Pakistaniaat: A Five-Year Journey

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In 2009, when I decided to launch a journal about Pakistan, I had high hopes and a vague idea of its eventual unfolding as a scholarly enterprise. I recall that in the first editorial for our very first issue, I had posed this question: "Why start a journal about Pakistan?" (Raja i). My answer, then, was more philosophical and the need for launching the journal was linked intimately to the issues of representation and production of knowledge.

Now in the fifth year of its publication, I dare suggest that Pakistaniaat has lived up to our expectations. So far we have published (including this one) thirteen issues of the journal including two special issues: One on 1971 Indo-Pakistan War and another on Faiz Ahmed Faiz, one of the greatest Pakistani poets.

As I have argued elsewhere about the general representations of Islam and the Islamic—whatever way one defines it—Islam is no longer beyond the horizon of Western academy but rather an "important raw material for literary representations" (Raja, "Democratic Criticism" 464) in the metropolitan. Similarly, as an Islamic republic and as the only Muslim nuclear power, Pakistan is also central to so many aspects of the current world order.

It is, therefore, only proper to accord Pakistan the kind of importance it deserves. Over the past years, we at Pakistaniaat have tried our best to represent Pakistan in the best way possible. Our efforts have borne fruit, as Pakistani scholars have trusted us to publish their academic, creative, and critical works from the first issue onward. We acknowledge without reserve that while we may provide the space and the technical knowhow to publish the journal, its true value is deeply connected to the productivity, generosity, and professionalism of an international group of scholars and creative writers who have shared their work with us.

Since our first issue, we have covered myriad of themes and topics about Pakistan. We have, for example, informed our readers about how the Pakistani journalists are also trying to emulate the "Sound-Bite culture" (Khan 35) of Western news reporting model; how the Pakistani writers have "portrayed the

lives of Pakistani women under the imposing role of religious, social, and economic parameters" (Ahmed 92), and dealt with the issues of class, gender, religion, ethnic identities and much more. What I am trying to say is that even though our journal is focused on Pakistan, the subjects of our scholarly engagement are certainly as complex and large as the country and its people and cultures.

We have mostly had successes but also some setbacks. We have successfully published thirteen open access issues without resorting to any form of practices associated with close-content subscription-based journals. We have also consistently published, through a print-on-demand publisher, the print version of our journal. On the other hand while initially we qualified to be an approved journal of Pakistani Higher Education Commission (HEC) we lost that status due to policy changes at the HEC. HEC now recognizes only the journals that are listed as impact factor journals in the Thomson Reuters index. While this may not be an impossible task, it will take us some time to be listed. Meanwhile, however, the MLA as well as Ebsco and certain other major indexing agencies index us. Besides our general issues, this year we also published one of the best issues on Faiz Ahmed Faiz. Edited by Dr. Amina Yaqin, this issue offers, in her own words, "a point of departure to think through questions of individual and social transformation in Faiz" (v).

Thus, in the last five years an international group of volunteers and an equally international array of writers and scholars have made Pakistaniaat into one of the finest journals on all things Pakistan.

We know that there are many challenges ahead and that many a topic still need our attention, but we will continue to strive for the best. With your help and support, I am sure Pakistaniaat will continue being a prominent and timely voice on all issues related to Pakistan.

Thank you so much for being a part of our journey. Stay with us, for we plan on plodding ahead with patience, courage, and love!

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"Unwilled Choices": The Exilic Perspectives on Home and Location in the Works of Zulfikar Ghose and Mohsin Hamid

By Muhammad Safeer Awan

'I once went to sleep and dreamt that I was a butterfly.
And then I woke up.
What am I, now?
Am I the man who went to sleep and dreamt that he was a butterfly;
Or am I the butterfly the man dreamt about?' (Loa Tse, 'The Way')

Writing Home in Exile

Iocasta: What is an exile's life? Is it great misery?
Polyneices: The greatest; worse in reality than in report.

(Euripides's *The Phoenician Women*)

The phenomenon of human migrations and resultant shifts in cultural boundaries and shaping of identities is as old as human history itself. With the onset of the 20th century, the great imperial structures began to dismantle, resulting into large-scale immigrations from the former colonies to the erstwhile imperial centres. Never before in human history had so many crossings – geographical, cultural, racial – happened at such scale. On the heels of those crossings, the problem of identity of the immigrants emerged as the biggest issue among all such post-imperial concerns. The problem of cultural identity as it is studied in the postcolonial academia now is a result of the colonial encounter. The concepts of home/exile, cross-culturality/cultural purity, assimilation, and hybridity have become more important than the older forms of group identifications. Particularly "Home has become such a scattered, damaged, various concept in our present travails' (Gurr 10). Closely related to the concept of home or Home is the classical idea of exile which has multiple layers of meanings. Andrew Gurr has suggested that a distinction should be drawn between the idea of exile, which implies involuntary constraint, and that of expatriation, which implies a voluntary

act or state. Edward Said has also explained four almost synonymous terms in his essay 'Reflections on Exile', that is, "exiles", "refugees", "expatriates" and "émigrés". In *Searching for Safe Spaces: Afro-Caribbean Women Writers in Exile*, Chancy provides a viable definition of exile as "the condition of consistent, continual displacement; ... the radical uprooting of all that one is and stands for, in a communal context, without loss of the knowledge of those roots" (1). Chancy has also delineated the specific conditions that force people to leave their countries of origin and live in involuntary exile:

> The threat of governmental/political persecution or state terrorism; poverty enmeshed through exploitative labor practices that over-work and underpay; social persecution resulting from one's dehumanization because of color, gender, sexuality, class standing; ... the impossibility of imagining moments of leisure, moments for the nurturance of the soul.... Such indignities lead to suicide, violence, more poverty, a vicious cycle of hopelessness, or, finally, self-imposed exile, that is, emigration. (2)

Reading Chancy's list of possible reasons of exile, many writers of Pakistan come to mind who were either forced to leave or went into exile at will. A classic case in point is Faiz Ahmad Faiz. Iqbal Ahmad was another intellectual-activist who lived in many countries with his revolutionary zeal. Exile is often juxtaposed with escape – the yearning to redefine one's identity or to live out an imagined life elsewhere. In the context of contemporary Pakistani writings in English, many writers are living in diasporas and are documenting their exilic perspectives on home and exile. Bapsi Sidwa, Mohsin Hamid, Abdullah Hussain, Zulfikar Ghose, Hanif Kureishi, Nadeem Aslam and many others have given creative responses to their experiences of (voluntary or involuntary) exile. Invoking some of their writings, this article aims to answer three questions. First, that in the face of global migrancy and the formation of multi-lingual, multi-racial and multi-cultural societies in the west, to what extent the harmonizing of different cultures be realistically achieved without too many compromises on the part of the host or migrant communities? Second, what is the place and role of the creative writer, whose roots are located in one culture and whose mind is nurtured in another? Third, how the events of September-11 have become almost a cut-off point to

distinguish between the old/classical exile and the reformulations in the exilic perspectives of the Muslim migrants to the US and Europe, in particular?

The immigrant fiction writers in the Anglo-American world give overt and subtle references to the differences in life styles and culture they encounter in their host countries. Facing entirely new socio-cultural conditions, the immigrants in this body of work are often depicted as facing a series of crises of their values and beliefs, "surrendering to the unwilled choices" (Ghose 4), and, at times, discarding their original values for those of the host culture. As Iqbal Mahmood writes in his *Strategies of Negation*:

> The immigrant fiction brings together people of diverse backgrounds, cultures, religions, nationalities and creeds. In addition to these concerns are the issues of migration, nationalities, displacement, diversity, and multiculturalism, which are addressed in a non-Western context. (Mahmood 24)

In this way, their previously whole, identifiable selves are shaken and split, resulting into a state of incessant anxiety, wherefore they endeavor to seek stability of their selves by resorting to establish new (hybrid) identities that conform to perceived expectations of the dominant society as a condition of acceptance. This dearth of stable identity and search for a new identity goes on under the influence of hegemonic influences that direct the transformation of identity. The exile only waits to reach "an interpretation that would solve the complex riddle of the buried self" (Ghose 72).

Homi K. Bhabha describes the state of displacement as a disorienting condition thus:

> It captures something of the estranging sense of the relocation of the home and the world – the unhomeliness – that is the condition of extra-territorial and cross-cultural initiation … In that displacement, the *borders between home and world become confused*; and, uncannily, the private and the public become part of each other, forcing upon us a vision that is as divided as it is disorienting. (Bhabha 9) (emphasis added)

In this way, the sensibilities of diasporic communities are affected by the process of dislocation and, therefore, need regeneration, recollection, and creative reimagining of their memories in the production of their literature. In their writings, they attempt to depict their struggles with hierarchies that are inclined to set their culture aside. As a result the immigrants often have to replace their cultural values in favor of the values and practices of the dominant culture. Another aspect of the immigrants' haunted psyche is their memory. It "refers to the capacity to store and recall past experiences" (O'Sullivan et al. 177), yet its long-term storage in terms of history is significant in that it evokes nostalgic appeal among a displaced people in an alien setting. Thus, they nostalgically keep on recalling the language(s), customs, cuisine, values, beliefs, and even climate of their home vis-à-vis their host cultures. As Ghose writes in one of his poems:

> My temporary peasant fervor
>
> plays out its fantasy on the Texas hillside.
>
> I'm not sure what this earth means to me.
>
> I don't take the peasant's pride
>
> in the quality
>
> of the soil. I don't need to. But feel poorer
>
> because of this loss,
>
> this irrelevance. (37)

The immigrants, having an entirely different history, memory, and cultural roots are placed in a different land which "implies a disruption and forcing together of any unlike living things, grafting a vine or a rose onto a different root stock, making difference into sameness" (Young 26). Such grafting or hybridization, takes many forms: linguistic, cultural, political, racial, etc. Cultural hybridization forces the immigrants to live in a 'Third Space of enunciation' or a liminal buffer-zone:

> Hybrid agencies find their voice in a dialectic that does not seek cultural supremacy or sovereignty. They deploy the partial culture from which they emerge to construct visions of community, and versions of historic memory, that give

> narrative form to the minority positions
> they occupy: the outside of the inside: the
> part in the whole. (Bhabha 58)

The immigrants' relationship with the culture of their host country is ambivalent as it continually fluctuates between wanting to live there and returning to their country of origin. It is a complex mix of simultaneous attraction and repulsion for a foreign culture. The relationship is ambivalent because an immigrant is never simply and completely opposed to his host land. "This relationship produces subjects whose mimicry of host culture is never very far from mockery. Ambivalence describes this fluctuating relationship between mimicry and mockery." (Ashcroft et al. 13) Among writers of Pakistani origin, Zulfikar Ghose is perhaps the only expatriate whose work is fraught with issues of ambivalence and the dilemma of living multiple identities. In Alpana Sharma Knippling's words "Zulfikar Ghose is a writer who transcends categories and exemplifies the complex nature of the Pakistani-American experience" (160).

Ghose's Triple Exile

His personal journey as a rootless man qualifies him almost as a modern day Odysseus: he has migrated to three continents and has lived in four countries, since his birth in 1935 in Sialkot (now in Pakistan) where, even before 1947 Partition of India, he felt and lived like an exile. He first went to Bombay and lived through the traumatic tragedies of Partition. Realizing that the old multi-cultural India was lost forever to the conflicting nationalisms, his family migrated to England where he first tasted the bitter-sweet fruit of exile in a world ravaged by the Great War.

Ghose is one of the most unusual world writers. Married to a Brazilian artist, Ghose has multiplied his exilic experience to a very complex state. In his third novel, *Triple Mirror of the Self*, he traces his own steps back to his Subcontinental roots. Like his own protagonist, who is known as Urim in the Amazon, Shimmers in London, and Roshan in India-Pakistan, Ghose has lived like an archetype cosmopolitan figure – mapping continents, exploring cities, breaking taboos, negotiating multiple identities. One is reminded of Bharati Mukharjee's character Jasmine who goes through several changes in quest of her identity; her journey starts in a small place in India as Jyoti and in the course of a few years changes from Jyoti to Jasmine to Jazzy to Jassy to Jase to Jane. However, unlike Jasmine who seems to oscillate between two points on the identity scale, the Ghose persona has a more splintered personality, imbibing various influences and getting

transformed in the process. He is more like Hanif Kureishi's young anti-hero, Karim, who proclaims at the outset in *The Buddha of Suburbia:*

> My name is Karim Amir and I am an Englishman born and bred, almost. I am often considered to be a funny kind of Englishman, a new breed as it were, having emerged from two old histories…. Perhaps it is the odd mixture of continents and blood, of here and there, of belonging and not, that makes me restless and easily bored. (3)

The identity motif is closely linked to the place of birth and the changing landscape. Both Mukharjee and Ghose protagonists' names change with the shifting locale. His protagonist is not just the proverbial two-sides-of-the-same-coin; rather, in T.S. Eliot's phrase, 'a heap of broken images'; all of them ostensibly mirror one another and seem to be forming a composite self. From the silent, child-like Horuxtla whom he meets in the deep dark forests of the Amazon to various sexual escapades in Bombay and London he comes to live out a culture in all its peculiarities and subtleties. In a review article, Alamgir Hashmi has aptly summed up how Ghose's journey through decades of exile and alienation has determined the course of his life and creativity:

> As a child he suddenly found himself chucked out of his original habitat; as a youth he had to leave the landscape to which he was accustomed and cope with a new environment with which he could never be at one without the doubtful aid of "external" interferences and attachments; as a man he had to consider his roots, rely on memory, and invent a language that would make sense of the contemporary world for him who has all but lost his "home". (66)

The titles and subtitles of Ghose's novel *Triple Mirror of the Self*, and autobiography *Confessions of a Native-Alien* suggest a worthwhile way to explore his fiction. For example, he divides *Triple Mirror of the Self* into three parts of meaningful subtitles – 'The Burial of the Self', 'Voyager and Pilgrim', and 'Origins of the Self'. So much so that the name of the first 'self' is Urimba, or "the scattered one." (Ghose 3) Each new name encompasses a new identity and a rebirth of sorts.

The roots of Ghose's exilic perspective and alienation lie in his childhood in India-Pakistan and his school days in Britain, the time of his first identity transplant. As in his autobiography, *Confessions of a Native-Alien,* he confesses about his multiple experiences as a global exile. For this reason, he confesses to be an "Indo-Pakistani who had gone Anglo" (156). The paradox in the title itself reflects the leitmotif of his work under discussion.
Following a visit to Pakistan Ghose wrote an article "Going Home". One feels that Ghose is deeply struck by the feelings of nostalgia, loss and recovery which keep a permanent resonance in his creative memory. Ghose writes:

> It was my first visit to Pakistan in twenty-eight years but when I climbed up the stupa at Dharmarajika in Taxila on a beautiful clear May morning and looked at the land stretching to the mountains on the horizon I had the sensation that absence from that soil had been of a far longer duration and, at the same time, now that I had my feet planted in it, I had existed continuously on that earth for two thousand years … There are moments in our lives when we can hear the soul whisper its contentment that the long torment of being has been stilled at last. The air in Taxila filled my brain with that serenity. I felt I was at home. (3)

Ghose's homecoming is reminiscent of such a sensation felt by Rudyard Kipling that he expressed in an uncollected article, 'Home', written during his last visit to India in December 1891 and was published in *Civil and Military Gazette*. He expressed his private vision of India, the India of his childhood (1865-71) and of his early youth (1882-89). They always co-existed in his imagination.

> A smell came out over the sea – a smell of damp earth, coconut oil, ginger, onions and mankind. It spoke with a strong voice, recalling many things; but the most curious revelation to one man was the sudden knowledge that under these skies lay home and the dearest places in all the world. Even the first sniff of London had not caused so

> big a choke in the throat, or so strict a tightening over the heart… Allah be praised we stepped straight into India again. (Karim 20)

Both the pieces have close resemblance, in terms of subject-matter and for the fact that both the writers were returning *to* 'Home' *from* England. It is apparent that the postmodern dilemma of "living here and belonging elsewhere", has always been haunting exiles and expatriates, particularly, in an unprecedented fashion, in our relentlessly globalized world.

According to Gurr, exile has had an "enormously constructive" effect on writers who were born in colonies and fled to metropolis, since it creates in them "a sense of home" and thus "a clearer sense of [their] own identity" than is available to their metropolitan counterparts (9) Questioning this essentially romantic view of exile, Said writes: "To think of exile as beneficial, as a spur to humanism or creativity, is to belittle its mutilations… For exile is fundamentally a discontinuous state of being. Exiles are cut from their roots, their land, their past" (Said 50ff). Ghose attempts to create a composite self out of the fragments of various selves: "I create personae which aren't just fantasies but different approaches to the same self: the desperate lover, the silent poet, the worried alien." The images that haunt his mind from his present and past, he says, "are not about myself so much as of the idea of what I have been and of people and things around me. From them I proceed inwards." He says that his present is unwholesome and meaningless without his past, which he reflects upon living in the present. He wants to know himself "and that is why I turn from myself to the outer images and thought" (Ghose 100) .

Throughout his *Confessions*, Ghose seems to be oscillating between his past and present. He keeps assessing his failures and disillusions; he has to live in a land with which he feels almost no bond. In the last three chapters of *Confessions* Ghose has documented his feelings of alienation, rootlessness and the problems of a hybrid identity and its consequences. He is vaguely considered as an Indian (or a Pakistani) in England and a British in India but without a protocol, which hurts him deeply and he concludes that he is none of them. Even his 'Indianness' is questioned by an English boy as he is without a bow and an arrow. Ghose needs 'home' and recognition as a writer. Or, in Gayatri Spivak's words, he wants to be known to put an end to the torments that he is conscious of:

> The person who knows has all the problems of selfhood. The person who is known, somehow seems not to have a problematic self…Only the dominant self can be problematic; the self of the Other is authentic without a problem, naturally available to all kinds of complications. This is very frightening. (66)

When he arrives at Karachi airport as the sports correspondent for *The Observer*, the local news reporters refuse to consider him as a British journalist due to his brown skin.

> I was not mentioned and felt stung; some people must have thought I was some sort of fraud trying to obtain free passes to the test matches and I continually had to produce my credentials to convince them that I was genuine reporter. 'But this name', many would say 'Zulfikar and Ghose is very odd. Who are you? (Ghose 125)

Such encounters only deepened his alienation and "exaggerated the truth that I did not belong to any group of people who have allegiance to a country…Myself and my loneliness were all and the intensified need to write poetry" (126). Ghose expresses his struggle with the new language as he tries to mimic to get recognition and regain his lost self-hood: "I woo the English language each morning and… she divorces me each night" (126).

His exile marks the state where all exiles struggle with antithetical forces and then come to terms with the third, hybrid way of existence that allows them to move back and forth between two worlds with the least possibility of belonging anywhere. He finds different justifications to lessen the torments of his dissonance with all the countries he has lived in. He belongs neither here nor there, as he writes about one of his visits to India:

> This is not my country. I'm an alien here. I have the same paranoiac sensation of being watched by people, being pointed out with whispers of 'He doesn't belong here' which I

> experienced when I would walk and walk
> round Putney Heath day after day during the
> years we lived near there. (Ghose 138)

Bill Ashcroft et al. describe the erosion of the exiled postcolonial subject through the processes of dislocation and cultural denigration:

> A valid and active sense of self may have been eroded
> by dislocation, resulting from migration, the experience
> of enslavement, transportation, or 'voluntary' removal
> for indentured labour. Or it may have been destroyed by
> cultural denigration, the conscious and unconscious
> oppression of the indigenous personality and culture by
> a supposedly superior racial or cultural model." (9)

Ghose's sense of self is eroded by not only the dominant culture but also by the culture that is dominated. The errant life that Ghose is compelled to lead seems to have been marked by "the mind of winter", a term Said borrowed from Wallace Stevens, using it to situate exile in a space where "the pathos of summer and autumn as much as the potential of spring are nearby unobtainable" (Said 55).

The condition of exile is no longer rendered simply as an aesthetic formulation as in the days of such expatriate writers as James Joyce, T.S. Eliot, and Ezra Pound; or the creative exile of Auerbach in Istanbul, and Edward Said in New York. "Home" now signals a shift away from homogeneous nation-states based on the ideology of assimilation to a much more fluid and contradictory definition of nations as a multiplicity of diasporic identities (Mishra 7-45). Such identities are hyphenated as Asian-American, African-American, Pakistani-British, Indian-Canadian; the list is endless. As Knippling writes, "hyphenation institutes unequal power relation" and that it "negatively emphasizes ethnicity and a minority status over a viable American cultural identity" (Knippling xxi).

However, 9/11 attacks and the resultant global war on terror, and its politics, gave rise to new fears and conflicts among the diasporic communities and their host countries. Romantic exilic perspectives gave way to new apprehensions and trepidations. Mohsin Hamid's *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* is the prototype work of fiction that is based on those new trends in reformulating the immigrants' relationship with the local populations. As the feelings of alienation is increasing, the Muslims living in the West in particular have been forced to redefine their relationship with their host cultures, especially in the United States of America.

Hamid's Reluctant Fundamentalist

Muslim immigrants from South Asia, particularly Pakistan, live through a double bind: on the one hand they are bracketed with the Asian/South Asian diasporic identity, and on the other, their transnational identity also compels them to be part of the Muslim *Ummah* at large. For this reason they have to respond to international political crises confronting Muslims, such as the Rushdie affair, the Gulf War or, more recently, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the confrontation between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The conflicting pull between the economic interests lying in the West and Muslim national loyalty creates fissures in psycho-cultural terms. *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* is the narrative of that conflict epitomized in the personal dilemma of its protagonist to come to terms with the post-September 11 America and the new identity imposed upon him.

As the racial scenario changes in the wake of 9/11 attacks, Hamid's protagonist faces debasing stereotypes based on religion and ethnicity. The novel is a narrative of emergence as well as regression since it relates an immigrant's success story, culminating in the achievement of an autonomous, unified self on the one hand and his ultimate rejection of that newly acquired transplanted American identity on the other. "Princeton made everything possible for me. But it did not, *could* not, make me forget such things as how much I enjoy the tea in this, the city of my birth" (Hamid 9). In this sense, it is not a completely realized postcolonial text, since Hamid's portrayal of America in the first part of the novel does not rely on the trope of the Manichean allegory and the demonization of the American system. "This, I realized, was another world from Pakistan; supporting my feet were the achievements of the most technologically advanced civilization our species had ever known" (20). However, Erica, his American girl friend, and Jim, his boss, notice a "foreignness" in his mannerism and his bearing that gives him advantage over others. Erica remarks, "You give off this strong sense of home, you know that... This I-am-from-a-big-family vibe. It's nice. It makes you feel solid" (12). Later Jim tells him, "You are a watchful guy. You know where that comes from?' I shook my head. 'It comes from feeling out of place', he said. 'Believe me. I know." (25) Thus his survival in the land of dreams depends upon a flexible strategy of appropriation and transformation, resulting into a new self that is plural yet divided.

