students." Efforts were made to find scientific bases for religion and morality. Natural theology, apologetics, scientific justifications for moral principles, and many other intellectual endeavors were part of this movement. At the same time, the recognition that science was supposedly value free led the social sciences to increasingly distance themselves from values and norms. Instead of passionate advocacy of measures to promote human welfare, social sciences moved towards analytical, descriptive and detached observation. This move undercut efforts to base morality on science, and ultimately, after many efforts in different directions, the whole effort was abandoned in USA universities.

Loss of the high moral purpose of universities has been sensed and regretted by many commentators. Many alternatives have been proposed and tried but none has proven successful. Thus students can learn how to manufacture atom bombs in modern universities, but not a word about the morality of killing and torture. The grave consequences of this have been graphically depicted in Glover (2001) in the form of countless atrocities committed in a world which has lost its moral bearings. Finding a solid basis for instilling morals in the coming

generations is an urgent need, but it seems impossible in the Western context. Here in Pakistan, we have agreement on a religion, and therefore the same target is much easier to achieve. However, in imitating the Western educational system, we lose the possibility of doing so.

Lessons for Social Science Education in Pakistan

The main thrust of this essay has been to point out deficiencies in the Western Social Sciences, and suggest that blind imitation is not the route to improving social science education in Pakistan. Instead of advancing the discussion, this actually takes us back one step; we deny the efficacy of one simple, concrete, and often recommended plan of action, without having proposed any replacement. Improving social sciences in Pakistan would be a lot easier if it was just matter of sending enough students to the West to get their doctorates and then hiring them in local universities as teachers. This type of strategy has not worked fine in the Physical Sciences, not to speak of Social Sciences, for reasons already discussed.

What then is the alternative? It is well known that imitating an existing technology is substantially easier than inventing a new one. Our discussion suggests that despite its difficulty, that is what is needed. Borrowing frames, concepts, analytical techniques, etc. from Western social sciences runs serious risks of imposing alien views on local problems. For example, the Marxist concept of conflicts between capitalists and laborers are deeply grounded in Marx's observations of industrializing England, and attempts to impose these categories into the Pakistani context do violence to the ground realities of Pakistani society. Class struggles here occur along entirely different lines. Examples of this type could be multiplied. Our basic suggestion is to dispense entirely with the Western categories and concepts, and look at our own society, find our own prioritization for the problems we face, and find our own solutions. In the process of solving real problems facing Pakistani society, we will automatically create a body of knowledge that we could label "social science." This may well have categories of overlap and similarity with Western social sciences, but will also have its points of difference and singularities. Creation of a new set of sciences from scratch is a mammoth task, and daunted by this, many authors who came close to realizing the necessity of this backed away from grasping the full implications of their own analyses. Writings which debate these issues fall within the broad category of the project of "Islamization of Knowledge" – see for example Al-Attas (1978) and Al-Faruqi (1982) – widely considered to be an important current need of Muslims.

After having stated the main issue in a stark and blunt form, I would like to add some refinements and qualifications. Serious intellectual endeavor requires a substantial amount of discipline and training. Lest there be doubt, let me state that I am a great admirer of the intellectual traditions of the West. Training our scholars in Western social sciences would be a valuable investment, as it would provide them with experience in rigorous analysis and structured argumentation. While much of the substance of Western social sciences is derived from Western experiences and hence cannot be imported, the form of the analysis, the logical rigor and empirical orientation, are very much worth emulating. There is a lot we could learn from post-Modernism, which develops an internal Western critique of much of Western social science. Our colleagues in India have done a lot of work on developing ‘subaltern studies,’ and many other disciplines where they have challenged Eurocentric views and developed and presented their own alternatives. Most importantly, we have our own tradition of Islamic scholarship, which has unsurpassed depth and complexity. Although it has been somnolent in the recent past, there are many signs of its revival. Extending and adapting this intellectual tradition to cope with modern problems would provide a methodology rooted in our own history, with a much better chance to flourish than alien implants. Just as our Islamic tradition has in the past been able to creatively borrow and adapt materials from Greeks, Indian, and many other intellectual corpora, there is no reason that we cannot absorb and assimilate relevant Western insights. In closing, I would note that I have focused almost exclusively on one particular problem, the extent to which we may borrow from Western social sciences, in developing social sciences in Pakistan. A large number of other relevant issues have been ignored. Qureshi (1975) has given an excellent analysis of many of the dimensions of the problem at book length and suggested solutions. Even though the book is old, the problems discussed remain pretty much as described. It is sad that despite its crucial importance to the future of the nation, no real progress has been made towards solving these problems in decades.

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Pakistan's Relations with the United States During Ayub Khan's Period

By Muhammad Iqbal and Samia Khalid

Pakistan-United States Relations:

General Muhammad Ayub Khan after taking over the government in a bloodless coup, 1958 made an announcement regarding the foreign policy of Pakistan and mentioned that we are “the most allied ally”¹ of the United States. This shows that during this era Pakistan became more pro-west. Ayub Khan believed that Pakistan could not make progress unless the Kashmir problem was solved, which was not possible without the help of the Western Bloc. That's why Ayub Khan depended on Western Bloc, especially United States. At that time Pakistan was facing two major problems: the unresolved Kashmir issue and the perceived Security threat from neighbor country, India. On the other side the United States aims were to help Pakistan and to maintain her independence in an area threatened by communism.²

On 5th March, 1959 Pakistan and the United States signed the bilateral agreement of Defense for bilateral cooperation. According to this agreement, United States agreed to cooperate with Pakistan to deal with its security threats and its defense requirements. At the same time the Government of the United States was promoting its national interest by maintaining the peace in South Asia and especially by the preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan. Pakistan reaffirmed its determination to resist the aggression, when United States promised “that in accordance with the constitution of United States, it will take such appropriate action to promote peace and to combat the communist's stability in the Middle East and also in Pakistan.”³ The United States also declared that any attack on Pakistan would be considered as attack on America.⁴ This United States-Pakistan alliance, during the height of the cold war, promoted world peace instead of communist aggression and upgraded defense of Pakistan against all aggression including the possible threat from India.⁵

Actually, India adopted a hostile attitude towards the pact signed between Pakistan and United States. India felt threatened from this pact. So, United States Government approached the Indian authorities for modification or clarification of their point of view according to which the defense pact could not be used against a

security threat for India.⁶ Another reason of bilateral agreement was that when Iraqi Revolutionaries⁷ withdrew from SEATO Pact, America leaned towards Pakistan and agreed to sign bilateral agreement with Pakistan. United States also desired to establish a base in the North West of Pakistan to monitor Russian military research centers. China, however, felt threatened by these developments as the bilateral agreement was seriously against the policies of China, Russia and Afghanistan.⁸

On 30th April, 1959 American National Security Council arranged a meeting under the secretary of State Douglas Dillon about the possibility of the Indus waters settlement. Thus United States supported Pakistan's point of view on the distribution of Indus river waters and provided aid for new projects.⁹ In May 1959, United States sent fresh supply of arms to Pakistan. Ayub Khan demanded for F-104 Fighter aircraft and also informed the United States about the problems created by the United States intelligence activities against Soviet Union from Badaber American base for Pakistan. He also told Ambassador Langley that the Soviet Union and India were security threats for Pakistan, but he did not receive the desired response.¹⁰

On 7th December, 1959 Eisenhower became the first United States president to visit Pakistan. Ayub Khan wholeheartedly welcomed him. Ayub Khan considered the visit of the United States president a major event in the history of Pakistan. During this visit Ayub Khan also informed the United States president about his own planned visit to India for the solution of Kashmir issue.

Ayub Khan also informed Eisenhower that the United States aid to India would be a great threat to Pakistan. On the military assistance to India, American president said that "these problems were already very much in his mind."¹¹ Ayub Khan also informed Eisenhower that Pakistan also felt threatened by China (because at that time Pakistan's relations with China were not so cordial) and demanded F-104 American aircraft immediately. Thus, Eisenhower promised, that he would review the issue and "give the matter further thoughts."¹² Then Eisenhower went to Kabul and later visited India. After he came back to India, Eisenhower found Ayub Khan to be ready to negotiate, but the Indians were not willing to not to yield an inch on the solution of Kashmir. He warned both the countries to go slowly and avoid to war, but Eisenhower's hopes trashed when war of 1965 was started between India and Pakistan.¹³

On 5th May, 1960 Soviet Union captured a spying U-2 aircraft of America. The USSR's Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced that "the United States spy plane bases could be in the Turkey, Iran or in Pakistan. He warned these countries that place their territories at the disposal of aggressive forces (of SEATO and CENTO) and thus making it easier for those forces to act against USSR. He added that in fact these countries are playing with fire."¹⁴

Ayub Khan replied (at that time he was in London) that the Americans were Pakistan's friends. The United States planes flew over Pakistan frequently. Pakistan did not know about the activities of the United States planes after they took off from their bases in Pakistan. Ayub Khan also said that if any aircraft took off from Peshawar in the direction of Soviet Union, Pakistan would protest about it to the United States.¹⁵ Above all statements, it needs to be mentioned that the policies of military Government of Ayub Khan during 1958-60 were completely pro-American.¹⁶

According to Dennis Kux, on 7th May, 1960 when all the leaders of the United States, Soviet Union, France and Britain were gathered on one table for summit in Paris, Washington announced a false statement about captured aircraft. The statement declared that a weather reconnaissance aircraft was lost while flying over the Soviet Union.¹⁷ But in reality that U-2 aircraft was used for getting secret information about Russia and Pakistan had provided the base for such activities in return for military and economic aid.

Resultantly, Pakistan got a lot of aid from western countries, especially for the five year plan in 1960. The United States wanted to provide military aid to Pakistan for strengthening Pakistan's armed forces, which was the greatest stabilizing force in the region and also encouraged Pakistan to participate in concluding defense agreements with other countries.¹⁸ When Kennedy became the United States president, he ignored the interest of Pakistan. Seeing this change in American attitude, Ayub Khan stated that America was most allied ally in Asia where Pakistan was the only Asian country who was a member of both SEATO and CENTO pacts. In 1960, Kennedy decided to give aid to India to assist in their third five year plan. Ayub Khan felt threatened by this American policy shift; he felt this aid would be used against Pakistan. In May 1961 Kennedy decided to send Vice President Lyndon Johnson on a visit to the Philippines, Taiwan, South Vietnam, Thailand, India and Pakistan. The aim of this visit was to strengthen SEATO and to reaffirm the resolve of the United States to help those countries that felt threatened by China and Communists Subversion.¹⁹ American Vice president, Lyndon Johnson, reached Karachi in May 1961. Ayub Khan and Johnson met. Ayub Khan highlighted the importance of Kashmir issue to Johnson and Johnson agreed to try to solve the Kashmir problem. Ayub Khan also expressed his desire for the U.S economic aid and informed Johnson that American aid to India was a direct threat to Pakistan. At a public reception, Karachi Municipal Corporation Chairman, H.M. Habibullah, who spoke in Urdu, criticized the poor American policy on Kashmir issue. At the end of this trip Johnson concluded that the United States wanted to see the modernization of Pakistan's army.²⁰

On 7th March, 1961 Ayub Khan accepted an invitation from President Kennedy to visit the United States. Ayub Khan had first planned that visit in November

1961 but later on the schedule was changed, and Ayub Khan was invited earlier in July 1961 by Kennedy.²¹ Even before the meeting, an exchange of views started between the Pakistani and American Presidents. In these statements both leaders showed a desire for a ten year mutual cooperation program. At this point Ayub Khan stated:

On this occasion I wish to pay special tribute to the enlightened people and leaders of the United States of America, who have been in the forefront in promoting programs of mutual assistance and security amongst free nations.²²

Kennedy replied:

United States has deep interest in the success of second five year plan of Pakistan and reiterated his country's firm intention to support Pakistan's determined efforts to make a plan success.²³

To this Ayub Khan replied:

We in Pakistan are dedicated to the creed of individual liberty, free institutions and independence for all, we want to live in peace and friendliness with all nations of the World and want economic betterment of Pakistan.²⁴

James S. Killen, Director of the United States operation mission to Pakistan, in a statement issued on the occasion of the completion of ten years of United States-Pakistan friendship, in which Pakistan had received \$1.5 billion in aid, said: "After nearly four years in your country, I look over that time and see the great achievement that you have been gained here in Pakistan through the determined effort of the Government and the people of Pakistan." President Kennedy stated "we are proud to have the privilege of working with the people of Pakistan. We have made known our deep interest in the success of second five year plan."²⁵

On 6th July 1961, six days before his visit to United States, Ayub Khan said: "Pakistan was concerned, upset and disappointed over the . . . United States policy in the region." On the eve of his departure for Washington, Ayub Khan said that the increased aid to India poses a great threat for Pakistan.²⁶

On 6th July, 1961 when Ayub Khan threatened that "Pakistan might pull out of United States backed SEATO pact if United States will continue its heavy aid to India."²⁷ Ayub Khan also mentioned, "India has purchased 350 tanks and non recoil guns from United States". The United States State Department replied on this is-

sue on 7th July by saying that over a period of last 10 years India has purchased a limited quantity of military equipment from the United States. Mr. White, Secretary of State, also assured Ayub Khan that “United States Government ready to help Pakistan, in the field of defense and economy.”²⁸

When Ayub Khan reached England, he used these words in a T.V. interview in London: “If India became too powerful, its smaller neighbors would have to seek China’s protection and China could not reject for providing protection.”²⁹ On 11 July, 1961 Ayub Khan paid his official visit to the United States as the president of Pakistan; he was welcomed by President Kennedy. At that time Kennedy declared Pakistan “a powerful force for freedom in its area and praised Pakistan as a first country who offered support to United States during Korean War.”³⁰ In the evening Ayub Khan was entertained to a dinner on rolling Lawns of the White House. At dinner time president Kennedy said that “Ayub Khan had come to United States at a time of hazards and the people of the United States valued friendship in hard times.”³¹ In his address to the Joint session of the United States Congress, Ayub Khan expressed his views on friendship with America in the following words:

We value our friendship with you and we also take deep interest in your affairs.” He made an appeal to congress for economic aid and America today has world agreement. If America feel any difficulty there is no country in Asia where you will be able to put your foot in. we are the only nation who will stand by you.³²

Then again in private discussions Ayub Khan informed Kennedy that India was a great threat to his country, but the United States administration still wanted to provide military aid to India. Ayub Khan warned President Kennedy that “if United States adopts this policy we would withdraw from Pacts and alliances. Kennedy gave assure to Ayub Khan that United States would not lose her friend³³ and Pakistan would receive economic aid, and the United States agency for international development. (AID) offered \$ 500 million over a two year period. After that Ayub Khan also informed Kennedy about poor drainage irrigation system in West Pakistan. A few days after Ayb Khan’s visit, Kennedy sent a high level team to Pakistan which prepared a comprehensive plan to attack the problem. Afterwards economic aid played a major role in funding of large scale and successful projects to improve the drainage and irrigation system. Ayub Khan requested Kennedy to increase aid from \$500 million to \$945 million, but Kennedy refused and told Ayub Khan that “Pakistan would have to increase its own missionary work in this field.³⁴ When asked, at National press club in Washington, about “How would Pakistan react if arms aid was given to India?” Ayub Khan replied:

We have made our position clear to the United States and to the whole world. We want to live in peace with India. If India would use American aid for economic development we have no objection, but it will use for military purposes, the Pakistan had to prepare herself to meet the threat.³⁵

Ayub Khan returned to his country after his visit to the United States on July 19, 1961. In a news conference in Karachi, he declared his visit a success. He also stated: “Kennedy assured me to solve Kashmir problem and also provide military aid to Pakistan.”³⁶ On 15th January, 1962 President Kennedy stated in a news conference in Washington: “We want that both countries (India and Pakistan) to live in peace, and improve their economy.” He also said: “We want Kashmir settlement and not want to blame both countries.”³⁷

On 24th January, 1962 President Kennedy wrote a letter to Ayub Khan and Nehru suggesting that they should accept World Bank president Eugen Black as mediator in the dispute; Ayub Khan accepted that proposal but Nehru rejected it.³⁸ When Kashmir issue was ultimately taken up by the Security Council in February 1962, India requested that Kashmir case should be opened after Indian General Election, but Security Council discussion continued up to June and nothing became of it. Kennedy wanted to solve this problem, but the Soviet Union vetoed the resolution on 22nd June, 1962 ending that session of UN Security Council without any results. After the end of that session, Kennedy assured Ayub Khan that the United States will continue its efforts to solve the Kashmir problem.³⁹

Ayub Khan and President Kennedy met a second time when Ayub Khan visited United States on 24th September, 1962 to attend the UN session. Ayub Khan again emphasized that large scale United States economic aid to India posed a security threat to Pakistan and Kennedy gave same the statements as his previous ones. At that time Kennedy added that United States economic aid would work as a lever to press India to negotiate on Kashmir issue.⁴⁰ The Pakistan Foreign Minister, Muhammad Ali Bogra, met the secretary of State, Dean Rusk, on 13th October, 1962 to discuss the United States aid to India and once again demanded to find a solution to the Kashmir problem. Dean Rusk replied that “the Kashmir problem was irrational and one that had cost Pakistan and India a great deal of money and development. We cannot stake our entire policy in Asia on the settlement of Kashmir.”⁴¹

On 27th October, 1962 Kennedy sent a message to inform Ayub Khan about his decision to provide military aid and assistance to India and his wish was that Pakistan should help India in Sino Indian war of 1962. Ayub Khan replied that Pakistan would not attack Chinese border to help out India. Sino-Indian war started on 12 October, 1962 and ended on 21 November, 1962 with Chinese success. On 21

November China declared a cease fire, after which Indian army surrendered, about two thousand square miles territory in Ladakh (Kashmir) and Chinese surrendered 15000 square miles territory in Kashmir on Indian side.⁴³

Ayub Khan called the National-Assembly's emergency session in which he discussed his policies and asked members of the National Assembly to criticize SEATO and CENTO Pacts. He alerted them against extremism and said, "Pakistan had to be grateful to the United States for economic and military assistance. At the same time he was also criticizing the pacts as "Although SEATO and CENTO Pacts had lost much of their meaning or importance."⁴⁴ Then about Kashmir he pointed out that "We have two options to solve Kashmir problem through war or by negotiations," but later on he proffered negotiations. His opinion was that if we withdrew from these Pacts, we will be deprived of Western aid for the construction of Tarbella Dam project, which was essential for the future economic prosperity of Pakistan.⁴⁵

According to Dennis Kux Harriman and Sandy's, American representatives met Ayub Khan on 28 November 1962, and went afterwards to New Delhi to see Nehru. Pakistani leaders agreed to negotiations on Kashmir problem but India refused to do so. In the discussion, Ayub Khan also appeared to agree that the plebiscite was not the best way to settle the Kashmir dispute and Pakistan could not receive all of the Kashmir Valley.⁴⁶ After Sino-Indian war, Kennedy again put pressure on India to solve Kashmir problem. In those days Nehru told the Indian Parliament that he was under great pressure from President Kennedy to solve the Kashmir problem. Kennedy also followed his efforts with six rounds of talk started between both countries, but the talks ended with no solution. America could not succeed in solving the Kashmir dispute.⁴⁷ Pakistan signed the border agreement with China on 29th March, 1963 along with other agreements. After these agreements, American response towards Kashmir dispute was lukewarm as the United States wanted to strengthen India as a regional ally against China. When Pakistan appointed ambassador G. Ahmad on 11th August, 1963 to America, Kennedy said to the new Pakistani ambassador:

We are conditioned by our history. I can well understand your reaction to our extending military aid to India, but allowance must be made for the special circumstances which occasioned our assistance.⁴⁸

After Sino-Pak Agreement on 29th August 1963, Kennedy Administration responded by imposing a restriction on Pakistan for the first time, postponing indefinitely a \$ 4.3 million loan to build a new airport at Dacca, from which Pakistan International Airline was to launch a flight to China. This was a silent protest by America⁴⁹

Then a meeting was held from 3rd September, 1963 to 6th September, 1963 between American and Pakistani secretaries. In the final round, Ayub Khan delivered a speech in which he clarified: “American aid to India is a main cause to increased Indian threat to Pakistan. We want to normalize our relations with neighboring countries India, China and also USSR”⁵⁰. Ball; the American secretary, tried to criticize Ayub Khan’s decision to build friendship with China. Ayub Khan said, “Although we are poor, but we are proud to be Pakistani.”⁵¹ Ayub Khan concluded his speech by saying he was not urging a radical change in United States policy, but wanted to put a safety limitation on their assistance to India.⁵²

On 12th September, 1963, Kennedy replied to United States press conference against Ayub Khan’s suggestion to Ball. Kennedy said “Although we provided so many aids to India against China but now America whole heartedly wishing to solve Kashmir settlement.”⁵³ But Kennedy’s this dream could not complete due to his sudden death on 22nd November, 1963. After Kennedy’s death, Johnson became the new president of United States. He sent General Taylor Maxwell, chairman of United States Joint Chiefs of Staff to visit Pakistan in November, 1963. He met Ayub Khan and asked and tried to realize that in July, 1961 he promised to be with United States and now he has shifted his sympathies to China. Ayub Khan replied this change is result of United States’ changing policy. Taylor complained to Ayub-Khan about Pak- China relation and also asked the problems of region. Ayub Khan said that Pakistan is facing a tragic situation, due to changed policy of United States which provided aid more and more to India. Resultantly Pakistan had to seek the Chinese protection.⁵⁴

Ayub Khan was the pioneer of Pakistan’s multilateral⁵⁵ policy with all the countries. Ayub Khan visited China in March 1965 and USSR in April 1965. These visits were the results of his bilateral policy. During discussion in the National Assembly civil military official member asked him, Pakistan is a small country like a lamb and beside big powers that are like Lion. How can lamb face a lion?⁵⁶ Ayub Khan accepted that “Pakistan is a lamb and major powers are loins. Now we have to decide how to live peacefully among the lions by setting one lion against another.”⁵⁷ He also said that Pakistan would remain membership of CENTO and SEATO Pacts as well as would maintain good relations with China and Soviet Union.⁵⁸

Pakistan’s relation with United States reached at the lowest ebb, when President Johnson cancelled Ayub Khan’s visit to Washington in April, 1965. A few weeks later he also stopped Pakistan’s funds for the third five year plan. During Indo- Pak war, which was started, 6th September, 1965, United States stopped the supply of weapons for both India and Pakistan. On 15th September, 1965 Ayub Khan requested to Johnson for the solution of Kashmir issue. He replied that the United States would work through the United Nations.⁵⁹ Ayub Khan visited Amer-

ica in December 1965, and United States President Johnson met him in Washington, White House. Although Ayub Khan wanted help from Johnson for solution of Kashmir issue, but received poor response. According to Abdul Sattar when Ayub Khan visited London and Washington in December 1965, before going to Tashkent, Johnson told him that the alliances between the United States and Pakistan is over. He said if Pakistan wants military aid from United States in future then you would have to avoid relations with China.⁶⁰

In January 1966, Vice President of United States visited Pakistan, and he announced a loan of \$50 million to Pakistan for import of commodities of its need. The export import Bank also agreed to provide aid and a loan of \$152.3 million to Pakistan.⁶¹ On 17th March, 1966 Secretary of State Rusk issued a statement:

We have just announced our willingness to negotiate on certain economic development loans with India and Pakistan. We are prepared to continue the help if these two countries demonstrate their willingness to take necessary self help measures in the fields of agriculture and other priority areas and find a way to live at peace with each other.⁶²

In April 1966, Secretary of State Dean Rusk even asked foreign minister Bhutto for Pakistan's help to arrange a meeting with Chinese foreign Minister for discussions on Vietnam War. But he did not succeeded in his aim as Bhutto, by then, had resigned. In April 1967, United States President Johnson decided to sell spare parts to both India and Pakistan, but decided not to provide military assistance and financial credit. Although Ayub Khan was pleased to receive spare parts, he did not succeeded in getting military assistance from United States.⁶³

On 22nd December 1967 President Johnson met Ayub Khan at Karachi airport on his way back home from a trip to Vietnam. He agreed to help Pakistan with additional supplies of vegetable oil and wheat.⁶⁴ Bhutto resigned from Foreign Ministership and Mian Arshad Hussain was appointed as the new foreign Minister. He said, in the National Assembly On 28th June 1968:

With a change in the world situation these Pacts SEATO and CENTO have lost a good deal of their importance. If we are continuing our membership of Pact CENTO, it is out of difference to wishes of other members especially Iran and Turkey.⁶⁵

In January 1969, Johnson Government ended and Ayub Khan was also in trouble of his poor health and law and order situation in Pakistan. Nixon took the charge as new President in January 1969, while Ayub Khan resigned in March 1969.⁶⁶

Conclusion

During his whole era, Ayub Khan was fought for a solution of the Kashmir issue on one hand and on other side he was secured western aid for the betterment of economic and military sectors of Pakistan. During the same period while Pakistan was a member of SEATO and CENTO, non-communist pacts, it was also emerging as a strong ally of China, one of the two major communist powers. Pakistan was also on good terms with the Soviet Union. The credit for this leadership in a complex period of world powers goes to Ayub Khan and his vision for Pakistan.