Prior to the xenophobia that gripped certain section of the American society and government in the wake of 9/11, Changez seems to have assimilated perfectly into the host culture. As he informs the readers: "I felt bathed in a warm sense of accomplishment. Nothing troubled me; I was a young New Yorker with the city

at my feet. How soon that would change! My world would be transformed. (27) The American corporate system and multicultural society exert a powerful influence on Chengez as long as he does not resist and is ready to become a cog in the machine. "I was the only non-American in our group, but I suspected my Pakistaniness was invisible, cloaked by my suit, by my expense account, and – most of all – by my companions (42). The corporate success and pre-9/11 America gives him such confidence that he, while visiting his girlfriend's family, "wore a starched white kurta of delicately worked cotton over a pair of jeans. It was a testament to the open mindedness and – that overused word – *cosmopolitan* nature of New York in those days that [he] felt completely comfortable on the subway in this attire" (29).

Until 9/11 happens, there is no visible threat to that enforced identity except that Erica, in spite of their close physical intimacy, remains aloof emotionally and accepts him only when he is "willing to try to take on the persona of Chris [Erica's dead boyfriend], because my own identity was so fragile" (89). He is still struggling with this crisis when forces larger than Erica come into play. In the wake of 9/11, he is stripped of his illusions and acquired identity. A few days after the attacks, as he returns from Manila with his team, on the airport he was separated from his colleagues at the immigration desk. "They joined the queue for American citizens; I joined the one for foreigners" (44). This is the moment when regression starts and any hidden/subconscious desire to see America harmed is entrenched in his conscious self. The transformation begins, both for Changez and the host country. His emergence into visibility for the wrong reasons makes him a locus of suspicion and discourse. As he informs the readers:

> America was gripped by a growing and self-righteous rage in those weeks of September and October as I cavorted… Pakistani cabdrivers were being beaten to within an inch of their lives; the FBI was raiding mosques, shops, and even people's houses; Muslim men were disappearing, perhaps into shadowy detention centers for questioning or worse. (56)

> Our telephone extensions and fax machines would mysteriously stop working; our security badges and notebooks would disappear. Often I would emerge into the car park to find that one

> of the tires of my rental car was punctured – far
> too often for it to be mere coincidence. (57)

The achieved state of the reconstituted identity is shattered. Zulfikar Ghose, writing much earlier, is strangely prophetic about the loss of such utopian America for the immigrant who now faces a revolutionary rhetoric and an official discourse that

> ... breeds
>
> a counter-rhetoric's pretentious
> slogans: *America – Love It or Leave It*, and so on.
> Earth-kissing Zionists aside (and each country is an Israel for
> someone),
> people don't really
> care nowadays for sentimental gestures,
>
> for sacredness is suspect,
> the earth more a problem for conservation than
> a banner across a jingoist breast, and the land
> merely a real estate speculation.
> countries, countries! Brand-
> names, faded and disfigured. (Ghose 38)

Changez, like millions of others who vied for the American dream, and idolized its history full of human struggles to achieve equality and freedom, reinvents himself by adopting a counter-rhetoric. His transformation may be seen as an active strategy of resistance against the official discourse of terror and the media images which were mistaking *effects* for *causes*. Suddenly a new identity, that of a terrorist or at least a terrorist-look-alike is imposed on the successful Princeton graduate and a brilliant business analyst for Underwood Samson's, whose cardinal business principle is *"Focus on the fundamentals"*. Ironically, he starts concentrating on another set of fundamentals which turns him into a reluctant fundamentalist. He confronts and suffers many unpleasant changes in American attitudes from the highest echelon to public sphere. "Affronts were everywhere; the rhetoric emerging from your country at that moment in history – not just from the government, but from the media and supposedly critical journalists as well – provided a ready and constant fuel for my anger" (Hamid 101), and, "There was something undeniably retro about the flags and uniforms, about generals addressing cameras in war-rooms and newspaper headlines featuring such words

as *duty* and *honour*" (69). A promising business associate, vying to keep his place at the centre, is pushed to the margin once more. For Changez, the borders of conflict shift from American streets, corporate offices and metros to Pakistan, the frontline state in the war against terror.

The Reluctant Fundamentalist examines such shifting of the ideological borders and multiple identities, perpetually in a state of flux due to the pull and play of forces greater than the capacity of individuals. As the narrator remarks, ''my blinders were coming off, and I was dazzled and rendered immobile by the sudden broadening of my arc of vision." (87) Hamid's migrant protagonist is simply alienated in the increasingly charged atmosphere in the US. Re-discovering and re-inventing the lost self and cultural roots is the only viable response available to him. The war on terror and the discourse surrounding it have further obfuscated the issue of identity for the migrants living in exile. Particularly the Muslim immigrants have been equated with terror and held responsible for the crimes of the few.

A noteworthy analogy in the work of Hamid and Ghose is that they both have voiced their painful sense of 'exclusion' in their respective exilic experiences in the western societies. In Ghose's pre-9/11 world, the repressive encounter between the immigrants and their destination of exile in the West was rather passive, but Hamid's post-9/11 encounter is more violent and dynamic, featuring struggles and counter-struggles between the host society and the immigrants. In Ghose's work, the pain suffered is partly the result of his blurred identity which is evident from his being denied the status of a 'British journalist' in Karachi merely because of his indigenous sounding name. However, in Hamid's work there is a rather clear differentiation in the treatment meted out to an American national and a foreign Muslim immigrant. Hamid's protagonist Changez was not allowed to join the queue of American citizens on the airport and was subjected to additional inspections. The violent turn that things have taken for the immigrants in relation to the host communities in the context of the war on terror is clearly palpable in Hamid's text. The situation in Ghose's writing is rather more traditional and in line with the fashion of old (pre-terror) world and has a greater focus on the exilic effects at the individual level rather than the wider social group; Hamid, on the other hand, seeks to highlight the effects of exilic experience on an entire social, political or communal group. Such adverse effects become more painful when viewed against the apparent status of Hamid's protagonist who has accepted and is fully conformed to the social and cultural norms of the host society. It brings out the fact that the troubles of the "unwilled choices" do not distinguish between the highly educated and successful elite and the common people. Despite the fact

that Changez has fully integrated and assimilated in the American society, he is still not spared the backlash of 9/11. Nostalgic patterns of the two writers are also comparable. While standing atop the stupa at Dharamarjika in Taxila, Ghose feels that his feet had existed there for two thousand years thereby showing a strong psychological bond with his native land. Similarly, Hamid's Changez also remains attached to his native Lahore, as he reminisces about taking tea in old Anarkali, while working in New York.

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US Sanctions Against Pakistan: Rationale and Impact (1990-2001)

By Muhammad Fiaz Anwar

The United States has long been a leader of worldwide efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations. American leaders use coercive policy measures to prevent nuclear proliferation, and additionally endorse the United Nations' policies of coercive sanctions that have been in vogue since the early days of the nuclear age. The Baruch Plan, for example, contained recommendations for punishing future violators of the universal non-nuclear regime. Sanctions were an implicit option in the nuclear non-proliferation regime, although the text of the Non-proliferation Treaty contained no reference to them. The safeguard system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an international organization of the United Nations, verified the NPT. Non-nuclear states who participated in the NPT negotiated inspection agreements with the IAEA to verify the peaceful use of their nuclear material. The various export-control mechanisms in the nuclear and technological arena, most prominently the London Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines, as well as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), also contained elements of sanctions against violating states. These sanctions could cut off aid, economic assistance, military cooperation, and technology access to countries that violated nonproliferation agreements or took steps such as testing nuclear weapons and threatened security objectives. Military threat-based strategy, including coercive diplomacy and the threat of preventive strikes, could also be used, as well as breaking of diplomatic relations, cultural and sports boycotts, commercial sanctions both on imports and exports, and naval blockades. Of all these measures, the most widely used are economic sanctions. As the growing clout of the Third World countries made the UN approval extremely difficult, the US adopted the policy of unilateral imposition of sanctions. In the area of non-proliferation, imposition of US unilateral sanctions has been a practice since the 1970s. These sanctions were imposed against South Africa (1975-82), Taiwan (1976-77), Brazil (1978-81), Argentina (1978-81), India (1978-82) and Pakistan (1979-80).[1]

After the end of the Cold War and as a result the emergence of the US as a super power, Non-Proliferation became the new major policy objective. Bill Clinton's administration adopted an aggressive stance and followed a counter-

proliferation policy that included coercive strategies with an increased role for the Pentagon. Direct military action could now be taken against the country violating the non-proliferation regimes to destroy or deter nuclear weapons, not only at an advanced stage, but also during the early phases of development.[2] The rationale to check nuclear expansion through coercive means was manifold. First, proliferation constituted a threat to international peace and security. Notwithstanding the dispute over whether the spread of nuclear weapons to other states could be a stabilizing factor, those who advocate coercive approaches assume that nuclear proliferation is an inherently dangerous process. If war broke out among nuclear-armed adversaries, it could escalate into an atomic exchange, which would result not only in incalculable death and destruction of belligerents but also in nuclear contamination of the environment of the other countries. The state that engaged in nuclear acquisition, especially if it was member of NPT, was therefore seen as violating the widely accepted norm of international conduct that nuclear weapons should not spread to other countries. A second rationale is that the target state is acquiring nuclear weapons because of narrow objectives, such as domestic power calculations or regional power ambitions, rather than security threats (since a significant nuclear challenge is remote in most cases). Even when security concerns are genuine, nuclear acquisition would pose an even greater threat to international and regional stability and to maintenance of the non-proliferation regime. In other words, protecting international non-proliferation norms given in the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system, however unequal they may be, takes precedence over national considerations of the military security. [3] Additionally, it was generally assumed that the potential threat to the economic and technological advancement of a country would also bar the path to proliferation. The leaders of the target state might change the policies and refrain from developing nuclear weapons. [4] If the existing nuclear capability of the ambitious state was destroyed or was properly safeguarded, and the new technology completely denied, it would delay the acquisition of nuclear technology. During this period the leadership of the target state might change its decision.[5] For all of these reasons, the US Congress passed numerous laws to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

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[1] Paul R.S. Gebhard, "Not by diplomacy or defense alone: the role of regional security strategies in US proliferation policy," *Washington Quarterly* 18 (Winter 1995), p. 167-79.
[3] Dianne E. Rennack, Robert D. Shuey, "Economic Sanctions to Achieve US Policy Goals: Discussion and Guide to Current Law," *CRS Report for Congress*, p. 3.
[4] Ibid.
[5]Shai Feldman, "The bombing of the Osiraq-revisited," *International Security 7* (autumn 1982), 114-42.

Pakistan was directly impacted by much of the US' legislation. In 1976 Senator Glenn sponsored an amendment to section 669 of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) that was designed to bar assistance to non-NPT signatories that import uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing technology. The Glenn Amendment barred aid to countries that have not signed the NPT and import nuclear fuel processing equipment, technology or materials.[6] The 1998 Symington Amendment also barred aid to non-NPT signatories that import uranium enrichment equipment, technology, and materials. Because of the legislative language, a subsequent amendment by Senator Glenn covered both reprocessing and enrichment transfers. In 1985, Representative Stephen Solarz presented another amendment to Foreign Assistance Act that barred aid to any country whose government illegally imported nuclear technology from the United States, as a warning to address alleged illegal purchases of the nuclear equipment from Western countries. Unlike the Pressler Amendment, this authorized a Presidential waiver on the basis of US national interests. In 1985, legislation was adopted in section 902 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, which added a new subsection E (e) to section 620 E to the Foreign Assistance Act. The Pressler Amendment was only for Pakistan and required a yearly affirmation of non-nuclear states from the President before he could waive cut-off. The Brown amendment, passed in 1996, was designed to lift some of the harsh provisions of the Pressler amendment and give a little bit of relief to Pakistan via military and economic aid in order to win its cooperation in the areas of peace keeping, antiterrorism, and drug trafficking.

In March of 1985, Senator Larry Pressler introduced an amendment, in Section 620 E popularly known Pressler Amendment to Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) 1961. This amendment was passed when the US intelligence confirmed that Pakistan had achieved nuclear capability. But Pakistani leadership at the peak of honeymoon period of US-Pakistan relations was so enamored of US patronage that it could not use the Pakistani influence as a frontline state to check the passage of this amendment. From 1985 to 1989, Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush certified, under the Pressler Law, to US Congress that Pakistan did

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[6] Glenn Amendment: In 1976 Senator Glenn sponsored amendment of section 669 in the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) 1961. This Legislation was designed to bar assistance to non-NPT signatories that import uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing technology. The Glenn amendment to Foreign Assistance Act bars aid to countries that have not signed NPT and that imports nuclear fuel processing equipment, technology, or materials.
The Symington Amendment bars aid to non-NPT signatories that import uranium enrichment equipment, technology, and materials. Because of the legislative language, a subsequent amendment by Senator Glenn covered both reprocessing and enrichment transfers.

not possess any nuclear explosive device and they kept on supplying the US assistance to Pakistan, arguing that this assistance would help Pakistan in adopting the path of non-nuclearization in its defense preparedness.

The Congressional and the Reagan administration's support of aid to Pakistan was based on the assumption that if the United States shored up Pakistan's conventional security by providing F-16 fighter and other sophisticated weapons, Pakistan would not want to risk losing US economic aid and arms supplies by opting for nuclear deterrence. Under the Reagan administration the US-Pakistani relationship strengthened and the two countries came closer to each other than ever before. A six-year $3.2 billion package of economic aid and military sales was signed in June 1981, and spring 1986 $4.2 billion was sanctioned for 1988-93. More importantly, this aid package included the sale of sophisticated weapons like the F-16. In his testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator John Glenn stated that this aid was not solely intended to get the Soviets out of Afghanistan. The military assistance was provided to address the security concerns of Pakistan and to keep Pakistan from acquiring the nuclear weapons.[7] The withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989, and later on the collapse of the Soviet Union, removed the major concern of US foreign policy. At the same time the decade long Iran–Iraq war exhausted the Iranian revolutionaries and decreased their military capability to a level where they ceased to pose any serous threat to the US interests in the region. Consequently, South Asia was placed in the low-priority areas of the world in the US foreign policy goals, and as a result Pakistan lost its previous importance of being the Cold War ally. The Issue of Nuclear Non-Proliferation became of priority concern in the US foreign policy goals.[8]

The US policy makers now perceived South Asia as an unstable region where tension between India and Pakistan could erupt into a nuclear showdown. As the two countries had the capability to develop nuclear devices, an armed conflict between the two countries might escalate into a nuclear confrontation. Such a possibility would have fatal consequences not only for South Asia, but also for the security of the neighboring West Asia and South East Asia. Moreover, Pakistan's continuous defiance of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty had been a constant irritant to the US policy makers and their global concerns for nuclear and missile proliferation. Before the imposition of Pressler Law, US sanctions used different channels to dissuade Pakistan from following the path of nuclearization. At the same time, the US leadership made it clear that, with the departure of Soviet

[7] Senator John Glenn, *Testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee of Senate,* July 31, 1992.
[8] Tehmina Mahmood, "Pressler Amendment and Pakistan's Security Concerns," *Pakistan Horizon,* Volume 47, Number 4, October 1994.

troops from Afghanistan and the winding down of the Cold War, the policy dynamic on the nuclear issue had changed. There would soon be stronger reasons for nonproliferation supporters in Congress to avoid imposing sanctions on Pakistan. Along with the nuclear issue there were also some other areas that provided grounds for the imposition of US sanctions, under Pressler law,[9] against Pakistan. In January 1990, Chief of Army Staff General Aslam Beg visited Iran and held cordial discussions with his Iranian counterparts. This sparked fears in the US of nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and Iran and raised the fear of an Islamic Bomb. Moreover in an address at the POF's seminar in Wah Cantt on December 2, 1990, he went a step further by claiming that the US would face in Iraq a situation similar to the one confronted by the USSR in Afghanistan, implying that the US would suffer a defeat in Iraq. He also advanced the concept of "Strategic defiance" in cooperation with Iran, Pakistan and China to meet the threat of US unipolarism.[10] The US also perceived that the Kashmir dispute had the real potential for nuclear war in South Asia, and there was always the possibility of accidental war through miscalculation. In Washington, Under Secretary of State Kimmit warned of a "growing risk of miscalculation which could lead events to spin dangerously out of control."[11] This view was endorsed by Ambassadors William Clark in New Delhi and Robert Oakley in Islamabad. Moreover, in early 1990 unusual large–scale military deployment by India and parallel Pakistani troop movements caused a sharp rise in tension between the two countries. Indian Prime Minister V.P. Singh raised the temperature further by publicly speaking of an India-Pakistan war. The Islamic orientation of the Kashmir movement also caused concern for the US: when India complained that Pakistan and the Afghan Mujahideen were involved in "terrorist activities" in Kashmir, the US put Pakistan on the terrorist watch list in order to pressure the Pakistan government to desist from any kind of assistance to the Kashmiri freedom fighters.[12] Although the US recognized Kashmir as a disputed territory it wanted Islamabad to refrain from giving any type of assistance to freedom fighters, and, instead, to negotiate with India in order to reach a peaceful

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[9] Pressler Law: In 1985, legislation was adopted in section 902 of the International Security and Development cooperation Act of 1985, which added a new subsection E (e) to section 620 E to the Foreign Assistance Act. The Pressler Amendment was only for Pakistan and required a yearly affirmation of non-nuclear states from the President before he could waive cut-off.

[10] Address by General Mirza Aslam at the POF's Seminar in Wah Cantt. on December 2, 1990, *Pakistan Horizon* 44, January 1991, pp. 146-148.

[11] Al Kamen, "Tension over Kashmir Called Strongest in Decade" *Washington Post*, April 21, 1990.

[12] Mujeeb Afzal, "Pak-US Relations: Post Cold War Phase," *Pakistan Journal of American Studies,* Volume 14, Nos. 1&2, Spring & Fall 1996.

settlement of the issue. So in March and April of 1990, the US approached Russia, China, Japan and important European governments to pressure both India and Pakistan to reduce their on-going nuclear programs. Moreover, the issue of China's alleged transfer of M-11 missiles to Pakistan added to the soured atmosphere.

When the US imposed sanctions under Pressler law, Pakistan was, after Egypt and Israel, the recipient of the most US aid. Under Pressler law, the $564 million of economic and military assistance approved for the fiscal year 1991 was frozen. Even the delivery of military hardware already paid for by Pakistan, including 28 F-16s, was stopped. Humanitarian aid, food and agricultural exports, food assistance, and bank loans and credits for purchase of food and agricultural commodities were exempted. Despite the cold US-Pakistan relationship at the bilateral level, during this period Pakistan was actively participating in US led UN peacekeeping and peace making missions by dispatching the maximum number of their military forces to conflicts throughout the world. In Gulf War, Pakistan sent five thousand troops to join the multinational force. In September 1992, it sent six thousand troops to Somalia as a part of operation "Restore Hope" and refused to withdraw despite the fact that twenty-four soldiers were killed in June 1993. Pakistan also sent three thousand troops to Bosnia for peacekeeping missions.[13]

In November 1993, Benazir Bhutto became the Prime Minister of Pakistan. She started her struggle for a better relationship with the United States. In this regard, she took some drastic measures without sacrificing the major national interests. The government of Pakistan dealt heavy-handedly with the drug traffickers. Pakistani courts convicted some of them, and a few who were allegedly involved in drug trafficking in the US were handed over to that country for legal action. In February 1995, Pakistan also helped the US in the arrest of Ramzi Yousuf, an alleged mastermind behind the February 26, 1993 terrorist bombing of New York's World Trade Center.[14] Pakistan signed an extradition treaty with Egypt to lessen the concerns of the pro-west Arab states about the presence of Islamic fundamentalist elements in Pakistan. It also asked the Arab fundamentalist groups to leave the country.[15] During this time, the Bhutto government also reoriented its Afghan Policy towards the establishment of a friendly government in Kabul. It supported the Taliban Movement in its advancement beyond Kandahar towards Kabul. The US endorsed the Afghan policy of the Bhutto government as it was anticipating that Taliban victory would

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[13] Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies,* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 328.
[14] Hassan Askari Rizvi, "Pak-US relations: The Latest Phase" *The Nation*, October 3, 1995.
[15] Mujeeb Afzal, "Pak-US relations: Post Cold War Phase," *Pakistan Journal of American Studies*, Volume 14, spring and fall 1996, No. 1 & 2.

end civil war and help permit reconstruction in Afghanistan and enable the cessation of havens for terrorists and drug traffickers. It would also greatly improve the prospects for a large gas-pipeline project involving a consortium led by Unocal, a major American oil company that hoped to transport natural gas from the vast fields of Turkmenistan across Afghanistan to energy-short India and Pakistan. Friction that had developed between the Taliban and Iran was also regarded positively in US against the backdrop of continuing US hostility towards Iran.[16] Moreover, in energy sector the Bhutto Government gave many incentives to US industrialists to attract the US investment in Pakistan. In 1993 Pakistan withdrew, under US pressure, its resolution on Kashmir from the UN. This was on the hope that it would be a helpful step towards negotiations with India.[17]

At this time the US also realized the need to give a second look to its post–Cold War foreign policy in South Asia, as the punitive policy on nuclear proliferation was hurting the long-standing links with Pakistan and creating anti-US feelings both among the Pakistani elite and the masses. US Defense Secretary William Perry conceded that "…I have never been to a country where even the taxicab drivers and the school children know in detail about a law passed by the US Congress."[18] There was damage to the US interests not directly related to nuclear proliferation, such as economic and commercial growth, counter terrorism, and professional development in army.[19] The US reoriented its priorities in post-Cold War foreign policy agenda in South Asia, changing the policy of neglect and indifference to a policy of engagement. The dominant emphasis at the top level remained the prevention of nuclear proliferation, as the Secretary of State Warren Christopher, a number two official of State Department, had shown little interest in South Asia other than the non-proliferation issue.[20] But there was an improvement in bilateral relations despite the nuclear stand off.

The US Department of Defense considered Pakistan a long-time friend and helpful partner in international peacemaking and peacekeeping, counter terrorism and drug trafficking. So to keep in touch with the Pakistan army and to establish working relationship, the US started an interaction in which different top-ranking officials periodically visited Pakistan. This need was realized in the

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[16]Dennis Kux, op. cit., P. 335.
[17]*Jang (Rawalpindi) Urdu*, September 24, 1995.
[18] William Perry, A speech to New York Foreign Policy Association, cited in Ali Abbas, "Pressler embargo—A blessing in disguise?," *The News,* December 6, 1998.
[19] Samina Yasmin, "Pakistan's Cautious Foreign Policy" *Survival*, Vol.36, No.2, summer 1994, P.126.
[20] Amna Mehmood, "An American Policy of non-Proliferation towards Pakistan: A Post Cold War Perspective." *Pakistan Horizon* Volume 56, Number 1, January 2003.

context of US cuts in defense budget and downsizing of the army. In January of 1994 Commander of US Training and Doctrine Command General Frederick M. Frank Jr. visited Pakistan, followed by General Joseph P. Hoar of the Central Command in July of 1994, and General. J.H. Binford Peay in December of 1994 and again in August of 1995. A four-member US Army team headed by Col. John Hoseman visited in November, 1994, while US Under Secretary of Defense, Walter B. Stocombo, came in December 1994. A seven-member delegation headed by Dr. Edward L. Warner, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Strategy, and Requirement, came to Pakistan to participate in a seminar on Peacekeeping Operations held at General Head Quarters (GHQ) Rawalpindi, in March of 1995. Commander of the Central Command Lt. General Steven L. Arnold visited in April and September of 1995.[21]

From the Pakistani side, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Abdul Waheed Khan visited the US in March and April of 1994, Pakistan's Defense Delegation visited in September of 1994, and in May of 1995, the Defense Secretary, as head of a delegation, visited for the meeting of Consultative Group. These visits of the top commanders of the two countries helped to improve the relationship. Limited scale joint military exercises were held in Pakistan in May 1995.[22] In July 1994, in recognition of Pakistani efforts to diminish terrorist activities, and as a good will gesture, the State Department removed Pakistan from its informal watch list of the states supporting terrorism.[23] The US also softened its attitude in some other areas. In 1994, the US Vice President Al Gore met with Prime Minister Bhutto in Cairo. After this meeting the US launched Pakistan NGOs Initiative (PNI) program with USAID. Under this program the US provided nearly $10 million for child survival and female literacy programs in Pakistan.[24] The US also encouraged private investment in Pakistan, and US energy secretary Hazel O' Leary led a delegation of eighty US businessmen to Pakistan in September 1995, where they signed agreements for sixteen projects valued at $4 billion.[25]

The major development in US policy to evolve the working relationship with Pakistan was started with the pro-Pakistan stance of Robin Raphael, the Assistant Secretary of State and first head of the Bureau for South Asian Affairs. This Bureau was first established in the State Department under the Clinton

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[21] Hassan Askari Rizvi "Pak-US Relations: The Latest Phase," *The Nation,* October 3, 1995.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Dr. Rais Ahmed Khan, "Fifty Years of Pak-US Relations," *Pakistan Journal of American Studies*, Vol.16, No.1, spring 1998.

[24] Lee H. Hamilton, "Time to Modify the Pressler Amendment," *The News*, March 15, 1995.

[25] *The Nation*, March 10, 2001.

administration. Robin Raphael, before her visit to South Asia in 1993, told journalists that "[t]he United States had never accepted the accession of Kashmir to India."[26] This statement caused uproar with the Assistant Secretary of State in India, while the reaction in Pakistan was that of applause. The other senior office holder in Clinton Administration was the Secretary of Defense William Perry who acted in harmony with Raphael. The US Department of Defense was unhappy over the deteriorating relationship with Pakistan, considering Pakistan a long time friend and potentially helpful partner in western Asia and the Middle East. During Perry's visit to Pakistan in 1995 he suggested resumption of security cooperation between the US and Pakistan and proposed the revival of a joint US-Pakistani military consultative group that was originally established during the Afghan war to carry out consultation on defense matters at the military level. He assured Pakistan that he wanted "to make the most I can for the security relations between the United States and Pakistan …I want to try to make the things better"[27] In addition to Perry, the influential Senator Hank Brown, who became the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee after a sweeping victory of the Republican Party in 1994 in Senate elections, also agreed with Raphael's ideas. Brown supported US-India relations but was convinced that the Pressler Amendment damaged US national interests. He also rejected the claim of Senator Larry Pressler that sanctions were imposed to prevent an "Islamic Bomb".[28]

Moreover, Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's visit to the US in April 1995 further helped to improve the relations. She influenced the public opinion in the US in her favor and made the US administration and Congress realize the injustice done to Pakistan by the Pressler Law, providing convincing evidence that the imposed sanctions were unfair. President Clinton, in a joint statement with Benazir Bhutto at the end of the visit, declared that the US was one of the closest friends of Pakistan. He categorically refuted the claim that the "US was dumping Pakistan."[29] Pakistan's nuclear program at that level of development was perceived as regional issue, which had little relevance to the security of the US and its allies. Additionally, the US administration was also mindful about the peculiar position that Pakistan had as the second largest Muslim nation in the world.. Pakistan had deep historical and religious links to Iran, Central Asia, and Saudi Arabia, as well as an active role in Organization of Islamic countries. Pakistan was also an important and the most populous member of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), a regional Muslim Organization that includes

[26] Dennis Kux, op. cit. p. 328.
[27] Danna Priest, "U.S. Pakistan to Renew Talks," *Washington Post*, January 11, 1995.
[28] Dennis Kux, op. cit., P.329.
[29] *Joint Statement of President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto at the White House*, Washington D.C., April 11, 1995. US Department of State Dispatch 6, April 24, 1995.

all of the five Muslim Central Asian states. A considerable portion of Pakistan's population was moderate and held Western enlightened liberal and democratic thoughts and values, but there was a fear that "Islamic fundamentalism" would spread, throughout modern, democratic Pakistan, as in Iran, Algeria, and Sudan. This fear, among other factors, persuaded the recalcitrant in the US to come around. A politically democratic Pakistan was a bulwark in this region against the fundamentalist Islamic regimes of Iran and Taliban.[30]

The US desired some level of contact with Pakistan, since, although the Cold War was over and Pakistan lacked strategic importance for the US, the country's cooperation might be essential in any future arrangement in the region. No one was sure about the 21st century world order, and Pakistan was situated in an area where the US was short of friends., South Asia, West Asia, and Central Asia are perhaps the most unstable regions in the world and the US military considered Pakistan a potentially helpful partner in this strategically important area. The rise of China, India, and Iran, the volatile situation in Middle East, the unstable condition in Afghanistan, and the premature state of the newly emerged Central Asian States, as well as the unresolved disputes between India and Pakistan that jeopardized peace in South Asia, compelled the US to rethink its relations with Pakistan.[31] To quote President Clinton, Pakistan "has been a good partner…the future of the entire part of the world where Pakistan is, depends in some large measure on Pakistan's success."[32]

On May 11, 1995, Senator Hank Brown (Republican), the Chairman Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on Near Eastern South Asian Affairs, presented an amendment to modify the Pressler Law. The US Congress passed the Brown Amendment in October 1995 and President Clinton signed it into law in January of 1996. The Brown Amendment authorized the release of the military equipment and spare parts, worth $368 million, that were already paid for by Pakistan but had not delivered due to Pressler sanctions. With the implementation of this amendment, the US consultative group became active again in 1995 and the US and Pakistan began to hold joint exercises annually. But this was a low level of engagement which was limited to cooperation in the areas of narcotics control, international terrorism, peacekeeping, military training, and joint exercises. The problem that remained at heart of US-Pakistani relations was the release of the twenty-eight F-16 aircraft or the return of $658 million paid by Pakistan. This transaction was out of the parameters of Brown Amendment. So

[30] Ibid. p. 15.
[31] Lee H. Hamilton, "Time to modify the Pressler Amendment" *The News*, November 24, 1998.
[32] Joint Statement Dispatch 6, April 24, 1995, cited in Dr. Rais Ahmed Khan, "Fifty Years of Pak-US Relations," *Pakistan Journal of American Studies*, Vol.16, No.1, spring 1998.

the response to this legislation was described as either "a glass half full or a glass half empty," depending upon the perception of the person discussing it.[33] The military hardware was released but the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC),[34] Trade and Development Assistance (TDA), and International Military Education and Training (IMET) provision of the Brown Amendment did not materialize, and therefore the Brown Amendment had only a cosmetic effect. As it was related by the Assistant Secretary of State in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs:

> The key impact of sanctions relief is not military or financial. The effort would be in the political realm, creating a sense of faith restored and unfairness rectified with a country and a people who have been loyal friends of the United States over the decades. This is fully recognized by the government of Pakistan, which knows we are not re-establishing a defense supply relationship.[35]

After all, the Brown Amendment, in authorizing a one-time lifting of the ban on weapons sales, did not resume American economic or military aid to Pakistan. Even the military sales relationship could not be restored. It gave only grants to Pakistani nongovernmental organizations, amounting to $2 million a year.[36] When Benazir Bhutto met Brian Atwood, administrator of United States Agency for International Development in April 1995 in Washington during her visit, he told her that there were no sufficient funds for a bilateral program.[37]

In November 1996, Clinton was elected the President of United States for second term, and he re-examined the US's South Asian Foreign Policy. As Thomas Pickering, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, put it: "[w]e want to show that we don't consider South Asia the backside of the diplomatic globe."[38] Although US interests in South Asia were not vital, they were important, and the region's strategic, economic, and human significance demanded much attention and a revised approach. So it was decided to broaden relations with India and Pakistan and to place less stress on nonproliferation matters. After the Cold War, US foreign policy had not pursed geo-strategy,

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[33] Dr. Rais Ahmed Khan, op. cit, p. 6.
[34] The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) is a development institution and agency of the USA. It works closely with EXIM and Trade Development Agency (TDA) for determining country strategy. It only operates in those countries, which have bilateral agreements with the US.
[35]Robin Raphael, "Raphael: US Proposes Compromise on Pressler Amendment." *Congressional Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee*, September 14, 1995.
[36]Robert G. Wirsing, "Pakistan's Security in the "New World Order": Going from Bad to Worst?," *Asian affairs: An American Review*, Vol. 23, No.2, Summer 1996.
[37]Dennis Kux, op. cit, p. 331.
[38] Ibid, p. 340.

instead focusing on geo-political and geo-economic interests, but the future of the international situation pointed towards a re-structuring of their approach, with Pakistan as a potential ally in their future setup. Speaking at the seminar "India and Pakistan: Fifty Years of Independence," organized by the Woodrow Wilson Centre in June 1997, South Asia specialist Prof. Stephen P. Cohen said that: "[i]n the long run the emergence of China as an aggressive power would raise profound issues for all three states (US, India and Pakistan)". Assuming "a violent or expansionist China would be power in future" he also suggested a dialogue among all three of these states to combat this potential threat. Selig Harrison, another South Asia expert, shared the same view. [39] The US needed to develop a good relationship with Pakistan army and assist in training and providing support to develop a flourishing political system. Therefore, IMET should be extended to help keep the Pakistani forces professional and linked to the West.[40] The US also resumed limited arms sale to Pakistan in order to maintain contact with the army and acquire support in international peacemaking and peace keeping.[41] Additionally, the sale of US arms meant that Pakistan would not be looking beyond the West for arms and would also be less dependent on nuclear arms.

During this period, although there was no close relationship on the bilateral level between the two countries, Pakistan was helping the US in its efforts for peacekeeping (See Appendix), to curb drug trafficking, and to combat terrorism. Pakistan helped the US in the arrest of Mir Aimal Kansi, a Pakistani national charged with the murder of two Central Intelligence Agency employees in June 1997 and allowed the US to fly Kansi back to the US without going through the extradition process.[42] The US's new policy towards Pakistan prioritized issues of international terrorism, narcotics, Islamic fundamentalism, free market economy, human right and democracy.[43] It had already been realized that the continuous policy of benign negligence towards Pakistan was not in favor of US interests. The US had passed Brown amendment but, as shown above, this legislation could not be implemented when the US imposed MTCR sanctions and the policy of negligence further increased the social and economic problems of Pakistan, which might harm the very existence of Pakistan and could turn it into a failed state.[44] Acute economic problems might push Pakistan to sell its nuclear

[39]Dr. Rais Ahmad Khan, op.cit, p.14.
[40] Independent Task Force Report, op. cit., p. 36.
[41] Ibid..
[42]Ibid., p. 340.
[43]Independent Task Force Report, *A New US Policy Toward India and Pakistan* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997), p. 23.
[44] Independent Task Force Report, *A New US Policy Toward India and Pakistan* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997), p.15.

capability to some Islamic countries, especially Iran. So it was felt that the US's non-proliferation legislation must be brought into conformity with the existing realities of US-Pakistani relations.

The US Task Force on Foreign Policy, regarding India and Pakistan, suggested that a pragmatic approach towards Pakistan would be in the best interest of the US, and that the US policy should be in accordance with the existing realities and be implemented unconditionally as early as possible. (These suggestions were also in Brown amendment but could not be implemented when the US imposed MTCR sanctions). The first step was to develop a good working relationship with Pakistan in the economic realm: the US should enhance cooperation in trade and investment by providing credits such as Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) aid and Export-Import Bank (Exim bank) guarantees. The US should also cooperate in energy related issues, including the peaceful use of nuclear energy and enhancement the nuclear safety, help to write off loans, reduce debt, and provide support for the programs of social sector development, economic modernization and privatization, and the reform of tax and development mechanism.[45]

The US policy of non-proliferation needed to be in sync with the realities of Pakistan. The US needed to soften its policy of bilateral pressure on Pakistan and adopt the policy of a regional and step-by-step approach that would check further development of Pakistan's nuclear capability. The policy of "cap, roll back, and finally eliminate of weapons of mass destruction" was appropriate according to the circumstances.[46] Reversing the Pakistani nuclear program from a de facto nuclear weapon status was unlikely. The US needed to instead concentrate on persuading Pakistan to refrain from testing nuclear explosives, deploying nuclear weapons, and exporting nuclear weapons or missile related material, technology, or expertise. To achieve this objective the US could not simply threaten penalties but instead needed to lead the international community in offering real incentives to restrain Pakistan's nuclear weapons and missile program.[47]

In July 1997, the US Senate passed the Harkin Warner Amendment in the Foreign Operation Appropriations Bill (FOAB), which removed the hurdles that had prevented full implementation of Brown Amendment.[48] To demonstrate increased interest in the subcontinent, a series of high-level trips were also planned. In September 1997, Clinton met Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of

[45]Independent Task Force Report, *A New US Policy toward India and Pakistan*, op. cit. p. 36.
[46] Shirin Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship*, (New York: Prager Special Studies, 1982), p. 8.
[47] Independent Task Force Report, *A New US Policy toward India and Pakistan*, op.cit. p. 26.
[48] Dr. Rais Ahmed Khan, op. cit, p. 6.

Pakistan during the UN General Assembly session in New York, expressed his desire to enhance bilateral relations, and reiterated his interest in visiting South Asia.[49] Under this policy an investment incentive agreement between the US and Pakistan was signed on November 18, 1997, during the visit of Madeline Albright to Pakistan. The agreement provided investment support through OPIC in the form of insurance, debt, and investment guarantees. This agreement brought immediate results. A six-member joint US delegation of OPIC, TDA, and EXIM bank visited Pakistan in March 1998 and held top-level meetings with the economic ministries.[50] After the visit of Secretary of State Albright in November 1997, USAID also resumed its operations.[51]

On May 11, 1998, India tested a series of five nuclear devices. These tests once more put the nuclear issue at the center of the US South Asian policy. The US expressed its anger against India by announcing sanctions under the 1994 Non-Proliferation Act: they cut off all aid and voted against loans to India by the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. Japan also imposed sanctions against India. But no other country did so because of their commercial interests. [52] The US then turned towards Pakistan to persuade her not to follow India. President Clinton sent Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot to Pakistan. The US envoy offered to lift of all the military and economic sanctions, provide delivery of the F-16s, and resume substantial economic and military aid. US President Clinton himself talked four times to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to underscore Talbot's entreaties. [53] In its response Nawaz Sharif told Clinton that Pakistan needed US security guarantees against India to hold off from testing. The President said that he could not give this but reiterated his intention "to cut through the knot" of laws blocking aid and give Pakistan the "tools you need to defend your country." This was not good enough for Pakistan.[54]

It was a difficult choice for Pakistan. The economic cost of testing was high. The US offer of lifting all the sanctions and resumption of substantial economic and military aid was tempting. This aid could restore Pakistan's declining economy and provide a substantial conventional arms supply. But previous US dealings had left Pakistan distrustful about US promises and doubtful

[49] Dennis Kux, op. cit, p. 341.
[50] Shabir H. Kazmi, "The US Companies in Pakistan," *Pakistan and Gulf Economist*, Vol. 29 (March 27-April 2, 2000), p. 15.
[51] United States Agency for International Development, "Promoting Primary Education for Girls in Pakistan, Impact Evaluation," May 1995.
[52] James Bannet, "Clinton Calls Tests a Terrible Mistake, and Announces Sanctions against India," *New York Times*, May 14, 1998, cited in Dennis Kux p. 346.
[53] Dennis Kux, op.cit P. 345.
[54] Ibid. p. 346.

about Congressional lifting of sanctions.[55] On the other hand, there was domestic pressure to match India in the wake of the arrogant tone of L. K. Advani, the Indian Home Minister who called on Pakistan "to accept the new realities imposed by the tests." He further added, "Islamabad should realize the change in the geo-strategic situation in the region and the world, roll back its anti-India policy, especially with regard to Kashmir." Indian Minister of Parliamentary Affairs Madan Lal Khurana asked Pakistan to fix a time and place where it wanted to fight the "fourth round" [56] People in the streets along with political leaders, in opposition as well as in the government, were demanding to match Indian capability. It was a matter of now or never for Pakistan. As a result of the unsettled Kashmir dispute, India's arrogant and threatening tone, the international community's unsatisfactory response to Indian tests, and the fear of rising pressure on Pakistan for signing the NPT and CTBT, Pakistan conducted five nuclear tests on May 28, 1998. Three days later Pakistan also conducted a sixth test. President Clinton commented that "[b]y failing to exercise restraint in responding to the Indian test, Pakistan lost a truly priceless opportunity to strengthen its own security, to improve its political standing in the eyes of the World". [57]

On June 16, 1998, the United States announced a range of sanctions against Pakistan, as it was legally required to do under the Glenn Amendment to the Arms Export Control Act.[58] According to the US administration the nuclear arms race between Pakistan and India was a serious danger to the stability of the entire South Asian region. Moreover, the US was of the opinion there were several scenarios that could be more threatening, such as actual deployment of nuclear weapons, their use, or their being transferred to third parties.[59] So after 1998 nuclear tests, the US imposed sanctions against Pakistan but efforts to waive them soon began due to US commercial interests. If the sanctions were fully implemented they would bar agricultural export credits and US wheat growers of the Pacific Northwest, already hit by falling grain prices, would have to halt the sale of 350,000 tons of wheat to Pakistan, or one third of the area's

[55] *Dawn*, May 16, 1998.
[56] Tehmina Mehmood, "India and Pakistan Nuclear Explosion: An Analysis," *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol., 52 No. 1, January 1999, p. 46.
[57] John F. Burns, "Pakistan, Answering India, Carries out Nuclear Tests; Clinton's Appeal Rejected," *New York Times* May 29, 1998, cited in Dennis Kux, op cit. p. 347.
[58] Jeanne J. Grimmett, "Nuclear Sanctions: Section 102 (b) of the Arms Export Control Act and Its Application to India and Pakistan," *CRS Report for Congress,* December 9, 1999.
[59]Richard H. Haass, "Crisis in South Asia: Part 2 Pakistan's Nuclear Test" *Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern &South Asian Affairs* Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, June 3, 1998.

production.[60] As a result, just two months after the tests, the US Congress passed the Agriculture Export Relief Act (AERA), P.L. 105-194, which amended AECA section to exempt credits, credit guarantees, and financial assistance programs provided by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) to support the purchase of food or other agriculture commodities, and made this amendment applicable to USDA credits, guarantees, and assistance made before, on, or after the date of enactment, through September 30, 1990. The act also lifted any sanction that had already been imposed involving the USDA program.[61] The Congress, considering the negative humanitarian consequences, also exempted the humanitarian assistance. According to Secretary of State Strobe Talbot, the United States has attempted to "avoid bringing hardships to the peoples of India and Pakistan…especially the poor." [62] The US realized that the rigidity of the laws and sanctions would not bring fruitful results, as there was little evidence that Pakistan would alter the proliferation behavior during the period that sanctions were in place. There was also fear that a punitive approach towards Pakistan might push the country towards Islamic radicalism, presumably supported by pro-Islamic political parties and fundamentalist elements in the ISI and the military. These radical groups would have increased appeal to a Pakistani public weary and frustrated after a decade of economic mismanagement, political feuding, and chronic lawlessness under Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. So the 106th Congress granted the President authority, in the national security interest, to extend waivers for an indefinite period (P.L. 106-79).[63]

There was also fear that the sanctions might sink the shaky economy of Pakistan. At that time when Pakistan tested its nuclear arms it had foreign reserves of only $600 million and a foreign debt of over $30 billion. It was not possible for Pakistan to even pay its next upcoming debt service payment without the fresh help of IMF. Furthermore, when the Pakistani government, after its nuclear tests, froze the foreign–currency accounts it caused havoc for the foreign companies working in Pakistan. Realizing the serious economic situation of Pakistan, the US decided to provide breathing room and announced that it would no longer oppose IMF financial assistance to Pakistan.[64] In fact, this policy was outcome of the fear of the United States that financial hardships would lead

[60] Dennis Kux, op. cit, p. 347.
[61] Jeanne J. Grimmett, "Nuclear Sanctions: Section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act and Its Application to India and Pakistan," *CRS Report for Congress*, December 9, 1999.
[62] David Cortright, Samina Ahmed, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, Chicago*, Sep./Oct., 1998.
[63] K. Alan Kronstadt, "Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Proliferation in India and Pakistan: Issues for Congress," *CRS Report for Congress* July 31, 2000.
[64] Ibid.