Notes:

1. A. K Hameed, *Foreign Policies of Major Powers*. Lahore: Aziz Publishers, 1989. N.P.
2. Farhat Mahmood, *A History of US Pakistan Relation*. Lahore: Vanguard Books Pvt. Ltd. 1991,35. The world “Communism” means, “Vesting a property in the community. After the Second World War, two powers emerged as big powers like United States and USSR. In Capitalist block United States Britain and France, and in Communism Block USSR and China. So cold war started between two powers and that war converted in hot war 1979, during Soviet Afghan war at last Russia broke in 15 states in 1991.”
3. Farhat Mahmood, *A History of US Pakistan Relation*. Lahore: Vanguard Books Pvt. Ltd. 1991,35. The world “Communism” means, “Vesting a property in the community. After the Second World War, two powers emerged as big powers like United States and USSR. In Capitalist block United States Britain and France, and in Communism Block USSR and China. So cold war started between two powers and that war converted in hot war 1979, during Soviet Afghan war at last Russia broke in 15 states in 1991.”
4. *Dawn* Karachi, 7th March, 1959.
5. *Dawn* Karachi, 7th March, 1959.
6. Farhat, *History of US Pakistan Relation*, 35.
7. United States made this agreement with Pakistan after the reservations of the neighboring countries of Pakistan were over. Moreover, the neighboring countries like India, USSR and China etc, were feeling threat from this bilateral agreement between Pakistan and United States.
8. Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, 50.

9. Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001,104.
10. Ibid.,104.
11. *Dawn* Karachi, 8th December, 1959.
12. *Dawn* Karachi, 8th December, 1959.
13. S.M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Reappraisal*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990,266.
14. *Dawn* Karachi, 6th May, 1960.
15. *Dawn* Karachi, 14th-15th May, 1960.
16. *Dawn* Karachi, 14th –15th May, 1960.
17. Kux, *The United States and Pakistan*, 12.
18. Farhat, *History of US Pakistan Relations*, 82.
19. Muhammad Ayub Khan, *The Pakistan American Alliances Stresses and Strains foreign Affair January 1964*, 195. quoted Farhat Mahmood ,135.
20. Cited in Kux,118.
21. Burk and Ziring, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan* ,269.
22. *Dawn* Karachi, 1st July, 1961.
23. *Dawn* Karachi, 1st July, 1961.
24. *Dawn* Karachi. 1st July, 1961.
25. *Dawn* Karachi. 2nd July, 1961.
26. *Dawn* Karachi. 7th July, 1961.
27. *Pakistan Times*. 8th July 1961
28. *Pakistan Times*. 8th July 1961.
29. Burk and Ziring, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, 269.
30. Farhat Mehmood, *History of US Pakistan Relation*, 146.
31. *Dawn* Karachi. 15th July, 1961.
32. Kux,*The Pakistan and United States*, 122.
33. Ayub Khan, *Friends not Masters*, 137-138.
34. Dennis Kux,*The United States and Pakistan*, 123.
35. Muhammad Ayub Khan, 137.
36. *Dawn* Karachi. 20th July, 1961.
37. *Dawn* Karachi. 16th January, 1962.
38. Farhat,159.
39. G.W. Choudhury, *Pakistan's Relations with India, (1947-66)*. London: Pall Mall Press, 1968,131.
40. Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan*, 127.
41. Farhat, *History of US Pakistan Relation*, 186.
42. *Dawn* Karachi. 22nd November, 1962.
43. Syed Sami Ahamd. *History of Pakistan and Role of the Army*. Karachi: Royal

Book Company, 2004, 277-78.

44. *Dawn* Karachi, 21st November, 1962.

45. *Dawn* Karachi. 21st November, 1962.

46. Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan*, 134.

47. Quoted by W.M. Dobell, "Ramifications of The China, Pakistan Border Treaty" *Pacific Affairs*, 292.

48. Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2005*, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2007, 82.

49. Kux, *Pakistan and United States*, 143.

50. *Ibid*, 143.

51. *Dawn* Karachi, 7th September, 1963.

52. *Ibid*..

53. *Dawn* Karachi. 13th September, 1963.

54. Altaf Gohar, *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler*. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1993, 246-247.

55. Multilateralism is meant that kind of foreign policy in which a balance is maintained between the relations with other powers. Ayub Khan was the Pioneer of Pakistan's Multilateral Policy. He said, "We want to establish normal relations with three powers i.e. America, USSR and China."

56. Sayed Shabbir Hussain. *Ayub Bhutto and Zia: How They Can Fell Victim to Their own Plans*. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2001, 63.

57. *Ibid*, 63.

58. *Ibid*, 63.

59. Rais, Ahmad Khan, *Forty Years of Pakistan United Relations*. Karachi: Royal Book Company, 45.

60. Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, 99-100.

61. K. Arif, *America Pakistan Relations*. Lahore: Vanguard Books LTD, 1984, 128.

62. Kux, *The United states And Pakistan*, 173. Vietnam is an Indo-China country the United States did not want to spread or set up a communist government for this purpose she attacked on Vietnam in 1962. After the prolong straggles of Vietnams Against the United States. China Supported Vietnam against United States. At last Vietnam got victory and consequently United States defeated badly.

63. *Ibid*., 173.

64. *Ibid*., 174.

65. Rais, Ahmad Khan, 52.

66. *Ibid*., 52.

Deliberative Oratory in the Darkest Hour: Style Analysis of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Statement at the Security Council

By Syeda Sara Abbas

In 1971 Pakistan suffered a near death experience: genocide, civil war, migration and territorial reconfiguration. Central to understanding this experience is the statement of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (henceforth Bhutto) at the United Nations Security Council on December 15, 1971. This statement not only embodied the Pakistani reaction and explained the national viewpoint, but it brought forth the major complexities of and the participants in the conflict.¹ Pakistan's viewpoint termed the war as an Indian-Russian conspiracy and not a local movement and Bhutto's statement reflected this binary view. The participants were either aggressors: India and Russia or they were allies, China and U.S. Bhutto viewed France and Britain as aggressors as they had abstained from taking sides. As he tore his papers on the floor of the Security Council, Bhutto showed a deep contempt for the Indian-Russian alliance that had facilitated this disaster.

Writers have stated Pakistan was a country without a viable government, money, international policy or a constitution when the war reached the United Nations on December 4, 1971 (La Porte 105; Raza 122). Several draft resolutions were presented before the Security Council that were either suspended, rejected, vetoed or delayed for deliberation. Because of the unanimity among the members the question was referred to the General Assembly, where Pakistan scored its only diplomatic triumph with the "Uniting for Peace" resolution which recommended a ceasefire. This war was intricate in nature as it involved gross human rights violations and also a territorial conflict between two long-standing enemies. East Pakistan was not a colonial territory nor a separate nation. However the violations of murder, rape and arson were severe enough to deem it an international crisis. Sydney Schanberg, an eye witness and reporter termed it a pogrom and reported

¹ The author would like to thank Claudia Carlos, Assistant Professor in Rhetoric, Department of English, Carnegie Mellon University for reviewing an earlier version of this paper.

one million killed and 400,000 raped (qted in Tharoor). Because of war crimes the issue came back to the Council. The movement between the two forums the General Assembly and the Security Council revealed a dismal understanding and weak handling of the war on Pakistan's side. Pakistani generals drew analogies between 1965 and 1971 and expected the war would end inconclusively as in 1965. They neglected diplomatic channels until the last week. Rafi Raza who accompanied Bhutto to the Security Council claims that they came too late. Bhutto arrived at the Council on December 10, when the Pakistan Army began suffering reversals and the Soviet Union began to appeal for a hearing for the Bangladeshi representatives (Raza 118). He expressed the Pakistani viewpoint in statements delivered on December 13 and 14. He appealed to the Council to condemn Indian aggression and order a ceasefire. US and China, Pakistan's allies, did little to help Pakistan diplomatically. Meanwhile back in the Security Council, the members proposed new resolutions that revealed Pakistan's deteriorating position. The three new draft resolutions, the Polish, the Russian and the Anglo-French recommended a ceasefire with troop withdrawal and power handed over to East Pakistanis. Pakistan's choices were grim: it could accept any resolutions or wait for the army to surrender. Finally on the December 15, Bhutto requested the president of Security Council to convene a session where, in the words of Khalid Hasan, he "made the most emotional, though well-prepared, speech of his career." The fall of Dhaka the next day put an end to all the deliberation.

The focus of this paper is a style analysis of the statement delivered by Bhutto at the United Nations Security Council on December 15, 1971. The statement has three versions: a brief version as reported in *The New York Times* and on YouTube videos. The second version called "My Country Beckons Me" appears in Sani Panhwar's website, www.bhutto.org which is a useful database on Bhutto. The last and more virulent version appears in the government publication, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Speeches in the Security Council September 22 1965, December 1971. This statement has been derived from the last version, the government publication because it is the only published version which appeared during Bhutto's rule in 1972 and can be deemed as authentic.²Bhutto's personal

² Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Speeches in the United Nations Security Council September, 22 1965 and December, 1971. Karachi: 1975. Department of Films and Publication. 43-47

style, flamboyant and binary, is revealed in his writings. Rhetoricians, Edward P. J. Corbett and Robert J. Connors say that style is difficult to describe as it involves language, diction and structure (21). I understand a style analysis as the study of artful expression of ideas. It looks at structural features such as, sentence length, number of words and number of paragraphs.

It also looks at diction, figures of speech and the construction of statement or speech. Holistically a style analysis looks at audience, purpose and message and analyses how a speaker creates and maintains ethos. The style analysis will help to answer the research question: Why did Bhutto, a renowned diplomat, use such “undiplomatic” language in the statement? Why did he tear up his papers? Here is an excerpt from the statement that shows Bhutto’s undiplomatic language:

The Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union talked about realities. Mr. Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union, look at this reality. I know that you are the representative of a great country. You behave like one. The way you throw out your chest, the way you thump the table. You do not talk like Comrade Malik; you talk like Tsar Malik. (Bhutto 45)

I argue that Bhutto’s statement at the UN is a clash of two discourses: the scholarly and theatrical as he was trying to communicate with “two” distinct audiences simultaneously, the international community and the Pakistani nation. As a diplomat he appealed to the western audience and the international community to order a ceasefire so a small country with varied ethnic groups could defend itself. He used scholarly themes laced with rhetorical wordplay for this audience. This was a logical appeal that reached out to smaller countries with heterogeneous populations in the post-colonial era. As a political figure he tried to mentally prepare his voters for the reality of dismemberment and military defeat so they would absolve him of blame. He used theatrical, hyperbolic themes to connect to Pakistani audience. Withstanding his complex personality that points to “feudal ethos and megalomania” Bhutto may have wished to portray himself as an emotional leader as he understood the nuances of Pakistani culture (Gilani 217). Even in normal times, Pakistan’s patrimonial culture requires a feudal ethos and theatrical discourse. In such epic wartimes such discourse would be further exaggerated. Pakistan had been dramatically beaten (Ziring 582). At the eve of the fall of Dhaka, Pakistanis *would not* have responded to a reasonable, responsible, cautious statement. Bhutto created his statement and ethos keeping in

mind the emotional needs of his Pakistan audience. The following statement excerpt shows extreme theatrical discourse:

For four days we have been deliberating here. For four days the Security Council has procrastinated. Why? Because the object was for Dacca to fall. That was the object. It was quite clear to me from the beginning. All right, so what if Dacca falls?... So what if Dacca falls? So what if the whole of East Pakistan falls? So what if the whole of West Pakistan falls? So what if our state is obliterated? We will build a new Pakistan. We will build a better Pakistan. We will build a greater Pakistan... (Bhutto 40-44)

The excerpt begins in active voice, “For four days we have been deliberating here...” but then moves to the passive voice, “...the object was for Dacca to fall.” The sudden shift from the active to the passive hides the doer or the subject. The subject changes from “we” to the “Security Council” in the next sentence. The subject “Security Council” is carried forward in the next sentence, “the object was for..” which is in passive voice. The implied argument is that the Council let Dhaka fall and in this way destroyed Pakistan. The hyperbolic statements “so what if Dhaka falls”, “so what if East Pakistan falls” have a complex rhetorical effect because they are based on actual events and are simultaneously an exaggeration and a fact. Bhutto may have felt safe in indulging in hyperbole as territorially and diplomatically there was little to lose. Hyperbole elicits strong responses from readers, and these statements would have piqued Pakistani readers/ listeners. This hyperbole creates a rationalization that Pakistan was destroyed by the U.N. The next hyperbolic statement, “We will build a greater Pakistan” circumvents the main issues behind the war and creates a simplified solution to the problem. This brief style analysis is representative of the whole paper. The paper will analyze the Bhutto’s statement keeping in mind diplomatic discourse and deliberative oratory.

1. Diplomatic Discourse

Christer Jonsson and Martin Hall expand the understanding of diplomatic communications from “regulated process of communications” or “communication system of an international society” to include symbolic gestures (196). They argue that verbal communication, nonverbal symbols and public and private realms are important repertoire for diplomacy. Expanding on this definition, I posit that diplomatic discourse is the oral, written and visual communication by way of speech, gestures, documentation and body language between diplomats, members

of supranational organizations, global institutions and international groups. Minor gestures as handshakes, facial expressions, stance, tone of voice are thus an important part of diplomatic discourse along with tone, register and language. Diplomatic discourse is highly stylized, adaptive and strategic and depends on the speaker, culture, conflict and era. This conflict came during the Cold War era, where the U.N. worked as a court of appeal. Regional alliances as CENTO, SEATO very much reflected the global hegemony of the two superpowers. Regional powers, digital media and multinationals were yet to evolve and so diplomatic activity at the UN took an enhanced hue and shaped a country's image. Ray T. Donahue and Michael H. Prosser describe the United Nations as "the world's debating society" where countries and regions argue their viewpoints before an august, global audience (221). Condemnation by the UN of any country is diplomatically embarrassing and countries strive to avoid making statements that can bind them. Speechmaking is a social situation and countries display their diplomatic position by the rank of their officials (Donahue and Prosser 124). Pakistan sent its deputy prime minister, a higher-ranking official than India, who sent its foreign minister. This demonstrated the importance the country attached to the conflict. The aim of diplomatic discourse is to promote national values, and language is a tool in peace-building because it is used to create and sustain alliances. Francisco Gomes de Matos recommends that diplomats, "learn to identify and to avoid potentially aggressive, insensitive, offensive, destructive uses of languages" (283). Thus diplomats are trained to project a positive, restrained, serene and rational demeanor while undertaking negotiations on behalf of their country. Speeches at the United Nations can take two main forms: addresses and statements. Addresses are more formal and are given at regular sessions of the General Assembly and Security Council and reflect "a vision for the future"(Donahue and Prosser 223). Statements come at times of crisis during special or emergency sessions at the United Nations and reflect a country's point of view. The Security Council acts a court of appeal between nations by calling on members to stop aggression and withdraw forces. Since statements usually seek to "move an audience towards belief, policy or action" they are part of deliberative oratory (Donahue and Prosser 218).

Bhutto's speech was a statement. It borrowed from the genre of diplomatic discourse by firstly being strategic, secondly by pushing national aims and lastly by using scholarly themes. Scholarly themes are necessary in diplomatic discourse to sway members. These themes are also strategic as they aim for global harmony, national interest and help countries define policies towards an issue. Bhutto used strategy effectively when he reminded smaller countries with

heterogeneous populations that inaction by the United Nation could set a dangerous precedent for their own region. He argued that any country could suffer from secessionist elements and would resort to military force to put down rebels. The UN had to respect the territorial integrity of smaller countries. He argued that smaller countries had to survive in a bipolar world by aligning themselves with the two superpowers; this alignment upset the global balance of power. Bhutto's appeals to nationalistic aims sought to generate general diplomatic support, as he depicted India and Russia as warlike nations, denounced colonial powers for their inaction, and ironically praised China and America for their (nonexistent) support. Lastly the statement carried several scholarly themes with global ramifications: moral ideals, quotes from statesmen such as Jefferson and Wilson, global values such as eradication of poverty and global peace.

The statement broke several conventions of diplomatic discourse as it was simultaneously rude, belligerent and extremely personal. Bhutto's language was belligerent on occasion and his tone and body language were accusatory throughout. He used elaborate hand gestures when talking of "legalization of aggression"(Bhutto 39). Youtube videos from unspecified sources show him sitting back in his chair and turning around to look at everyone in the Council. He tapped his pen several times and did not refer to notes. He paused as he said, "We might have been a party to some settlement" and let his words sink in. His voice cracked with emotion and he waved his hands as he said, "...we will go back and fight." In the video footage, he ended the statement, tore up his papers and walked out the hall with the Pakistani delegation in tow. These symbolic gestures showed his utter disregard dissatisfaction with the proceedings. Even on paper Bhutto's rudeness is significant. He called the Russian representative "a Tsar" (Bhutto 45) and compared the Indian foreign minister to "a janitor":

Mr. President, you referred to the "distinguished" Foreign Minister of India. If he can be Foreign Minister of India, I could have been Prime Minister of united India. But I would rather be a janitor in a free country. (Bhutto 41)

Bhutto spoke in "a voice choking with emotion" (Tanner), and talked about himself excessively during the statement:

My people must know. I have not come here to accept abject surrender. If the Security Council wants me to be a party to the legalization of abject surrender, then I say that under no

circumstances shall *I* be. Yesterday *my* 11-year- old son telephoned *me* from Karachi and said to *me*, "Do not come back with a document of surrender. We do not want to see you back in Pakistan if you come like that." *I* will not take back a document of surrender from the Security Council. *I* will not be a party to the legalization of aggression. (Bhutto 39) (Emphasis added)

Excessive personal references are undesirable in diplomatic discourse as the country is more important than the diplomat. The speaker's aim is to find support for his country's cause while keeping himself in the background.

Deliberative Oratory

This statement was basically persuasive in nature and is an example of deliberative oratory. Corbett and Connors say deliberative oratory is concerned with comparing the worthy with the unworthy and seeks to persuade the audience to pursue a certain viewpoint (271). It is concerned with the expedient, which can be understood as an imperfection marked by a time constraint. The speaker not only wants to persuade his audience, he or she may also want to persuade them *within* a brief span of time. Since deliberative oratory is marked by time-constraints, it uses by- words for stress and to provoke a sense of urgency. These key words are repeated at different times of the discourse for emphasis and repetition. Because deliberative oratory is persuasive in nature, the speaker must have "strong insight into the topic and the audience" (Corbett and Connors 271). The audience has to be won over by depicting the outcome if a course of action is not pursued. Thus comparisons, metaphors and analogies with morals, famous individuals and historical events are common in deliberative oratory.

Bhutto's statement borrowed two conventions from deliberative oratory. First, he used extensive historical analogies. He compared the war to previous wars over disputed territories such as Cypress and Jerusalem. Bhutto also used all rhetorical means to compare Indian aggression to "Hitlerite aggression" (Bhutto 44) and "gunboat diplomacy" (Bhutto 44) implying the military might of the two countries was unbalanced and the world was allowing a larger country with military might to over run a weaker country. In this way he appealed to self-interested smaller countries that feared the territorial ambitions of their stronger neighbors. He painted a picture of a dysfunctional, bipolar world without

international law and precepts where smaller countries were forced to give up territory to larger countries and become “harlots of the world”:

You will be turning the medium-sized and the small countries into the harlots of the world. You cannot do that. It is against civilized concepts, it is against all the rules of civilization and of international morality and justice. (Bhutto 45).

Secondly he used repetition. Repetition of by-words is necessary for stress and to provoke a sense of urgency in deliberative discourse. Bhutto’s by-words referred to the ideals of international community: justice (16 times), free or free country (8 times), foreign occupation (5 times), world peace (4 times), truth (7 times). He repeated Pakistan (53 times) to emphasize his country’s predicament in dwindling time. Time is a precious commodity in wartime and affects the rhetorical situation. Time had run out for Pakistan as Indian troops were outside Dacca and the Pakistani generals had already asked for a surrender (Tanner). The Russian representatives were pressing for a hearing for the Bangladeshi representatives at the UN. Bhutto had merely hours to present his viewpoint, to extricate Pakistan’s honor and to survive this political disaster (Taseer 129). He invoked a sense of time by referring to the death toll in the war, a reference to loss of life that also formed an ethical appeal. Bhutto’s demeanor in the 1971 statement was therefore complicated. It was emotional and theatrical as it was a response to the complicated rhetorical conditions and it was scholarly as it was addressed to an august, law-making body. The statement sought to satisfy the demands of the genre of deliberative oratory even though it defied some of conventions of diplomatic discourse.

Bhutto and his Discourse

Bhutto (1928-1979) is known for his personal magnetism, Oxford diction and what Hafeez Malik says is an “acute sensitivity to the concept of balance of power” (205). It is difficult to categorize Bhutto’s discourse because he served in several roles: academician, diplomat, feudal, politician and ruler. Anwar Hussain Syed describes Bhutto as a mass leader and an intellectual and writes that Bhutto like other populist leaders, such as Nasser, Sukarno and Ghaddafi, ruled through a combination of charisma, autocracy, nationalistic rhetoric and alignment to world order (13). Bhutto used highly stylized language to become Pakistan’s second organic, charismatic, nationalist leader; and by 1971, the 43-year old was a

political maverick and well-known internationally for his flamboyance and oratorical flair.

Bhutto's evolving discourse at the United Nations

Bhutto's discourse in the United Nations began as a guarded, traditional deliberation, wary of global hierarchy, heedful of the limitations faced by smaller countries, and embellished with Latin phrases. His style was narrative and gradual, his arguments were based on *logos*. He mentioned international precepts and laws, theories of statecraft and related these to international predicaments. He repeated themes of peace and friendship. He was a typical diplomat: pedantic, restrained and formal. This quote illustrates formality and is a sample of his early speech where he addressed the General Assembly in 1957. Notice the use of Latin phrase and the pedantic style towards the end:

Before entering into the substance of the issue, please allow me, Mr. Chairman, Sir, to conclude, so to speak, my *obiter dictal* by saying that the most salutary aspect of this discussion is that the "End" or "Objective" of all gathered here is identical. That end is, if I may be permitted to take a slight liberty with the wording of the preamble, to save succeeding generations from the scourge of aggression. All are sedulously seeking to find lasting guarantees for the insurance of perpetual peace. (Bhutto speeches 1948-1965)

The pedanticism showed a careful and in-depth understanding of the global community which had common aims. However metadiscourse in the excerpt, "Before entering into the substance of the issue, please allow me, Mr. Chairman, Sir,..." is representative of seminal work. Because metadiscourse is wordy it shows indirection and formality in a statement before the speaker moves to the main topic. New speakers unsure of audience response use more formality and metadiscourse than experienced speakers. The use of Latin phrases shows his command over the language which was a probably a third language for him. This showcased his brilliance, his learning and his time at Oxford, the world's premier institution. He sounded like a textbook as he was learning the discourse and mannerism of an institution and may have felt this imitative style would show his "place" in the institution. Bhutto's age, 28 years, may have appeared as an impediment so he may have adopted this formal style so seasoned diplomats would consider him seriously. Later his discourse became natural but it was very

much the discourse of a diplomat from a small country. It was rare for a representative from a small country, like Pakistan to display effrontery against the cultural norms of the Security Council. Defying the social norms meant defying the power differential of the world order. A June 1964 speech to the UN similarly shows the formal, pedantic style while providing an intellectual argument on self-regulation:

We have studied the United Nations Charter and we know its limitations. The United Nations is not a super state nor a supreme court. It does not issue edicts or writs, which are necessarily complied with. The Charter has its limitations and we know the pitfalls in taking such problems to the United Nations. In the final analysis, these problems have to be faced and overcome by us, the people of Pakistan (Bhutto speeches 1948-1965)

The reference to documents and laws (charter, edicts, writs) again show a pedantic style. The formal style is enhanced by metadiscursive phrases, “necessarily complied with”, “in the final analysis” which draw attention to the writer. The initial use of the “we” pronoun is interesting as it is ambiguous and Bhutto could have meant himself, Pakistan or the developing world here. Ambiguity is desirable as it allows speakers to shift positions. Furthermore the explanatory statements, “It does not issue...” are ambiguous as they are exclusive in nature. They exclude the working of the UN and focus on its limitations, rather on what the UN does *not* do which in turn creates an argument for self-regulation that countries should resolve their own problems. Bhutto’s pedantic style changed significantly with the ‘65 war and his statements were often laced with hyperbole and irony. In ‘65 Pakistan took the Kashmir issue to the Council and saw a stalemate. Bhutto’s changing style showed pessimism with the UN. Kashmir the center of Bhutto’s hawkish agenda, piqued his belligerent stance. For instance, in a 1965 visit to the UN, he talked about avoiding war for economic well-being. However he chose to include confrontational language among his usual scholarly, humane arguments. After declaring he wanted peace, Bhutto called India “a great monster” and threatened “a thousand year war.” His infamous statement, “Indian dogs are going home...” in the Security Council also came during this session and was reportedly expunged from record (Taseer 60). These contradictory statements which simultaneously praise and declaim were clearly emotional nuance in communicating purpose:

We are a small country and as I said, our resources are limited—one has only to look at a map of the world and a map of the sub-continent to see that we are not interested in war. We do not want aggression—we do not want conflict. We want peace in order that our people can develop...We should like to see all our energies and all our efforts directed towards economic well-being... We are facing a great monster and a great aggressor. We shall wage a war for 1000 years, a war of defense... I am not referring here to some of the remarks made by countries which have no right to be here—they are not even countries... (Bhutto 1-5)

Emotional nuance is individualized marketing: phrases, gestures and body language that piques targeted individuals in a certain way. Floyd Henry Allport, the father of social psychology, describes emotional nuance “as an attitude to feel and react in a highly specific fashion towards another human being” (96). Using emotional nuance shows a deep understanding of the audience, message and purpose because it is tailored to each individual. The audience may feel that the speaker is addressing them individually. It is interesting to see *how and why* Bhutto used emotional nuance. His words reflected the ambivalent relationship between India and Pakistan from the Pakistani viewpoint. Hussain Haqqani writes that both countries needed peace before they could progress but, Bhutto like most Pakistanis particularly felt “that India had not truly recognized partition...”(97).

There are two significant example of emotional nuance before the December 15 statement. The first was at Tashkent, where Bhutto showed his dissatisfaction with the Tashkent Pact by his sullen body language, sulking and later by paranoid, repetitive references (Junejo 51; Gilani 221; Raza 213). In disrespecting Ayub Khan, a Pakistani military dictator and his political godfather, Bhutto showed he was not only against the Pact and the hurried peace with India, but also against Khan and the establishment he represented. The message sent forth was that he “sanctioned” the Pact because of Khan’s presence. The second example was the statement delivered on 14 December, 1971. Amongst his scholarly arguments on alleviation of poverty and global peace, he used Punjabi phrases to address Swaran Singh, the Indian foreign minister, who spoke English in a strong Punjabi accent. In a show of undiplomatic behavior and emotional nuance, Bhutto mimicked him several times in private sessions at Pakistan’s

foreign ministry (Taseer 46). The clash of scholarly and the theatrical discourse is highlighted in 14 December statement. which uses Punjabi phrases in the end:

From the outset I am quite prepared to accept that we have made mistakes...We are prepared to rectify those mistakes in a civilized spirit... And if the world does not seize the problem, if the world does not have the courage and moral fiber to say that these issues must be resolved...And who will suffer? The poor people of India and Pakistan will suffer- and I am a friend of not only the poor people of Pakistan: I am a friend of the poor people of India also. We have more poverty than any other people in the world... Like Alice, we have come to Wonderland to tell you that our country and our subcontinent is turning into a wasteland... *Sonar Bangla, Sardar Sahib eta Ama der Sonar Bangla, Bharater nai*: listen, Sardar Swaran Singh, the golden Bengal belongs to Pakistan, not to India, Golden Bengal belongs to Pakistan. You cannot take away golden Bengal like that from Pakistan. We will fight to the bitter end ... (Bhutto 9-38) [emphasis added]

The Punjabi language is known for its coarse and earthy appeal and this usage brought a village brawl quality to the Security Council. Bhutto may have implied that he expected the listener, a person of a Punjabi heritage, to share the attributes of his language. He had talked about a thousand year war during the campaign and in the UN after '65. However taking it to the Security Council in the given circumstances seems foolhardy for a man of Bhutto's intellect. Why did he do it? Though scholars have tried to delve into Bhutto's complex psychology to assess his confrontational stance, we will look at rhetorical reasons. Bhutto realized that Pakistanis would be listening and tried to address them while talking to the Council. In essence, Bhutto spoke to "two" audiences simultaneously and varied his discourse accordingly.

Scholars have discussed Bhutto's understanding of audience, message and purpose in campaign discourse. All say he expertly played up to his audience's expectations. He knew how to cajole his audience and used emotional nuances to communicate with them at several levels. Syed writes that Bhutto's discourse was his legacy and that his conduct was a mirror in which Pakistanis could view themselves (253-259). Syed Zulfiqar Gilani writes that his discourse cultivated his audience's need for identity and a redeemer or messiah (232). He

thrived on confrontation and assimilated the personal and political (228-229). Akmal Hussain writes that Bhutto cultivated his charisma and encouraged audience participation through rhetorical questions and rhythm. During delivery he sought to look and behave like his audience; he unbuttoned his collar, shirtsleeves and assumed the disheveled appearance of his audience (136). His critics call him a demagogue. Khalid Bin Sayeed says Bhutto entertained his audiences with mimicry and dramatics and was mostly an actor (51). Golan Waheed Chaudhary argues that he could only influence illiterate voters (236). Lawrence Ziring argues that Bhutto happened to be at the right place at the right time in a third world country where the political culture guaranteed the rise of single leader (582). However the extraordinary conditions in which Bhutto created this statement need to be assessed.

The 15 December Statement

This statement was made in extraordinary conditions because of Pakistan's position and Bhutto's own status. Pakistan was not only on the losing side but it was poised to lose half of its territory. There was virtually no historical precedent for this situation. Countries were disembodied after world wars: Ottoman Empire in 1921 and Germany in 1945. Pakistan would face dismemberment similar to that experienced by the Ottoman Empire and Germany and would be divided into smaller countries. Territorial dismemberment would accompany military surrender and national humiliation. The war was too short, the enemy too weak, and the Pakistani Army too entrenched in bloodletting to elicit international sympathy for surrender. Pakistan would suffer the disgrace of the biggest surrender in military history and 93,000 men would lay down their arms. The war meant the end of united Pakistan. There was also the problem of breaking such news to a deeply emotional public that had believed in the invincibility of its armed forces and in the superiority of its culture. Pakistani nationalism stressed cultural superiority over Bengalis and religious superiority over Hindus (Ahmed). Hussain Haqqani says Pakistani generals exaggerated the military strength of their soldiers and said that Muslims had the fighting prowess of five Hindus" (87). These conditions worsened the complicated rhetorical situation. There was also the problem of Bhutto's status. Unlike Swaran Singh, his Indian counterpart, Bhutto had the most to gain politically from the break up of the country as a leader. Unlike Singh, Bhutto was both diplomat and leader and both roles were in direct conflict. Pakistan's loss was his gain. Haqqani argues that Bhutto's trip

to the UN was arranged by the Army to put a civilian façade on a military debacle. The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) realized that schism was inevitable and they would need a charismatic, civilian scapegoat to blame for the break up of Pakistan (88- 91). Bhutto was a deputy prime minister from a martial law regime that itself lacked legitimacy. Ironically he had no fiat and had been almost recalled on his way to New York (Raza 122). There was also the problem of weak ethos. Internationally Bhutto was viewed as brash and fiery (Raza 237; Pace). While at home despite his immense popularity, he was perceived as a maverick and was criticized for his boycott of the Assembly.

The direct audience for the statement was clearly hostile. This audience was comprised of members of the Security Council, elite press and the international community. The reports of mass killings, millions of refugees, and Indian rhetoric had transformed the conflict from an internal issue to a global conflict where superpowers picked sides in glaring view of the international press (La Porte 103). The indirect audience was the people of West Pakistan for whom the primary message was that East Pakistan was lost. Giving this audience the bad news was tricky as the state-controlled media and press had reported glorious victories until the day of the statement. For the East Pakistanis the message was that Bhutto accepted the mistakes made by the army and they could consider him a sympathetic leader. He tried to salvage national pride by shifting attention from the institutional to the individual.

Structure of the Statement

The statement itself was 4678 words long and divided into 26 paragraphs and 288 sentences. His greatest challenge in communicating with a disparate, vast audience. Bhutto used short sentences to simplify the message, and his balanced and varied diction used both formal language and colloquialism to reach his vast, multilingual and global audience. Yet his formal, highly stylized language is also laced with diplomatic jargon quite expected in the Council. Speakers from former colonies have to focus strongly on their diction or risk coming across as deficient, semi-literate or pedantic but Bhutto with his Oxford education faced no such challenge. And having been in the UN since 1957, he knew the demands of the register, genre and the importance of tone (Junejo 33). As he began, he reminded the Council that “a grave moment in his country’s history” gave him the right to speak:

We have met here today at a grave moment in the history of my country and I would request the Council kindly to bear with me and to hear the truth, the bitter truth. The time has come when, as far as Pakistan is concerned, we shall have to speak the truth whether members of the Council like it or not...We were hoping that the Security Council, mindful of its responsibilities for the maintenance of world peace and justice, would act according to principles and bring an end to a naked, brutal aggression against my people... I felt that it was imperative for me to come here and seek justice from the Security Council. But I must say, whether the members like it or not, that the Security Council has denied my country that justice. (Bhutto 39)

Bhutto began the statement in active voice, “We have met here at a grave moment..” which makes brisk, compelling prose and balances the use of abstract terms such as, “grave moment”, “bitter truth”, “brutal aggression”. Abstract terms show emotion and ideals but not doers of actions and are effective in creating *pathos*. The use of strong adjectives, “brutal”, “grave”, “bitter” have strong emotional overtones and immediately set a sanctimonious tone. It is up to Bhutto, the representative of a small country, to remind the UN of its responsibilities. He drew attention away from the responsibilities of Pakistani soldiers towards the responsibilities of the UN delegates. He discussed the principled stance of Pakistan as an independent country facing troubles created by a powerful neighbor. He referred to the history of the Indo-Pakistan conflict and prospects for peace. This was a good rhetorical choice as it was based on *logos*. Formal language is enhanced by nominalizations. Nominalizations give any speech a formal, slow style. Bhutto’s nominalizations included: “dilatatory tactics” (Bhutto 39), “legalization of aggression” (Bhutto 40), “imprisonment” (Bhutto 48). He balanced the formal language with colloquialism, which allowed laymen, press and common people to understand a complicated geopolitical situation in which three countries, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, claimed to be victims:

Let us face the stark truth. I have got no stakes left for the moment (Bhutto 40)

Well, you will be sunk (Bhutto 43)

We will not lick the dust. (Bhutto 46)

The rhetorical effect of colloquialism or everyday language is to simplify the message into something informal, casual which even the general public could understand. Colloquialism makes an abstract idea concrete.

Bhutto established the *ethos*, his authority, by referring to his career as a diplomat, his experience in the Council and also his own reputation as a noted orator. He quoted statesmen like Woodrow Wilson and Thomas Jefferson to identify with his audience. He used these references to frame himself not as a trouble-maker or demagogue but to show his audience, that though he was not from the western world he was an erudite, well-read man like them in thinking and education. They could trust him to tell the truth. In the opening that criticized the Security Council and India, Bhutto described Pakistan as a country wronged by its powerful neighbor, isolated by its allies and neglected by its former colonial masters, and so was forced to speak unpleasant truths and use harsh language because of the severity of the situation. Blistering criticism was tempered by few conciliatory words. He was most critical of the United Nations:

The Security Council has failed miserably, shamefully... President Woodrow Wilson said that he fought the First World War to end wars for all time. The League of Nations came into being and then the United Nations after it. What has the United Nations done? I know of the farce and the fraud of the United Nations. (Bhutto 40)

Bhutto used diction cleverly here by using related terms with emotional connotation: “Wilson”, “League of Nation” and “First World War”. These terms work together to impart a sense of impotence and feebleness because of their associative history. Then the use of emotional terms “shamefully”, “fraud”, “farce” further enhance this connotation. The idea generated is that UN is following in the footsteps of the League. Given the paucity of time, his tone was harsh and sanctimonious from the opening and, throughout the statement he would vary the level of emotional nuance and create theatrical discourse. As in deliberative oratory, he used by-words to exhort his listeners: justice (16 times), world peace (4 times), truth (7 times), Pakistan (53 times). He appealed to the higher aspirations of the Council as a global community. This conflict was an opportunity to exercise the principles of justice and truth which were the ideological foundations of the UN. Neglecting the issue would mean damaging its ideological foundations.

The statement also uses several imperative sentences, which convey a power differential by giving orders or commands. The word “must” is often used and implies that the speaker is somehow in the position to give such commands; this was an extraordinary choice given the rhetorical conditions.

I have some home truths to tell the Security Council. The world *must* know. My people *must* know. (Bhutto 40)

I go back to the Roman Empire and I say what Cato said to the Romans, "Carthage *must* be destroyed." (Bhutto 42)

He was a representative of a small country on the brink of extinction and his own position as deputy prime minister was shaky. Yet he gave advice and orders as if he were truly in power; this created his image of a global *wadera*. Even the plain declarative sentences sound defiant because of the use of action verbs such as must, will, do not:

Do not come back with a document of surrender. (Bhutto 40)

You *will be* turning the medium sized and small countries into the harlots of the world. You *cannot* do that. (Bhutto 45)

Declarative sentences make statements and give information about some noun or verb. Bhutto created an image of power despite with strong verbs such as “do not” and “cannot do”.

Most interesting is the use of abstract terms to refer to terms with negative connotation. These were negative terms such as the Pakistani Army, refugees and massacres which could not have not been mentioned in the Council without censure and would have weakened Pakistan’s stance . Abstract terms refer to ideals and are open to interpretation. He used the abstract terms to gloss over the actions of the Pakistani army who were responsible for the massacres and the refugee problem:

We have been subjected to attack by a militarily powerful neighbour. Who says that the *new reality* arose out of *free will*? (Bhutto 43)

Syeda Sara Abbas

If the Security Council wants me to be *a party* to the *legalization of abject surrender*, then I say that under no circumstances shall I be. (Bhutto 40)

He used the passive voice to shift blame and to prevent mentioning the Pakistan army. The passive voice is always used in shifting blame and is an excellent way of breaking bad news as it hides the subject or the doer of action. It was useful to protect the Army from censure. Bhutto only mentioned the Pakistani soldiers once, in a quotation from British general who praised their valor. He mentioned the Pakistan army indirectly by referring to “the refugee problem” and called the “the massacres” “mistakes”:

The *refugee problem* was used as a pretext, an ugly, crude pretext, a shameful pretext to invade my country, to invade East Pakistan. (Bhutto 44)

Unfortunately, nothing was said of the *massacres* that took place between 1 March and 25 March. No doubt there were *mistakes* on our side. (Bhutto 44)

Bhutto understood that the involvement of several protagonists such as refugees, insurgents, two armies, the UN, Indians and the superpowers made the situation difficult to comprehend. He chose to explain the complicated situation by short sentences, which add energy to any speech (Corbett 465). Average sentence length in this discourse is 16 words³. Short sentences are easier to understand in speech and shows that Bhutto kept in mind the diverse, global listening audience while composing the statement. He also used short sentences to frame analogy and provide varied historical references as he perceived that other countries viewed the dismemberment as a war of liberation. Here are some examples of short sentences used in the statement:

Why can Texas not be free? Let there be a republic of Texas. (Bhutto 46)

Since the Opium War, China has seen reality. The reality for France was that it was under occupation. (Bhutto 42)

³ Corbett and Connor say average sentence length is calculated by dividing the total number of words by the number of sentences (361).

Ethiopia was under Fascist domination. But the Ethiopians fought... Ethiopia is free today. (Bhutto 42)

He also used short sentences to state his central argument. The central argument was laid out in syllogism, a logical appeal, and stated: All countries have problems and make mistakes but they are not dismembered. Pakistan has a problem and has made a mistake. Therefore Pakistan should not be dismembered.

Which Government does not make mistakes? But if some government has made a mistake, does it follow that the country itself must be dismembered, obliterated? Is that going to be the conclusion of the Security Council if it legalized Indian aggression on the soil of Pakistan? (Bhutto 44)

The syllogism simplified the complex event into a two-line argument that would have been easy for even a layman to understand. It also formed a logical appeal that would have piqued the self-interest of smaller countries with separatist groups. It also showed the listening audience that Pakistan was aware of its responsibility in the tragedy. For the Pakistani listeners the implied argument was that international powers contributed to the dismemberment.

The short sentences are placed in paragraphs of varying length. Paragraphs show progression of related ideas on a topic and are usually denoted in speech as pauses. Bhutto used 26 paragraphs in the official version which were both long and short since there were several related topics. The statement's structural strength is revealed in the paragraphing: he used each paragraph to discuss a different aspect. For instance Bhutto used paragraph 2 and 3 to describe the delays by the Council, paragraph 17 to defend the American stance. There are some transitional paragraphs such as 14 and 16 that discuss ideas of world stability and primarily addressed to the Council. There are some capsule or short paragraphs 12, 21 that show that Bhutto was trying to cover a lot of ground in a short time:

East Pakistan is an integral part of Pakistan. Kashmir is a disputed territory. Why does India then not permit it to exercise its will? (Bhutto 44)(Par.12)

Muslim Bengal was a part of Pakistan of its free will, not through money. We did not buy it as Alaska was purchased. Why do the people of the United States not see that? (Bhutto 44)(Par. 21)

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Pronominal references have been used creatively in the statement. The use of second person pronoun “you” made it seem that Bhutto was addressing the listener directly. This gave the entire statement the impact of face-to-face conversation—inclusive and personable—despite being delivered to a larger audience:

You do not need a Secretary General. *You* need a chief executioner. (Bhutto 40)

But the Indians are so short-sighted... But *you* know they do not have vision. (Bhutto 41)

So *you* will see now: this is not the end of the road; this is the beginning of the road... (Bhutto 44)

An interesting finding is the glaring overuse of first- person, singular pronoun. Bhutto referred to himself about 88 times in the statement: he “spoke from the heart”, spoke about his son, his reputation as speaker and his victory in the polls, which was “greater than Mujib ur Rehman’s.” It is difficult to separate the political from the personal in some paragraphs:

I told the United States Ambassador in Pakistan that once a civilian government came into being in Pakistan, *I* was prepared to go to the refugee camps *myself* to talk to them. But they pre-empted it all because the refugee problem was used as a pretext to dismember *my* country. (Bhutto 44) (Emphasis added)

Finally, *I* am not a rat. *I* have never ratted in my life. *I* have faced assassination attempts, *I* have faced imprisonments. *I* have always confronted crises. Today *I* am not ratting, but *I* am leaving your Security Council. *I* find it disgraceful to *my* person and to *my* country to remain here a moment longer than is necessary. *I* am not boycotting... (Bhutto 47-48) (Emphasis added)

Seeing Bhutto’s tremendous eruditeness these statements were a deliberate choice and really tested the limits of diplomatic discourse and truth. Why did he do it? Though it makes for egocentric prose it achieved an important rhetorical goal; the focus of the statement shifted from Pakistan to Bhutto. The man was more visible than his country. This may have seemed to him a good way of

deflecting attention from the terrible humiliation that lay ahead for Pakistan and politically it was advantageous because it showed him as a strong leader who understood his nation.

3. Stylistic Features and Their Rhetorical Effects

Though there are several stylistic features used in the statement I will focus on those that are intimately connected to audience, purpose and message. Bhutto used emotional nuance through rhetorical question and irony, fulfilled purpose through metaphors and metonymy, and stressed the message through anaphora and epistrophe.

There is a discernable pattern of rhetorical questions followed by historical reference. The rhetorical question is used to invoke audience participation and make them feel that the speaker shares their values. It was Bhutto's signature style in campaign speeches, where he used it to assume a defiant posture. Here he used it to create doubts in the listener's mind regarding India:

How is he [the Indian Foreign Minister] distinguished when his hands are full of blood, when his heart is full of venom? (Bhutto 41)

What hope will India give to the people of East Pakistan? What picture of hope is it going to give when its own people in Western Bengal sleep in the streets, where there is terrible poverty, where there is terrible injustice and exploitation, when the parliamentary rule in West Bengal has been superseded by presidential rule? (Bhutto 46)

Rhetorical questions induce the listeners to make an appropriate response and are good devices to keep the audience rhetorically engaged. Here Bhutto used contrasting elements: hope and injustice, presidential rule and parliamentary rule to augment his broader argument of justice and injustice.

Bhutto used apposition exquisitely as irony (emotional nuance) in the statement. Apposition places two coordinate elements side-by-side: the second coordinate explains the first. He used apposition to confront the Indian and Russian representatives and represent them as figures of ridicule:

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If he can be Foreign Minister of India, I could have been Prime Minister of united India. But I would rather be a janitor in a free country. (Bhutto 41)

I know you are the representative of a great country, you behave like one. The way you throw out your chest, the way you thump the table. You don't talk like Comrade Malik, you talk like Tsar Malik. (Bhutto 45)

I don't see what objection he has to it if he sees some similarity between his [Russian] empire and the Roman Empire. (Bhutto 42)

These ironical references are rude, sarcastic and an extreme example of emotional nuance that flout all rules of diplomatic discourse. Irony shows Bhutto's true understanding of elite press (audience) who are more likely to remember and report hyperbolic phrases rather than any clichés. The ironical references also depict contrasting elements or analogies through rhetorical wordplay: "Foreign Minister", "Prime Minister"; "Czar Malik", "Comrade Malik". It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze why Bhutto said this, but one reason may be that Bhutto decided to live up to his reputation as a fiery speaker by indulging in hyperbole and emotional nuance. In some ways he spoke to these individuals as he spoke to political opponents.