Pakistan to transfer the nuclear technology to some Islamic countries, especially Iran.[65]

Furthermore, in fall of 1998 at the UN General Assembly Clinton met with Nawaz Sharif and extended him an invitation for an official visit to the United States. This visit sought to provide Sharif with a psychological boost and to aid in the creation of a working relationship with Pakistan regarding its post-nuclear tests agenda. After this meeting Clinton sent the Deputy Secretary of State to South Asia in an effort to influence Pakistani nuclear policy. Talbot conducted seven rounds of talks with Indian and Pakistani officials separately on the agenda of the Geneva declaration. These discussions were held in the United States, Europe, and South Asia. These were the most extended high-level engagements since the 1960s.[66] In December 1998, Nawaz Sharif visited the United States and resolved the nettlesome F-16 issue. The US government paid $324 million in cash from a fund maintained by the Treasury Department and provided $140 million of wheat and other commodities over the next two years.[67] There was also a major development at the regional level towards confidence building measures between India and Pakistan when Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Lahore in February 1999. Both decided to resume bus service between the two countries. The Lahore talks raised hopes that the two enemies, sobered by the dangerous implications of their decision to become overt nuclear weapons powers, might at last begin a serious effort to reduce tension.[68] But the prospects for an India-Pakistan détente suffered a severe setback in May-July 1999 when the two countries reached the brink of war in Kashmir. In the worst of the fighting Indian soldiers sought to dislodge some 700 Pakistani-supported Mujahidin who were occupying fortified positions along mountain ridges overlooking a supply route on the Indian side of line of control near Kargil. Following a meeting on July 4 between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and President Clinton in Washington, the Mujahidin withdrew across the line of control.[69]

The US maintained concern about Pakistan's continued support for the Taliban's military operations in Afghanistan, as the Taliban supported harsh treatment of women, tolerated the drug trade, and provided a haven for Islamic

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[65] Amna Mehmood, "American Policy of non-Proliferation towards Pakistan: A Post Cold War Perspective," *Pakistan Horizon*, Volume 56, Number 1, January 2003, p. 55.
[66] David Stout, "Clinton Putting off Visits to India and Pakistan," *New York Times,* October 1, 1998, cited in Dennis Kux, op. cit. S, p. 349.
[67] Dennis Kux, op. cit., p. 351.
[68] Tanveer Ahmed Khan, "Lahore Summit," *Dawn*, February 23, 1999.
[69] Barbara Leitch LePoer, "Pakistan–US Relations," *CRS Issue Brief for Congress*, December 31, 2001.

extremists and terrorists.[70] The US also continued diplomatic efforts to pursue the non-proliferation policy. At the start of 1999, Strobe Talbot traveled to South Asia for his eighth round of nuclear discussion with Pakistan. The talks proved futile since the Americans offered to lift all sanctions against Pakistan, including the Pressler amendment, in reciprocity for the signing of the CTBT, immediate capping of missile cooperation with North Korea, agreement to participate in multilateral negotiations to ban the production of fissile material, and adoption of a comprehensive nuclear export-control regime. Pakistan refused to bargain on the issue and insisted that it would only accept the US proposal if India adopted it first.[71] Along with the Glenn Amendment, the Pressler Amendment of 1990 had already subjected Pakistan to certain US unilateral sanctions that were only somewhat eased by the passage of the Brown Amendment in February of 1996., and after the nuclear tests of 1998, the US imposed new, further sanctions under Symington Amendment.

Most of the economic assistance to Pakistan had been on hold since October of 1990. USAID activities in Pakistan were limited and supported primarily the work of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Asia Foundation and Agha Khan Foundation. Exim Bank restarted its work in February 1998, after the implementation of Brown Amendment, for short and medium term programs for both public and private sectors. After the imposition of Glenn Amendment, sanctions froze all applications for new projects in Pakistan.[72] Pursuant to Glenn Amendment, on June 1, 1998, Exim officially closed for new business. When sanctions were imposed, Exim Bank's exposure in Pakistan for loans, loan guarantees, or credit insurance totaled $429 million, with an additional $1.1 million letter of interests for a project in Pakistan not yet approved by Exim bank. OPIC, which had just restarted its work on March 24, 1998, also closed its business, but as it had just begun work and new programs were under way, its loss was minimal.

At the time of imposition of Glenn Amendment, no new loans from international financial institutions were under consideration for Pakistan. Most World Bank Loans had been disbursed to Pakistan for the fiscal year 1998. The sanctions, however, delayed the disbursement of a second installment of a $1.6 billion IMF loans under a three-year economic assistance for Pakistan. As Pakistan's economic situation appeared to deteriorate sharply in late 1998, the G-7 countries agreed to relax their multilateral sanctions to allow the IMF to

[70] Ibid.
[71] Dennis Kux, op. cit., p. 351.
[72] US International Trade Commission, *Overview and Analysis of the Economic Impact of US Sanctions With Respect to India and Pakistan,* Investigation No. 332-406, Publication 3236, September 1999, pp. 2-5.

negotiate a support program for Pakistan. Pakistan's consultation with IMF resumed in late 1998. The IMF approved the disbursement of $575 million for Pakistan on January 14, 1999. The US, as a sign of its support, did not oppose the vote for the loan.[73] In 1997, the last full year before the imposition of Glenn Amendment sanctions on Pakistan, the US merchandise exports to Pakistan were valued at nearly $1.2 billion, or 0.2 percent of total US exports. That year, Pakistan ranked as the 52nd largest export market. In 1998, after the imposition of the sanctions, the US merchandise exports to Pakistan declined by nearly one half to $719 million, or 0.1 percent of US exports to the world. In 1998, Pakistan ranked as the 59th largest US export market.

On October 12, 1999, the Pakistan army, under Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf, carried out a bloodless coup, wherein they deposed then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and put him under house arrest a few hours after Sharif had announced the replacement of the chief of army staff. Two days later, General Musharraf suspended the constitution and the Parliament and named himself chief executive. After the military coup in Pakistan, the US ambassador to Pakistan William B. Milam, who was in the United States at the time of the coup, arrived in Islamabad and met with General Musharraf with a clear message from the United States government "that there should be a prompt return to civilian rule and a restoration of democratic process in Pakistan".[74] After these sanctions the US government's assistance to Pakistan was limited to areas of refugee, counter-terrorism, and counter-narcotics. US counter-narcotics aid to Pakistan, administered by the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, totaled $ 3.5 million in FY 2001.[75] These sanctions had little impact on Pakistan, as it was already under many US sanctions because of the Pressler Amendment and the 1998 nuclear tests.[76] The Musharraf government tried to lessen foreign criticism by downplaying the military label, stressing its interest in reform, and emphasizing its interim character. It did not impose martial law, ban political parties, or institute press censorship. Although pleased with these steps, the Clinton administration was less happy with Musharraf's reluctance to offer a timetable for the return to democracy. The trial and ultimate conviction of Sharif for attempted murder also raised concerns, as

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[73] Ibid., P. 4-10.
[74] James Foley, "US seeks civilian rule in Pakistan, tries to maintain ties," October 15, 1999, http: // www.cnn.com/US/9910/16/us.Pakistan.
[75] Barbara Leitch LePoer, "Pak-US Relations" *CRS Issue Brief for Congress*, December 31, 2001, p. 13.
[76] Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 355.

did the regime's firing of roughly ten percent of judges who refused to take an oath of allegiance to Musharraf, including the chief justice of Pakistan.[77]

In spite of the sanctions, the US could not entirely abandon Pakistan, as it was a nuclear state with serious economic problems, massive population, and few effective civilian institutions. The US was an apprehensive that the weakened political system in Pakistan could be replaced by a hardline Islamic military leadership.[78] The US feared that Pakistan might become a "failed State" at some time in future, and that such a potential breakdown of central control might leave nuclear weapons in the hands of radical Islamist groups. There was also concern that economically troubled Pakistan might sell nuclear secrets abroad, particularly to North Korea, which could supply Pakistan with missile technology in return for assistance with nuclear development.[79] David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, took an alarmist view of the security of Pakistan's nuclear program. He maintained that Pakistan pursued "an organizational culture that scorns security guidelines" because it had built its nuclear program through "illicit procurement and deliberate deception" that circumvented western export controls and the discipline of nonproliferation. He asserted that "in the organizational culture of such a program, disaffected individuals could find plenty of justifications and opportunities to transfer classified information or sensitive items."[80] In late 2001, the US concern became serious after the disclosure that two retired Pakistani nuclear scientists had briefed Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders on several occasions. The continuing war in Afghanistan also heightened fears of instability in Pakistan.[81]

Despite strained relationships with the military government, President Clinton, who was initially reluctant to visit Pakistan in order to show his displeasure over military rule in Pakistan, finally decided to visit on his trip to South Asia. Clinton showed his disapproval of the military government when he arrived in Pakistan on March 25th, 2000. He declined to be welcomed by the military ruler and was instead welcomed by the President Rafiq Tarar. The US

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[77] Dennis Kux, op. cit., p. 355.
[78] N.V. Subramanian, "Will Pakistan's Coup Repeat?" *Defense News*, January 17, 2000, cited in Alan Kronstadt, "Nuclear weapons and Ballistic Missile Proliferation in India and Pakistan: Issues for Congress," *CRS Report for Congress*. July 31, 2000, p. 6.
[79] Kim Sa Nae, "North Korea aid to Pakistan raises nuclear fears," *Los Angeles Times*, August 28, 1999, Cited in Alan Kronstadt, "Nuclear weapons and Ballistic Missile Proliferation in India and Pakistan: Issues for Congress" *CRS Report for Congress*. July 31, 2000, p. 6.
[80] David Albright, "Secrets, What Secrets?" *Scientific American*, December 2001, cited in Rajesh Basrur, Hasan Askari, "Nuclear Terrorism and south Asia" *Cooperative Monitoring Centre Occasional Paper 25,* February 2003, p. 48.
[81] Barbara Leitch LePoer, "Pakistan-US Relations" *CRS Issue Brief for Congress*, December 31, 2001, p. 9.

president in his visit to South Asia showed complete disenchantment with Pakistan and clear tilt towards India, as he spent five days in India and just five hours in Pakistan during the first visit of any US president during the last thirty years.[82] However, the US also appreciated the decision of Supreme Court of Pakistan when on May 12, 2000, it set a deadline of three years for the holding of general elections. General Pervez Musharraf, in compliance to the orders of Supreme Court, pledged to hold parliamentary elections by October 2002. More than this, in December 2000, President of Pakistan Rafiq Tarar gave pardon to Nawaz Sharif, the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, for his crime in exchange for at least ten years of exile.[83]

In June 2001, General Musharraf dismissed the former president Rafiq Tarar, and assumed the presidential post himself, while retaining his own positions as chief executive and chief of army staff. This action of General Musharraf raised US concern as another turn away from democracy. [84] The US was also worried because of the rise in Indo-Pakistan tension after the coup. India took an instant dislike to Musharraf as the mastermind of Kargil operation. It also blamed him for a post-Kargil rise of violence in Kashmir. Events reached their highest point after the hijacking of an Indian Airlines' plane and as a result the Indian government had to release several jailed extremists in return for the freedom of the passengers.[85] The US also had serious concerns about Pakistan's continued support and protection of *Jihadi* groups active in Indian-held Kashmir, such as Harakat-ul-Ansar, Jash-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Harakat ul Mujahidin.[86] Islamabad failed to take effective steps to curb the activities of certain *madrassas,* or religious schools, which served as recruiting grounds for terrorism.[87] During the third week of January 2000, three important officials of the US government, Karl Inderfurth, the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Michael Sheehan, the State Department's counter terrorism chief, and Donald Kamp, the South Asia specialist on National Security Council, met with General Musharraf to discuss the issue of terrorism and ask General Musharraf "to lay out a more comprehensive road map so we can see where he is heading." A senior official added that, "[h]e did not rebuff us on the terrorism issue. He said he would consider the administration's requests to deal with these organizations

[82] Dennis Kux, op. cit, p. 358.
[83] Dianne E. Rennack, op. cit, p. 4.
[84] Barbara Leitch LePoer, "Pakistan-US Relations" *CRS Issue Brief for Congress*, December 31, 2001, p. 5.
[85] Ibid., p. 355.
[86] U.S. Department of State*, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999*, May 2000.
[87] US Department of Sate, *Report on Global Terrorism for 2000*, April 30, 2001.

of concern to us." [88] In June 2000, a Congressionally-appointed Commission for Counter-terrorism recommended to the administration that Pakistan be threatened with sanctions for its alleged failure to cooperate with counter terrorism efforts.[89]

In early 2001, to enhance efforts to counterterrorism, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation began offering anti-terrorism training courses for Pakistan police officers in the United States. [90] The US also had serious concerns about Pakistan's Taliban policy. According to the US State Department report on global terrorism for 2000, "Pakistan supplied the Taliban with material, food, funding, and technical assistance, as well as allowing numbers of Pakistani nationals to cross into Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban."[91] During this period Pakistan also cooperated with the United States in its efforts to counter the narcotics trade. In March 2001, President Bush submitted to Congress his annual list of major illicit drug producing and transiting countries eligible to receive US aid and other economic and trade benefits. Pakistan was among the countries certified as having cooperated fully with the United States in counter–narcotics efforts or to take adequate steps on their own. According to the report, Pakistan almost achieved its goal of eliminating opium production by reducing the poppy crop to a record low of 500 hectares, down from 8,000 hectares in 1992. Pakistan's cooperation with the United States on counter-narcotics efforts was described as excellent, including arrests, extradition, and poppy eradication.[92] Pakistan was also actively participating in US-led peacekeeping and peacemaking United Nations efforts. In November 2001, there were 5,500 Pakistani troops and observers participating in UN peacekeeping efforts in Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, Congo, and other countries.[93] Throughout the first eight months of 2001, the Bush administration kept on hinting that the United States would like to lessen the sanctions imposed against Pakistan. But it did not do so. Up until September 11, 2001, the US just had a working relationship with Pakistan that was far from friendly. But after the September 11, 2001 tragic incidents of plane hijacking and crashing into the buildings of World Trade Centre and Pentagon, there came a major thaw in US-Pakistan relations. The US started its war on terrorism and requested Pakistan to open its airspace to US military aircrafts, share military intelligence, and provide logistic support against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. On September 13, 2001,

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[88] John Lancaster, "U.S. Pressures Pakistan to Cut Ties With Extremist Groups" *The Washington Post* , January 26, 2000.
[89] National Commission on Terrorism, *Countering the Challenging threat of International Terrorism,* June 7, 2000.
[90] Barbara Leitch Lepoer, op. cit., p. 14.
[91] US Department of State, *Report on Global Terrorism for 2000*, April 30, 2001.
[92] Ibid., p. 13.
[93] Ibid., p. 11.

President Musharraf, under strong US diplomatic pressure, offered President Bush unhindered cooperation in the war against terrorism. Because of Pakistan's proximity to Afghanistan and former close ties with the Taliban, Pakistan was considered important to US-led efforts to root out terrorism in the region. As the Taliban and Osama bin Laden had strong support in Pakistani society, the problem was how to make use of Pakistani support without seriously destabilizing an already weak state that had nuclear weapons. Thus the US, in order to improve its relations and to lessen the miseries of the military regime, decided to waive all sanctions against Pakistan.

The US usage of sanctions against Pakistan suggests that sanctions usually do not work. Instead, a course based on diplomatic negotiations with the target country should be adopted. The sanctions cannot contribute towards change, especially when serious matters like the national security of a country are in danger. The sanctions are counter-productive because they not only hinder constructive negotiations, but also prevent growth and slow reform, and honorable society is not possible anywhere in the world without economic growth and well-being.

Appendix

Pakistan's Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Missions

Total Forces Abroad	918
Iraq/Kuwait	8 Mil Obs
Angola	7 Troops
	6 Mil Obs
Liberia	8 Mil Obs
Rwanda	22 Mil Obs
Western Sahara	5 Mil Obs
Former Yugoslavia	14 Troops
	8 Mil Obs
Georgia	8 Mil Obs
Haiti	845 Troops

Source: UN Military Staff Committee Monthly Summary of Troop Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations, as of February 29, 1996. "Mil Obs" is an abbreviation for military observers.

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Borrowing and Code Mixing in Pakistani Children's Magazines: Practices and Functions

By Sarwet Rasul

One of the dimensions of spread of English is heavy borrowing and mixing of English words/phrases in other languages of the world. As far as Pakistan is concerned, English vocabulary is frequently borrowed and mixed in Urdu, the national language of Pakistan. The tendency of borrowing and mixing is not restricted to the spoken discourse rather is evident in the written discourse as well. The present paper explores how far this trend is exhibited in Pakistani children's magazines. Two Children's monthly magazines – *Taleem-o-Tarbiat and Hamdard Naunehal* – are taken as a sample for the current research. Practices of borrowings and code mixing in these magazines are explored to examine their nature, frequency, causes, and functions. These explorations are interesting in the backdrop of general claims that these magazines use stylized Urdu syntax, and assert that they are working for the perpetuation and dissemination of standard Urdu.

Introduction and background of the research

Language has always been a very complex and sensitive issue in Pakistan capable of triggering volatile responses from all segments of the population as "language practices are socially and politically embedded" (Heller, 2007: p.1). More than 70 languages including Urdu (the national language of Pakistan), English, and regional languages are used in Pakistan. In this background, Urdu/English controversy has serious implications. Globalization also has a significant impact on the multi-lingual context of Pakistan; resultantly English has emerged as a significant feature of the linguistic landscape of Pakistan. Code switching, code mixing and borrowing of English in the national and regional languages is one of the dimensions of spread of English in Pakistan; and this is quite significant because all of linguistic reality is determined by certain purposes, programs or aims reflective of societal needs (Prucha, 1983).

Practices of Borrowing in Pakistan

Pakistan is a multilingual society and majority of people speak and communicate in more than one language. Historically, languages that evolve at a later stage are

infected and inflected by the languages that have been earlier in their conception. For that reason, many of the words of different languages become a part of the other language due to the permanent and constant use. As far as the case of the sub-continent is concerned, Urdu emerged in a context where already English, Hindi, Arabic, Persian and many local languages were being used in varied contexts and to varying extents. In the socio-political context of the sub-continent, after colonization, English emerged as a dominant language and left its permanent marks on Urdu and Hindi. As a result, some of the vocabulary of English has been mixed in Urdu, has become a part of its vocabulary and is permanently used as a part of Urdu. Emergence of English as a global language in the recent decades has also contributed towards frequent borrowing from English into many other languages; and Urdu in this regard is no exception. This aspect is known as borrowing. Romaine (1995: p.142) argues in this regard:

> …as a result of genetic inheritance and diffusion the South Asian languages share such a large number of syntactic, grammatical and phonological features, lexis may be the most distinctive level.

Children's Magazines in Pakistan

Children's literature comes in many forms like stories, poetry, fiction, riddles etc. Books for children come in many forms but one of the most common and far-reaching source is magazines whether published weekly, monthly or annually. Gupta (1997:p.11) alludes that it was the awareness about children's literature that led to the initiation of magazines and periodicals for children. In Pakistan, too, a number of children's magazines are published predominantly in English and Urdu.

Magazines are one of the major sources of entertainment for children in Pakistan. Language is an important ingredient of the messages conveyed through literature and in children's literature language holds the place of conveying social messages. Children receive and accept whatever is presented to them. In Pakistan children's magazines are multilingual as are the people. Magazines published for children in Urdu (National Language of Pakistan), apart from anything else, play the role of promoting the national language. They use stylized Urdu and a difficult Urdu vocabulary of formal written discourse is used. These magazines are associated with the middle-middle social class who are not identified with English and the power of English. These magazines, conversely, code-switch and use borrowed words from English language to fulfill discourse demands and to convey connotations that can not be conveyed otherwise.

Significance of the Current Research

Borrowing and code mixing are not new phenomena; and they take place in almost all the languages of the world. However, the increasing globalization has added to the speed of borrowing and mixing of English into other languages. Borrowing and code mixing of English in Pakistani children's Urdu magazines is very common in the current times. This research documents the phenomena; and provides insights into what are the practices of borrowing and code mixing and how they are carried out. It also examines the functions of the borrowed and code mixed items.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Children's Literature

Children are the forbearers of the future of a nation. For a better society to be formed and a better culture to be established, children are to be educated in as positive a way as possible. Wisdom of the Chinese proverb is obvious when it says 'If you are planting for one year, plant grain; if you are planting for ten years, plant trees; if you are planting for hundred years, plant children.'

Apart from the formal education that children get at school, their informal education depends largely on the variety of materials that they read at home. Besides textbooks that are basically moralizing, factual or informative, a child needs entertainment too, which is provided in a large variety of children Literature.

> Thus, out-of-school books are a catalyst in the development of reading habit and a vivacious instrument for preventing a loss of interest in reading. They broaden a child's mental and intellectual horizon and to a large extent supplement the information and knowledge gained through the textbooks. (Gupta, 1997: p.3)

Children's literature incorporates the world in miniature for its readers i.e. children. Gupta (1997) and Hancock (2000) view children's literature as the literature that appeals to children and caters for the interests, moods and preferences of children. Obserstein (1996: p.17) cites Landsberg (1987) that children's literature is defined by its purpose to lure and connect with children, "it wants to be something in particular, because this is supposed to connect it with that reading audience – 'children'-with which it declares itself to be overtly and purposefully concerned". Obserstein (1996: p.17) further asserts, "no other

pleasure can so richly furnish a child's mind with the symbols, patterns, depths, and possibilities of civilization" as literature written for them.

The Language of Children's Literature

The linguistic content of children's literature is of vital importance; however, the way to present this content is more crucial. Linguistic choices, nature of structures and style of presentation need to be given importance in writing and publishing children's literature. Every language is associated with a different set of cultural and social boundaries.

The choice as to which language will be used is a critical decision in itself when it comes to writing children's literature. Stephens (1996:p.58) points out the importance of language in literature dubbing that even thematic similarity of two works can be handled in a different way with the tool of language. The language in children's literature is even more sensitive as it is their early encounter with the world and the way language is employed creates and builds concepts and expectations in their minds. Obserstein (1996**:** p. 20) opines that children like difficult/hard words but citing McDowell (1973: p. 51) reports that one of the characteristics of children's literature is that the language used is "child-oriented" (p. 25). The impact of language in written work is highlighted as:

> …by analyzing how language works, we come nearer to knowing how our culture constructs itself, and where we fit into that construction. Language enables individuals to compare their experiences with the experiences of others, a process which has always been a fundamental purpose of children's fiction. (Stephens, 1996: p. 59)

When it comes to bilingual speakers, the issue of language choice becomes even more complicated. Wallerstein (1983: p.6) observes in this regard, "when we teach a second language, we are teaching different cultural expectations and communicative styles". This implies that when we choose a particular language for children's literature actually we make a choice for a particular set of cultural knowledge and social context to be shared with them. Choosing code A or B or a mix of A and B (through code switching, code mixing and borrowing) then would have different implications.

Code-switching

The bilingual speakers accommodate and mould their speech with the help of the two languages they know by alternating words from both the languages

simultaneously. This phenomenon of bilingualism is termed as Code-switching. Mesthrie, Swann, Deumert & Leap (2000: p.146) determine code-switching as a "switch back and forwards between languages, even during the same utterance". The speaker makes choice from the languages s/he knows to acquire the best possible expression. Romaine (1995: p.121) cites Gumperz (1982:p.59) that code-switching is "the juxtaposition of within the same speech exchange of passages of speech belonging to two different grammatical systems or sub-systems". Poplack (1980) asserts that there are three types of code switching: Inter-sentential, Intra sentential and Tag switching. As far as the purpose of code switching is concerned, it is "to establish, cross or destroy group boundaries; to create, evoke or change interpersonal relations with their rights and obligations" (Gal, 1988: p.247).