He fulfilled purpose through metaphors and metonymy. Metaphors are analogies or comparisons between two similar objects and ideas and express value judgment. Metaphors fulfill the audience's need for simplification (Corbett and Connors 479). Bhutto's metaphors include:

My heart is bleeding. (Bhutto 45)

You will be turning the medium-sized and the small countries into the harlots of the world. (Bhutto 45)

We are your guinea pigs. (Bhutto 46)

Finally I am not a rat. (Bhutto 47)

They seem like survival metaphors as both guinea pigs and rats are hunted down or used in experimentation. Comparing small countries to harlots drew attention

to the precarious situation of weaker countries in a bipolar world. Survival metaphors served to remind smaller countries of the current static hierarchy and power differential. They also helped to repeat the message in a subliminal manner. Bhutto used metonymy for brevity. Metonymy substitutes some attribute or suggestive word for what is actually meant and it is useful for rhetorical wordplay. He summed up the past, present and the future of Indo-Pak relations in a word: Carthage (Bhutto 42), an allusion with a powerful, succinct affect that may have affected the audience because of his well-known hawkish agenda. The connotations of Carthage are infinite, continuous wars until the complete destruction of the enemy.

Bhutto stressed the message through epistrophe and anaphora. These stylistic devices are useful for repetition. Epistrophe is the repetition of the same word or phrases at the end of each successive clause or sentence. Bhutto's epistrophes include:

China was *under foreign occupation* for years. Other countries have been *under foreign occupation*. France was *under foreign occupation*. Western Europe was *under foreign occupation*. (Bhutto 41) (Emphasis added)

But you know *they do not have vision*. The partition of India in 1947 took place because *they did not have vision*. Now also they are lacking vision. They talk about their ancient civilization and the mystique of India and all that. But *they do not have vision* at all. (Bhutto 41) (Emphasis added)

Epistrophe is effective and resonant as a memory aid because it repeats terms and allows listeners to remember some of the speech. Had Bhutto said, "France, China and Western Europe were under foreign occupation" it would have been effective but dull. Epistrophe enlivens prose and makes it memorable.

Anaphora is the repetition of the same word or phrases at the beginning of each successive clause or sentence. Here are some examples of anaphora from the statement:

Let us build a monument to the veto, a big monument to the veto. *Let us build* a monument to the impotence and incapacity of the Security Council and the General Assembly. (Bhutto 41)

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You have to be either on the side of justice or on the side of injustice; *you are either* on the side of the aggressor or of the victim. There is no third road. It is a black and white situation in these matters; there is no grey involved. *You are either* for right or you are for wrong; *you are either* for justice or for injustice... (Bhutto 47)

Anaphora gives a ringing tone to any paragraph and in the first example it accompanies a hortative sentence type, "Let us..." which gives it a sanctimonious, bitter aspect. Again Bhutto is reminding the Council of its duties. These devices are used for emphasis and rhythm as they are repetitive and resonate longer in memory. These also show the arrangement of words in increasing importance and add a sense of climax. Bhutto used the terms "right/ wrong" and then followed it with stronger terms "justice/injustice", which are much more appealing terms for a global community. Rhythm piques listeners' expectations and is used to embellish oral and written texts. This attention to sentence arrangement brings desired ideas into focus and also shows the arrangement of words in increasing importance. However both stylistic devices working together in one sentence may not have the desired effect.

So what if the whole of East Pakistan falls? So what if the whole of West Pakistan falls? So what if our state is obliterated? We will build a new Pakistan. We will build a better Pakistan. We will build a greater Pakistan. (Bhutto 41)

As the paragraph progresses the listeners' attention is focused on the subject of the sentence "We will," which is repeated through anaphora and depicts resolve and determination. However with the use of epistrophe the listener's attention shifts from the subject phrase "We will" to the predicate phrase "build a new Pakistan." The change in focus from the doer, "We" to the object "a new Pakistan" is somewhat jarring. This is an example of overuse of stylistic technique. The paragraph becomes somewhat too rhetorical and the effect is bombastic and hollow. The use of hyperbole is overdone and complex in this instance.

In conclusion, the statement is a vivid, electrifying discourse that appeals to *pathos* and varies between a caveat and narrative. Barring a few stylistic flaws, the use of concrete terms and active voice make the statement inspiring. There is

flowing prose and strong rhythm throughout the statement. There is a coherent argument sustained through syllogism, contrasting elements and historical analogies.

5. Conclusion

Near death experiences of nations are difficult to communicate. The choice of the announcement of the surrender was crucial as Pakistanis were expecting victory. As an elected leader Bhutto chose to let the army announce the surrender. He established his legitimacy as the leader by distancing himself from the military junta by evoking key phrases and promoted himself more than his cause. His theatrical discourse may have been seen as an affront to the Council by the international community who disregarded his emotional appeals. Ironically the fall of Dhaka the next day ended the deliberation.

Bhutto's rhetorical aims with the direct audience had a shock value: though the Security Council went back to procedural matters, the elite press played up to his expectations by vivid reporting of the statement. His theatrics gained as much attention as the Fall of Dhaka. *The New York Times* reported that as Bhutto walked out, members of the Council looked on expressionlessly and after a moment of silence the President Ismael. B Taylor gave the floor to a Tunisian delegate and the Council droned on. *The Washington Times* called it "living theatre". The British press was quite critical of Pakistan.:The *Sunday Telegraph* said Britain should have supported India instead of remaining neutral, which was ironically one of Bhutto's minor points. The *Daily Mirror* blamed Pakistan for the war, saying it had forced West Asia to the point of war (Nagendra Kr Singh, Vol 2).

Pakistan's daily *Dawn* ignored the fall of Dhaka the next day and chose to focus on Bhutto. It reported matter-of-factly on December 16, "UN a farce, says Bhutto- walks out" (Bangladesh Genocide Archives).

Bhutto was more successful with his indirect audience, the Pakistanis. Though theatrical, deeply personal and hyperbolic, the statement served their emotional needs. He told them what they wanted to hear, which was that Pakistan would survive. They wanted to *blame someone*; India, Russia or an international conspiracy for the near death experience. His statement told the world that Pakistan possessed organic, popular, and forceful leadership that was as

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anomalous as the nation. The Pakistani press played up the theatrical, florid side of the statement and Bhutto came to power in a burst of popularity.

In some ways Bhutto may have been *too* successful in his rhetorical aims with the Pakistani audience, since he may have deflected attention away from the true events behind Fall of Dhaka that later it became difficult for Pakistanis to believe in the genocide unleashed by the Pakistani army. The genocide was remembered euphemistically as military action, the suffering of war refugees was eclipsed by the capture of prisoners of war. Later scholarship such as Ziring and Choudhury minutely analyzed Bhutto's role and rhetoric in the breaking up of Pakistan and disregarded the role of Pakistan Army in affecting Bhutto's discourse. This needs further study.

Bhutto projected himself as a human microcosm of the country. At that moment in the Security Council he *was* Pakistan with all its rage, prejudices and complexities. No Pakistani leader would have dared used such rhetoric against the superpowers on their own turf. It is also doubtful that any other discourse would have satisfied the Pakistani people in their darkest hour.

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Crisis and Reconciliation in Swat*

By Sultan-i-Rome

Introduction

The historic Swat, often compared to Switzerland for its natural beauty and picturesque landscape, is situated in a geo-strategic region of the world where the significant regions of Asia—South Asia, China and Central Asia, meet.¹ Swat, which at present is part of the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) of the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa Province of Pakistan, has held prominence throughout its known history. It has been periodically invaded by huge armies: the deployment of a huge number (since 2007) of the Pakistani security forces is a living example.

During the years 2007-2009, the world saw the upheaval in Swat that not only shook the Pakistani government writ and fabric but at the same time kept the world, at large, alarmed as well. This paper deals with the crises, erupted in 2007, in historical perspective, the factors that stimulated the unrest and disaffection against the prevailing system and government, and attempts to give the blueprint for a permanent solution.

Historical Background

The Yusufzai Afghans migrated en masse to the Peshawar Valley, and by mid-16th-century occupied Swat and emerged as the dominant segment here. However, they did not establish a government and a state, and lived in tribal way. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, some portions of Swat came under the

¹ For the strategic location and significant position of Swat in the past, present and the future; and the narratives and location of the routes and passes to and from Swat see: Verma, n.d., pp. 52-56, 68-69, 267-268; Popowski, 1977, pp. 173-181, especially pp. 174-176 for Swat alone; Chandra, 1977, pp. 3, 8-11, 19-20, 72-73, 93-95, 182; [Shui-ching-chu], 1950, pp. 69, 72; Tucci, 1977 (1-4), pp. 70-85; Macmunn, 1929, p. 16; Khan, n.d., p. 62; Muncherji, 1959 (3), pp. 40-41; Raverty, 1982 (Vol. 1), pp. 194-313.

neighbouring Dir ruler, some under the British loose control and some remained independent.

Weary of the constant internal faction fighting and the Nawab of Dir's excesses, some sections of the Swatis made a common cause against the Nawab in early 1915 and succeeded in gaining independence. A *jargah*² of them installed Abdul Jabbar Shah as the King of Swat in April 1915, but replaced him with Miangul Abdul Wadud, in September 1917. With coming into power Abdul Wadud (alias Bacha Sahib) kept moving the expansion, consolidation and development of the Swat State.

Developmental works and schemes were undertaken. Measures were made to eradicate some of the socio-cultural vices. Possession of arms was controlled and regulated to a greater extent. Schools and hospitals were established, which provided a base for progress in modern education and health-care services. Peace, order and authority of the state were established in an illiterate society and tribal set-up with amazing success; and the state became a model of peace, tranquillity and progress in a Pukhtun tribal society. The changes were brought about by developing a model, which was a mixture of the traditional values, Islamic laws and modern norms and developments.

Miangul Jahanzeb (alias Wali Sahib) replaced his father as ruler on 12 December 1949. He gave impetus to the developmental works and schemes. Priority was given to communication, education and health sectors. At the same time he also endeavoured to Westernize the state and society. Power, status and position of the traditional leadership and privileged class remained intact to a greater extent but in a changed manner. With the passage of time considerable changes were brought about in the social set up. In Barth's (1995) words:

Internally independent, Swat State was ruled with its own rules, system and administrative machinery without the superfluity of paper work. The administrative system was unique and "represented a new and emergent structure" (p. 156).

In 1969, Swat State was brought to an end by General Yahya Khan, chief martial law administrator and president of Pakistan. This change brought both positive and negative effects and impacts to the land and the people.

The areas of the former Swat State were given the status of a district and thus Deputy Commissioner was put in charge there. The Kalam area, formerly an

² The traditional consultative institution and forum wherein issues of common interest as well as communal affairs are discussed and decided.

agency administered by the ruler of Swat State as ‘Administrator’ on behalf of the government of Pakistan, was made part of the Swat District.

During the Swat State era, both the policies and decisions were made and implemented locally. There was no red-tape and bureaucratic file work. Multi-faceted developmental works were done, but in the words of the Wali Sahib (ruler of Swat State, from 1949 till 1969):

There was never a foundation stone laid by me, and never an opening ceremony performed. No propaganda for myself. People used to tell me: “You must advertise!” I said: “This is my duty, I am doing” (Barth, 1995, p. 152).

After bringing an end to Swat State in 1969, Sayyad Munir Hussain, the first Commissioner of Malakand Division, wrote a note to the effect, Naeemul Hadi quoted: “Further developmental works are no more needed in Swat. *These are more than sufficient* [my italics]. We should have only to maintain them.” (personal communication, July 5 & 9, 1998)

The change in the mode of the ruling, with the end of the state, slowed down if not brought a complete halt to new developmental works. However, a decade later, in 1980s and onward, a number of works were carried out. For example, the number of educational and health care institutions increased, and the chain of communication system extended to every nook and corner. But the standard and quality became poor and having exceedingly deteriorated further with each passing day; and the civic amenities faded away. The new officers’ and bureaucracy’s main concern was/is not to remove the anomalies, to solve the problems and redress grievances of the people, or to address the core issues properly and spiritedly; but to make money and pass their time best. The Wali Sahib has compared (in 1979) the post- Swat State and the state periods as follow:

The present administration functions very differently from mine. Cases must wait for years before they are decided; security has become poor, maintenance of public facilities is poor. Officers in charge come and go; they never have time to learn, or to see any project through. The different branches of Government do not coordinate. At the time of the State, one mind and one purpose controlled it all; we could coordinate all the efforts and pursue persistent and long-term policies. (Barth, 1995, p. 151)

Thus with bringing an end to Swat State by the government of Pakistan, drastic changes occurred all around. A new and alien administrative apparatus was installed, characterized by federal and provincial centralization, bureaucratic

mindset, red-tape and dilly-dally. Determining priorities, developmental schemes and the allocation of funds were/are now made at the federal and provincial levels and the implementation was/is done through the bureaucratic hierarchy and chain which was/is a new and alien thing for the people.³

In this backdrop, following are the main factors that stimulated the unrest and dissatisfaction, and contributed to the upheaval, insurgency and current situation in Swat (2007-2010).

Factors that Stimulated and Expanded the Unrest and Dissatisfaction

Constitutional Issues

The tribal social organization and setup of Swat was altered drastically by the rulers of Swat State and hence, Swat as a tribal society, receded into the background.⁴ The area's constitutional status as a tribal area however, is significant as it differentiates the area constitutionally from the settled areas and also provided it a separate status.

The area is part of the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), under article 246 of the Constitution of 1973. Being so, no law made and passed by the federal and provincial legislatures apply here unless and until extended by the governor of the province with the approval of the President of Pakistan: under article 247(3) of the Constitution of 1973.

Additionally, the area's constitutional status has also created a sort of diarchy: the area is a Provincially Administered Tribal Area and hence, under the control of the provincial government, which is responsible for the maintenance of law and order; but the provincial government has no authority to make and promulgate laws for the area on its own. This is done with the consent of and by the governor of the province (under article 247(4) of the constitution) with the prior approval of the president of the country; both of whom are neither part of the provincial government nor answerable to it. Nor are they answerable to the people either.⁵

³ Some efforts and lobbying were made in late twentieth century, basically initiated, supported and stressed upon by foreign donor agencies, for introducing decentralization in Pakistan. Resultantly, the local government system, comprised of a hierarchy of local governments, was introduced in 2001 by the military government of General Pervez Musharraf, supported by most of the NGOs and the foreign donor agencies; but this also does not deliver due to a variety of reasons.

⁴ For some detail see Sultan-i-Rome, 2008, chapter 9.

⁵ For some detail see Sultan-i-Rome, 2009, pp. 8-12.

Judicial issues

The commonly held belief that Swat State's judicial system was Islamic and hence, disputes were settled swiftly, as per Islamic laws, is unfounded.⁶

The question that arises then is despite this, why do people view this period with such nostalgia? The reason is that the judicial system during this period was an effective one: the trials were quick and cheap; the judgments/verdicts were properly executed; and the cases were usually decided on the first or second hearing. Moreover, "some of the shortcomings of the Western judicial system—technicality, delay, and high costs" (Wilcox, 1963, p. 155) did not exist. Thus, before the merger of the state, whether just or unjust, disposal of cases was quick and cheaper. The litigants were spared of the trouble of bearing high expenses and prolonged procedures.

The situation however, changed with the merger of Swat State. The government gradually started to extend Pakistan's laws but at the end it failed to redress the grievances of the people that were in progress with each passing day. Though for most of the period in the post- Swat State time the judicial mechanism, on the whole, remained different from the rest of the province as special procedures were applied, it did not deliver.

These proved to be some of the negative results and outcomes of bringing an end to Swat State. This, along with other factors, resulted in the activities of Tahrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) and the demand for the enforcement of *sharia* laws in the courts; and the consequent uprising of 1994. And in the post 1994 period still the system was characterized by prolonged procedures, undue delays, technicalities, high costs, and in some cases, bribery.⁷

It might be pertinent to ask why the people of Swat rose up in struggle for a change in the judicial system, while those in the rest of the country, did not? The reason is that they lived under a judicial system in the Swat State era which was quick, efficient, and cost-effective, and which they believed was in line with Islam.

Not only in the judicial system, but also in all the other areas, the Swatis compare the post-state/present situation, which compares dismally to what existed during the time of the Swat State—especially in the areas of law and order, health, education, communication, peace and security.

⁶ For details see Sultan-i-Rome, 2008, pp. 195-203.

⁷ For some detail see Sultan-i-Rome, 2009, pp. 12-16.

Police's role

The indifferent and repressive behaviour of the police towards the common populace and the way they deal and interact with them, and also their involvement in bribery, severe torture, high handedness and their collaboration with and assistance to criminals, embittered and alienated most people. Instead of offering peace, security and assistance to the people, the police became a source of trouble for them. Blatant police corruption even for day-to-day affairs became the source of such resentment. Moreover, the way the police tortured and insulted TNSM members and workers during their 1994-95 agitation generated further bitterness towards the police, within the rank and file of TNSM. All these developments played significant role towards creating the present upheaval in Swat.

Political parties' failure

Ironically, both the political parties and leaders, whether religious or secular, too behave in the same manner as of the officers and bureaucracy. They have often failed to take concrete steps to remove the anomalies, solve the problems and redress the grievances of the people. They utterly failed to address the core issues properly and spiritedly. They have the habit of making false promises and tall claims, and advertise and propagate (for their own ends) what little they do, but at the end prove to no or little avail.

Role of Babas and Mullas

The role played by the religious men—Mulla, Faqir, Haji Sahib, Baba and the likes, in the history of the Frontier (Khyber Pukhtunkhwa), especially the tribal areas including Swat, particularly against the alien powers cannot be underestimated. Their relations with India and Afghanistan, and even Turkey in the past; and their association with the prominent religious figures and officials of these states is not a new phenomenon.⁸ In this scenario, the role of Sufi Muhammad, Fazlullah, and other such figures who advocate armed struggle on religious grounds is neither unique nor a new thing. Besides, the asylum and protection granted to religious men from outside (who were opposed to and had actively struggled against alien powers in the region) is also not a new development.⁹

⁸ The archival record of the colonial government in India has ample examples and testaments to this effect.

⁹ The history of the Frontier is full of such cases and examples.

Intelligence agencies and governments

Foreign and Pakistani intelligence agencies have also played an important role. The Pakistani and American intelligence agencies organized and trained jihadi organizations (forerunners of the Taliban) for armed jihad (*qital*)¹⁰ to counter the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.¹¹

Many believe that the Taliban was the creation of Pakistan's intelligence agencies, for their own ends. The Swat Taliban repudiated the contention that they have any connections or a secret understanding with the Pakistan army or that their fighting with the Pakistan army is a façade (Dawran, 2008). President Asif Ali Zardari, however, conceded that "the militants and extremists...were deliberately created and nurtured as a policy to achieve some short term tactical objectives". He said: "Let us be truthful to ourselves and make a candid admission of the realities"; and that "the terrorists of today were the heroes of yester years until 9/11 occurred and they began to haunt us as well." (*The News International*, 2009, 8 July, Rawalpindi/Islamabad edition)

The American, Afghan and Indian intelligence agencies are also involved in their own ways, to engage the Pakistani Taliban and other jihadi organizations inside Pakistan to divert their attention and to drive them back from incursions into and fighting in Afghanistan and Kashmir; and thus to lessen the pressure over their forces in those areas. They do so as to create internal troubles for Pakistan so as to prevent it from interfering in Afghanistan and Kashmir and also to put pressure over it to do more. This is believed to be one of the cardinal factors responsible for the 2007-2009 turmoil in Swat and the other tribal areas. Against this backdrop an analyst has observed:

The blindfolded reaction of the [Pakistan] government has provided innumerable opportunities to foreign secret intelligentsia to interfere and aggravate the deteriorating situation further. (A call from the pulpit. Retrieved from <http://valleyswat.net>, on October 29, 2007)

¹⁰ Jihad has wider meaning and different kinds. Fighting in the way of Allah by means of arms (holy war fought for the cause of Islam against the non-Muslims) is one of its kinds and is mentioned as *qital* in the Holy Qur'an. With the overwhelming purposely use of the word *jihad* for its *qital* aspect only, its other aspects, kinds and dimensions remains hidden from the eyes of majority of the people around the globe.

¹¹ Also see Yusuf & Adkin, 2007; Rana & Gunaratna, 2007, pp. 12, 24-27, 35, passim; Marwat & Toru, 2005, p. 2; Duncan, 1990, p. 280; Lamb, 1991, pp. 196, 206-642; Khan, 1998.

The then federal government (2002-2007) and intelligence agencies, as well as the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam) and Pakistan Peoples Party (Sherpao)—ruling partners at the federal level—covertly supported Fazlullah with a view to create problems for the then provincial government of Mutahida Majlas-e-Amal (MMA). On its part the MMA government was more tolerant of the Taliban than others, for it recognized that like the Taliban, they too are engaged in a struggle for an Islamic system, and thus, could not be seen as obstructing those advocating and struggling for the same cause. Such a policy put Fazlullah up and put him and his agenda in places in a relatively shorter span of time.

In response to the question: “Who is responsible for not taking timely action against the Taliban?” the then District Nazim Swat (Jamal Nasar) claimed “...The MMA government intervened and stopped the district administration from taking action against Fazlullah.... This inaction on part of the NWFP government turned Fazlullah into a monster and the issue reached a point of no return” (Jan, 2009). However, one Sher Ali Khan claimed on radio FM 96 Swat (an FM radio channel run by the army in Swat), on May 30, 2009, that the then federal government (practically run by General Musharraf) decided in 2006 not to take decisive action against Fazlullah.

The Afghan war echoes and neo-imperialism

In 1979, Soviet’s forces were sent to Afghanistan. US, Europe and the Arab countries started proxy war in Afghanistan against Soviet Union. For this Pakistan became baseline. The US dollars and petro-dollars (money coming from US and the Arab countries) worked well. Jihadi organizations were founded and Mujahidin trained. Madaris were established in every nook and corner, especially in the Pukhtun areas of Pakistan. A new jihadi mindset and culture was created to counter the Soviet Union in Afghanistan but it continued to work after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces as well. The US backtracked after Soviet’s withdrawal and left Afghanistan in anarchy and chaos.

To bring an end to the infighting in Afghanistan and to settle down the Afghan issue Pakistan and Saudi Arabia fully and openly supported the newly emerged group in Afghanistan coined as Taliban, with whom the Pakistani jihadis also established links and relations. This created the Taliban phenomenon in Pakistan as well. The fighters trained by US and Pakistan (with blessing and support also from the European and Arab countries) proved the future trainers as well. And when in the backdrop of the 9/11 (2001) incidents in US, Pakistan backtracked from the support of the Afghan Taliban under the US pressure, Afghan Taliban’s Pakistani supporters and counterparts (now called Pakistani Taliban) resented this U-turn and owed to fight against the US and its allies

(including Pakistani security forces). Hence the impact of the Afghan War has been enormous.

Besides, modern or neo or American imperialism has multifaceted interests in the region which include, a policy of containing Russia; get access to and control of Central Asia; and countering China, to mention a few. The Americans are also believed to have contributed to and maintained such a scenario to justify their presence in Afghanistan and the region; the real aim of that is to keep control over Central Asia and to keep check against Russia and China.¹² To counter this, the other actors: Russia, China, Iran, and Pakistan, could not remain to be mere silent spectators (India also is engaged for her interest) and hence added fuel to fire to play their war on the Pukhtun soil,¹³ of which Swat is a part.

¹² Also see Rifatullah Orakzai, *Swat aur Shangla mayn jharpayn*, November 18, 2007,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/pakistan/story/2007/11/printable/071118_shangla_update_nj.sht...

¹³ Although late, Mian Iftikhar Hussain, provincial minister for information, also conceded to the point by asserting that America, Russia, China, Iran, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan play third world war (i.e. war for securing their interests) on the Pukhtun land (see *Mashriq* (Urdu daily), Peshawar, May 9, 2010).

Not mentioned by Mian Iftikhar but Arab individuals and some of their countries like Saudi Arabia have also been part to the game and the war as continuous moral and material support come from them to the Madaris, the jihadi organizations and their supporters. And European countries too have been part to it, whose forces are now directly taking part in shape of the NATO forces. However, countries like Germany and Italy are believed play double game.

Recently, former Afghan Ambassador, of Taliban regime, in Pakistan, Mulla Muhammad Zaif, too has said in an interview with a private TV channel that it is likely that Iran, Russia, China and some Pakistani forces have their hands in supporting and assisting the Afghan Taliban (see *Roznama Aaj Peshawar*, (Urdu daily, Peshawar), Wednesday, October 20, 2010; *Roznama Azadi Swat* (Urdu daily: Mingawara, Swat), October 20, 2010).