Code-mixing

Code mixing is also termed as intra-sentential switching. In code mixed sentences, pieces of one language are embedded in the other language while a speaker is basically using the other language. These 'pieces' of the other language are often words, but they can also be phrases or larger units. Discussing the purpose of code mixing, Kachru (1978: p. 36) asserts that there are basically three motivations for code-mixing i.e. "role identification, register identification, and desire for elucidation and interpretation". Muysken (2000:p.1) uses the term code-mixing to refer to "all cases where lexical items and grammatical features from two languages appear in one sentence". It involves the mixing of words from one language into another and is practiced at the sentence level. Liu (2006: p.4) points out that code-mixing is the embedding of different linguistic units for instance affixes (bound morphemes), words (unbound morphemes), phrases and clauses from a "co-operative activity" where the discourse participants have to reconcile what they hear with what they understand if they really want to infer what is intended to be communicated by the speaker.

Code mixing in Urdu

Discussing the phenomenon of code mixing in Urdu, Rasul (2009: p.41) asserts, "it is not new as a linguistic process; it pre-dates partition. Through this process new languages emerged from the old ones." Rangila, Thirumalai, & Mallikarjun (2001) cite Grierson's 1901 census report on the mother tongues spoken in India that referred to situations where the natives mixed the English items in their own language (Rasul, 2009: p.41).

According to Rasul (2009: p.42), after the creation of Pakistan Urdu was given the status of national language, but "certain factors- the colonial background, controversial issue of official language controversy over medium of education, and, prestige factor attached to English, industrialization and globalization- have added to the importance of English with the rising of every dawn". Today in Pakistan, English is an important component of education; and it is taught at schools as a compulsory subject. "The rush of English through the communication/ media channels has added to the exposure to English. One of the consequences is frequent code switching and code mixing, which in turn has resulted in the desertion of certain lexical items of Urdu" (Rasul 2009:p. 42). Today code mixing is common and frequently used in almost all spheres of life. Ranging from informal conversations in everyday life to media discourse, from text books to newspapers and magazines it is frequently employed.

Borrowing: An Overview

Borrowing can be defined as "when any part of the structure of a language is changed by importation of features, whether from some other part of the same language or from some other external source, the imported features are said to be borrowed" (Hall, 1967:319). Depending on the source of borrowing we can categorize it as:

1) Internal borrowing
2) External borrowing

Mesthrie, Swann, Deumert & Leap (2000: p. 249) view borrowing as **"**a technical term for the incorporation of an item from one language into another". He further explains that these items could be sounds that are least frequent, grammatical elements and words that are most frequently borrowed. These items are, through a constant use, a part of the language and the native speakers are often unaware of the original roots of that specific word. The speakers of a language might not be aware of a word that is borrowed. He gives example of the word 'donga' and 'fund' that many English-speaking South Africans are surprised to know that these are not a part of the English language (Mesthrie, Swann, Deumert & Leap, 2000: p.249). They (2000: p.251) further comment that speakers prefer to borrow some terminology (register) from a language and continue speaking in their own language rather than shift and switch to another language. Borrowing, they consider, is a way of enriching one's language.

Hudson (1980: p. 55) elaborates that the main purpose or motive of borrowing can be either the intention to be identified with the native speakers or the non-availability of the word in the same language. Mesthrie, Swann, Deumert & Leap (2000: p.250) identify the practice of borrowing in the technical terms related to long-distance travel, domestic appliances, computers, television and other forms of communication whereas Romaine (1995) points out borrowing of culture-specific items, e.g. food, dress, cultural institutions and activities etc.

Stockwell (2002: p.138) asserts that there are certain constraints on borrowing as all the languages are not equally adjustable to borrowing. He asserts that all languages can not "incorporate borrowed elements equally easily". In grammar for example if two languages are typologically different, borrowing is difficult than between two languages that are closely related to each other.

Kachru, establishes the relationship of borrowing with code mixing by asserting, "code-mixed language types can easily be considered as examples of extended borrowing not restricted to the lexical level of a language. Borrowing is the initial step toward code mixing" (1978: p.31). However, to him it is not the only criterion as in the case of several South Asian languages, borrowing from other languages such as Dutch, Portuguese, and French etc. has not resulted in any 'serious code mixing" though on the other hand borrowing from English and Persian in the Sub-continent has resulted in "cultivation of special language types'. In Pakistan, too, the heavy linguistic borrowing, combined with social, economic, political, and international factors has led to code mixing. In this context Sridhar (1978) asserts that three features of the text, that is the multi level range on which mixing takes place, the non- cultural bound nature of the items, and the dual grammatical system working for their mixing, help in differentiating code mixing from 'heavy borrowing'. He further asserts that the mixed elements do not necessarily fill a 'lexical gap' in the absorbing language; they exist side by side with perfectly acceptable equivalents in the absorbing language, forming an additional lexical stratum. It is conceivable that there might be a subtle pragmatic difference in the minds of the users of the mixed language between the mixed elements and their absorbing language counterparts, but such differences- if they exist- are extremely hard to characterize (1978: p.111).

Difference between Code-Switching, Code-mixing and Borrowing: Overlapping of the Terms

Romaine (1995) asserts that certain terms in linguistics such as borrowing, code switching and code mixing overlap at certain points, and thus hamper the study of

language change and variation. Code mixing and borrowing are so closely related and the difference is so subtle that some times it becomes difficult to distinguish whether the user has code mixed or borrowed an item. This problem cannot be solved merely on the basis of "degree of assimilation" since "assimilation is a gradient and not categorical concept" (Myers-Scotton, 2000:p.133). To her, the general hypothesis that borrowings show more assimilation is also not workable in many cases. Furthermore, the general division that the insertions of L2 that carry a social significance are code switching but those that do not, are borrowings, is also problematic "since a borrowing can appear as code switch when it is a part of style switching" (Myers-Scotton, 2000:134).

Mesthrie, Swann, Deumert & Leap (2000: p. 249) differentiate between borrowing and code-switching that code-switching involves expertise of both the languages and the use of the technical rules of the languages too. Borrowing on the other hand, does not demand any of the two. Romaine (1995: p.124) seconds their view that "borrowing can occur in the speech of those with only monolingual competence, while code-switching implies some degree of competence in the two languages". According to Coulmas (2005: p.110), the difference between a borrowed and a switched word is one of frequency, clear only at the extremes of a continuum that relates both phenomena. Haugen (1956) as cited by Romaine (1995:p.143), also proposed that bilingual phenomena could be situated along a continuum of code-distinctiveness with switching representing maximal distinction, integration (or borrowing) representing maximal leveling of distinctions and interferences referring to over-lapping of two codes.

Important Characteristics of Pakistani Urdu Children's Magazines

Important characteristics of these magazines, including the sample magazines are:

- They make overt/covert claims to promote Urdu.
- They use stylized Urdu.
- Difficult Urdu vocabulary of formal written discourse is used.
- These magazines are associated with the middle-middle social class who are not identified with English and the power of English.
- These magazines do not provide any glossary for the code mixed words.

Selection of data for the current research

In the present research, code-mixing and borrowing in the magazines for children is explored. As far as the list or number of Urdu magazines published for children are concerned, the only available source was Wikipedia[1] which has provided a list of twenty nine Urdu magazines published for Pakistani children. Out of these only nine are marked as monthlies, one as as quarterly and the rest are not marked because they do not publish very regularly. The study has focused on two children magazines that are published monthly. The selected Urdu magazines for children are *Taleem-o-Tarbiat* (January 2010), and *Hamdard Naunehal* (January 2010). These magazines are selected as sample for the current research because they are amongst the most famous children's Urdu magazines in Pakistan. Secondly, these are the oldest of their kind published in Pakistan. *Hamdard Naunehal* has been published regularly since 1953 while *Taleem-o-Tarbiat* has been published since 1940. Thirdly, these two magazines are representative children's Urdu magazines published by the two most prominent publishers of children's Urdu magazines namely Hamdard Foundation Pakistan and Ferozsons Limited respectively.



Illustration 1: Title page of *Taleem-o-Tarbiat January (2010)*

Research methodology for the current research

The research is both qualitative and quantitative in nature. It explores the frequency of occurrence of the instances of borrowing and code mixing under different categories. The qualitative aspects of the research provide insights into why and how they occur. Titles covers of the selected magazines, *Taleem-o-Tarbiat* (January 2010), and *Hamdard Naunehal* (January 2010), are provided in figures 1 and 2 respectively. Only two magazines are selected as sample for the current research because a content analysis of the code switched and mixed language used in these magazines is done; and it was beyond the scope of a research article to handle more data than the selected one.

[1] *en.wikipedia.org/wiki/**List_of_Urdu_magazines_for_children***

Presentation and analysis of data

The data is categorized under two major categories: 1) Code-mixing, 2) Borrowing. Borrowing is further sub-categorized as follows:

1a. Names, Titles, Designations, Occupations
1b. Edibles
1c. Measurements
1d. General



Illustration 2: Title page of *Hamdard Naunehal January (2010)*

The categorized data of borrowing from *Taleem-o-Tarbiat* and *Hamdard Naunehal* is shown in appendices A and B respectively. In the category of code-mixing, it is examined whether the words/ linguistic items that are code-mixed have an Urdu equivalent or not. The data of code mixing from *Taleem-o-Tarbiat and Hamdard Naunehal,* and the Urdu equivalents available for these code mixed items are shown in appendices C and D respectively.

It is important to mention here that many linguistic items/ words are used repeatedly in these magazines. So, to avoid any confusion in the quantification of data, every new item that occurs in a magazine is counted as one 'instance' of code mixing or borrowing; however, any item that occurs more than once its frequency is shown against it in the table. The term 'occurrence' is used to refer to the total times these items are found. This implies that if the word 'book' is found seven times in a magazine it is one 'instance' and seven 'occurrences' of the linguistic item 'book'.

As far as the findings are concerned, in *Taleem-o-Tarbiat* there are total 493 occurrences of both code-mixing and borrowing whereas total instances are 213. In the second magazine, *Hamdard Naunehal* total occurrences that are found are 194 whereas the number of instances is 108.

Presentation and Analysis of the Data of Category 1- Borrowing

This category deals with the presentation of data from both the magazines that falls under the category of Borrowing. In the data collected from *Taleem-o-Tarbiat*, total instances of borrowing that are found are 146. As far as the other magazine '*Hamdard Naunehal*' is concerned, total 53 instances are found. These borrowings are practiced in all the sub-categories such as Names/ Titles/ designations/ Occupations, Edibles, Measurement and General. In these instances, the words used are those that have become a part of Urdu language and they are

directly used in Urdu without any translation. Even the illiterate and uneducated class of people uses them frequently in their everyday language use. In the data of *Hamdard Naunehal*, the word that occurred frequently is "pound" which occurred 19th times in the data. Likewise, in *Taleem-o-Tarbiat* , "tuition" is the word that occurred 24th times in the data. The total instances of borrowing in *Hamdard Naunehal* are shown in the following table:

Table no. 1. Total Instances of borrowing in ***Hamdard Naunehal*** January (2010)

Names/Titles/ designations/Occupations	**Edibles**	**Measurements**	**General**	**General**	**General**
Governor [1]		Centimeter [2]	Arts [1]	Film [4]	Program [1]
Humdard foundation [2]		Feet [1]	Bulb [2]	Flat [2]	Robot [1]
Humdard centre [1]		Inch [1]	Button [1]	Gate [1]	Record (N) [1]
Speaker assembly [1]		Kilo [3]	Cabin [1]	Glass [1]	Report [1]
		Kilogram [1]	Calendar [1]	Glasson [1]	School [3]
		Kilometer [1]	Cinema hall[1]	Hotel [4]	Science [3]
		Meter [2]	Clip[1]	Lecture [1]	Swimming pool [1]
		Minute [1]	College[4]	M.A [1]	Telephone[1]
		Pound [19]	Doctor [12]	Mobile [2]	Television[1]
			Driver [1]	Number [2]	Third division [1]
			Driving [1]	Phone [1]	Traffic [2]
			Engineer [1]	Piano [2]	VCR [1]
			Engineer*on*[1]	Police [2]	
			Fees [1]	Powder [2]	

In the data of *Taleem-o-Tarbiat*, there are certain names or titles that are originally named in English and are borrowed in Urdu such as **Admiral,**

Engineer, Naval headquarter, Secretary General, Commissioner etc. Usage of English titles is prevalent in our society. Since people are used to these English terms and titles, if a loan translation of these terms is used in these magazines, they would be unidentified by the readers.

In the data of the current research, some terms and modes of address are also found that are borrowed from English. According to Girish (2005), terms and modes of address are crucial in any society for the sake of identification and expression of ideas. Their use depends upon the social status, age, and the gender of the persons involved in a communicative act. To Koul and Madhu- Bala (1989), one of the differences between English and South- Asian languages is the difference in the use of modes of address. There is a multiplicity of ways in which South-Asian languages permit their speakers to mark out different kinds of relationships between each other in the mode of address. In Pakistan, there are certain honorific words and reference terms used to address people in formal situations. In fact, in Pakistan, like many other South Asian countries, a complex system of modes of address is used in everyday life which helps in pointing out differences or establishes equality in social status of the speakers. "One of these is a highly developed system of naming in which, for example, first names and surnames, together with terms associated with professions and kinship, are all used in specific ways to imply particular kinds of social interaction and varying degrees of interrelationships" (Aitsiselmi, 2004). Usually, a borrowing fills in a lexical gap when we do not have an Urdu equivalent. However, some of the borrowings found in this category have Urdu equivalents available such as **Miss, Mrs., Sir.** We have Urdu words ***Muhtarama*** and ***Janaabah*** for females and ***Muhtaram*** and ***Janaab*** respectively for males. But, in *Taleem-o-Tarbiat* instead of Urdu words their English equivalents are preferred.

It is significant that *Taleem-o-Tarbiat* is one of those Pakistani children's Urdu magazines that make (overt or covert) claims to promote Urdu; use stylized Urdu; and generally opt for difficult Urdu vocabulary of formal written discourse. The total instances of borrowing in *Taleem-o-Tarbiat* are shown in the following table:

Table no. 2. Total instances of borrowing in ***Taleem-o-Tarbiat*** , January (2010)

Names/Titles/ designations/Occupations	**Edibles**	**Measurements**	**General**	**General**	**General**
Admiral [1]	Burger [1]	Foot [2]	Arts Group [1]	Master plan [2]	Sector [6]
Assistant Director [1]	Cake [1]	Kilogram [1]	Bacteria [6]	(*Bijli* ka meter) [3]	Sectron[1]
Commissioner [1]	Calcium [1]	Kilometer [8]	Blackout [1]	Model (N)(of car) [1]	Session [1]
Driver[2]	Chips1	Inch [3]	Board [1]	Motor cycle [10]	Station [5]
Doctor [8]	Chocolate [1]	Liter [2]	Bulb[2]	Motor-cycl*on*[1]	Steering [1]
Engineer [1]	Ice-cream [6]	Meter [3]	Century (cricket)[1]	Muffler [1]	Stop [1]
Emergency ward [5]		Minute[7]	Camera [3]	Notebook [1]	Studio [2]
Commander [1]		Ounce [18]	Cartoon[1]	Notes [1]	Sweater [1]
Embassy road [1]		Pound	Cassette[3]	Novel [1]	Switch [1]
Field marshal [1]		Second [2]	Century	Number [8]	Team[2]
Furniture House [11]		Passport size [1]	Coat[1]	Package [1]	Telephone [1]
General ward[1]			College [1]	Park [3]	Television station[1]
General Haspataal [3]			Copy [1]	Phone [4]	Test cricket[1]
Gymnastic[1]			Cricket[1]	Plastic [1]	Test match[1]
Headmistress[1]			Cycle [4]	Plate [1]	Ticket[2]
Inspector[23]			Design [1]	Police team [1]	Tyre [1]
Miss[9]			Double century [18]	Powder [1]	Torch[1]
Mrs.[1]			File, Filain, Filon [4]	Principal [1]	Tube light*ain*[4]
National Bank of Pakistan			Firing [1]	Program [3]	Truck [1]

[1]					
Muslim Commercial Bank [1]			Footpath [1]	Puncture *ho jay*[1]	Tuition [24]
Naval headquarter[1]			Form[1]	Quarter Quartr*on*[4]	Tuition center[2]
NGO [1]			Frame[1]	Race [8]	Tuition class [1]
Open University [1]			Fees[5]	Receiver [2]	TV 2
Pilot [4]			Furniture [11]	Recording [1]	TV channel [3]
Police[9]			Gate [1]	Record *kurnay kay liay* [3]	Vice chancellor [1]
Police station[1]			Glass [1]	Remote control [1]	Ward boy[3]
Radio station[1]			Heater [2]	Result card [2]	
Railway station [1]			Hotel [1]	School [13]	
Rome Olympic [1]			Lecture [1]	Science encyclopedi [1]	
Secretariat block [1]			Lift (Noun) [1]	Science [1]	
Secretary general [1]			MA [1]	Seat [4]	
Sir [1]					
SP [1]					
Supreme court [1]					
The jungle [3]					
Test cricketer [1]					
World Champion [1]					

Many examples of compound words and phrases are also found that are used as titles or names of companies and organizations. For example General Hospital, Furniture House, General Ward, World, Champion, The Jungle, National Bank of Pakistan, Muslim Commercial Bank. Conversely, there were a few examples where the head noun is in Urdu such as *Hamdard* Foundation and *Hamdard* Centre (*Hamdard Naunehal),* which again are the names of organizations that cannot be changed for linguistic purposes. In the Pakistani

context, the coinage of names or titles of organizations, firms, products etc. in English or a mixed code holds significance. "The identity that the founders, holders or owners of an organization or firm, or the manufacturers of a product want to attach to it, is reflected through the choice of name or title" (Rasul: 2009, p. 216). Since in Pakistan, English is associated with modernity, it is considered that a name or title of an organization or firm in English suggests connotations of being more modern, and up-to-date.

In the subcategory of Edibles in *Taleem-o-Tarbiat*, the words used are **burger, calcium, ice cream, chips** and **chocolate**. None of these words but ice cream has an Urdu equivalent. Even the Urdu equivalent *of ice cream '**Kulfi**'* is considered less preferable because the connotations of ***kulfi*** are limited to only one specific traditional flavor of ice cream. In *Hamdard Naunehal,* no instances of borrowing in Edibles were observed.

In the subcategory of 'Measurements', in both the magazines, words like **Kilogram, kilometer, inch, centimeter, Liter, Pound, second** etc. are used; and they do not have Urdu equivalents. This is also an instance of using the specific terminology in English language that has become so much a part of the language usage of common people that no need is felt to create words/ terms in their native language is this regard.

In the 'General' subcategory all those instances are placed that do not fit into the other specific subcategories. Thus, most of the instances of borrowing fall under this subcategory. The single word examples like **Bulb, design, plate, File, Package, Gate, Number, Piano, Film**, and **Clip** are all nouns that are found in *Taleem-o-Tarbiat*. All these words are commonly used in Urdu language whether consciously or unconsciously. In *Taleem-o-Tarbiat ,* there are a few examples where the borrowed word has become a part of the Urdu language with a little difference in pronunciation such as , /Progrœm/ (English) and /Progra:m/ (Urdu); /To:rch/ (English) and /Ta:rch/ (Urdu); /Mo:del/ (English) and /Ma:del/ (Urdu); Fo:rm (English) and /Fa:rm/ (Urdu). The use of such assimilated borrowings is very common in Urdu. Moreover, there are also some instances where the root word is in English whereas the inflections are taken from Urdu to assimilate the borrowing such as in the data of *Taleem-o-Tarbiat* instances are found of the use of **Sectr*on*** (the plural of sector), **Motor-cycl*on*** (the plural of motor-cyles), **Filain/ Filon** (the plurals of file), and **Tube-light*ain*** (the plural of tube-light). Interestingly the plural English equivalents are available in English but hybridized

forms with Urdu inflections are preferred. Examples of the same kind are also found in the data of *Hamdard Naunehal such as* **Engineer*on*** and **Glass*on*[2].**

At this point it is important to mention that as already discussed in the literature review section, the boundary between borrowing and code mixing is very blurred. All the above given examples of addition of Urdu inflections/ plural markers to English roots are placed in this research under the head of borrowing because the roots of all such instances that are found in the data are of such English words that do not have commonly used Urdu equivalents (a criterion to distinguish borrowings from code mixing in this research). However, the same process of creating hybrids can be found in cases where an English root word has a commonly and frequently used Urdu equivalent available. In that case, it would fall under the main head of code mixing, not borrowing. However, since the boundaries of borrowing and code mixing are not neatly defined sometimes researchers loosely use the term code mixing as an all embracing term to cover both the types. In this regard Rasul (2009) uses the term code mixing to refer to both the types of hybridization within words; and asserts that most of the instances of hybridization within word are created by adding plural suffixes of Urdu to singular nouns of English. She further adds, "we can frequently observe hybridization of English noun + Urdu suffix in Urdu-English code mixing in everyday life for instance **student*on*** (students), **shopkeeper*on*** (shopkeepers), **tyr*on*** (tyres), **bus*on*** (buses), and **flower*on*** (flowers) etc. are a few more examples; and, the list of such hybrids is exhaustive". It is to be notices that Rasul (2009) presents the data containing English roots **student, shopkeeper** and **flower** that have frequently used Urdu equivalents ***taalib-ilm, dukaandaar*** and ***phool*** with the data containing English roots **Tyre** and **Bus** that do not have Urdu equivalents.

However, the use of such hybrids is not restricted to Urdu; rather Girish (2005) cites such examples from Malayalam/English mixing in India in which English noun and Malayalam suffix are used:

Shop + kaaran **(Shopkeeper - male singular)**
Shop + kaari (Shopkeeper - Female Singular)
Shop + kaar (Shop keepers - Common plural)

In the Pakistani backdrop this type of hybrids has a very "limited scope and low social prestige attached" to them (Rasul, 2009: p.167). However, it is significant in the context of the current research that despite all the claims to

[2] All the transcription rules including the rules to indicate the plural markers such as **Engineer*on*** and **Sectr*on*** are followed as used by Rasul 2009.

employ standard and formalized Urdu, these children's magazines have used such hybrids whereas according to Rasul (2009: p.166), "the use of hybridized plurals is comparatively less approved of socially; and generally on the grade of social prestige and approval attached to language use it falls on a lower level".

Moreover, in the data of the current research collected from *Taleem-o-Tarbiat* there are also examples of verb hybridization '**record *kurnay kay liye'*** and '**Puncture *ho jay'***. Again the verbs in these hybridized forms are taken from English; and they are borrowed items as they do not have prevalent Urdu substitutes. In Urdu, the substitutes of several English main verbs take additional auxiliaries, thus resulting in "the production of compound verbs for instance, **feel** (*mehsūs kurnā*) and **train** (*tarbiat daynā)* etc." (Rasul, 2009: p.192). Both the examples found in the data of the current research are of compound verbs. However, apart from this type, conjunct verbs are also created in Urdu by taking a noun from English and turning it into a verb by adding auxiliary from Urdu for instance **acting *kurna*** (to perform acting), though no example is found in the data of the present research.