Even the Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman, Abdul Basit, said in June 2009 that there are unconfirmed reports that speak of the provision of funds from Arab and European countries to the extremists and terrorists. He said the issue will be raised with the concerned countries, after confirming

Other contributing factors

The dissipation of sanctions and restrictions over the non-Swatis, in the post Swat State period, for residing and doing business etcetera in Swat resulted in an influx of outsiders into Swat for business, trade, industry, tourism, labour, services, and other such activities. In this context the exemption from taxation also worked.

Emergence of a new wealthy class and their desire for a change in the power structure so as to find and create a space for themselves in the socio-political set-up is considered to be another factor.

Some section of the society, previously persecuted by the Khans and Malaks¹⁴ in the past, have a chance to take revenge and make the scores equal also joined the rank and file of TNSM and Taliban, owing to that some analysts label it a class war.

The plan to convert the present Saidu Sharif Airport (situated in Tahsil Kabal or Nikpi Khel; at a short distance from the village from which Fazlullah hails) into a military airbase and establishment of military cantonment in Swat were never seen to be put in practice and justified without such an upheaval. That is why, allegedly, Fazlullah was given a free run and the initial support by the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam) and Pakistan Peoples Party (Sherpao)—the then ruling allies at the centre, and the intelligence agencies.

Mismanagement on the part of the successive governments, an inefficient administrative system and the failure of almost all the government departments in delivering services not only caused the loss of their credibility but also

the information (see *Roznama Aaj Peshawar*, (Urdu daily, Peshawar), Friday, June 26, 2009).

¹⁴ In Swat, Khans and Malaks were chiefs selected and designated so by the people of the respective segment. These were not hereditary posts and designations. The Malaks were, on the whole, lesser tribal chiefs compared to Khans. After the emergence of Swat State, the situation gradually changed and the state rulers started to designate the persons they wished as Khans and Malaks, who besides other perks, were paid stipends or Muwajibs as well, from the state exchequer; the amount of which represented the status of the Khan and Malak concerned. After the merger of the state this system came to an end, as neither the people designate and select Khans and Malaks nor do the government. Interestingly, all the families and offspring of the previous Khans and Malaks usually call them so. But they have neither the role as was in the pre Swat State period nor do that of the Swat State time.

disappointed the masses, who no longer have faith in the governments, on their departments or the prevailing system.

The federal government's operations in Waziristan and other parts of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) operation in Islamabad in 2007 (especially the manner in which it was carried out), and the government's failure to enforce and implement Islamic laws in the courts spiritedly—as demanded by the TNSM and promised by successive governments—are some of the other key reasons¹⁵ that resulted in the 2007-2009 armed struggle and upheaval.

Restiveness, a trait of the Swati society, though receded due to the policies and steps of the Swat State rulers, re-emerged due to the aforementioned factors.¹⁶

TNSM factor

It was in 1989 that a movement was started in Dir District, called Tahrik Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM), meaning Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law, and an organization formed of which Sufi Muhammad was made head.¹⁷ Motto of the organization was to compel the Pakistani authorities to enforce Islamic laws in the judicial arena¹⁸ and make the judiciary conform to the Islamic system in Malakand Division. The organization gradually extended the movement to Swat as well (Shah, 1995, pp. 24-27). The prolonged legal procedures (after the merger of Swat State), undue delay, heightened expenditure, bribery, misuse of *riwaj* and further complication under the PATA Regulations¹⁹

¹⁵ Also see Haroon Rashid, *Swat shidat pasandu ka frontline kaysay bana?*, October 26, 2007, http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/pakistan/story/2007/10/printable/071026_swat_haroon_as.shtml

¹⁶ For some other such like factors and some detail see Sultan-i-Rome, 2009, pp. 6, 20-21.

¹⁷ For how the movement started, the organization came into being and Sufi Muhammad was made its head, see Shah, 1995, pp. 10-19.

¹⁸ Also see *Roznama Azadi Swat* (Urdu daily: Mingawara, Swat), October 25, 2008.

¹⁹ Regulation I of 1975 (The Provincially Administered Tribal Areas Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Regulation), which was enforced immediately, and Regulation II of 1975 (Provincially Administered Tribal Areas Civil Procedures (Special Provisions) Regulation), July 26, 1975, which was only published and wherein in section 3 it was stated that “it shall come into force on such date as Government [Government of North-West Frontier Province] may, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint

had already aggrieved most people of Swat. A judgment of the Peshawar High Court, on February 24, 1990, and then of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, on February 12, 1994, declaring the PATA Regulations ultra virus to articles 8 and 25 of the Constitution of 1973, worried the executive circle in Malakand Division, for it meant a dilution of their unbounded power. Therefore, they allowed a free run to the TNSM and approved and supported its activities tacitly. All this resulted in an increased momentum for the TNSM in Swat (though at first, the Swatis were passive towards the movement and its organizers faced difficulties²⁰), which consequently led to the uprising and armed struggle in Swat in 1994.

The promulgation of the 'Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (Nifaz-e-Nizam-e-Sharia) Regulation, 1994', as a result of the 1994 insurgency, and the purported changes it brought about did not satisfy the TNSM, so the organization started 'Jeel Bharao Tahrik' in June 1995. Consequent upon the resentment and the struggle, a new regulation titled 'Shari-Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, 1999', was promulgated, but it also failed to bring about any practical change; and the issue continued to fester. And while Sufi Muhammad and his organization were busy in the struggle for the enforcement of Islamic laws and change in the judicial system, the incident of 9/11 (2001) happened and America invaded Afghanistan in 2001. Although the Taliban asked Sufi Muhammad not to come to Afghanistan to support them, he along with tens of thousands of his supporters crossed into Afghanistan in November 2001 to fight on the Taliban's side against the Americans and their allies. After having lost a large number of his supporters and being unable to counter U.S. assault, he, along with his son-in-law Fazlullah, made their way back to Pakistan, where they were caught and subsequently incarcerated.

Sufi Muhammad remained in jail but Fazlullah was released after seventeen months. After his release, he started preaching a purity campaign on

in this behalf" are commonly known PATA Regulations. On March 19, 1976, the date of the enforcement of Regulation II of 1975 was set as March 25, 1976. However, amendments were made in Regulations I and II of 1975 through Regulation IV of 1976, December 29, 1976; and the powers to decide cases, both criminal and civil were transferred from the judiciary to the executive. The executive referred the cases to *jargahs* (under and in accordance with the PATA Regulations) which unfortunately did not work properly as their decisions were usually manipulated. Moreover, the cases were not quickly decided, which generated resentment; as instead of redressing the grievances and facilitating the people the PATA Regulations led the situation from bad to worse.

²⁰ See Shah, 1995, pp. 26-28.

FM radio channel. Since his father-in-law was in prison, he was supported by TNSM activists and sympathisers and with the assistance of the radio channel he quickly got on track. Soon, he started the construction of a *madrasah* (seminary) and *markaz* (centre) in his home village Mamdherai also called Imamdherai. People from all sections of society donated generously at his orders; and would personally gather in thousands at short notice. He was greatly projected in and by the local media, though some opposition existed.

His growing power and popularity emboldened him and his supporters to challenge the government writ now and then, to counter that, the government also had to make a show of force. These developments, however, were brought under control each time by reaching some agreement between the provincial MMA government and Fazlullah. The policy and course of action adopted by Fazlullah however, became a source of dissension within the rank and file of the TNSM. Though the TNSM disavowed his policy and officially severed connections with him, his power and popularity continued to increase amazingly. And in December 2007, the breakaway faction, led by Fazlullah, became part of the newly-established organization Tahrik Taliban Pakistan, at that time headed by Baitullah Mahsud, an alliance or umbrella organization of different groups.²¹

Musharraf's tussle with the judiciary

President Musharraf's tussle with Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry) and the judiciary started in March 2007, and the resulting chaos and struggle provided space for Fazlullah to continue his activities unhindered and expand his sphere of influence; as both the federal and provincial governments were involved (one way or the other) in pro or against the parties/sides activities, and all the political parties and non-state actors/civil society turned their guns to that direction and focused on that issue.

²¹ Interestingly, while outwardly there were differences between the two groups (one headed by Sufi Muhammad and the other by his son-in-law Fazlullah), especially with regard to strategy and course of action, both have the same motto and objective. Sufi Muhammad was reported to have told the media that if *sharia* laws were implemented as per his demands, he would go to Swat and disarm the other group (headed by Fazlullah); and Muslim Khan, the spokesman of the other group, asked that Islamic laws be enforced in toto, as per the draft submitted by Sufi Muhammad. See *Roznama Azadi Swat* (Urdu daily: Mingawara, Swat), October 22 & 26, 2008; *Roznama Aaj Peshawar* (Urdu daily: Peshawar), October 18 & 22, 2008. Also see *Roznama Azadi Swat* (Urdu daily: Mingawara, Swat), October 20, 2008.

In this backdrop the Swat issue and Fazlullah's activities went into the background; resultantly Fazlullah and TNSM benefited out of and exploited the new situation for their own ends, made their power and position strong enough, and kept control over the area.

Security forces' conduct

Although sent into Swat in July 2007 to curb Fazlullah's activities and growing power, and to restore government's writ, the security forces remained dormant and spectator to his activities. It was in the army's presence that he for the first time came out, in person, of his village with might and main and not only have a show off of his force but offered the Eid prayer in the Kabal ground, kilometres away from his home and centre.

Ironically (and to the further surprise of the masses) the army, deployed at Kabal Golf Course, sought Fazlullah's permission and offered the Eid prayer with and behind him. And afterwards, the operation against the Swat Taliban from November 2007 until February 2009 was carried in a way that apparently did not target the Taliban but innocent civilians.

The aforementioned behaviour and course of action of the army; and the way the security forces interacted with the civilians and the damages and destructions it brought forth during the three phases of the Operation Rah-e-Haq (Operation the Righteous Path), generated distrust and resentment against the security forces, and created and increased soft-corner and support for the Taliban.

Taliban's policies and works

Some of the Taliban policies and courses of action were abominable, but some of their policies and works generated sympathy and support for them. For example, unlike NGOs and the government functionaries, they addressed the people in simple Pashto, their mother tongue that was easily comprehended/absorbed by educated and non-educated alike, and thus went to the hearts of many.

They constructed new roads and paths; opened up irrigation water courses that were covered and brought within the houses in many places; decided cases and disputes quickly without bearing any costs by the parties; solved some age-old disputes and issues; tried to effect conciliation among enemies; and stressed upon women's right to inheritance; decreased doctors' and pathological laboratory fees; compelled PESCO²² and PTCL²³ employees to repair and restore the lines without delay; and ended electric power load-shedding in Swat.

²² Peshawar Electric Supply Company; that supplies electricity, repairs its transmission lines and restores the supply.

Besides, police highhandedness and oppression was brought to an end as the police became ineffective; a number of dacoits and the habitual murderers (*ujrati qatilan*: those who commit murders for others and taking money for the task) were eliminated; and *charas*, heroin, alcohol and other intoxicants and narcotics were banned. They also banned the direct flow of the toilet wastes to the drains and made compulsory septic tanks.²⁴ These and some other works of public utility and policies of the Taliban generated support and sympathy for them in a circle.

The Present Scenario

As both the government and Fazlullah refused to budge from their respective stances, by October 2007 the situation became extremely volatile. So the government deployed more security forces in the area and started an operation named Operation Rah-e-Haq. Overtly, some armed clashes occurred, but simultaneously, the government seemed to be willing to find a peaceful solution to the problem, with the provincial governor declaring that any army operation would be the last option. President Musharraf however, asked the other side, the same day, to lay down its arms (*Roznama Azadi Swat*, October 30, 2007). The other party also showed flexibility and expressed its desire for a peaceful solution of the issue through negotiations. However, despite this they also demanded the withdrawal of the security forces, an enforcement of Islamic laws, and the release of Sufi Muhammad.²⁵

The overt clashes and the security forces' heavy shelling by gunship helicopters, artillery and mortars, mostly hitting not the Taliban and their bases but the civilians and the hills, continued. However, after some days, Fazlullah and his *shura* (consultative body or aides²⁶) ordered their fighters to pull back from the

²³ Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited; that supplies the landline telephone connections and repairs and restore the lines.

²⁴ For some instructions issued by the Taliban to the public regarding civic works of such a nature see a pamphlet titled *Aama Itla* (Pashto) [April 2010], Minjanib Tahrik Taliban Swat.

²⁵ See Abdul Hai Kakar, *Ghair mulki nahi hay, magar aa saktay hay*, October 31, 2007, http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/pakistan/story/2007/10/printable/071031_swat_commander_as.s...

²⁶ For Fazlullah's aides see Rahimullah Yusufzai, *Men on mission*, Retrieved from <http://valleyswat.net> (on November 6, 2007).

roadside bases to avoid further losses to the civilians and went underground.²⁷ This, they termed not their flight from the fight, but a change of the war strategy.²⁸ While the situation seemed to have calmed down by January 2008, heavy and indiscriminate shelling caused heavy loss of lives and property of innocent civilians as well as the displacement of a large number of people: inside Swat. Monetary losses worth billions of rupees in different forms were also incurred.

In February 2008, general elections were held in Pakistan and the Awami National Party (ANP)-led coalition government was formed in the province. Since the ANP contested the elections on the slogan of restoring peace and order and bringing normalcy to the province, the provincial government negotiated with Sufi Muhammad and Fazlullah's organizations. Agreements were made and Sufi Muhammad was released. In addition to other terms, the government promised the enforcement of Islamic laws as per the demands of the other side, who in turn, besides other commitments on their part, agreed to support the government in its righteous endeavours and in the restoration of peace and maintenance of law and order.²⁹

²⁷ Announcement made on their FM radio channel. Also see Rifatullah Orakzai, *Swat: char muqamat par murchay khali*, November 27, 2007, http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/pakistan/story/2007/11/printable/071127_swat_a_reasfree_rzt.sht...; Rifatullah Orakzai, *Swat: Taliban kay murchay khali*, November 27, 2007, http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/pakistan/story/2007/11/printable/071127_swat_o_peration_updat...; Abdul Hai Kakar, *Swat: mazeed pachas halakatu ka dawa*, November 28, 2007, http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/pakistan/story/2007/11/printable/071128_swat_d_eads_sen.shtml

²⁸ See Rifatullah Orakzai, *Taliban hikmat aqli tabdeel, Matta fauj kay pass*, December 5, 2007, http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/pakistan/story/2007/12/printable/071205_swat_u_pdate_zs.shtml; Rifatullah Orakzai, *Swat: lugu mayn adam tahafuz barqarar*, December 8, 2007, http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/pakistan/story/2007/12/printable/071208_swat_matta_capture_n...; Abdul Hai Kakar, *Kharija policy mayn tabdili chahiyayn*, November 30, 2007, http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/pakistan/story/2007/11/printable/071130_taliban_uniform_sen.s...

²⁹ For texts of the agreements see *Myashtinai Pukhtu* (Pashto), 2008, No. 5, pp. 51-52, & No. 6, pp. 6-7.

Differences, however, soon emerged on certain points. Each side blamed the other for not holding fast to or honouring the agreements, which, once more, strained the relations and resulted in fresh armed clashes. The security forces embarked on the second phase of its operation; and the other side sorted out its own strategies. All these, however, again brought untold misery and great losses—of both human-beings and materials to the civilians. Additionally, the unprecedented curfew (which lasted 22 consecutive days during the month of Ramazan),³⁰ and the severance of electricity and telephone lines, caused immense problems for the local population. While one side resorted to decapitation, slaughter, targeted killing and the destruction of government installations (especially government educational institutions, bridges, police posts, and police stations); the other resorted “to carpet bombing and massive shelling as [usually] invading armies do” (Alam, 2008). The targeted blowing up and destruction of residential houses and bungalows, and shops and commercial markets etc. by both sides became routine. If the course adopted by one side generated resentment and brought misery and worry for a majority of the people; the actions of the other, compelled the people to look upon it “as an occupying force rather than a protector” (Alam, 2008). The course of action of both the sides was abominable for the civilians and the populace.

The security forces’ course of action managed to generate sympathy for the Taliban and resentment against the government and the army; because it was “the people of the area who” were “suffering as innocent civilians” were “being killed in the army action” (Expats from Pakistan’s Swat worry over relatives. Retrieved from

http://khyberwatch.com/nandara/index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=475&po..., on March 12, 2008).

Even the ANP parliamentarians and ministers, showed their reservations about the security forces course of action and the credibility of the operation. Haji Adeel, ANP Senior Vice President and Senator, observed: “What will be the credibility of the military operation in Swat when houses of ministers are destroyed and their family members are queued up for shooting.” He admitted that “the people have lost confidence in the government and the army” (Daily Times – Site Edition, 2008, December 7).

The limbo continued and the army conducted the second and third phases (Phase Three was claimed as the fastest one) of the Operation Rah-e-Haq; resulting in spreading and expanding the power, control and authority of the

³⁰ Ironically, the curfew in Swat broke the old global records as it continued for eleven months: sometimes with breaks of relaxation and sometime without any break of relaxation.

Taliban with each passing day and in shrinking and waning that of the government. The tragedy was that there were “many players involved” (both at the state and global levels); each one with “his own agenda” (Alam, 2008). But those who continued to be victimized were Swat and its innocent civilians.

While the government continued to press for an unconditional laying down of arms as a precondition to a dialogue and settlement, the other side was also adamant to its demands including the withdrawal of the security forces, implementation of Islamic laws as per their demand, compensation for their losses at the hands of the security forces, and an unconditional release of their arrested associates as a precondition for pulling themselves back.

Swat was at a crossroads. At last the provincial government smelled a rat, entered into a fresh agreement with Sufi Muhammad on February 15, 2009, and the clashes subsided. Amazingly and to the surprise of the Swatis, Indian, American and Afghanistan’s reaction (especially India’s) at the peace deal was abnormally negative. This testifies to greater extent the involvement and stakes, one way or the other, of the external elements and forces in the affair, upheaval and destruction in Swat. Even countries like France that were unheard so far on the issue of militancy and the upheaval in Swat, did not remain silent as “France’s new special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan” later, while talking to reporters in New Delhi, expressed his reservation over the Talibanization in Pakistan and said: “The Swat agreement ‘has a worldwide resonance’.” (Daily Times – Site Edition, 2009, May 2).

Anyhow, at the peace agreement, Sufi Muhammad came to Swat, established his camp and made peace marches to various areas. Outwardly the situation was moving back to normalcy and the tempers were cooling-down. Sufi Muhammad, however, was pressing the government to speedup the implementation process of the Islamic laws otherwise he would wind up his camp and will go back; and later on he practically did so. It was expected per verbal commitments that Sufi Muhammad will not only restore peace in Swat but also will denounce, in public meeting, militancy and fighting against the government forces as un-Islamic. He, however, instead denounced different organs of the state, which resulted in a great miss and led the situation to worsen; because of the media propagating it to a higher degree in negative terms.³¹

Interestingly, Fazlullah and the Swat Taliban ruled the roost through their FM radio, from 2007 until April 2009. The broadcasts not only continued

³¹ This was his old viewpoint and stand which he expressed instantly/frequently, at occasions. It however is believed that he was now dictated by hidden forces/hands to pronounce this at this public meeting otherwise to be ready for the consequences.

uninterrupted (from the army and government side), at fixed frequency and time, but the frequency was continuously upgraded, enabling the Swat Taliban to extend their influence and to keep control over Swat and parts of Dir, Shangla and Malakand Protected Area (commonly called Malakand Agency).

Another development in the post-peace agreement days was the release of an old video-tape to the media, by a women activist Samar Minallah, wherein the Taliban's have lashed-out a girl allegedly for immorality. Despite the fact that this was not the sole case of lashing out the allegedly guilty/criminals as there were reportedly four cases of lashing out females and some twenty four of lashing out males, for allegedly different crimes, by the Taliban at the zenith of their power (a number of whom were recorded on CDs by the Taliban themselves and already available in the market) both the national and international media took this video-clip at hand, and propagated highly against the peace agreement. Interestingly, a year later government agencies claimed that the video-clip was fake and was financed by some non-state actors so as to defame Pakistan.³²

Though, the ceasefire was effected in February 2009 and peace restored, inwardly both the sides—the Taliban and the army—were making their positions stronger and flexing their muscles for a fresh and decisive round. Along with making their position stronger in Swat, the Taliban made inroads into Dir and Buner, with blessings of Commissioner Malakand Division, Muhammad Javaid.³³ Their inroad into Dir and especially Buner was sensationalized by the media; and was perceived as a march towards and a prelude to taking over Islamabad and the Pakistani nukes. Interestingly, the issue took crucial turn and was made more sensationalized when Fazlur Rahman (Amir/chief of Jamiat ul Ulama-e-Islam) said on the national assembly floor that the Taliban has reached Tarbela and there are only the Margalla Hills between them and Islamabad, the capital of the country.

The government claimed the inroads into Dir and Buner a violation of the peace agreement, effected between the provincial government and TNSM on February 15, 2009, and hence embarked on a military operation in those areas. On the other side Sufi Muhammad said that by launching these operations, “the

³² They claimed that they got the information from the arrested culprits, in the course of investigation, that the video was fake and that it was produced on the demand of some non-state actors for which a handsome money was paid. This caused a fresh debate in the media over the subject in March-April 2010.

³³ The projected inroads of the Taliban from Swat into Dir and Buner were dubbed/believed a manoeuvred for sensationalizing the issue and situation; and making ground and justification for a grand military action.

government had violated the Swat peace agreement” (DAWN.COM); and a Taliban commander, using the alias of Tahir, said that the “peace agreement with the NWFP government has practically been scrapped but we are waiting for a word from Maulana Sufi Muhammad for taking a decision” (*The News International*, 2010, March 5).

In this backdrop, “in a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee”, held on April 30, 2009, “Pakistan’s top military leaders resolved to support the government in showing ‘zero tolerance’ towards militancy in Malakand division” (Daily Times – Site Edition, 2009, May 1). Though the operation was in progress, Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani announced in a broadcast to the nation on May 7, 2009, fresh military operation against the Swat Taliban. This led to the military Operation Rah-e-Rast (Operation the Straight Path) in Swat. An Indian analyst, Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd) had already cautioned “the senior leadership of the Pakistan army”, in October 2008, that:

It needs to understand that artillery barrages and helicopter and air force bombings of civilian villages and towns are inherently counterproductive. The field commanders must be taught to discriminate between innocent civilians and armed combatants and must demonstrate concern for senior citizens, women and children instead of treating them with disdain. (Kanwal, 2008)

But in disregard for the aforementioned and to the dismay of the civilians, their fears and apprehensions proved true, as the security forces resorted to indiscriminate bombardments and shelling by jet aeroplanes, gunship helicopters and artillery and the use of force targeting also the civilians that caused great civilian casualties, destruction of houses, buildings and the infrastructure, and displacement of hundred of thousands of people bringing distresses to all the Swatis one way or the other.³⁴ Even at this critical juncture, the policy of containment and not elimination was followed. Ironically, the catastrophe and calamity brought forth to the land and people of Swat was not natural but man-made. And it is a pity that the federal and provincial governments and the security forces try to absolve themselves of the responsibility.

The government and the security forces claimed success and, in late July 2009, return of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) was allowed phase-wise.

³⁴ This destruction and displacement was at the hands of the government security forces that were duty-bound by all moral and legal standards to take care of the civilians and their properties at all costs, in such a situation as well.

The grip of the Taliban loosened, but the distresses of the civilians perpetuated due to the mass destruction brought forth to the land and people of Swat. Moreover, the security forces, on the whole, behaved and interacted with the civilians like foreign occupation forces and did not uphold local values and traditions.