Presentation and Analysis of the Data of Category 2- Code-mixing

Code-mixing, in these magazines, provides interesting observations. As it has already been mentioned, code mixed items are those for which the embedding language has equivalents; however, as a social practice or for convenience linguistic items from the other language are mixed. As far as the mixing of English in Pakistani children's Urdu magazines is concerned, the instances of mixing of single words as well as phrases are found. Some examples of mixing of single words with their Urdu equivalents are given below:

> **Accident** (*Haaidsa),* **Advance** (*Payshgi),* **Airport** (*Hawai-adah),* **Auntie** (*Khala, phopho, chachi, mumaani etc.),* **Bag** (*Thayla, boura),* **Compartment** (*Dibah, bogi),* **Coupon** (*Prchi),* **Degree** (*Sanad),* **Fashion** (*Rwaaj),* **Injection** (*Teekah),* **Library** (*Kutab- khana),***Lunch** (*Zuhrana),* **Order** (*Hukm),* **Modern** (*Jadid),* **Mood** (*Mizaaj),* **Teacher** (*Ustaad),* **Train** (*Rail-gari),* **Transfer** (*Tabdili),* **University** (*Jaamia),* **Plate** (*Thaali, rkabi),* **Result** (*Natijah).*

The word "coupon" occurred with the highest frequency as it occurred 9th times in the data of *Hamdard Naunehal*. While in *Taleem-o-Tarbiat* "part" is the word with highest frequency as it occurred 11th times in the data. The total

instances of code-mixing of single lexical items in *Hamdard Naunehal* are shown in the following table:

Table no. 3. Total Instances of code-mixed words in ***Hamdard Naunehal***, (January 2010)

Code mixed Words	Equivalent	Code mixed Words	Equivalent
Canteen [1]	*Dukaan*	**Mission** [1]	*Maqsad*
Car [4]	*Gari*	**Papers** [1]	*Prchay*
Checkup [2]	*Muaainah*	**Party** [1]	*Daawat*
Chemicals [3]	*Kimyaai maaday*	**Perfume**[1]	*Itar, khushbu*
Class [2]	*Jmaat*	**Position**[1]	*Drjaah*
Coupon [9]	*Prchi*	**Operation** (Noun) [3]	*Jaraahi,*
Currency [1]	*Sikkah raij-ul-waqt*	**Miss** (In the context it means teacher)[1]	*Ustani*
Degree [1]	*Sanad*	**Library**[1]	*Kutab-khana*
Depression [4]	*Udaasi, yaasiyat*	**Regular**[1]	*Mustaqil*
Discipline [1]	*Nazm-o-zabt*	**Result**[2]	*Natijaah*
Duty [2]	*Zimaah, farz*	**Road**[3]	*Sarak*
Emergency [1]	*Hungaami haalat*	**Second** [1]	*Doum*
Fashionable [1]	*Khush-posh*	**Sir** [2]	*Janaab*
Hormones [1]	*Gudood*	**Sociology** [1]	*Samaajiat, muashriyat*
Infection [1]	*Choot, waba*	**Society** [1]	*Muashrah*
Guard of honor [1]	*Salami*	**Surgeon** [1]	*Jaraah*
Kitchen [1]	*baawrchikhanah*	**Sweet dish**[1]	*Mithah*
Late [1]	*Dayr*	**Test**[1]	*Imtihaan*
Leader[2]	*Rahnuma*	**Ticket**[3]	*Prchi*
Train [3]	*Rail gari*	**Time**[1]	*Waqt*
Tumor [3]	*Gilti*	**Uncle**[1]	*Chacha, taya, phopha, maamu etc.*

A few code-mixed compounds and phrases are also observed in the data of *Hamdard Naunehal*. These are shown in the following table:

Table no. 4. Total Instances of code mixed compounds and phrases in ***Hamdard Naunehal***, (January 2010)

Code mixed compounds and phrases	**Equivalent**
Businessman	*Taajir*
Membership card	*Rukniyat ka* card
Mango ice-cream	*Aam ki qulfi*
Private student	*Infraadi taalib-e-ilm*

There are a few code-mixed hybridized compounds and phrases in the data of *Hamdard Naunehal*. These are shown in the following table:

Table no. 5. Total instances of code mixed hybridized compounds and noun phrases in ***Hamdard Naunehal*** (January 2010)

Code mixed hybridized compounds and noun phrases	**Equivalent**
Javed And Company (Note: In context it means what the Urdu equivalent connotes)	*Javed aur uskay saathi*
Mukhtalif Size	*Mukhtalif naap*
Rangeen title	*Rangeen sar-e-warq*
Khubsurat getup	*Khubsurat waza*

Likewise, a few code-mixed verb-hybridized compounds and phrases are observed in the data of *Hamdard Naunehal*. These are shown in the following table:

Table no. 6. Total instances of code mixed verb-hybridized compounds and phrases in ***Hamdard Naunehal***, (January 2010)

Code mixed verb-hybridized compounds and phrases	**Equivalent**
Practice *kur ruhay hain*	*Mushq kur ruhay hain*
Operation *kur dia*	*Jaraahi kur di*

Prasad (2008: p.242) considers code mixing as "linguistic cocktail" which involves "a few words of one language and a few from others, and again a few words from the former and a few from the latter and so on, mix up" and such "changes generally takes place more or less randomly". In *Taleem-o-Tarbiat*, total forty four code mixed words have been used. In the category of code mixed words, mostly those words are used that are part of daily routine conversation. As stories in children's magazines are mostly based on daily routine life's events and situations, therefore, mostly the words are used that are related to the routine conversation. Words such as **Fashionable, Auntie, Car, Cheating** (Noun)**, Cousin, Teacher, Library, Market, School, Diary, Accident,, Airport, Bag, Bed, Bedroom, Box, Cabin, Canteen, Case, , Checkup, Class, Compartment, Coupon, Currency, Degree, , Fashion, , Injection, Inter, Kick, , Modern, Mood, Plan, Party, Train, Result, Perfume, , Order, Transfer, University, Plate, Point**, all are part of routine conversation in the Pakistani context. Although their Urdu equivalents do exist, still they are preferred and used so frequently that now they have become part of daily Urdu conversation. It is found that in terms of code mixing of single lexical items all the mixed items are nouns.

According to Treffers-Daller (1993: p.243) code-mixing can be defined as "the interaction between the grammars and the lexicons of two languages", while borrowing as "the interaction of the grammar and the lexicon of language A with only the lexicon of language B". In *Taleem-o-Tarbiat*, an instance of code-mixing on a word level is also found as a word 'partion' is used that is the anglicized plural version of the English word 'party'. Here the plural Urdu marker is added to create a code mixed item.

In the data of *Taleem-o-Tarbiat* , code mixed compounds and phrases are also found. There, total number of such occurrences is thirteen. Some of them are instances of code mixing of English compounds or noun phrases, while others are the instances of Urdu-English hybridization at compound or phrase level. For example: **main *bazaar*, *taamiraati* firm, new year night *ki* party, private *idarah*** are the examples of Urdu-English hybridization. The remaining compounds and noun phrases are those in which the phrases are formed by two or more English words. For example: **gold medal, , music show, new year night, new year party, new year night party, office building, business-man, coaching centre**, and **happy new year night**. The total instances of code-mixing of single lexical items in *Taleem-o-Tarbiat* are shown in the following table:

Table no. 7. Total Instances of code-mixed words in ***Taleem-o-Tarbiat*** (January 2010)

Code mixed Words	**Equivalent**	**Code mixed Words**	**Equivalent**
Accident [1]	*Haaidsa*	**Fashionable** [1]	*Khush-posh*
Advance [3]	*Payshgi*	**Injection** [2]	*Teekah*
Airport [1]	*Hawai-adah*	**Inter** [2]	*Baarhwin*
Auntie [1]	*Khala, phopho, chachi, mumaani etc.*	**Kick** [1]	*Thokar*
Bag [9]	*Thayla, boura*	**Library** [1]	*Kutab-khana*
Bed [1]	*Bistar*	**Lunch** [1]	*Zuhrana*
Bedroom [1]	*Khwabgah*	**Market** [2]	*Bazaar*
Box [1]	*Dibah*	**Order** [1]	*Hukm*
Cabin [5]	*Hujra, kamrah*	**Modern** [2]	*Jadid*
Canteen [3]	*Dukaan*	**Mood** [1]	*Mizaaj*
Car [3]	*Gaari*	**Plan** [1]	*Munsubaah*
Case [7]	*Muqadmaah*	**Party** [11]	*Daawat*
Cheating [1]	*Dhokaah, naqal*	**Teacher** [9]	*Ustaad*
Checkup [1]	*Muaainah*	**Train** [8]	*Rail-gari*
Class [2]	*Jmaat*	**Transfer**[1]	*Tabdili*
Compartment [2]	*Dibah, bogi*	**University** [3]	*Jaamia*
Coupon [1]	*Prchi*	**Plate**[1]	*Thaali, rkabi,*
Currency [10]	*Sikkaah raij-ul-waqt*	**Point** [1]	*Muqaam*
Cousin [1]	*Khalazaad, maamuzaad etc.*	**Result** [1]	*Natijah*
Degree [1]	*Sanad*	**Perfume**[1]	*Itar, Khushbu*
Diary [14]	*Roznaamchah*	**School 1**[3]	*Mudrisah*
Fashion [1]	*Rwaaj*	**Part*ion***[1]	*Daawaton*

A few code-mixed compounds and phrases are also observed in the data of *Taleem-o-Tarbiat*. These are shown in the following table:

Table no. 8. Total instances of code mixed compounds and phrases in ***Taleem-o-Tarbiat*** (January 2010)

Code mixed compounds and phrases	**Equivalent**
Gold medal	*Talai tamgah*
Music show	*Mehfil-e- mousiqi*
New year night	*Saal-e-nou ki raat*
New Year Party	*Jashn-e-saal-e-nou*
New year night party	*Saal-e-nou ki raat ka jashan*
Office building	*Daftar ki amaarat*
Business-man	*Tajir*
Coaching centre	*Tarbiyati mrkaz*
Happy new year night	*Shab-e-saal-e-nou mubaarik*

The data of *Taleem-o-Tarbiat* shows a few code-mixed hybridized compounds and phrases. These are shown in the following table:

Table no. 9. Total instances of code mixed hybridized compounds and noun phrases in ***Taleem-o-Tarbiat*** (January 2010)

Code mixed hybridized compounds and noun Phrases	**Equivalent**
Main bazaar	*Sadar bazaar*
Taamiraati Firm	*Idaraah*
New year night (ki) party	*Saal-e-nou ki raat ka jashan*
Private *idarah*	*Niji idarah*

There are a few instances of code-mixed verb-hybridized compounds and phrases in the data of *Taleem-o-Tarbiat*. These are shown in the following table:

Table no. 10. Total instances of code mixed verb-hybridized compounds and phrases in ***Taleem-o-Tarbiat*** (January 2010)

Code mixed verb-hybridized Compounds and Phrases	**Equivalent**
Fail *ho gia*	*Naakaam*
Filter *kurta hai*	*Saaf kurta hai*
Note *kur ruha tha*	*Likh ruha tha*
Join *kur lia*	*Dakhil ho gia*
Start *kur di*	*Chla di*
Shift *kur dain gaey*	*Muntakil kur dain gaey*

There are a few instances of verb hybridization in the data too. The data reveals verb hybridized phrases such as, '**fail *ho gia*', 'filter *kurta hai*', 'note *kur ruha tha*', '*join kur lia*', 'start *kur di*' and 'shift *kur dain gaey*'**. It is interesting to note that the main or head verb is in English which is followed by the phrase which is in Urdu.

In the data of *Taleem-o-Tarbiat* , a few compounds and noun phrases are found which could not be fixed into any of the devised categories. These phrases are, '***saylaabi* camp'** and '**copy size *kaagaz*'**. In these instances, 'camp' and 'copy size' are borrowed from English, and do not have equivalents in Urdu.

In the other magazine *Hamdard Naunehal*, forty two instances of code mixed noun words are found. All these words are used frequently in mundane conversation. The word like '**uncle**' is used on regular basis as an equivalent of *Chacha, taya, phopha, maamu* etc. This word may be used due to its easy availability as it caters for multiple meanings in Urdu. It is also an example of fast contemporary life style in which those words are used and preferred that generate multiple meanings in a single instance. Similarly, **Fashionable, Car, Kitchen, Party, Operation, Society, Test, Time** have replaced their Urdu equivalents due to their frequent usage. Sometimes both the English and Urdu equivalents are used; the purpose of this repetition is desire for elucidation. For example in the data of *Hamdard Naunehal* following instance is found:

- *Muashra ya* society *ya samaaj* …

Alam (1996: p.79) asserts, "most of the lexical switches are connected with the noun, verb and adjective". The devices used for this purpose are mostly Urdu/English modifier + Urdu/English headword+ Urdu/English qualifier (p.80). Some examples of Urdu English hybridization given by Alam (1996: p.80) are 'shaandaar pageant', 'seyaah hood', 'himaaqat zada cookery book', 'nafees sa lecture', 'nafees impression', 'marmareeN porch', 'kaam ka overcoat' and 'nafsayaati complex'. Alam suggests, "English modifiers are attached to Urdu headwords (English+Urdu)" and few such examples are: 'French cut darhi', 'immature dimagh', 'adventures ki kahaaniyaN', 'indoor qism ke mashgale', 'typical qism ka shauhar' etc (1996: p.80). Likewise, eight instances of code mixed compounds and noun phrases are found in the data of *Hamdard Naunehal*, such as **Businessman, Membership card, Mango ice-cream** and **Private student.** Examples of hybridized noun phrases from *Hamdard Naunehal* are ***mukhtalif* size, *rangeen* title, *khubsurat* getup** etc.

As far as hybridized verb phrases are concerned, two instances of code-mixing are observed. These verb phrases are, '**practice *kur ruhay hain*'** and '**operation *kur dia*'**. It is interesting to note that for these English verbs 'practice' and 'operation', Urdu equivalents are available as '*mushq*' and '*jarahi*' respectively, but English verbs are used to create verb-hybridization.

In the data of *Hamdard Naunehal*, also a few instances are found that could not be fixed into any of the devised categories. For example, in the phrases, '***misri* pound'** and '***soudaani* pound'**, 'pound' is an English borrowed word which is used as-it-is in Urdu language and has no Urdu equivalent. Likewise, in '***shanaakhti* card'** and '***Eid* card'**, 'card' is a borrowed word and is used frequently in Urdu that is hybridized with Urdu words here.

The data of *Taleem-o-Tarbiat* and *Hamdard Naunehal* reveals the instances of code-mixing and borrowing in Pakistani Urdu children's magazines. It also shows the variety of instances of code-mixing and lexical insertions on deep structural level. The code-mixing has been observed in single lexical items as well as in compound noun and verb phrases. The instances of Urdu-English hybridization have also been found.

Conclusion

The phenomenon of code-mixing and borrowing is part and parcel of a bilingual society which enables bilingual speakers to converse conveniently. To differentiate the process of code-mixing and borrowing, Fernando (2003: p.8)

states, "code mixing is not a permanent borrowing or a part of the lexicon, but is used spontaneously, and depends on meaningful juxtaposition of two distinct grammatical systems. Code mixing is limited to single words or idiomatic phrases". On the other hand, borrowing is simply the copying of the words from the target language and using them in their original forms.

Code mixing occurs when a bilingual speaker fails to converse comprehensibly in one language. Sometimes code mixing of a word occurs because it is shorter and thus requires less linguistic effort. As media is a mirror of any society, therefore it reflects back the contemporary literary practices and rituals. Likewise, print media also replicates the existing literary traditions and produces the literature in such a way that it becomes acceptable for its readers. The data for this research has been taken from the two children's magazines. In children's magazines, the simplest words and vocabulary is used so that the young readers may grab them easily. The instances of code-mixing and borrowing are found in these selected magazines; and English words or phrases are used instead of their Urdu equivalents. English language has penetrated so much in Pakistani society that it has more or less gained the place of national language. Prestige factor attached to English forces its users to incorporate it in speaking as well as in writing. It is noticed that in these magazines English words are used that belong to the simple vocabulary and are prevalent in every day language uses in Pakistani society. These words as well as phrases have been used in the magazines for convenience and to convey the ideas more easily. All of the discussed reasons are true and applicable in spoken situations and in non-formal writing. But, formal writing in a children's magazine provides a model for the young learners. Therefore, in these magazines the usage of code-mixing is indicative of the changing literary traditions in Pakistan.

The study reveals that frequent borrowing and code-mixing of English occurs in Pakistani children's magazines that claim to promote Urdu language. It shows the existing literary practices in Pakistan in which no form of media can escape the effects of penetration of English and globalization. English language has so much protruded in Urdu that sometimes it becomes difficult to distinguish between the Urdu and English lexical items as they are frequently used interchangeably.

The research raises a few questions for its intended readers to be pondered over. Using very bookish and proper Urdu interspersed with heavy borrowing and code mixing in the children's magazines that are associated with the middle-middle social class who are not identified with English and the power of English,

leaves one with certain questions to think about. It is difficult to say with certainty whether the use of code mixing and borrowing in these magazines is an over sight or is it caused due to the lack of awareness about code mixing. The confusion persists whether it is an unconscious or conscious substitution. It also raises the question how far this code-mixing adds to the richness of Urdu or affects is beauty; and what implications does it have with reference to the issues of globalization and Identity.

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Abul Hashim: The Unsung Hero of the Freedom Movement

By Asma Zia Ullah

Introduction:

A charismatic leader as expressed in Weberian term is the one who combines passion and reason, emotionalism and pragmatism, idealism and realism in such a balanced proportion that the masses feel compelled to take his lead. Whether through stroke of fortune or by the uncontrollable unraveling of circumtances, a charismatic leader answers the call of destiny and rises to the occasion. Abul Hashim was one such leader, he emerged as one of the leading giants of Bengali Muslims alongside Fazul Haq and Suhrawardy, who worked tirelessly and whole-heartedly to improve the lot of the common Bengalis, aiming to set them free from the stranglehold of Hindu zamindars and industrialists. Born in an age when British imperialism had reached its zenith, unleashing in its wave the horrors of capitalism, this free spirited and independent minded man sought to free the society from the ravages of capitalism and religious fanaticism and establish a more humane society based on Islamic socialism. He chose Muslim League as a platform for the realization of a just and egalitarian society. His struggle towards this end was sabotaged by the vested and parochial interests of non-Bengali, pro-Punjabi politicians.

Hypothesis

This paper will trace down the political career and the philosophical cum religious outlook of Abul Hashim, how this outlook influenced his political strategy vis-à-vis the stakeholders of Bengal politics. It will seek to explore and analyze the key question whether the failure of his strategy be ascribed to the intrigues of non-Bengali elements or to the larger uncontrollable and fast changing dynamics of Indian political scenario, or was his strategy, like the strategies of all great men, far too ahead of his time? Max Weber extrapolates that "charismatic leaders emerge during "societal distress" and are under constant pressure to prove themselves because their charisma arises from their personality and ability to deliver the goods. Was Abul Hashim one such leader? This paper will also highlight the excruciating circumstances prevailing in Bengal, which made its

socio-economic problems distinct from the rest of Muslim provinces in India, since charismatic figures are here being taken as "intelligent, innovative, persuasive, and magnetic leaders who emerge in situations where people are economically, socially, and politically oppressed".[1]Hashim's ingenious objection to the Lahore resolution and last moment efforts for an independent greater Bengal, which later developments proved, were not without logic and deeper understanding of Bengal politics, sadly though, all such attempts were misconstrued as anti-state and anti-Islam. The central establishment, dominated by the feudal landlords and industrialists mainly from Punjab failed to read into the deep seated fears of Bengalis which were firmly grounded in the history of economic exploitation. But history held him out, an independent Bengal was the dream of Abul Hashim and an independent Bengal was what the world eventually saw.

Background

Bengals political struggle for independence was firmly embedded in its economic dynamics. The fact that 90 per cent zamindars and 99 percent of money lenders in Bengal were Hindus and their consequent hold over resources cannot be easily repudiated, in kamruddin Ahmed estimation it was "really a class struggle, which was converted into communal rivalry".[2] The only respite was during the Muslim leagues ministry 1937-41 which infused confidence in the Bengali Muslim leaders and business community. The Muslim youth got more chance to enter government posts which were hitherto closed for them. It was this "competition between the Hindu and Muslim middle class"[3] which provided the key to the rise of Muslim league and the popular support behind the creation of a separate state.

Secondly, the political landscape of India underwent a drastic change, particularly at the provincial level, after the elections of 1937; Muslim provincial leadership realized the futility of separate electorates and all other constitutional safeguards. "The stark reality of near total political powerlessness"…"Majoritarianism of arithmetical numbers"[4] dawned upon them. So accurately pinpointed by Fazul Haq that "their number (80million) might sound a big number but was not in

[1] Common Threads among Different Forms of Charismatic Leadership" *in International Journal of Business and Social Science.* Vol. 2 No. 9 [Special Issue - May 2011]

[2] Anwar Dil and Afia Dil, *Bengali Language Movement to Bangladesh***.** (Lahore: Ferozsons Intercultural Forum, 2000), 54

[3] *Ibid*., 54

[4] Jaswant Singh, *Jinnah: India-Partition Independence*, (New Delhi: Rupa Publications, India, 2010), 232

"effective majority" [5] even in Punjab and Bengal where, too, the position of Muslims was not safe. Moreover, they wanted economic liberty which was only possible in a state where they exercised complete control over their resources. Political autonomy naturally preceded economic independence, in fact, Fazul Haq fell over with Jinnah over this issue that "Muslim league High Command" had reduced the provincial autonomy and had made it impossible for him to function effectively as Chief Minister of Bengal" [6]

It was in light of these two factors that Bengali Muslims joined the rest of India in their support of Muslim league and Jinnah. Little did they know that their rightful claims and their rightful leaders would be so callously denied and crushed that within a decade another freedom struggle would take birth.

Abul Hashim's political creed

Abul Hashim's political strategy, his response to the Lahore resolution, reorganization of BPML[7] and goals must all be seen in the light of his philosophical outlook towards life in general and the interrelationship between religion and politics. In this context, he was influenced by his father, who like Jinnah was the product of middle class intelligentsia, which breathed in the moderate, on-communal anti-imperialist outlook of Congress in the early 20th century.Hashim was a gifted orator who hated the British imperialism and did not believe in the Two-nation Theory, he was an exponent of the "multinationalism" which meant that India was a sub-continent comprising various nations each having its own racial, linguistic, cultural and religious identity. "To me", he wrote, "India coveys the same sense as the term Europe does".[8]

His political philosophy was based on the idea of nationalism, regionalism, lingualism and socialism. He was a socialist of a different brand i.e. Islamic Socialism, called Rabbaniyat, meaning the social order prescribed in Islam.[9] That was the reason he so vehemently opposed the zamindari system and made its abolishment the focal central point of all his manifestos.