Of the two main actors, i.e. the Taliban and the security forces, the Taliban seemed uprooted and, in the blackout of the free media coverage, the security forces and governments issued statements/news of their own likes. But, though, not visible on the streets, the Taliban have presence in other ways. Besides, the security forces' success might not be construed that the Taliban's ideology and mindset changed or faded away. The Taliban are defeated physically and made vulnerable but their ideology, mindset and ideals still remain.

Therefore, all the forces and actors—direct and indirect—need to behave sanely and address the core issues contributing to and preparing ground for the Taliban and militancy and generating support for them, and the security forces need to further reform their ways of interacting with the masses, so that Swat might not again be a flash point. Only presence of the security forces never suffices for the Taliban's permanent removal from the scene, and is never a guarantee of durable peace.³⁵

At the defeat of the Taliban, *lakhkars* (*lashkars*³⁶) and some *jargahs*³⁷ in the name of peace *jargahs* have been formed, by and at the behest of the army.

³⁵ As is evident from the Peshawar case, despite having been army cantonment in Peshawar and the permanent presence and abode of the army, the government and the army fortify even the cantonment by replacing the barbed fences and grills with tall walls and giving further height to the existing walls as well as further fences them by heavy sandy embankments. The attack in Rawalpindi's General Head Quarter (GHQ) and the army area mosque too is a testament. Even in Swat, despite the defeat and disappearance of the Taliban, the security forces entrenched themselves for their security; and instead of removing the barricades and the entrenchments around them, they increase and make them stronger and fortified like.

³⁶ *Lakhkar/Lashkar* has been a tribal force taking field against the opponents/enemy on their own, when needed for self defence, at owns' arms, ammunition and costs; and disperses home at the close of the fight. It neither is nor has the role of a permanent standing force. In the backdrop of the operations and security forces actions—in the post 2001 scenario—in both FATA and PATA, the *lakhkars*, on the whole, are not formed by the people at their own will. The civilians being forced or induced to form these *lakhkars*, for which material support and incentives in different shapes are

Lakhhkars and *jargahs* are symptom of tribal society and the last Swat *lakhhkar* (from Nikpi Khel area) took field against Buner in 1923. Although a tribal area constitutionally being part of PATA, Swat's society is not tribal by any standard. Swat is far advanced and has gone through the tribal stage of its life, in the growth of civilization. By forming these *lakhhkars* and the *jargahs*, the Swati society reverts at least seventy-eighty years back. Keeping in view the ingredients and traits of the society, these might lead towards more polarization, social upheaval, welter and factional feuds in a new way and manner. It is food for thought that what will be the long term implications of the *lakhhkars*' taking arms and of the *jargahs*' decisions and steps; which moreover put a number of questions. For example under what law of the country they have the authority to take arms and make such decisions (e.g. to exile people, burn houses and confiscate properties) in presence of a state, federal and provincial governments, and a number of institutions and departments; and what are the legitimate position of their actions, decisions and steps?

Moreover, the security forces compel the civilians to patrol and do watches (especially at night-time) and search operations against the Taliban. But it is not the duty of the civilians to patrol, do watches and protect them themselves (as they have to do agriculture, trade and other works and services). It is the responsibility of the security forces to do the patrols and watches, ensure smooth run of life and not only provide security and working environment to the civilians but also a sense of honour and a sound sleep, without anxiety. Forming the

also given, these *lakhhkars* neither have the essence and spirit nor the force and legitimacy of the traditional ones.

³⁷ *Jargah/Jarga* (erroneously written as *jirga*) is the traditional consultative institution and forum where matters of common interest and communal affairs are discussed and decided. In *jargahs* all the stakeholders are represented; all the attendants express their viewpoints and present their arguments freely; and the decisions are made by consensus or unanimously, after the deliberations. Therefore the decisions, made in such a manner, are abided by all and the violators become liable to the fine and punishments etc.

The *jargahs* formed in Swat in the post-Taliban scenario are devoid of these ingredients and characteristics. Not only these *jargahs* are manoeuvred, one way or the other, but the decisions made and pronounced by them are also manoeuvred. Hence their decisions also lack the essence and spirit as well as the force and legitimacy of the traditional one. In Swat *jargahs* have been faded away during the Swat State time.

lakhkars and *jargahs* in the post-Taliban scenario and also the patrolling and watches by the civilians are steps that reverts Swati society to tribalism that is not a positive and encouraging sign.

The resentment against the destruction caused by the security forces in the course of the operations, the delay in and not recording all the losses—great or small that have been caused to the civilians in the course of the operations—while assessing the damages (in 2009), not giving full compensation of the damages but announcing a uniform meagre sum of rupees 160,000 and 400,000 for partially and fully damaged buildings respectively, giving no compensation for the damages of the household items and other articles and crops etc., the manner in which some of the security forces personnel interact with the civilians, the hurdles for the civilians in the everyday life, having no respect for *chadar* and *chardiwari*—sanctity of veil and privacy of houses—especially at the times of the search operations, disregard for the local values and traditions, occupation of private residences and other buildings that compel the owners to reside elsewhere in rented houses and making no payment to the owners of such residences and buildings and their rough use grow underground mistrust, abhorrence and resentment against the security forces and governments.

Besides, the security forces ruthless cutting of the trees standing on the paths and road sides and also that standing in the fields and other places (all planted and reared with great labour, and a great asset not only of the people and land of Swat but also of the country and humanity at large) on the plea of security concern (this act of the security forces is also in violation of the Islamic laws of war as well as of the Environmental Protection Act 1997 under which Environmental Impact Assessment of such a step is mandatory); banning cultivation of certain crops like maize (a source of livelihood for many; and which is not only a cash crop but also a food grain and source of wet and dry fodder and fire-fuel) in certain areas; forcing the masses in certain areas to have security passes (issued by the army) and that too over their necks or chests and also to have a vehicle pass; a number of check-posts which create hurdles in the smooth running of life even after one and a half years of the defeat of the Taliban; the unannounced frequent curfews on the Saidu-Mingawara (Mingora) road; and the news of the target killings and of the militants encounters with the security forces are some of the other factors that are matter of concern for the civilians at large.

The aforementioned issues and factors might possibly spark, if the grievances are not spiritedly redressed; the issues and concerns of the people of the area are not properly addressed; and the reconstruction and developmental works are not truly done without much delay. These might preferably be done through the civil administration and the concerned departments so as to shift the responsibility to them and establish their writ.

Permanent Solution

Termining the Taliban, fanatics and rebels is justified by some standards, as H. G. Raverty points to, in the nineteenth century, sardonically, that “all are ‘fanatics,’ ‘rebels,’ or ‘dacoits,’ who fight against us according to some people” (Raverty, 1982, Vol. 1, p. 251 n.). But this never proves a durable solution.

Although the Swat Taliban have been defeated, dispersed and made vulnerable, they are neither completely uprooted nor their ideology and mindset changed. Their defeat and disappearance from the scene might not be construed as an erasure of their ideology, mindset and ideals. Therefore, bringing them back to the mainstream is imperative.

If talks with the Afghan Taliban are imperative for a political solution, as head of the UN mission in Afghanistan, Kai Eide said that “it’s ‘high time’ a political solution is found with the Taliban to resolve the more than 8-year-old conflict. ‘It is time to talk’,” (*The News International*, 2010, March 5; Daily Times – Site Edition, 2010, March 5) why not in Pakistan as well?

Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani also conceded in Peshawar, on March 4, 2010, while addressing members of NWFP PPP Parliamentary Party, that “military operation was no solution to terrorism and extremism” (*The News International*, 2010, March 5). He even told the National Assembly, on January 19, 2009, that “military operations are not a solution to all the problems in the Tribal Areas and Swat, and vowed to come up with a ‘political strategy’ to deal with the situation” (Daily Times – Site Edition, 2009, January 20); and while talking to journalists, on February 13, 2009, said that “a military operation is not the only solution to the Swat situation” (Daily Times – Site Edition, 2009, February 14).

Being citizens of the country, the Taliban needs to be brought back to the mainstream for which general amnesty might be announced, and workshops and courses for their debriefing are to be arranged and conducted. If not all, the majority of them can certainly be brought back to the mainstream and made peaceful citizens with minimal efforts, the precedents of which are found in Indonesia and Saudi Arabia.

Further complementary and essential steps needed for defusing the situation permanently are the implementation of Islamic laws and making the judicial system responsive, efficient and effective; addressing the core local issues contributing to the disaffection and unrest; the security forces friendly interaction with the people; strengthening the civil administration; and the withdrawal of the army phase-wise, in a year. Moreover, withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan and Iraq, and resolving the Kashmir and Palestine issues are also

imperative. This will subside, the jihadi organizations and defuse the anti-West and anti-America sentiments that are found among the masses.

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Review, Sadaf Ahmad's *Transforming Faith: The Story of Al-Huda and Islamic Revivalism Among Pakistani Women*

Reviewed by Sohomjit Ray

Transforming Faith: The Story of Al-Huda and Islamic Revivalism among Pakistani Women. Sadaf Ahmad. New York: Syracuse UP, 2009. 227 pages. ISBN: 978-0-8156-3209-2.

Sadaf Ahmad's *Transforming Faith* is the first important study of Al-Huda, an Islamic revivalist movement with a large following among women in Pakistan. While it is not uncommon to find Islamic religious study groups (*dars*) of various ideological persuasions that engage women's participation in Pakistan, Ahmad is quick to point out that the "uniqueness" of Al-Huda lies in "being able to make inroads into the middle and upper classes of the urban areas of Pakistan, a feat other religious groups have been unsuccessful at accomplishing," especially when the group is perceived as being extremely narrow and one-dimensional in its interpretation of Islam (1). Ahmad frankly admits that the impetus to conduct research on the phenomenon of Al-Huda came from her personal perplexity "about why so many women from my hometown [Islamabad], who also belonged to the same class I belonged to, were changing their behavior and lifestyle" (3). The most noticeable of such lifestyle changes include starting to wear the *hijab* (head scarf) or the *abaya* (loose garment worn over clothes) and deeming music and traditional cultural rituals associated with major life events like weddings and deaths un-Islamic (*biddat* i.e. religious innovation not in keeping with the true Islamic principles) (3). Although Ahmad points out towards the very beginning of the study that the movement is no longer confined to the urban, relatively affluent

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Pakistani women anymore¹, she does maintain that her primary focus remains on the women of the middle and the upper classes of urban areas (21).

Ahmad is extremely aware that her comparatively similar (in some cases, identical) socio-cultural background with her subjects, not to mention her ideological perspectives as a progressive feminist with access to the metropolitan academia², opens up thorny questions of representation and objectivity, crucial in establishing credibility of the project itself. Indeed, it would have been a surprising omission if in the process of discussing the “politics of knowledge production” as it relates to the pedagogy of Al-Huda, the author had assumed a putative objectivity with regards to her own political affiliations (8). Instead, Ahmad provides a detailed rationale of her methodology and epistemological grounding in the very first chapter, aptly entitled “The Cultural Politics of Fieldwork,” persuasively arguing that a situated subjectivity is better than a false objectivity that grants only partial vision. After all, as she puts it simply: “Subjectivity does not imply a lack of rigor” (19)³.

Ahmad’s rationale for the popularity of Al-Huda can be broadly categorized into global and local factors, with the necessary disclaimer that these categories can hardly be water-tight in the age of a globalized neoliberal market economy. In the second, third and the fourth chapters, Ahmad focuses on elaborating on the ‘local’ factors that have been conducive to the dissemination and ensuing popularity of the Islamic discourse forwarded by Al-Huda. Ahmad’s account in these chapters contains impressively precise descriptions of various kinds of Islam practiced in Pakistan; the inevitable turn of historical events by which religion came to be the single most important factor in constructing national identity in Pakistan; and how women (Ahmad assumes a cohesive category of women here, probably not to deny the internal diversity within the category, but to merely name and describe a categorization that was enforced repeatedly by the Pakistani state) came to constitute the symbolic Other who would be vanguards of tradition even as it is being redefined in response to various socio-political changes that can be potentially construed as divisive. It is a sign of Ahmad’s descriptive and analytical skill that she manages to tease out the ramified linkages between these three correlated phenomena when she goes on to

discuss the pedagogical techniques of Al-Huda and the kind of Islamic discourse forwarded therein.

Ahmad's descriptive emphasis on the pedagogy of Al-Huda is important, because she credits it as a crucial factor that has led to success of the movement among the social elite.⁴ Although the headquarters of Al-Huda is located at Islamabad, it is clear from Ahmad's description that it relies on an extremely decentralized power structure that functions more horizontally than vertically. The graduates who emerge from Al-Huda go through a rigorous (although ideologically limited) training in interpreting Qur'an through the exegetical commentary available in the Hadith in order to earn their diploma. These graduates then begin to offer *dars* to the local population, employing the same pedagogical tools used at Al-Huda. The pedagogy lays a heavy emphasis on instruction of language and translation of Arabic verses along with a strong pragmatic approach in applying the knowledge gained to help the students lead a virtuous Muslim life following the straight, narrow and "true" path. Ahmad borrows from Foucault to delineate this process as the production of the 'ethical subject' who utilizes what Foucault has called "technologies of the self" to fashion what Saba Mahmood calls a "pious self"⁵ (66-67). In other words, Al-Huda's motivated discourse in interpretation of the scriptures is designed to make the subject conscious of her moral obligations and behavior, and encourages her to exercise control and engage in self-forming activities in order to attain the ideal piety that names her as a 'true' Muslim.

One of the ways in which Ahmad attempts to analyze the success of the pedagogy of Al-Huda is by comparing it with the *dars* of other ideological persuasions. The pragmatic approach of the Al-Huda ideology comes into sharper relief when contrasted with a *dars* offered by Zulaykha, a woman who retains the folk ritualistic Bairalvi Islam that draws from the *sufi* tradition much more than the *deobandi/wahhabi* Islam followed by Al-Huda. Ahmad notes that "[f]or most of the women in Zulaykha's *dars*, the Qur'an is primarily a means of connecting with Allah, and the entire session revolves around that goal. There is little space for the concrete, the physical" (105). This is seen when in one of the sessions the woman who initiates a discussion of the Hudood ordinance⁶ is admonished for shifting the focus away from Allah. On the other hand, Ahmad notes that "Al-

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Huda's gift, many women claim, is the way each and every verse of the Qur'an is made relevant to their lives" (66). This is seen in the way Al-Huda works to incorporate the "experiential commensurability" of the student-subjects for enhancing the transformative potential of their pedagogy⁷ (66). In Mother's Forum, a weekly group associated with Colors of Islam (a 'spin-off' of Al-Huda targeted at five- to twelve-year-old children), women discuss their everyday problems and dilemmas that range from dealing with their husbands and in-laws to clashes between religious and social norms in order to generate "Islamic" solutions collectively (52). It is easily understandable that the sense of community and bonding resulting from having a space of their own might help foster a greater credibility and desire for Al-Huda's ideology among these women than in a space where an esoteric and other-worldly love for Allah is privileged over mundane everyday concerns.

In fact, it can be argued that understanding this sense of community in an exclusively woman-oriented space is an instrumental factor to explain the popularity of Al-Huda. It is also evident from Ahmad's description that this space offers an opportunity for social networking and the freedom and mobility within a limited framework (117). It might seem contradictory at first to argue that a woman-oriented movement that relies on such female bonding is working to hold up a narrowly essentialist view of gendered behavior (2, 184). Such apparent contradiction functions as an indication of how sexist and feminist structures have been traditionally understood in an oversimplified single-axis paradigm as being mutually exclusive. Ahmad avoids reiterating such oversimplifications by insisting on a non-monolithic construction of women associated with the movement. Ahmad is as careful in placing Al-Huda in the context of already extant values in Pakistani society pertaining women (which are a result of complex interconnections of religious and nationalist discourses) that paved the way for this revivalist movement⁸ as she is in pointing out similar values that oppose the ideology of Al-Huda. These latter "competing cultural codes" may include, as it does in Razia's case, the secular "human rights discourse" that believes in equal rights for all religions⁹ rather than upholding a religious (and in this context, Islamic) code of life as the only possibility to attain an ethical and pious self (87, 88). In addition, Ahmad also notes various other 'disruptions' in

Al-Huda's discourse (with the reminder that disruption does not equal disbelief) and underlines that the change of subjectivity to fit the mold of a "unitary religious consciousness" is more accurately described as an open process rather than a closed category that is always already constituted (91, 106).

The last two chapters of the study attempt to understand the significance of this movement in the global political context of the post-9/11 world¹⁰. Ahmad's analysis does not overemphasize the importance of 9/11 in explaining the impetus to regain a 'true' Muslim identity. Instead, she historicizes the tendency to form a religio-nationalist identity in Pakistan against the alterity of a monolithic West (which figures as a space characterized by moral and sexual decadence and a spiritual void)¹¹, and an oversimplified idea of Indian culture which is mistakenly seen as coterminous with "Hindu" culture. The two alterities are used differently to espouse the strict interpretation of Qur'an and the exegetical commentary forwarded by Al-Huda. While the former is used to consolidate the many proscriptive sexual mores that affect women much more harshly than men, the latter is used to root out the indigenous ritualistic practices common in Bairalvi Islam as *biddat*, and hence un-Islamic.¹² The common factor that binds these two 'Others' is that they are both used by Al-Huda as a contradistinctive frame to mold a unitary Muslim identity that is supposedly pure and authentic.

As it often happens, the female body becomes the battleground for constructing a national identity based on a single-axis. Ahmad contends that adoption of the veil is the single, most visible and most consistent effect produced by this revivalist movement among its adherents. Although some of the interviewees like Sammiya "thought that the attention paid to their veiling was pointless and exaggerated," arguing that "[c]hanging things on the outside is very easy," it cannot be denied that veiling is quickly becoming one of the most contentious issues in the post-9/11 world marked by a hysteric Islamophobic discourse that is frequently couched in the rhetoric of bleeding-heart imperialist Western feminism that is an upgraded and more specified version of the colonial Enlightenment discourse (162). In an admirably succinct and thorough literature review, Ahmad not only provides the salient points of the debate (without getting into specific contexts like France, Belgium or Turkey that would have assuredly led the discussion astray), but also analyzes the reasons why the fear of sexual

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agency of the female body cannot be allied only to this one Islamic practice, and how Western patriarchies manifest other means of systemic and discursive validation of repressing this same agency.

In the “Preface” to her similar ethnographic study of Islamic politics in Egypt, Saba Mahmood acknowledges that “progressive feminists” like her have a “profound dis-ease with the appearance of religion outside of the private space of individualized belief” which is “accompanied by a deep self-assurance about the truth of the progressive-secular imaginary” (xi). Mahmood insists on a necessary skepticism of this ideological framework that immediately names “other forms of human flourishing and life forms” as intrinsically inferior (xi). Ahmad, clearly indebted to Mahmood’s work for theoretical grounding and methodological guidance, admits that in this case, any reductionist approach might lead to silencing of the voices of women—not a desirable outcome for any study that hopes to use feminist ethnography successfully (14). Her conclusion that veiling becomes a tool to exhibit agency within the worldview provided by Al-Huda is best examined in this context as redemptive. The larger question of what it means to be Muslim in Pakistan in contemporary times is raised in a less rigorous, anecdotal way towards the end of the book. Deeply personal in tone, the chapter simply called “Reflections” raises questions about the authenticity espoused by Al-Huda, which sound poignant in the context of her observation that the kind of discourse propagated by this revivalist movement imagines the originary center of Islam in the Middle East (more specifically Saudi Arabia) (143). Therefore, when she writes that “[g]iven the rapidly changing sociopolitical scene in Pakistan, I do not think that any of us has the luxury of merely debating the impact of people who consider themselves the custodians of truth at a purely theoretical level anymore,” her project in writing this book becomes more than just another well-executed ethnographic study (191). It becomes the first radical intervention on a matter that invites immediate praxis.

¹ This is something Ahmad realized when she started the fieldwork. She clarifies that she did not conduct research in rural areas, but did interact with women from the lower middle classes (21). In fact, two of the five *dars* surveyed in the fourth chapter for their pedagogical techniques have women mostly from “lower middle to middle class.” Ahmad does not provide the exact basis of such categorization.

² The study is published by Syracuse UP, and is one of the titles under the 'Gender and Globalization' series edited by Susan S. Wadley, professor of Anthropology at the Maxwell School, housed at Syracuse University.

³ In the Introduction to *Orientalism*, Said quotes Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* to note that a necessary *point de départ* of critical elaboration is to be conscious of what one really is, and to compile an inventory of the historical processes that have led to that consciousness (25). Ahmad's rigorous attention in providing such an inventory throughout the study is very visible. This is not to say that there are no occasional lapses into a 'biased' rhetorical choice, but that it is a sign of her rigorous attention in providing this inventory that the 'bias' immediately becomes apparent, and hence proves the merit of her situated subjectivity.

⁴ "I suggest, however, that it is not just the discourse itself but the manner in which it is propagated that has allowed Al-Huda to achieve the success it has, particularly among the middle and upper classes of urban Pakistan" (2).

⁵ Ahmad borrows from Foucault and Mahmood liberally to place the subject-forming enterprise of al-Huda into a theoretical grid.

⁶ "The Hudood Ordinance, based on the government's interpretation of Islamic law, and largely dealing with issues of adultery, theft, drinking, and gambling, was especially for women. For instance, if a woman reported being raped but was unable to produce four male Muslim witnesses of good character to support her claim, she was charged with the "crime" of engaging in premarital sex or extramarital sex, imprisoned, and lashed a hundred times. Sex outside of marriage became an offense against the state" (33-34). The Ordinance (also known as the Zina ordinance) was introduced when Pakistan was under General Zia-ul-Haq's martial law. Gen. Zia's regime is widely held to be "oppressive and misogynistic" and noted for its overt espousal of Islamizing the state apparatus of Pakistan (Zia 225). The Ordinance was repealed under the military regime of Gen. Pervez Musharraf.

⁷ Ahmad borrows the expression "experiential commensurability" from Benford and Snow.

⁸ Ahmad uses social movement theory to identify this as 'frame resonance' (62).

⁹ I take this opportunity to clarify (at the risk of taking on the role of the native informant) that 'secular' has historically meant according equal and same rights (legal and human) to all religions in the geopolitical context of the Indian subcontinent. The Eurocentric notion of 'secular' meaning separation of Church and State is more or less invalid in this context.

¹⁰ In this context, Khanum Shaikh's criticism in her review that "the thoroughly transnational dimensions and appeal of this organization remain underemphasized in the book" and "Ahmad's decision to situate this movement within the city of its birthplace (Islamabad) rather than framing it as a transnational movement may, indeed, foreclose exciting possibilities for theorizing the linkages between the politics of production and reception of Al-Huda's discourses on Islam" seem to be unfounded (313). It is not understandable how future analyses of al-Huda's transnational effects have been foreclosed by Ahmad's project. On the contrary, Ahmad's account might be said to have upset the Eurocentric expectation that interminable accounts of how the metropole is constituted/affected/effectuated by the Oriental other be produced, sustaining an epistemological framework that continues to bolster itself ad infinitum. One can only hope that Shaikh does not mourn a break in this monotonous routine.

¹¹ This is, as Ahmad rightly points out quoting Akbar Ahmed, the obverse of Said's *Orientalism* (134). For a very interesting recent discussion of how Orientalist and Nativist discourses have influenced each other over the years, see Joseph Massad's *Desiring Arabs*.

¹² It is only fair to comment that Ahmad succeeds here in creating an implicit bifurcation that might or not might not be unintended. It is not hard to imagine that the Indian soaps and movies

(as they become increasingly explicit with their sexual content) might be seen as overly 'Westernized' contra the sexually pure imaginary constructed in Al-Huda's discourse. But it is true that even in such a case, "India" (not coterminous with 'Hindu' here) can be seen as a culturally imperialistic intermediary that takes on some of the putative West's decadence. It is important to note in this context that Ahmad points out how the festival of Basant in the province of Punjab has not only been seen as an un-Islamic cultural accretion by Al-Huda, but it is also deemed to promote indecency and obscenity through women's participation in public events like flying kites (142).