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[5] Anwar Dil and Afia Dil, *Bengali Language Movement to Bangladesh*, 55

[6] *Ibid.,* 60

[8] Rana Razzaque, *Abul Hashim as a political thinker,* http://www.asiaticsociety.org.bd/journals/vol%2052/ABUL%20HASHIM%20AS%20A%20POLITICAL%20THINKER.html (7/26/2012)

[9] *Ibid*

Entry into politics

Abul Hashim can easily be classified as the sole politician who was responsible for making Muslim league a mass party with more than a million registered members, his extraordinary organizing and rhetorical skills were matched by his high intellect and humanistic attitude, above all, he was an "enlightened Islamic scholar" and a "visionary thinker"[10]

He was born in a distinguished family of Burdwan, his father Abul Qasim was a member of the Congress and had a non-communal outlook towards politics, from his mother's side he was related to Hussein Shaheed Suhrawardy.His father had been an ardent supporter of Surendranath Banerjee (1848-1925) and had taken part in the anti-partition movement. Muslim support for the Swadeshi movement in Bengal was a rare incident. He had also taken part in the Khilafat- Non-cooperation movement (1919-1922) in its early stage under the leadership of Gandhi during the Khilafat Movement (1918-1922). Abul Kasem never supported separatist politics. A tendency his son also inherited.

Abul Hashim took his degree in Law from Calcutta University. His formal entry into politics began in 1936 with his election to the Bengal legislative Assembly. In 1937 Jinnah met him at Ispahani's house and Hashim, in his autobiography narrates that when Jinnah said " Come, let us organize ourselves in such a way that we could oust the opportunists in Bengal and Punjab in 24 hours, Hashim thought he was speaking of Khawaja Nazimuddin and Sir Sikandar Hayat and the other landed gentry. He was disillusioned. He had pinned great hope on the leadership of Jinnah and struggled tirelessly to win mass support for Pakistan. But all his hopes were dashed.

Political ascendancy/Secretary General

Harun-ur-Rashid extols Abul Hashim's contribution to Muslim League in these words "The election of Abul Hashim to the Secretary ship of Bengal Muslim League marked the beginning of a new era in its history."[11]

Hashim's rise to political ascendancy was facilitated by a number of factors. In the wake of World War II, Fazul Haq had alienated himself from Jinnah and remained Jinnah's "worst personal problem"[12] Muslim league and due to Surawardy's mass campaign movement, demonstrations against Fazul Haq had

[10] Anwar Dil and Afia Dil, *Bengali Language Movement to Bangladesh***.** 285

[11] Harun ur Rashid, *The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh*, (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh,1987). 160.

[12] Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, (Karachi:Oxford University Press, 2005).216.

become common. The formation of Suhrawardy's ministry in 1942 provided a launching pad for Abul Hashim to spread the power base of league through the length and breadth of Bengal. The Bengal famine, which brought grievances of the poor and the famished to its peak, resulted in people losing faith in the traditional centers of authority and turning towards Muslim league in flocks. Moreover the ousting of Chandra Bose from Congress also left a political vacuum in Bengal.Hashim's brilliant organizational and administrative skills soon turned the moribund Muslim League into a mass party of the Bengali Muslims. On November 7, 1943 when Suhrawardy became the CM of Bengal, Abul Hashim was elected the Secretary General of Bengal provincial Muslim league by defeating Abul Qasim, the nominee of Khawaja group. The seeds of rivalry were beginning to be sown. Under the leadership of the Hashim and Suhrawardy "the BPML turned its attention towards organizational and policy matters."[13]
His personal courage and insight into politics became apparent when in his inaugural speech as General Secretary of Muslim League he observed that League was "thrice mortgaged firstly to Ahsan Manzil, meaning Nawab of Dhaka, secondly to Maulana Akram Khan's for its media campaign through his newspaper Azad and thirdly for its economy to Ispahani.He vowed that Muslim League would be "freed from three centers of vested interests."[14] In Retrospection, he writes that "Nine members of the Dhaka Nawab family were in the BPML. Hashim also observed in his memoirs, that Khwaja Shahabuddin was very good at adopting Machiavellian means when needed. Hashim was puzzled at times to see their political maneuverings.[15]
Hashim's son, Badruddin Umar also observed that Suhrawardy was equally Machiavellian like the Khwajas and all of them were power seekers.[16]

His most outstanding contribution was that he freed Muslim league from the coterie of landlords and industrialists and Islamic orthodox-the so called Nawabs of Dhaka, Nazimuddin, Ispahani and Maulana Mohammad Akram khan. He made

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[13] *Ibid*.,160.
[14] Kamruddin Ahmad, *A Social History of Bengal*, (Dhaka:Progoti Publishers, 1970). 61.
[15] Abul Hashim, *In Retrospection*, p. 38.as cited in Rana Razzaque*, Abul Hashim as a political thinker,*
http://www.asiaticsociety.org.bd/journals/vol%2052/ABUL%20HASHIM%20AS%20A%20POLITICAL%20THINKER.html
[16] Rana Razzaque, Interview with Badruddin Umar, Dhaka, October 29, 1995.
http://www.asiaticsociety.org.bd/journals/vol%2052/ABUL%20HASHIM%20AS%20A%20POLITICAL%20THINKER.htmls (28/7/2012)

league "a party of common man"[17]. His commitment to the peasantry and his socialist leanings were not a secret and he openly preached Islamic Socialism in all his meetings. He wanted to "liberate the peasantry from the rusty shackles of permanent settlement." [18]

At the time of the Bengal famine (1943) he again reached out to help his fellow brethrens, not only did he tried to provide for the needs of the famished population of Bengal, but also gave them hope for the future by giving them a promise of social and economic equality. It was in this period of "social distress" that he emerged as a magnetic, charismatic leader of the masses. He made the League a voice of the poor and underprivileged. It was his aim to alleviate poverty from Bengal and free the society from the evils of feudal system, for that purpose, he wanted to empower the lower strata of society and reverse the power-flow from bottom to top. Single-handedly he increased the membership of BPML so that it numbered more than the total membership of League in the rest of India. His extraordinary organizational skills resulted in a crushing defeat of Nawab family in Dhaka district Muslim league elections of 1944.He like Gandhi brought politics out of the drawing rooms to the doors of the poor and downtrodden. By 1945, ten lakh one million Muslim leaguers were enrolled in Bengal, the leftists and communist elements also aligned themselves with the league.

Steps taken to revive the Muslim league:

On taking over the BPML, Hashim saw three main stumbling blocks to league's popularity, lack of infrastructure, lack of funds and lack of democratization. He devised a three pronged strategy of a) to democratize and decentralize the Muslim league b) to increase its membership and c) to make it a truly mass based party by taking it from the grassroots to the top.

As the Secretary General he got 500,000 receipt books and membership forms printed and established a well manned office called party house at 150 Mugultuli Dhaka in April 1944, right at the front door of Nawab of Dhaka's office. The membership fee was reduced to two annas, result was, in words of Mafidul Haq, Bengal Muslim league became a truly mass supported party.

His vigorous electoral campaign showed the level of his commitment and dedication to the cause of freedom. "Within a period of only two years he was able to open Muslim League branches in 18 districts. Hashim made a tour of

[17] Anwar Dil and Afia Dil, *Bengali language movement to Bangladesh***.** (Lahore:Ferozsons Intercultural Forum, 2000. pg 61.

[18] Harun ur Rashid: *The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh*, (Dhaka:Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1987).171.

Bengal for 45 days, in 1945, and called it a "Long-March for 45 days", which reminds one of Chairman Mao-TseTung's Long March in China. Hashim's methods of organizing the party through direct personal contact with the people, through discussions, bulletins, pamphlets and manifestoes were similar to those of the Communist party."[19] The tons of placards and posters, sent to the mofussils, reflected the anti- zamindari rhetoric "land belongs to the plough", "Down with the vested interests", 'Laborers will be Owners'. "Abolish Zamindari without Compensation", during the election campaign. Abul Hashims newspaper *Millat* "Pakistan would bring emancipation of the 'proletariat' and complete destruction of all kinds of vested interests"…and that abolition of Zamindari would be a minor matter for the league."[20] He strove to organize the league along the Communist-Congress party model. Instead of amateur workers, he organized a "cadre of whole time workers", constituted of college and university educated middle class romantic youths. Students and the promise of a new homeland were his main armory. While electioneering District/Constituency Worker's camps were organized, this played a decisive role in the elections. To the opponents who lamented the loss of one year of studies, he replied: "Lose it, it is worth it." He even took political classes, particularly in "grammar of political warfare". These steps clearly reflected the Russian communist influence, but one can safely say in his defense that the communist and fascist parties in the 20th century had the most organized and disciplined party structures. It was his "organizing ability which was a considerable factor in the success in the 1945 elections."[21]Above all, it was this training which churned out the future leadership of Bengal, Shamsuddin,khondkar Mushtaq Ahmad,Kamruddin Ahmad, Mohammad Toaha and Oli Ahad all looked up to Hashim as their mentor. His opponents criticized him for giving too many high hopes to the youth, but had they given Hashim a chance to implement his plans he would have taken Bengali youth to even greener pastures.

The BPML had no organized fund or any treasury at the time when Hashim took over.. Although Mirza Hasan Ispahani was the treasurer and the "big guns" of the party collected funds, there was no regular system of preparing annual budget or disbursing the bills and making payments at regular times. For the Provincial Assembly elections BML prepared million rupees budget. On refusal of League

[19] Harun-or-Rashid,*The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh*, 166-167.
[20] *Ibid.,222.*
[21] Shaista Surawardy Ikramullah, *Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy*,(Karachi: Oxford University Press,2001).61.

High Command Suhrwardy and Hashim took upon a self claimed mission to raise the funds. Union League was ordered to subscribe a minimum sum of between Rs 250 to 500 towards the provincial Election fund. District ML and sub-committees in towns and business centres were set up for fund raising purposes. Students and youths engaged in fund raising drives. [22] Some 20,000 students from post-graduate level to middle school and junior madrassah campaigned for the League, as proclaimed by the Provincial Parliamentary Board.

The Muslim League had no office in any of the districts of Bengal. Office bearers were elected or selected in the "drawing rooms of local leaders"[23] Under Hashims skillful organizational leadership, 30 District Election offices and 119 sub-offices were set up, they were equipped with furniture and a library was made a must. League's workers were motivated to contact individual voters and since BPML had a number of rival parties to counter apart from the Congress, KPP (Krishak Proja Party) Muslim Parliamentary Board,Jamiat-ul-Ulema Hind,Nationalists Muslims and the Emarat Party, extra attention was paid to constituencies of Fazul Haq (KPP),Syed Nausher Ali(Congress) and Maulana Shamsul Huda (Emarat Party).
A regular bank account was opened and accounts were audited. The constitution of the party was modified to make room for lower cadre to move upwards and to get rid of "the age weight which was retarding the growth of league"[24] In his move to further democratize the party he ordered the holding of annual elections at all levels. A dispute settlement committee was set up to resolve intra-party disputes. These measures bore fruit and the membership and attendance in Leagues council showed a remarkable increase. The League, in Hashim's own words "was attaining manhood". Finally, the successful culmination of Hashim's electoral strategy was exhibited in the elections to the Bengal Legislative Assembly of March 1946, BPML was able to give a crushing defeat to all is rival political parties by winning 114 out of 250 seats.

Results of the elections (Muslim constituencies) to the Bengal Legislative Assembly held in March 1945.

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[22] Harun or Rashid,*The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh*,224.
[23] *Review of Muslim League Organization in Bengal* submitted by the Secretary Abul Hashim of the BPML to the
Secretary AIML as cited in Harun-or-Rashid, *The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh*,164.
[24] Abul Hashim quoted in Star of India,21st March 1944,as cited in Harun-or-Rashid, *Foreshadowing of Bangladesh, 166.*

Name of the Party	Number of Candidates	Seats won ( )b	Votes pulled (Special Constituency excluded)	% Total votes polled
BPML	121	114 (12)	2,036,049	83.64
KPP	43	4	131,191	5.39
JUH	12	---	27,756	1.14
EP	3	1	16,941	0.69
MPB	10	__	15,816	0.65
Congress	6	__	11,759	0.48
NM	5	__	4,426	0.18
CP	2	__	3,244	0.13
RDP	3	__	669	0.03
Independents	143	2	186,255	7.65
Totals:	348	121	2,434,106	99.98

a. These also included 3 special (reserved) seats, 2 women and 1 Muslim chamber of commerce and 1 special (general) i.e. Dacca University seat.

b. Number of seats won uncontested in brackets.
JUH Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind, EP Emarat Party,MBP (Muslim Parliamentary board),NM (Nationalist Muslim),CP (Communist Party),RDP (Radical Democratic Party) compiled 23rd May 1946,Franchise: elections in Bengal 1946

"If Suhrawardy was the organizer of the league in Bengal, Hashim was its builder and consolidator."[25] It was under Hashim's "progressive leadership that a party of KPP's stature in Bengal was totally absorbed by the BML.

RIFTS

All these measures, geared towards the elimination of traditional centres of control and authority perturbed the feudal cum industrialist class, the so called rightists group, the tussle was indeed between "the rising middle class v. the

[25] Harun or Rashid, *Foreshadowing of Bangladesh,191.*

landed oligarchy or people v palace"[26] Unfortunately, this led to rifts within Muslim league, the rightists dominated by Nazimuddin group and leftists by Abul Hashim. The Khawajas wanted a "government party" whereas Hashim wanted a "party government". Shahid Ahmad,a dedicated member of the ML, in a letter to Liaqut Ali Khan observed that the khawaja group was "nervous about its own leadership."

In order to curb the influence of the khawaja group, Suhrawardy and Abul Hashim concentrated on establishing their full control over the organization."[27] The extent of hatred of the Khawajas against Abul Hashim can be gauged from Isphahani's statement, Isphahani wrote to Suhrawardy on March 6, 1947, from Calcutta, "… Fazlul Huq is a danger and Abul Hashim is most undesirable." [28] Shahid Ahmad in a report to Liaqut Ali Khan made the following remarks about the Khawajas "Being unsuccessful in their mission they brought out the most dangerous weapon…it was given out that the young people in the organization belonged originally to the Communist party…Even the district magistrates were requested to keep special eye on us" [29] Same charges were levied against Hashim that firstly he was preaching communism under the Islamic garb; secondly, he created polarization inside the party and lastly for the controversial stance he had adopted during the Gandhi-Jinnah talks.

The hold of Khawaja coterie:

The President of the Dhaka District Muslim League was Khawaja Shahabuddin, also called the Chief whip, the younger brother of Khawaja Nazimuddin. While Bengal was passing through famine the Nawab family, under Nazimuddin's ministry was busy in "money-making by all means...Ministers and even their wives turned into government contractors"[30] Hashim saw all this and also noticed that whoever wanted to gain any political position in the BPML or fulfill any political aspiration, had to work in allegiance with the Khwajas.The cream of Bengal politics, Presidents and secretaries of district Leagues, like Nurul Amin, Ghysaduddin Pathan, Azizuddin, Hamidul Haq Chaudhry and Fazlul Rehman were all toadies of Ahsan Manzil.Hashim observed with disgust and also with

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[26] Harun Rashid, *The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh,* 160.

[27] Harun or Rashid,*Inside Bengal politics,1936-1947:unpublished correspondence of partition leaders*.(Michigan: Michigan University Press,2003).19.

[28] Z. H. Zaidi (ed.), *M. A. Jinnah – Ispahani Correspondence, 1936-1948* (Karachi, 1976). 295,516 ,517.

[29] Harun or Rashid, *Foreshadowing of Bangladesh,* 169

[30] Shahid Ahmad to Liaqut Ali Khan (17th may 1945) cited in Harun or Rashid, *Foreshadowing of Bangladesh,*

Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, Dhaka, 1987. pg 171

great concern that even Suhrawardy at times accepted the authority of the Khwajas to retain his political position. He was critical of the Khwajas from the beginning and kept himself out, as he put it, of this "unholy game of power politics."

Harun or Rashid mentions in his book that "the democratic upsurge failed to affect the upper echelons of the party mainly because of Suhrawardy's moderating role."[31] Although Hashim was his choice but when it came to direct confrontation with the khawajs he advised Hashim to "maintain truce". Maybe he realized the dangers of a split in party at this crucial juncture of freedom struggle. Political expediency won over higher principles. He tried to balance himself in the middle but little did he know that the politics for power and vested interests would soon engulf him in its fold. Anwar and Afia Dil hold the view that Jinnah was more inclined towards the rightists because he relied on their funds and suspected the leftists of favoring moves for United Independent Bengal whereas Shila Sen claims that the division of Bengal League into pro-Nazimuddin and pro-Suhrawardy factions was to some extent based on varying commitment to All India League policy and to the person of Jinnah."[32] Liaqut too had reservations about Mian Iftikharuddin and Abul Hashim whom he thought were conspiring with GM Sayed of Sindh to take his place. Despite the Isphahani-Liaqut moves to keep leftists out of power, the March 1946 provincial elections saw the stupendous victory of Muslim league due to the twin efforts of Suhrawardy as Secretary to the Parliamentary Board and Abul Hashim as General Secretary of Provincial Muslim League. In the aftermath of communal riots of 1946, Abul Hashim came under the attack of Hindu extremists which according to Sir Francis Tucker were led by Hindu Mahasabha, this caused him grief because he had"always held himself apart from partisan communal politics, who had the ability to harmonize diverse religious and ideological groups within the framework of his vision of Islamic socialism"[33]

Divide goes further

The Lahore resolution envisaging the creation of 'independent states 'in which constituent units would be autonomous further strengthened Hashim's resolve to fight for independence. Later events, however, shook his conviction and again

[31] *Ibid*.,174.
[32] Shila Sen, *Muslim politics in Bengal*, (New Delhi: Impex India, 1976). 192.
[33] Anwar Dil and Afia Dil, *Bengali Language Movement to Bangladesh***.** 290.

brought forth the bitter reality of compromise in politics. Although in politics he was against communalism and consequently against the Two Nation Theory, but he accepted its importance as a political bargaining chip. India at that stage was facing an upsurge of separatist tendencies and therefore Hashim's propagation of multi nationalism came under criticism. In fact it became another tool in the hands of non-Bengali leadership. What most East Pakistanis viewed as an intransigent behavior of Abul Hashim during the time of all India Muslim leagues Legislators Convention in Delhi on April 9th 1946, was more a reflection of his acute observation and genius for seeing the far off consequences of the word states versus state, when he raised an objection that Lahore resolution envisaged the creation two sovereign states, not a state, Jinnah tried to dismiss it as a topographical error but when Hashim insisted on consulting the minutes book, he was proven correct. Jinnah submission to his legal correctness was obvious when he asked Hashim for a suggestion, what followed was an exchange of dialogues between two legally sagacious minds

"Maulana sahib, I do not want one state of Pakistan. I want a legislative assembly for the Indians you suggest an amendment to my resolution in such a way that I can get what I want without going against the Lahore resolution."
Hashim replied "then please cross out the article one and put in the indefinite article "a" so that your resolution reads we want a state of Pakistan in the North West India and a state of Pakistan in North East India with Bengal and Assam."

His defiant attitude was based on logical reasoning and acclaims full credit. It was in recognition of this that Jinnah accepted it. For the conservative minded non-Bengali leadership this added conviction to their belief that Abul Hashim was out to destroy the very foundations of Pakistan. Since the elections of 1946 were fought and won on the demand for a single state, it became very difficult to address the issue at this stage. Jinnah's assurance that Pakistan's Constituent Assembly will be the final arbitrator put an end to all voices of dissent temporarily.Sajjad Hussein writes that "Abul Hashim realized that in the changed circumstances the demand for separate state meant not only weakening the demand for Pakistan but virtually counteracting it. Since the demand for Pakistan was "less a territorial than an ideological concept."

Greater Bengal debate

Abul Hashim carried a distinct approach towards the idea of Pakistan, for him it was more of a political objective than a communal demand, he could see that for non-Muslims "Pakistan stands for the pogrom of all those who are outside the

Muslim pale"[34].He felt the need for a clear-cut manifesto and in March 1945 published a manifesto embodying fundamental rights of people, freedom from discrimination and oppression, equal opportunities, religious freedom, end of zamindari system and capitalism. His was a charter for the establishment of a truly viable welfare state.

The Muslim League High Command had avoided defining the Pakistan scheme in concrete terms till 1946 but as the partition drew closer so did the question of boundaries. It was in this context that the scheme for "greater Bengal" (stretching from Purnea in Bihar to Assam) which had been on foot since February 1947 was renewed with more vigor by Hashim and Suhrawardy in collaboration with Sarat Chandra Bose and Shankar Roy. Shila Sen is of the view that the initiators of the move for an independent Bengal were Sarat Bose and Abul Hashim and not Suhrawardy.[35]

Hashim had seen the fascist tendencies of Hindus during 1946 Calcutta riots and wanted to work with moderate enlightened leaders like Bose. He also believed in the distinct nationality of Bengali Muslims, in 1942,East Pakistan Renaissance society was formed under Sheikh Mujibur Rehman to promote the idea that Purba (Eastern Pakistan) are a different from Hindus as well as the "religious brothers of Pakistan" Some Bengali leaders also suffered from centre-phobia which further led to the support of this scheme. Bengal had been the victim of British "denial policy" during 1943 and longed for freedom from central control. Their leadership was confident that Bengal left alone could better manage its resources. Maximum provincial autonomy was the whole purpose behind their support for Pakistan, the raison d'être of their struggle; ironically, the non-Bengali leadership of Pakistan instead of allaying their fears turned them into reality.

The working committee of BPML had also discussed the Raghib Ahsan's Confederacy of East Pakistan and Adibasistan.A confederation between Eastern Pakistan or Bangsam(Bengal and Assam) and the autonomous homeland of Adibasistan(for tribal people around Bihar).Abul Hashim and Suhrawardy supported this scheme. Their aim was to make Bengal self-sufficient both economically and militarily.

The Greater Bengal scheme was the continuation of the same efforts, it had three main points a) that present government will continue to hold office but new Hindu ministers will be nominated by Congress b) Bengal will not join either India or

[34] Harun or Rashid, *The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh,*189.
[35] Shila Sen, *Muslim Politics in Bengal*, 224.

Pakistan but will remain free, Constituent Assembly based on adult franchise will decide the issue later c) seats will be allotted according to the population ratio.