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Review: India-Pakistan: Coming to Terms

By Amit Ranjan

India-Pakistan: Coming to Terms. Ashutosh Misra. Palgrave Macmillan Publications: New York, 2010. 288 pages. ISBN: 978-0-230-61937-1.

Lots of books, research articles and editorials focusing upon the need for good relations between India and Pakistan have been written, but the two South Asian, nuclear-armed neighbors are still adamantly hostile to each other. The root cause of their conflict is their claim and counter claim to the entire region of Jammu and Kashmir. They have even fought three full wars, one limited war and a series of proxy wars but are yet to resolve this issue. No formal or informal talks between India and Pakistan can be concluded without raising the subject of 'Kashmir'. Thinking rationally, one feels that the two countries, for the time being, should put this issue into political cold storage and focus on other bilateral conflicts between them. In the event they resolve those issues they could apply the same mechanism and methods to address Kashmir. Ashutosh Misra's work is a step in that direction. Unlike others, he has tried to cautiously avoid the Kashmir issue and focuses upon the negotiations and dialogue process over resolved and non-resolved conflicts between India and Pakistan.

Leaving aside a detailed analysis of the Kashmir question, the author has talked about the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) of 1960, the Siachin dispute, the Sir Creek dispute, the Rann of Kutch and the Tulbul/ Wular barrage. On the basis of his research, Misra has described the conflict between the two as an "enduring conflict," a term used by many, including T.V. Paul, to describe India-Pakistan dispute. But despite such disagreements, on certain issues both countries follow the defensive neo-realist dictum that even traditional rivals cooperate if they find that cooperation is in their mutual interest. The Indus Water Treaty of 1960 is one such example.

The author has taken into account the theoretical aspects of negotiations, and talks about how negotiations proceed, about ripeness of the dispute, pre-negotiations, negotiation and agreement. India and Pakistan have followed this process but the relationship is so delicate and complex that one untoward incident negates all the hard work done by an individual or group of individuals. Mr. Vajpayee's and

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Nawaz Sharif's intentions were mowed down by the Kargil episode, then Dr. Manmohan Singh's and Pervez Musharraf's step forward faltered due to Mumbai carnage. Once these types of incidents take place the relationship goes back to zero and for any further political engagement one has to start from scratch. There is an absolute lack of continuity in bilateral dialogue, which is a must for resolution of any ensuing conflict.

Talking about the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), the author is correct to argue that they are just short term arrangements. People sometimes become hysterical and start expecting the unexpected, but in the end, these arrangements end up nowhere and come to an abrupt end. Many CBMs and treaties to encourage people-to-people contacts and increasing trade have been signed, but they have failed to add even a spoonful of sugar to their bitter relationship. But two important CBMs have been honestly carried out—the Indo-Pakistan agreement to not attack each others' nuclear installations and the exchange of nuclear lists on the first of January each year. One of the major reasons for the failure of other CBMs is that the government elite and private sector elite from both countries want the relationship to remain, so that their self-interests can be properly served.

Referring to the previously-mentioned Indus Water Treaty (IWT) of 1960, Misra has given a detailed analysis and description of the treaty and the problems cropping up now. In an abruptly concluded chapter, citing B.G.Varghese, he has supported the idea of having a new treaty—Indus-II. But it must be kept in mind that it's not possible for the two countries to sit together for such a long period and re-negotiate the entire water-sharing treaty. A few clauses of the IWT may be amended but the treaty, as a whole, must be kept intact. Like the IWT, the boundary issue in Rann of Kutch was resolved through arbitration in 1968.

Problematic areas between India and Pakistan continue to be Siachin, Sir Creek and the Tulbul/Wular barrage. Though talks have taken place to resolve these conflicts, they have not been fruitful. Manning and maintaining posts at Siachin glacier is responsible for large number of peacetime casualties. It also puts extra stress on the already burdened defense budget because a lot of money is spent by both countries to maintain their strategic posts at Siachin. But still the two sides are not ready to withdraw from there and declare it a no man's land. Many rounds of talks have been held to discuss the issue but were of no use. Sir Creek is a marshy land and is a storehouse of hydrocarbon materials. According to UNCLOS it was to be declared as international water by 2009 in case India and Pakistan did not agree to resolve the issue, but the United Nations still has not

taken any action regarding its status. The Tulbul/Wular project over the river Jhelum is a cause of tension between India and Pakistan too. Talks have been held to resolve differences over this project but those talks are yet to yield any result. Kishenganga, another controversial run-of-river hydroelectric project, was referred to arbitration court in April 2010.

It's not that these above mentioned problems cannot be resolved between the two countries, rather they could be, if there is a strong political will among the powerful elites to do so, otherwise the world is going to witness more decades of political tension between India and Pakistan.

Islamic terror groups were raised and trained by the Pakistani army to fight the USA's war against the former USSR in Afghanistan. Once the US's interest was served those groups were orphaned. Later on they were directed by the Pakistani government to fight Pakistan's low intensity proxy war against India, in Jammu and Kashmir. Now, like the Frankenstein monster, these groups are ready to engulf even Pakistan and are a worry for global security. They are responsible for carrying out many bomb blasts in major Indian cities, but the author has not taken note of the involvement of Indian Mujahidin and Hindu terror groups, which makes for an egregious disparity. Indian Mujahidin came into action after post-Godhra mayhem while Hindu extremist groups were formed in response to the Islamic groups. The Samjhauta Express bomb blast and the Mecca Masjid blast, among others, were carried out by the newly emerged Hindu terror groups.

In a few places the author has also made factual mistakes. He has written that "meetings of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh with General Musharraf in Islamabad" (22), whereas as Prime Minister, Dr. Singh has yet to pay a visit to Pakistan. In places he has cited an incorrect date, for example the meeting of former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee with General Musharraf in 2006 (39), whereas Dr. Manmohan Singh has been India's Prime Minister since 2004. The author, like many, has used the term Indo-China (several wars involving Indo-China between the 1950s and the 1990s) for the Sino-India war of 1962 (96).

Despite the occasional oversight, this book has carefully looked into the often neglected issues between India and Pakistan. The author has done good work to make readers aware of the multiple reasons why the India and Pakistan peace process negotiations have failed.

Review, *Education and Gendered Citizenship in Pakistan*

By David Waterman

Education and Gendered Citizenship in Pakistan. M. Ayaz Naseem. New York: Palgrave Macmillan (Postcolonial Studies in Education), 2010. 171 pages. ISBN-13: 978-0-230-61853-4.

While the foundational study for M. Ayaz Naseem's recent book is an overview of textbooks used in the Pakistani public schools and the marginalizing representations generally accorded to women, *Education and Gendered Citizenship in Pakistan* goes well beyond the study itself in examining the context – social, economic, political and legal – which allows for the creation of gendered subjectivities. The introductory chapter, “Contextualizing Articulations of Women,” makes the provocative argument that, in its current form, Pakistan's educational apparatus actually disempowers women, thus going against the grain of development discourse which insists that education always represents progress (4). After a brief description of the methodology of the study, the author takes the time to situate himself in terms of subjectivity, being an upper-middle class male, urban and Muslim, educated in English, feminist ally and postcolonial citizen.

The following chapter outlines the poststructuralist approach to the research, especially as elucidated by Michel Foucault through the lens of genealogical method and the functioning of power. In the domain of education, according to Ayaz Naseem, poststructuralism is extremely useful for a critical understanding of the everyday and the ordinary: “how certain educational discourses [...] came about in the first place [...] focusing on what can be said, who can say what is said, which ‘truths’ are validated and legitimized, and what is excluded” (15). Educational textbooks play a key role in normalization and the creation of docile, properly formatted citizens, whether in Pakistan or elsewhere; the particularity, according to the author, is the paucity of critical research regarding educational discourse in Pakistan, including its “symbiotic fusion” with religious and political discourse as well (17; 19). Since curriculum design is largely controlled at the national level, a

chapter is consecrated to educational policy, beginning with a brief overview of the discouraging state of Pakistan's educational infrastructure and the unkept promises of successive governments to seriously address underfunding, illiteracy and other essential reforms. "Education policy discourse," Ayaz Naseem reminds us, "has been largely guided by the transposition of an educational vision that is grounded in the colonial and the Orientalist discourses of education on the one hand and by the global modernization and developmentalist discourses on the other," not to mention the active involvement of religious leaders (40).

The fourth chapter provides what the author calls a history of the present in terms of women and the State, beginning with statistics from the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan regarding crimes against women, then continuing with a description of three axes along which the State has been conceptualized in Pakistan: historical-structuralist, Marxist and postfoundational (51; 53). Women have found themselves between two competing discourses, that of the State – itself a colonial legacy – and that of the religious ulema, and Naseem highlights the agency of women in spite of these difficulties, whether at the time of the nation's birth or in the present (61). One recalls the activities of the Women's Action Forum, and their sentiment of betrayal after having supported Benazir Bhutto's accession to power. The following chapter discusses in more general terms the constitution of subjectivity and positioning of the subject; here Naseem coins the term "religiopoly," defined as "a symbiotic merger of religious and militaro-nationalistic discourses where each discourse retains its originary criteria of formation but where these discourses together form the dominant discourse that constitutes subjects and subjectivities, positions subjects..." (66). The chapter continues with a section on legal discourse as it pertains to women in Pakistan; the author notes that prior to the Zia period, the legal system largely followed the British colonial model, but after the promulgation of the Hudood ordinances women were punished with far greater frequency than men (70). Representations of women in the media along a "good woman / bad woman binary" also help to reinforce what Naseem calls the "*hyperreality of the sermon*," privileging the message of conservative clerics (77; 78 original italics).

Textbooks from the Urdu and Social Studies curricula are reviewed in chapter six; among other problems of poor design and sloppy production, the author deplores the fact that "both the social studies and Urdu texts [...] are

heavily gendered with a pronounced androcentric bias.” He goes on to cite statistics showing 81% of characters are male, with males accorded more active roles – “freedom fighters, leaders, patriots, rebels” – as compared to the nurturing, mothering role of females (88-89). Throughout the textbooks, meaning is fixed along certain “nodes,” conflating “Muslim” with “citizen,” for example, or juxtaposing nationalism with religion, resulting, Naseem argues, “in a situation where everything that the text says has the authority and sanction of religion,” thus effectively separating Muslims from non-Muslims while clouding the immense diversity within the Muslim community itself (94-95). Such binary categorization is not limited to women, as we see in the following chapter, since this strategy of “Othering” also serves to effectively remove minorities from the national collectivity; Naseem points out that population statistics are never broken down into their nuanced elements – one seldom, if ever, finds Hindus or Bengalis mentioned, for example (104-105). Women, when they are mentioned, are most often connected to the Prophet’s family (Hazrat Khadija, Ayisha, Zainab) or to the nationalist cause (Fatima Jinnah; see 109). The section concludes with the various strategies and discourses of normalization, notably the normalization of militarism, authority, power / knowledge and gender relations / women. The final chapter of *Education and Gendered Citizenship in Pakistan* recalls the dramatic walkout by members of the opposition parties in 2004, in response to the omission of Quranic verses from biology textbooks (119), then draws some conclusions of the study, warning that the quantitative increase in enrolment of girls and young women at all levels of education has not translated into empowerment, evidenced by the continuing relegation of women to second-class status, not to mention the prevalence of “honor” killings which often go unpunished (121). Overall, Naseem’s study concludes that educational texts in Pakistan “construct a metanarrative of religion and nationalism that includes only the masculine, militaristic, and nationalist narratives from past and present [...] excluded from the metanarrative are women, dissidents, and minorities” (127).

While patriarchal and conservative religious societies are often reproached for blatantly oppressing women, education is – at least ideally – supposed to represent progress, a way out of inequality and poverty. M. Ayaz Naseem’s study is sure to attract a good deal of attention precisely because it contests the accepted wisdom that education always equals progress and liberation. Pakistan’s governing elite have for years been insisting that

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genuine progress has been made, but Naseem's study suggests that the education system as it currently exists is part of the problem, part of the status quo which continues to create gendered citizens. Naseem is to be congratulated for exposing the nuts-and-bolts mechanics of how such representations are deployed, and to what ends; his study will be of interest to educators and sociologists, indeed anyone interested in the role of institutions in the formation of subjects. Those who administer Pakistan's educational system, on the other hand, may not be happy with what M. Ayaz Naseem has to say.

Review, *Granta* Special Issue on Pakistan

Reviewed by Claire Omhovère

Special issue on Pakistan. *Granta. The Magazine of New Writing* 112 (2010) pp. 288. £12.99. \$16.99.

The gorgeous cover of the volume *Granta Magazine* has recently devoted to new Pakistani writing was designed by truck-artist Islam Gull from Karachi. Gull used the vibrant colors seen on decorated vehicles everywhere in this part of the world to capture a sense of home, or rather a sense of homecoming to the snow-capped mountains of Pakistan where wooden houses snuggle around rice paddies and lakes are so bright and blue they almost hurt the eye. On the back cover, fortified walls topped with ancestral guns are inserted in a green mosaic of birds and flowers, the dominant color inscribing an obvious reference to Islam, and the many conflicts that have been waged in its name in a country born in 1947 out of the need for an independent Muslim homeland.

The notion of a tradition in motion is implicit in the landscapes on the front and back covers, but also in the range of works collected in this impressive issue. Gathered together are eighteen pieces of fiction, literary journalism, memoir, and poetry—originally in English or translated from Urdu—interspersed with reproductions of works by Pakistani visual artists. Special mention should be made of “High Noon,” the central section introduced by novelist Hari Kunzru, and in which a selection of cutting-edge visual art is reproduced in collaboration with the London-based gallery Green Cardamom. Diversity in genre and provenance testifies to the development of contemporary Pakistani creation along increasingly transnational lines. In the context of globalization, Pakistani writing cannot be envisaged without due reference to the experience of arriving and growing up as a young immigrant in Britain, a common memory evoked in the bitter-sweet chronicles of Aamer Hussein’s “Restless,” and Sarfraz Manzoor’s “White Girls.” But the issue also leaves room for reflections on Pakistan from the outside with two reportages by Western press correspondents Jane Perlez and Declan Walsh, respectively on the father of the nation Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and on the political conundrum of Pakistan’s tribal belt. These two pieces communicate a wealth of information on the historical confrontations that have led to the challenges Pakistan now has to face, by setting them in the successive frames of the colonial involvement of Britain in Pakistan and neighboring

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Afghanistan, the American endeavor to foster and fund a resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and, finally, today's struggle against the Taliban. The in-depth surveys of Pakistan's fields of historical contest stand in fine balance with the investigations of other scenes of conflict, at home and abroad, as in Basharat Peer's moving article on "Kashmir's Forever War," and Lorraine Adams and Ayesha Nasir's collaborative investigation of the terrorist attack planned by Faisal Shahzad on May 1, 2010 in Times Square, New York City.

Criss-crossing perspectives on and from Pakistan never let the reader forget that this special issue is primarily *about* Pakistan. In this respect, the careful architecture of the volume deserves praise, as a great deal of attention has evidently gone into the arrangement of texts and pictures so as to create strong associations between the verbal and the visual. The enlargement of a tiny framed miniature (1.1 x 1.5 cm) showing the curvy belly of a faceless, pregnant woman thus greets the reader about to begin "Leila in the Wilderness," the opening novella by Nadeem Aslam. Leila's tale reads like a contemporary Arabian Night gone awry, as her husband Timur orders the young bride's baby girls to be killed, birth after stubborn birth, the instant they have taken their first breath on the banks of the Indus River. Nadeem Aslam's indictment of female infanticide is all the more effective as his story depicts a Pakistan teetering on a widening chasm between the legacies of legend and the reflexes of modernity. Magic-realism acquires a disquieting bitterness when Leila grows silver wings to escape her tormentors, only to have them nailed to the ground, and chopped off by the local butcher, while Timur is kept informed by mobile phone of his wife's condition so he can reach the next scene (of labor) at the appropriate time in his air-conditioned SUV. The permanence of the community-destructive violence exerted against women and their tender ties is also prominent in "The Sins of the Mother," the short story by Jamil Ahmad that concludes the volume. The hieratic tale of two lovers hounded for years by the woman's clan across the wastelands of northern Pakistan is imbued with such a stark beauty that readers will no doubt feel encouraged to find out more about this new writer who has just published a *début* novel entitled *The Wandering Falcon* at the age of 80.

Granta 112 gives us a bracing overview of the plurality of voices that make up contemporary Pakistani literature at home and abroad. Some of them have familiar names such as Fatima Bhutto and Kamila Shamsie who both surprise us with refreshing memories of growing up in a country interrogating its traditions, and inventing new ones with the emergence of pop idols on their way to earn diasporic fame in the 1980s. But most of the artists and writers selected for this issue are still in the process of attracting an international attention, and their names need to be commended to the potential reader with a keen—although by force lacunary—interest in the cultural productions of the English-speaking

world. Mohammed Hanif's "Butt and Bhatti" is one of the gems to be signaled to those among us who may have missed his 2008 novel *A Case of Exploding Mangoes*. The short story is told with such sardonic humor that its ambivalence endures long after its last sentence has been relished. It begins with Teddy Butt taking a Mauser to do his declaration of love for him. Teddy is a man of few words but complicated yearnings. Without spoiling the ending, one can admit that Teddy's relative inarticulacy is perhaps less responsible for the subsequent turn of events than Sister Bhatti's literal mindedness, and her failure to decode the fears underlying male swagger. The semiotic tragedy causes a whole city to erupt in violence because the characters on either side of the gender divide have long ceased to be able to decipher the signs they tentatively address one another. Signs, however, are taken very seriously in Uzam Aslam Khan's "Ice, Mating," a short story partly set in the Kaghan Valley in the North West Frontier Province and in the United States. High in the Himalayas, the populations from different villages still engage in the ritual of ice-seeding. A female block of ice is chosen from a village where women are renowned for their accomplishments while its male counterpart is picked in another village where the men are deemed equally worthy. The ice-bride and her groom are brought together in the cleft of a cliff where they are left to lie for five winters. When the time of gestation has elapsed, the cycle of freezing and thawing will have started the crystallization process out of which glaciers begin their stately course, bringing freshwater and irrigation to the valleys below. The story combines together ethnographic observation, landscape writing and a dash of romance so as to probe the effect certain locations—the River Kunhar but also the Bay of San Francisco—have on our sense of place. The result is superb and it is likely to fascinate all readers, no matter where one comes from.

US-Pakistan Relations: The Need for a Strategic Vision

By Masood Ashraf Raja

As a former Pakistani military officer and as the editor of an academic journal on Pakistan, I often interact with Pakistanis from different walks of life. During my visit to Pakistan a few months ago, I had the privilege of engaging with ordinary Pakistanis, academics, and some very powerful old friends. Our conversations always centered on the US-Pakistan relations probably because of my connection to the US as an academic. I find it worthwhile to share some of my exchanges about the US-Pakistan relations, as these views are not normally covered by the mainstream US media.

In my conversations with my friends, relatives, and people from my village, one topic always came up: the US drone attacks within Pakistani territory. According to my sources, there were 118 drone strikes in 2010 claiming 1127 lives of which 680 are believed to be those of civilian bystanders. President Obama has continued these attacks as an “effective” tactics in the US mission in Afghanistan. But strategically, in symbolic terms, these attacks tend to damage the long-term US interests in Pakistan. The Pakistanis see these attacks under several symbolic registers:

- They see it as a mockery of Pakistani sovereignty, a perception that is further accentuated by the frequent deaths of civilians caught in the targeted areas. The drone attacks also make their own government and their military look weak and ineffectual, even though, as is suggested by the US media, the Pakistani government often coordinates these attacks with the US forces.
- The people also see it as a tactics that replicates the Israeli targeted killings of Hamas leaders, and thus the US tactics, somehow, is seen as part of larger Israeli conspiracy.

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One of the most interesting and probably the most apt question came from one of my ex soldiers, who asked: “Do American people know that a lot of civilians are getting killed by these drones?” And, he further asked, “If they know about it, do they object to it? Needless to say, I had no convincing answer to this pointed question.

In my conversations with my military friends, the war on terror was often the main topic. In terms of Pakistan’s military operations against Taliban, as of January 2011, Pakistan has lost 2740 soldiers while 8500 of them have been wounded in action. These figures are enough to counter any claims by the US media that Pakistan is not doing enough. In fact, it seems, that Pakistanis have sacrificed quite a lot in this unending war.

While almost all these officers were sure that they can tactically control the FATA and probably win the war, but they all also suggested that in order to really solve the problem of radicalization of youth, Pakistan will need a lot of international help. Some of the sectors that could, in their view, use this help include: education, health-care, and job creation. Pakistan, obviously, cannot transform its infrastructure in all these areas single-handedly and this is where the US aid is crucial to the long-term stability of Pakistan. During my visit to one of the defense-funded schools (Heavy Industries Taxila Education City) I was astounded to learn that the school was providing free education for two hundred students recruited from FATA. Imagine the impact these students would have on the economic and cultural life of their respective regions after they have had a chance to get a more cosmopolitan, modern education. Just a little bit of help from the US and other powers could drastically increase the number of such students whose lives would have a long-term impact on the future of Pakistan.

It seems, however, that when it comes Pakistan, the US is guided more by an arbitrary, short-term vision and lacks any long-term plan of developing a people-to-people relationship. The US handling of Raymond Davis’s trial in Pakistan is a case in point. It is sad to note that in this case the US has chosen to respond with the typical myopia that signifies its relations to Pakistan. In an attempt to pressure Pakistan into handing over Mr. Davis, the US state department, as per the reports here, has canceled high level meeting with the Pakistani government on Afghanistan, has threatened to reduce defense aid, education aid and has also decided to slow down the visa process for Pakistanis aspiring to travel to the US. While it is important for the US to insist upon defending the diplomatic immunity of its embassy staff, the measures threatened publicly do not help the US cause in any way. In material terms, these measure

would end up hurting Pakistan in the very areas where Pakistan needs US help, which would ultimately also hurt US interests in the region. In symbolic terms, these actions would also harden the popular views against the US and against the unequal relationship between the two countries.

Unless the US transforms its relations to Pakistan to that of equal partners and unless Pakistani national interests are foregrounded in this relationship, the chances of US success in the region would be seriously hampered. The US media, therefore, need to highlight the nature and importance of this relationship. Looking at the situation from a Pakistani perspective, instead of just a US-centered approach, would be a good start.

Quality registry for improving the quality and relevance of higher education in Pakistan

By Mashhood Ahmed Sheikh

This short paper presents the possibility of establishing a ‘quality registry’ for higher education in Pakistan. It presents a tentative list of variables for measuring the structural indicators, process indicators, and the results and outcomes of higher education. Further research, planning and discussion are needed to establish a central quality registry for higher education in Pakistan, as this article only highlights the possibility, and usage of it.

Background:

The total number of students at university level in Pakistan was 650 in 1947, while it is now over 350,000 (Hoodbhoy 1998). At graduate and post-graduate level, there are several government and private universities in each city. There are many colleges that provide vocational or skill-based technical education as well. It is hard to get admission in the government institutes since they have a very low fee, thus attracting a large number of applicants. When it comes to universities, there is no set standard that divides government universities and private universities according to the quality of their education. Some private universities are among the top ranking business and economics institutes in Asia and the Pacific¹ while some government /semi government universities, like NCA², are also considered high-ranking universities. NCA is ranked as the best arts institute in Pakistan by HEC³.

Since it is easier to get admission into most private universities, they are filled with students whose parents can afford the tuition fees. There is a certain ‘economic class’ of students from each private institute depending on the tuition

¹ LUMS’ MBA programme, e.g., is ranked 18th in Asia according to www.asiaweek.com and is ranked as the best institute for Business studies in Pakistan according to Higher Education Commission of Pakistan (www.hec.gov.pk).

² National College of Arts

³ Higher Education Commission of Pakistan. (www.hec.gov.pk)

fees. In government universities, there is no such distinction, since the admission is (generally) strictly merit based. In this way, getting an admission in a good government university is considered a merit itself.

The higher education in Pakistan is not able to provide a promising career to young people. Up to 90 % migrate to the West to earn or settle permanently after graduation (Malik 1997, 126). Thousands of Pakistani students are studying in Sweden, and in 2008 approximately 6,000 students applied for a student visa while the number was 2,800 in 2007 (Tasleem 2008).

Almost all the decisions in the field of education and policy are made without any scientific data, evidence, or documentation; In fact the policy makers' own experiences, politics, and observations usually decide the policy.

Some important considerations in this discussion are:

- The students spend time and money on education in Pakistan, and that is why it is necessary to know the relevance and quality of education they receive.
- The students are not aware that jobs are not available for many academic disciplines; that is why it is necessary to evaluate whether it is relevant to spend time and money on an education that only leads to unemployment or to a flight out of the country.
- The students, who do find jobs, have to compete with others, and it is necessary to evaluate which institute is producing better students than the others, and how? So that an equal/similar quality of education can be provided at all institutes.
- Some students continue to study abroad, or work in international companies, which is why it is necessary to evaluate whether the education they received in Pakistan is comparable to the level of competence in other countries.

Quality Registry:

I define quality registry for the purpose at hand as a systematic, regular, and continuous data collection from students, administrators, and teachers from all the higher educational institutes in Pakistan. The data should be held in a central database.

A 'quality registry' consists of important factors like selection, measures, and outcomes. The factors to measure are all the indicators of quality education and educational attainment, and outcomes are the eventual skills the students acquire, the way they use those skills in lives, and their satisfaction.

In order to establish quality registry, to analyze the relationships, and to see what can be improved, the data for the following variables need to be collected. The information from current students and future should be regularly collected by online questionnaires, while for the other structure variables and the process variables, it should be reported regularly by teachers and administrators of each institute.

A: Process variables:

1. How many hours of teaching does a teacher do for a course?
2. How many assignments/exams does a teacher evaluate for a course?
3. What is the admission criterion at each institute?
4. How is the competition for admission in each institute?
5. How is the relationship between students and teachers?
6. Is there any sort of discrimination over gender or over socio-economic status of the student?
7. Do students learn what they were supposed to learn as the objectives of the course?
8. Do the students have a chance to comment on the teaching methodology?
9. Do the students have a chance to express any concerns to the teachers?
10. How do the students rate the teacher?
11. How do the students rate the learning outcome from each course?
12. What proportion of students passes the exam for every course?
13. What proportion of students complete the degree in due time?
14. Do the students know where they could apply for jobs after their education finishes?
15. What is the amount of required reading for every course at every institute?

B: Structure variables:

1. What is the student-teacher ratio in every department of every higher education institute in Pakistan?
2. What equipment/facilities does every institute has? (Projectors, air-conditioned classrooms, clean drinkable water, clean toilets, student canteen, availability of required books in libraries, etc.)

C: Results/Outcome variables:

1. Were the students satisfied with the quality of education they received?
2. Were the students satisfied with the course reading material/books, etc.?
3. Were the students satisfied with the assessment methods (exams, assignments, presentations, etc)?
4. Were the students satisfied with their relationship with the teachers and department administration?
5. Where do the students work after studies?
6. Do the students even find any jobs related to what they learned and studied at the university?
7. How much did the students learn? (Based on self-reported answer)
8. Were the students able to work at good firms/companies/organizations?
9. Do the students think they are able to study further at a Ph.D. level, if they want to?
10. How did the education help them in their career later on in life?
11. Were they able to apply the knowledge in field that they learned at the university?
12. Do they have the updated knowledge from the university, or do they need to update themselves while working?
13. Did the students find the education relevant for their career?
14. Do the students find the amount of knowledge acquired at the university justified in terms of the time spent on it?
15. To what extent do they utilize the knowledge they learned in education?

Discussion:

Many of the indicators/variables need to be measured on regular basis by online self-reported questionnaires. The data should be collected from each higher education institute in Pakistan. The outcomes will be gathered from students by asking them to fill out the online self-reported questionnaires. The results should be published, and a report with comparison between different institutes should be sent to all the institutes in Pakistan.

The main objective of this quality registry is to improve the quality of education, increase the participation in relevant education and vice versa, and assess the outcomes/results.

There is a need for the combination of process variables and the outcomes variables, so that we get the knowledge about the relationship between the quality and relevance of education and the result/outcome of the formal higher education.

Based on the variables I have listed above, it will be possible to know ‘if we do what we want to do’, and ‘if we do what we think we do’. The relationship between process and structure variables with the results/outcome variables will inform us as to how better decisions can be made, and what changes need to be initiated in order to get better results.

The most important factors in considering this quality registry are the attitude of the institutes, the teachers, administrators, as well as the students who have to provide feedback after they complete their education. The administration of the educational institutes and the teachers need to realize that this is not a clever way to find ways to criticize them or check their output. It is instead a systematic way for improvement. Improvement cannot come on its own; it needs transparency and constant monitoring. Similarly, the students who have finished their studies need to realize that their feedback will help change the education system to the better. They may not reap the benefit of this whole exercise in any way, but the future students will. As for the students who are studying, they need to realize that this is not a chance to criticize the teachers, or the institute, instead it is a chance to express their opinions, which will eventually be useful for the betterment of future students and the higher educational system as a whole.

This paper presented the idea of a quality registry along with the tentative protocol for higher education in Pakistan. The protocol should be improved, and in order for operation of the registry, a database needs to be constructed along with the necessary ICT tools.

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A Halva Vendor Bemoans a Legendary Calligrapher

By Shadab Zeest Hashmi

I see you about town
trying on sandals
mumbling
but the doves laughed

over and over
Cheeks puffed with
fig halva

You don't know your name
An egret stretches
from end to end of your nebula

I have studied your delicate strokes
Your volumes
fill the caliph's library

Here
Try these pistachios
in hot syrup
Yes, you need good shoes for
the court in Cairo.

The Mystic Dancers of Punjab

By Rizwan Akhtar

Rolled in orange and green chadars
dervishes dance to the metallic balls
clanging around ankles; iron-wristed,
knee-jerking, necks clogged with beads
they stamp the earth with their heels
and the earth's heart crack
tongs-clasped chanting verses
they whirl to become the circumference
of time measured in braided ringlets
touching their patched faces; children clap
to *Dhamal**, and copy their limbed world;
the saintly melody turns into a solemn
crescendo as they surround their *murshid**,
love becomes a cradle in which they sleep
with smoke-tinged fragrance of *agarbattis**
the whole world drowns for the one Man
the *kafis* and songs shape
the mud-smelling Punjabi poetry.

*Sufi trance dance

* Arabic word for 'guide' or teacher'

* a kind of incense

Pakistani story

(from real to comic)

By Rizwan Akhtar

I

When they call me Paki
they do not know that back home
the word means 'pure'.

I cover eight thousands miles
leave behind droning afternoons of Lahore;
a patched & dust-friendly sky;
a book of history shoved into a wrong shelf;
and a map burned at edges.

Oil slick and grease of the English waters
sits on my postcode and cheekbones,
the tongue is heavier than ever
the eyes are blurring than ever
but the nose is sharper than ever.

Oui ! paki-hairs, paki-drag,
Paki wife, paki kiddos,
*smelling basmati*and lamb's fats*
lovely! your flab and flaps!

My mother stitches a white cap,
embroidered kurta and *shalwar*
I wear it on Fridays
but the English winters

shape me for jackets and corduroys.

With a Paki flourish
I slip into a white butcher's coat
chop the grammar, skin the verbs
mince the personal pronouns
separate bones
from the fleshy sounds
hook broths with a gruff
thump the gurgling till
with the English huff.

II

My wife fries Paki *puris*
a touch fluffy than the Indian
for the sake of name
sava, suji or semolina
the desserts are same
borders merge in cuisines
but Paki shops are decked
in green Paki hopes
the land of pure
and pennies
are in their orbs —
invested in fat boys
ganging around
desi clubs
girls gyrating in jeans
tiptoeing to their jobs
inside Hijabs
a wink of uncertainty
stuck in their eyes
heaving mascara
contact lenses
and jilted ties.

III

Paki women lag behind
curled in yards of clothes
they simper in mimes
make babies
scrub grimes
herd dole-nourished children
whine for extra wages and time.

On Eids their dreams
return with vermicilli
sprinkled with nuts and tears
women release from etched duppatas
their wages of domesticity
but men stay in *namaz**caps,
yell and curse at the western sins
flatter their dyed beards with a grin.

IV

After years of travelling
in the underground
the seat next to me has a ghost
I hug it and it follows me
to the gas stations and roads
speaks nothing but asks for more—
the passport is punched
Home office is in my abode
I speak for the Queen but
bathe in the local streams.

Scrubbing, scarping, counting quids
end up buying a cheap day travel pass
never take a day off
and cab around
the Trafalgar Square
watch pigeons
picking grains and seeds,
feel for my licence and deeds
what if I am baled and dumped
in Thames and left to bleed.

I turn on a nazam*
Hum Ka thehere ajnabi
*itni Mulaqaton ka bad**
the cab halts abruptly
the Tower bridge folds
the Paki cab becomes
a dream toad
hops over the bridge
the eyes go wide
the English search me
in their data base and tides.

*prayer cap

*The literary meaning of Nazm is Poetry. Nazm is a poem fully dealing with a single subject or thought.

* 'after so many meetings, we are still strangers '; *Matla* (The opening She'r/couplet of a Ghazal or a poem) of Faiz Ahmad Faiz' ghazal.

An Interview with Zulfikar Ghose

By Mansoor Abbasi

The famous expatriate Pakistani writer and scholar, Zulfikar Ghose, visited Pakistan on one of his infrequent visits, in August 2006. I was lucky enough to have this opportunity to interview him, in which we were able to discuss many issues concerning Ghose and his art, Pakistani literature, culture and society, and various contemporary issues in international writing that are of considerable direct interest to students and scholars in postcolonial contexts and to which we have, in Pakistan, comparatively less exposure. An abbreviated version of this detailed interview was published in daily *Dawn*, Lahore edition, August 20th 2006 and the full text is reproduced here, in this article.

Zulfikar Ghose was born on 13 March 1935, in Sialkot, in what is now part of Punjab in Pakistan. His family moved to Bombay in 1942 and ten years later emigrated to England. Graduating from the University of Keele, UK, in 1959, he worked as a freelance journalist in London, reporting cricket and hockey for *The Observer* and book reviewing for *The TLS*, *The Spectator* and *New Statesman*. In 1969, he moved permanently to the United States where he is still based, and is Professor Emeritus at the University of Texas, Austin.

His first novel, *The Contradictions* (1966) explored what has remained a central part of his early literary-creative experience, “[the] differences between Western and Eastern attitudes and ways of life” (*Cambridge Encyclopedia*, 469). His best known and rather controversial work, *The Murder of Aziz Khan* followed, in 1967, with its very realistic criticism of the vagaries of Pakistani society and politics and the depiction of the clash between the traditional ways and a new, rampant materialism. Later, he wrote *The Incredible Brazilian* trilogy, comprising the novels *The Native* (1972), *The Beautiful Empire* (1975) and *A Different World* (1978). His other novels include *Crump’s Terms* (1975), *Hulme’s Investigations into the Bogart Script* (1981), *Don Bueno* (1983), *Figures of Enchantment* (1986) and *The Triple Mirror of the Self* (1992). There are a few unpublished novels which are in his archive at the Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center in Austin. Ghose has also published six volumes of poetry, six books of literary criticism and an early autobiography, *Confessions of a Native – Alien* (1965).

INTERVIEW

Zulfikar Ghose was staying at his sister's house, in Gulberg, Lahore, when I went to interview him there. Somewhat grayed over time, his natural good humour, courtesy and quiet, reflective personality were a welcome respite.

MA: We generally know you through your early work, *The Murder of Aziz Khan*, which is still considered of a controversial nature here, in many quarters. Do you still receive any comments/criticism?

ZG: Well. I have written much more since then, in various genres. *Aziz Khan* was a 'foundation novel', a preliminary work with some strong sociological content, reflecting a number of problems facing Pakistani society. Normally, I am not interested in content unless it can be presented in a form that charges that content with an unprecedented imaginative power and therefore engages the reader with new, and perhaps challenging, ideas associated with that content. But *Aziz Khan* was my second novel. I was writing it 40 years ago when the British Empire was still being dissolved. Remember that we—the writers from the Commonwealth—were the first generation of the so-called post-colonial writers and therefore subjected to a special scrutiny: before we could experiment with form, we had to prove that we could write in the traditional mould. *Aziz Khan* was my proof.¹

And yes, it received some adverse criticism back then --- and yes, I believe there was some criticism again a few years ago when the book was being taught in a university course. I heard that some students objected to a reference to homosexuality and apparently the matter was referred to some government official. I was not told anything, but a little later the publisher declared the book out of print.

Whatever the facts, any society that calls for a restriction and eventual censoring of another human being's ideas is a very immature society. I believe that we in Pakistan are the inheritors of some of the most advanced civilizations the planet has known and that one consequence of that extraordinary inheritance is an intellectual evolution that makes us gifted creators in the arts and the sciences; but our tragedy as a nation is that we have let our native genius be stifled and nearly choked to death by religious exclusivity and the appalling intolerance associated with it.

We should never be intimidated by any subject matter but should direct our criticism at the way it is presented, we should estimate not what is said but

how it is said.

MA: What is your subject matter?

ZG: There is very little ‘new’ subject matter; human experience is repetitive and universal. It’s all been said and thought before. Therefore, in my view, one’s emphasis should be on the quality of the writing. That is what I do. I believe in emphasizing this aspect in my work. In the creative writing courses that I teach [at the University of Texas], I advise the students to try to find the best way to present their subject matter: pay attention to the language, the construction of the sentences, see if you can’t arrive at a style that captures your unique voice.

MA: What about International writings, especially South-Asian writing in English? What is new about these? How would you rate these as literature?

ZG: I don’t believe in categories, be they regional or national or parochial.² It has been said before—by Henry James and Chekhov, among others—that there are only two kinds of literature: that which has life and that which does not, and it makes no difference from which part of the world the work originates. I admire Cervantes (Spanish), Pushkin (Russian), Proust (French) and Machado de Assis (Brazilian) not because there is anything to learn from them about Spain or Russia or France or Brazil but because I see in each a unique imagination that renders reality with such forceful originality that it takes on a new dimension. When we applaud a Dante or a Shakespeare, we honour the individual and not the nation he was born in.

It is understandable, of course, that Pakistanis want to read books set in Pakistan and the English books set in England, and so with other societies. But this is a rather elementary level of reading; worse still, such a lowly approach pays no attention to quality, for it is easily impressed by the nationalist association. It is like saying that you like Monet’s paintings of water-lilies because you are a keen gardener, but if you happen to be a businessman with no time for gardens then those paintings mean nothing to you.

Or it is like an Englishman lamenting the fact that *Hamlet* was set in Denmark and that it would somehow be a better play had it been set in Windsor Castle.

As for South Asian writers, there are several that I admire, but not because they are South Asian but because they are good writers.³ It is always the individual, not the group, that matters. However, I will add that some of the finest English writing in recent decades has come from the former British colonies—not

Mansoor Abbasi

only South Asia, but also from North America, Africa and Australia. Of course, it is gratifying that among the best writers a few have come from our part of the world, but, really, artists are a global and not a flag-waving nationalist community.

MA: Do you think that the trauma of Partition in 1947 is a subject that offers a lot of scope for subcontinental writers? Especially in Pakistan?

ZG: Again, ‘subject matter’ should not be confused with ‘great literature’. Tolstoy’s *War and Peace* is a great work of art because of its canvas, its beauty, not merely because of its subject matter. Partition was a trauma. It affected millions of people in the subcontinent. But I am personally not really engaged with the political aspects, or dimensions, of this historical event. Some writers have found that they can write about this aspect, this dimension in the context of the subcontinent. As a human being, one is touched: I share the same feelings—about Partition, about Pakistan—as most Pakistanis do. Just as I grieve for the people suffering in Lebanon right now. I take a broader view of history. I believe in liberating the mind through study, through knowledge.

Look at the state of Pakistan now [2006]. The political situation is disappointing. When Benazir [Bhutto] originally came to power, I thought things might get better, that the government would promote education. But it didn’t. The failure of democracy to serve the people in Pakistan is quite disappointing. Perhaps the power of the military on the one hand and the excessive influence of the priests on the other, each group jealously guarding its power and the wealth that comes with it, have created a vested interest in sabotaging democracy that connives to keep it so weak that any liberal progress is stifled.

MA: Do you find Pakistan has changed for the worse? In what ways?

ZG: I recollect a visit I made to Taxila sixteen years ago. I found a richness of experience there [at the Museum/ruins]; I felt that I was part of this place, this ethos. It gave me a consciousness of being rooted deeply in that past, so much so that I still feel it within me as a sense of cultural continuity. I think this is our common inheritance, but I don’t see it translated into that dimension of political action which would advance the common good. What I mean is, we have the intellectual grounding to take us to great heights, but I see no evidence of our using it. We have the potential to be a prosperous liberal state, the very picture of advanced civilization. Instead, the image of Pakistan in the world is that of a country that has been handed over to the barbarians.

However, that is not to say that the situation is hopeless. There still are some very cultured people living in Pakistan, although they now constitute a thinning minority. But I believe that it is this small minority, which is alive, which is producing fine creative work, which could bring about positive change in Pakistan—if it is given the chance to exercise its intellect freely, a freedom that only a secular state can guarantee, without any constraint from the inflexible dogma of a theocracy.

MA: You say that you have moved beyond a conscious involvement with any one culture or literature. Do you still find the subcontinent, or Pakistan, reflected in your writings, at any level?

ZG: Well, not directly, not consciously. I am no longer ‘involved’ in that way. But, perhaps, at a deeper level, the concerns of this region do creep into my writings. In *The Incredible Brazilian* trilogy, I feel that Brazil has become my surrogate subcontinent, the subtext is Pakistan, to quite an extent.⁴ Although I don’t like labels and tags, I do have an awareness, a sense of this duality, consciously or unconsciously, as a ‘once-Pakistani’.

At various levels, I have a special, non-political, non-politicized associative relationship with Pakistan, with Pakistani culture. I have some nostalgic feelings, too, but more than that, rather than dwelling on what Pakistan ‘means’ to me, I tend to see [for example] what the Pakistani cricket team is doing in the field. I share the feelings of Pakistanis over the loss of the Test series against England. I also have an abiding love for Pakistani music. I’m sorry to say that I have largely lost the vocabulary of Urdu and Punjabi, therefore I cannot speak these languages with any fluency or confidence any more. But I listen to Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan, Ghulam Ali and Abida Perveen, on my way to campus daily [in Austin]. Nusrat Fateh Ali is truly wonderful....

MA: Someone remarked that you do not receive much critical attention in the West, any longer, as you do not write the type of books that people ‘want’ there. Do you agree?

ZG: Yes I agree that apolitical writing has affected my public image, as a writer, in the West. Especially when some writers have made reputations and won accolades for a certain type of politicization of our ethos --- in the subcontinent, in the Middle East, in terms of a certain type of writing, which is ‘expected’. If you are an Indian and write a novel set in India, your book will immediately receive

the attention of professors teaching post-colonial literature; but if you are a Pakistani writing a novel that is set in Brazil, the same professors are not going to look at it. A friend of mine, an American writer, said to me sometime ago, “Had you kept on writing on the pattern of *The Murder of Aziz Khan*, you would have won the Nobel Prize”. I don’t take this as a compliment. I strongly disapprove of any sort of ‘formula writing’. There are different kinds of obsessions that we all suffer from, and mine is entirely concerned with aesthetics.

MA: Why don’t you come back to Pakistan? Or, at least, visit more regularly?

ZG: I would like to! I loved being here in the 1960s. I thought of staying here [for good] and went around the editors of different newspapers for a job. I was already an established journalist in London, but no Pakistani editor had a job for me.

I would be glad to visit, now, to come every year if I could—Pakistan should give me a passport! Having to get a visa and to endure all that bureaucratic hassle to visit one’s native country is enough to put one off.

[Interview Concluded]

Comments

As a conclusion, it might be appropriate to add this. Like many other former colonies, we in Pakistan, too, have a strongly Anglophile tradition, and a vibrant ‘diaspora’ in more developed countries such as the UK, USA, Canada and Australia. Many expatriate writers of Pakistani origins, such as Zulfikar Ghose—and Bapsi Sidhwa, Attiya Hossein, Hanif Kureishi etc., have added considerably, one way or the other, to creating ‘representations’ of Pakistan abroad (Tarin, 70-72). Yet, almost all of these representations and images, direct or indirect, seem to be more focused on the diasporic or nostalgic experiences and impressions of a ‘lost’ homeland, with rare exceptions. Firstly, these diasporic writings have a tendency to cater to the popular Western perceptions or trends, that seek to present a distinct image of Pakistan/Pakistanis, and Muslim societies in general: As writers like Naipaul have gained a lot from catering to such requirements. This raises the important concern, or question, of why we are not capable of creating our own, comparative critical-literary set-up to offer our own perspectives. For this, the sites, centers and sources of production of international literature, especially in English, need to be ‘relocated’ so that a truly effective response can be generated. Furthermore, those writers who are writing in Pakistan, can also be enabled to present their work in a more balanced, realistic atmosphere of “critical globality” (Weinbaum and Edwards, 255). Secondly, with special reference to issues of identity and the continued ‘intervention’ of colonial/imperial discourses in post-colonial societies, in

countries like Pakistan, for example, diasporic writings of writers such as Ghose (and others, as mentioned) need to be seriously re-evaluated, in the proper critical perspectives. Alastair Pennycook gives a fitting agenda for such considerations, when he points out, "... the potential meanings that can be articulated... [in] discourses of development, democracy, capitalism, modernization, and so on" (53). No doubt, English is the 'world language', in which the cultural identities of nations are now being articulated, in an increasingly globalized environment. Yet, quite frequently, diasporas and diasporic writings are not necessarily the best interpreters of identity as far as developing ex-colonial/post-colonial nations are concerned. Pakistani universities and academic bodies, intelligentsia etc., need to be able to develop larger critical faculties, and facilities, to respond to these challenges (Tarin, 72). This is very significant. Since this is basically an Interview-based article, I shall not dwell more on matters that require deeper debate and discussion. It is hoped that Ghose's preceding interview, along with the brief critical comments herein contained, might prove to be useful for other scholars, so as to generate a larger debate in these pages.

¹ In an earlier interview abroad Ghose said that apart from his novel *The Murder of Aziz Khan* and some of his early poems, he never intentionally wrote about any 'one culture', or a 'particular culture'. In other words, he was not politically motivated in writing on certain themes and did not subscribe to the usual 'pigeon-holing' of texts in such simplistic categories. See R.W. Dasenbrock and Feroza Jussawalla, "A conversation with Zulfikar Ghose", July 1985. http://www.centerforbookculture.org/interviews/interview_ghose.html

² Ibid.

³ At the same time, Ghose believes that he himself is much closer in many ways to English/British writers of Anglo-Saxon provenance. He stated as much, in an earlier interview: "I am more Anglo-Saxon than the Anglo-Saxons." This is a satirical comment as the interviewers were trying to push him into a multicultural category. Therefore, he further says, "... I don't mean to align myself with Kingsley Amis or Philip Larkin... all I mean is that my education has been British and that it was such a

powerful conditioning force that I cannot see myself apart from it.” (In Dasenbrock and Jussawalla)

⁴ Interestingly, in the above quoted interview of 1985, Ghose talks of ‘transposing’ *The Incredible Brazilian* to an Indian environment. He says that the, “Brazil in my [trilogy] novel is simply a substitute for India”. So, in the present interview, when he says that the “sub text is Pakistan, to quite an extent”, he is essentially referring to his own shared memories of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, of South Asia in broadest terms, rather than any specifics. Thus India for him is a place not a state. (In Dasenbrock and Jussawalla)

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