In June 1947, when Muslim league again met in Delhi to decide the issue of partitioning Bengal, Hashim implored Jinnah not to accept a "truncated Pakistan" he would rather wait for ten more years for real independence than rush through what he called such a "Mad scheme" [36] he warned Jinnah that it would lead to an "unstable government" and to adopt the Raja Gopalacharia plan but Jinnah spoke of realities which made it necessary to push through Pakistan. In desperation he had appealed to the Council" do you want to have Pakistan in my lifetime? The Dawn dubbed Abul Hashim and his group as "snakes in the basket" On the question of position of minorities in the new homeland both Hasrat Mohani and Hashim were forced into silence.

Abul Hashim derisively criticised the leaders favoring the partition, he termed them as " intellectually bankrupt ,opportunistic and seeking cheap popularity" he showed them their true faces as agents of the imperialists" cent per cent alien capital, both Indian and Anglo American exploiting Bengal is invested in west Pakistan…he went on to prophesize "that Bengal today is standing at croosroads,one leading to freedom and other to eternal bondage" he assured the Hindus that in "free Bengal they will not be denied of their legitimate share in administration and in the employment of her material resources. But in a divided Bengal, west Bengal is bound to be treated as a far flung province a colony of alien Indian imperialism where Hindus will be reduced to the status of daily wage earners of an alien capitalism" [37] lastly he appealed to Hindus to accept his 50 50 formulae.

Abul Hashim decided to quit Muslim league and give more time to greater Bengal scheme but sadly the Congress and its handmaiden the Hindu Mahasabha under Prasad Mookerjee put an end to all schemes,although Gandhi had given them his blessings. Hindu historian Mujamdar comments that the reasons behind this attitude of congress was rooted in the Hindu capitalists of Rajasthan and Western India who owned iron and coal fields in western Bengal.Abul Hashim continued undauntedly to propagate the idea of united Bengal; Jinnah's stance on Bengal is ambiguous, it is true that he wanted a united Bengal but whether he wanted it independent or with Pakistan is disputed amongst historians. On 26th April 1946, he had told Mountbatten "What is the use of Bengal without Calcutta they had better remained united and independent. I'm sure they would be on friendly terms with us"[38] When Jinnah had refused to accept the division of Punjab and Bengal,

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[36] Anwar Dil and Afia Dil, *Bengali Language Movement to Bangladesh*, 63.

[37] Anwar Dil and Afia Dil, *Bengali Language Movement to Bangladesh*, 65

[38] Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman*. (Lahore: Sang e Meel Publications 1999),265.

Mountbatten accused him for throwing away the substance for the shadow.[39] Ayesha Jalal makes a similar allegation on Jinnah, according to her" A provincial agreement to keep Bengal and Punjab undivided was the only way to achieve a viable Pakistan but "seven years of strident propaganda for Pakistan" and economic grievances had turned into a communal issue and "made supra-communal agreements practically impossible."[40] Ayesha Jalal accuses Jinnah of keeping a "calculated silence" over this issue but it is to be fairly said in his defense that he saw the growing opposition from Congress and realized that it would open up a Pandora's Box and torpedo the demand for Pakistan.

Failure of the plan

Even within the Bengali leadership there were divisions over the issue of united Bengal.Maulana Akram President of Muslim league Bengal clamored for a "sovereign Muslim state in Bengal" "such a state would be an integral part of Pakistan"[41] Secondly he wanted to get rid of Burdwan district, "perhaps as a way of ridding the league of the Abul Hashim plague"[42]Leaders like Noor ul Amin, speaker of Bengal Assembly dreamed of the Premiership of Bengal, he had already started distributing loaves and fishes to his cronies like Hamid ul Haq Chaudhry.

At this juncture, Hashim along with Maulana Azad Subhani became more devoted to cause of Islamic universalism. By early 1947, there emerged a rift between Suhrwardy and Abul Hashim over the presidentship of Bengal Muslim league, when Akram khan resigned and Abul Hashim and Fazul Haq both offered their candidacy. Suhrawardy at this juncture kept neutral and quiet and did not support Abul Hashim despite the fact that in 1946 he had supported Suhrawardy against Nazimuddin.Rana Razzaque mentions in his article that "he was disappointed when he observed that Suhrawardy too, was interested in gaining higher political position than in merely organizing the party." But Hashim gives him the credit of being totally non communal and not vindictive.

Totally disillusioned, he left for hometown Burdwan, devoting more time to research and writing on Islamic thought. But the socialist spirit he had infused in

[39] *Ibid*.,253.
[40] *Ibid*., 267.
[41] Shila Sen, *Muslim politics in Bengal*, 234 and 235
[42] Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman*, 266.

younger generation did not vanish, writes Kamruddin Ahmad, they decided to rededicate themselves to the economic emancipation of common man, to fight evils of religious fanaticism."[43] His autobiography, *In Retrospection* and his other writings, such as, *As I See It, The Creed of Islam, Integration of Pakistan*, reveal his political, social and religious views.

Refutation of Bengali leadership as being un-Islamic

Bengali leadership has often been criticized as having secular tendencies, being pro communists and sharing little of the Aligarh traditions so ardently followed by their west Pakistani counterparts, nothing can be further from truth.Surawardy, Fazul Haq and Abul Hashim were as secular as Jinnah, they believed in liberal democracy and protection of minority rights.Suhrawardy and Abul Hashim were as obsessed with the safeguard of religious minorities as was Jinnah, the same yardstick should have been applied to both cases but that was a quality rarely exercised by our ruling clique. Anwar and Afia Dil also seem to have fallen prey to this tendency, their claim that" a number of West Pakistani leaders were furthermore dominated by the pan-Islamic ideology which did not have much appeal for Surawardy, Abul Hashim, Fazul Haq and a number of other Bengali leaders".[44]For Surawardy and Fazul Haq the immediate concern was the welfare of Bengalis, maybe their thought at that time did not transcend beyond their immediate concerns. But to say that about Abul Hashim would be nothing short of grave misunderstanding. His perception of social justice, egalitarian society, end of zamindari system and emancipation of tenants were all inspired from Islam. Islamic socialism formed the basis of all the manifestos he devised for political parties and his appeal to the youth circled around the same objectives.

Even the power sharing plan between Chandra Bose and Hashim was devised to guarantee equal rights for minorities and prevent subjugation of one dominant group over another, in this sense Hashim was clearly inspired by Islamic ideals of social and economic justice, Anwar Dil's contention can be refuted on the grounds that Abul Hashim constantly demanded safeguard of minority rights and economic emancipation from the gilded capitalist and landed aristocracy class which had for long subjugated the Bengalis. It was this fake claim of Punjabis that Bengalis were not "true Muslims" which later resulted in giving religious connotations to the movement which had in its heart graver political and economic factors.

[43] Anwar Dil and Afia Dil, *Bengali Language Movement to Bangladesh***.** 291
[44] Anwar Dil and Afia Dil, *Bengali Language Movement to Bangladesh***.** 57

Conclusion

The sense of political failure and disillusionment coupled with the large scale massive killings and riots which followed partition caused irreparable grief to Abul Hashim his eyesight dwindled with sorrow. His house in Burdwan was burned down by Hindu nationalists,so he migrated to Dhaka in 1950.

"But there were enough hints to tell him that all was not well in the new country. There were not merely the old stirrings of communalism but the very clear indications of Bengalis being threatened with insignificance in the new order of things. It was clear to him that unless there was resistance to those who believed the Bengali language could be relegated to the backyard in the interest of the Pakistan state, the future for Pakistan's Bengalis would be at risk. The authorities did not fail to notice his activist role in the movement and only days after the shootings of 21 February 1952 packed him off to jail. He was to remain a prisoner of the Pakistan state for sixteen months. When he was freed in 1953, he formed the Khilafat-e-Rabbani Party, to which he provided leadership till 1956."[45]The success he could not achieve in politics was compensated through his literary achievements; his book the creed of Islam is considered an asset in cotemporary Islamic thought.

In the new political stage, the greatest heroes of the freedom struggle were ruthlessly driven out of power through well planned propaganda and political maneuverings of the feudal industrialist's non-Bengali elite, which quickly became the new masters and eroded all opposition which threatened their powerbase.

Hashim's biographer Mafidul Hoque writes that although Hashim helped in drafting the manifesto of the Awami league in1949, he did not take interest in the new party."[46]He shifted his focus towards Islamic research under the banner of the Tamaddun Majlis which fought for the status of Bengali as the national language. He presided over the historic All Party State Language Committee held on 20th February, 1952, a day before the Ekushe. He died in 1974.He was a towering though tragic figure writes Anwar and Afia Dil, who warned his people to stay away from narrow sectarian attitudes.[47]

M.H. Askari in his article asks the pertinent question" Did Abul Hashim and other Bengali leaders who were in harmony with his thinking have the premonition that

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[45] Stories of politician, tales of struggle. http://badruddinumar.blogspot.com/2008/06/tribute-to-badruddin-umar-on-his.html (26/7/2012)

[46] Anwar Dil and Afia Dil,*Bengali language movement to Bangladesh***.** 292.

[47] *Ibid*. 292.

within the setup of a single state, the people of Bengal despite their majority, would have to live under the domination of a highly centralized government, with no regard for their own aspirations and political and cultural identity? [48]. Eminent historian, Prof Khalid Bin Sayeed has expressed the view that once Pakistan had come into being, the central leadership adopted the perception that "a significant number of influential Bengali Muslims were probably not completely loyal Pakistanis." It was openly suggested that in matters such as the Bengalis' insistence upon retaining the Bengali language and culture, it was evident that they were under the influence of ideas from across the border. Syed Badrul Ahsan writes in his review of Badruddin Ahmad's book on Abul Hashim-stories of politician, tales of struggle

"A recapitulation of the life and times of Abul Hashim is fundamentally a going back to an era where good men defined the parameters of politics. And yet some of these good men, for all their political integrity, somehow found themselves drawn to the tragic drama that was soon to divide India on a scale of violence and passion never before seen in its history. Hashim was one of these men. He loved nature and was fond of flowers. For him life was forever a matter of aesthetics."[49]
The success he could not achieve in politics was compensated through his literary achievements; his book the creed of Islam is considered an asset in cotemporary Islamic thought.

Analysis:
In the final analysis, Abul Hashim undoubtedly emerged as a charismatic leader for the Bengalis, he did not reach the stature of a national leader unlike Jinnah but did enjoy the honour of being amongst the " Big Three" of the revolutionary Bengali leaders(H S Suhrawardy, Fazul Haq). He played a major role in the self awakening of the Bengal masses. His strategy for the revamping of BPML and infusing it with a more democratic spirit was completely successful. He freed the Muslim League from the elitist, oligarchical rule of khawajas, Ispahanis and Nawab of Dhaka. His services cannot be easily undermined, had ML not returned with sweeping majority in Bengal and Punjab, events would have unfolded in totally different manner.

His second strategy for the formation of greater Bengal met defeat due to the larger drama unfolding in the political scene of India, the beast of communalism

[48] M.H. Askari, Who *is to blame for '71 crisis?* http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/1998/07Mar98.html
[49] http://badruddinumar.blogspot.com/2008/06/tribute-to-badruddin-umar-on-his.html access date: (27/7/2012)

and the mindboggling issue of divisions rendered his Greater Bengal scheme futile. Later on, Pakistan's own ruling clique dominated by the feudal cum industrialists and corrupt politicians proved a death knell for Bengali inspirations for autonomy. A systematic campaign was carried out to tarnish the image of Bengali leadership as traitors and secessionist serving as Trojan horses for India. Hashim one man front was swept away in the tide of vaulting ambition of iron control from the centre. His disillusionment with politics was acute, his experience taught him how in reality politics was far from ideals and ground realities demanded Machiavellian tactics, only shrew politics of self-aggrandizement succeeded. But the success of a leader is gauged not by his temporary achievements but by their influences on the future course of events, from that angle, Abul Hashim emerges as one of the greatest and most charismatic leader of the 20th century. "For only a charismatic leader has the ability to break through the inherent conservatism of organization and to excite masses to support great things."[50] Time and again his ideals were smashed but since revolutions are born in the mind first, Hashim had already sown the seeds of that revolution for equality and Islamic socialism in the minds of the Bengali youth, who later became the flag bearers of Bengali Language movement which later crystallized in the form of a separatist movement, or rather, a movement for justice, equality and end of exploitation.

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The Significance of Socio-Political Context in Shaping the Authenticity of Jamaat-i-Islami's Gender Discourse

By Shahbaz Ahmad Cheema

1. Introduction:

The paper argues that authenticity in religious discourses is not an absolute and universal entity, but that it is shaped/defined and reshaped/redefined in various socio-political contexts. Hence, the significance of these socio-political contexts is far more than what is generally assumed. To substantiate this argument, I have deconstructed the constitutive processes of authenticity in the Jamaat-i-Islami's (hereafter referred to as JI) gender discourse analyzing its interaction with the political space in Pakistan. The paper has selected some gender-related issues for analysis. These issues are: (1) The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (hereafter referred to as MFLO), (2) the JI's support to Ms. Fatima Jinnah[1] as a presidential candidate of Pakistan, (3) Hudood Ordinances, 1979 (hereafter referred to as HOs), (4) The Protection of Women Act, 2006 (hereafter referred to as PWA), and (5) election of women members of the JI on reserved seats for women in the Parliament.

There are two important matters which need explanation before beginning an analysis of the selected gender issues referred to in the list above. The first is the selection of the JI's gender discourse for analysis and what are main features of its gender discourse. The second is the notion of authenticity employed in the paper which is different from the generally understood connotation of the term.

Let us explicate the first issue. The JI is one of the most organized religio-political parties of Pakistan (Nasr 1994: Joshi 2003). It was organized by Maulana Abul Ala Maududi in 1941 before partition of the Indian Subcontinent (Nasr 1996, 41). Maududi kept on anchoring and supervising the JI for more than three decades till his death in 1979. According to Nasr (1996, 3), Maududi is "the most influential of contemporary revivalist thinkers." The same is the opinion of Jackson (2011). At present, Maududi's brainchild, the JI, works under the same

[1] Fatima Jinnah was the youngest sister of Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Quaid-i-Azam) founder of Pakistan.

name "Jamaat-i-Islami" in five geographical locations in the Indian Subcontinent (Grare 2005, 11). The JI's influence has exceeded far beyond its place of birth, i.e. the Indian Subcontinent. It maintains links and has established sister organisations in the USA, UK, and other parts of the world, and such ideological connections are maintained largely due to the diaspora of the Subcontinent (Grare 2005, 102). Maududi's ideological influence may also be observed in Central Asia, North Africa and Southeast Asia (Nasr 1996, 4).

Maududi wrote on gender issues extensively. His most important book on the subject is *Purdah*[2] (2003) written in Urdu and published in 1940. The book was translated into English as *Purdah and the Status of Woman in Islam* (2010).[3] Maududi (1943; 2010) was one of the most vocal proponents of the duality of spheres between men and women. In simple terms, duality of spheres signifies that activities outside the home are to be carried out by men while women's sphere of activity is within the home. According to Maududi (1943; 2010), this scheme of division of labour into two distinct and complementary spheres is not only sanctified by their essentialist and different human nature but it is also considered as apposite in light of the divine. We will come across in two out of five selected gender issues in the paper where the JI adjusts this standard version under the influence of different socio-political contexts.

Let us now discuss how the term authenticity, which is at the foundation of the analysis carried out in the paper, has been employed. The notion of authenticity as understood in religious discourses takes it as a static and an immutable entity which is not liable to transformation and reshaping. This paper regards authenticity as susceptible to change and influence by multiple factors including the socio-political context. Authenticity is not taken to be as defined once and for all; rather, it goes through the same path which is travelled by the authenticity seekers. Thus, authenticity is not universal and absolute; it is contingent and always opened to re-evaluation and reassessment. The reason for adopting this variant understanding of authenticity is that it is more conducive to the nature of analysis in this paper. If we take authenticity as a stable and immutable entity as is generally understood, then we would be left with single

[2] It means seclusion and veiling.

[3] There are other books by Maududi dealing with gender issues including *Khawateen aur Deeni Masayl, Haquq us Zojjain, Tafheemul Quran, Deen aur Khawateen, Rasael-o-Masayl.*

argument, that a particular discourse does not conform to its standard stance in this and that situation.

This notion of authenticity has been derived from the famous French philosopher Michel Foucault's concept of truth. According to Foucault (Rabinow 1984, 4; 12: Gordon 1980, 230-231: Foucault 1980, 66; 93: Foucault 1984, 72-73; 74), there are four characteristics of truth which are also present in my use of authenticity in this paper. Firstly, there is no universal and absolute notion of authenticity, which is similar to Foucault's concept of truth i.e. authenticity is relative and contextual. Secondly, authenticity ought to be deconstructed from an analysis of its constructive processes instead of searching it at an abstract level within the parameters of right and wrong. Thirdly, the paper regards authenticity in JI's discourse as constructed by its day to day religio-political experiences. Fourthly, authenticity in JI's gender discourse is shaped and reshaped by different configurations of power which work within the discourse and also influence it from outside, i.e. its socio-political context.

Informed by this notion of authenticity, the paper argues that authenticity in JI's gender discourse is continuously defined and redefined due to its interaction with a particular socio-political context. Hence, the latter is a significant factor for constructing authentic versions or stances of the JI at different junctures in politico-legal history of Pakistan. Even though the paper is meant to highlight socio-political context as an important factor in shaping the authenticity of JI's gender discourse, it should not be taken to mean that it is the sole and exclusive factor in this regard. The paper's sole focus on the socio-political context is for illustrating its significance which is often eclipsed by a passionately assertive reading of the divine. Another extreme and hasty conclusion would have been to regard the JI as a product of its socio-political context. This last conclusion is as faulty as the earlier one. What could be said instead is that the JI contributes to the political space of Pakistan after being inspired by its ideological underpinnings and political goals. What would appear during the analysis is that the JI's contributory role is often downplayed by structural and emphatic influences of the socio-political context.

Let me point out an important limitation of the paper: it has not debated the religious texts and their varying interpretations. Since the focus of the paper is to analyze the role and significance of the socio-political context in construction of JI's gender discourse, any discussion of the religious texts and their interpretations would tend to derail the analysis or make it more voluminous. Hence any such attempt is consciously avoided. Let us now discuss the selected episodes one by one.

2. The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (MFLO):

This Ordinance is one of the most contentious ordinances in the legal history of Pakistan. In 1955, a Commission on Marriage and Family Laws[4] was constituted to suggest amendments in the laws regarding marriage, divorce, maintenance, and other ancillary matters with a view to ameliorate women's status in the society (Rehman 1997, 3). The Commission was composed of seven members: three women and four males, and one of them was a religious scholar.[5] The JI was not represented in it. The Commission presented its recommendations in 1956 and all members were unanimous in its findings and suggestions, except the religious scholar Maulana Ihtisham-ur-Haq. The MFLO is based on these recommendations.

The changes brought about by the MFLO were quite significant. It introduced compulsory registration of marriages, allowed inheritance rights to orphaned grandchildren from their grandparents[6], regulated polygamy and divorce, and regarded unspecified dower as prompt in case its mode of payment is not settled in the marriage contract. After comparing the recommendations of the Commission and the MFLO, Pearl (1969, 182) has opined that "minor reforms" were introduced by the MFLO. This statement refers to the fact that all the

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[4] It is known as "Rashid Commission."

[5] Following were selected as members of the Commission:

(1) Begum Shamsunnahar Mahmud,

(2) Begum Anwar G. Ahmed,

(3) Begum Shah Nawaz,

(4) Mr. Enayat-ul-Rehman,

(5) Khalifa Abdul Hakeem,

(6) Mian Abdul Rashid, Ex-Chief Justice of Pakistan

(7) Maulana Ihtisham-ul-Haq (Rehman 1997, 3).

[6] Orphaned grandchildren are not allowed to inherit anything from their grandparents their uncles and aunts are alive according to classical law of inheritance as practiced by all Sunni schools of thoughts.

recommendations of the Commission did not find favor with the government while enacting the MFLO. Despite the selective approach of the government in this regard, there were many factors shaping the severe and critical response by various religious segments of the country, including the JI.

The post-independence period in Pakistan was marked by the religious enthusiasm of religio-political parties. These parties were hopeful of pushing forward their agenda of Islamization due to the fact that the state was not well entrenched, and these groups were of the view that they would have an opportunity to accomplish their programs. To some extent, the government responded to them in a positive way by adopting the Objectives Resolution in 1949 which is considered a cornerstone of Islamic constitutionalism in Pakistan (Muhammad 2001).[7] This raised hopes of the religious parties that the country is drifting towards thorough Islamization. The JI regarded it as the foundation stone of an Islamic state and an Islamic license to enter into electoral politics in Pakistan (Nasr 1994). The JI galvanized this event and proclaimed that the Objective Resolution had baptized the new born state of Pakistan into Islam (Muhammad 2001, 69).

This scenario of hope, quite paradoxically, was not without an entirely opposite feeling of fear. There was an unspoken understanding among religious segments of the country that we must not give in, in that sphere, to secular laws, which was regulated by Islamic law in the colonial period. During the colonial period, family laws were part of that protected sphere; these laws were generally not interfered with because they were understood to be the core of *Shariah* (Anderson 1959, 39-40).

The post-colonial legal domain in Pakistan was characterized by a mixture of two strands of jurisprudence: one was secular, and the other presumed to be divine (Pearl 1969, 66). Given the colonial heritage, the family laws were based on religious interpretations and un-codified Islamic law, while the rest of the domain was mostly regulated by secular law. In such a scenario, it was perceived by the religious segments of the country that if the secularists were successful in

[7] The Objectives Resolution was passed in the Constituent Assembly to guide the legislative process in the early days of Pakistan as a country. It was resolved in that resolution that sovereignty of the country would be vested in Allah Almighty and the representatives of the people would exercise their power as a trust. Moreover, it was stated therein that Muslims would be provided with an atmosphere that would be helpful for them to live according to the tenets of Islam. Full text of the resolution is available online http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/annex_objres.html (Accessed on 14/12/2012).

implementing their agenda, the family laws would be "largely affected" (Pearl 1969, 166). Therefore, any maneuvering in the protected sphere of *Shariah* was perceived to jeopardize the Islamic character of the family laws, and in this manner, would strengthen the secular elements of the country. On the other hand, the Commission's recommendations were specifically meant for the regulation of different family issues which were not interfered with by the colonial government.

The JI was appreciative of the colonial government for accommodating the religious sensibilities of Muslims by not interfering with family laws (Islahi 1958, 12-13). In JI's perspective, the religious aspect of the laws ought to have been looked into more attentively after the independence of Pakistan rather than changing them massively, as attempted on the basis of the Commission's recommendations (Islahi 1958, 12-19). On the contrary, the same non-interference with family laws by the colonial government facilitated members of the Commission to criticize it as this attitude let the laws to stagnate (Islahi 1958, 12).

This perception of non-interference was not accurate as many changes were made to the Muslim family law by the colonial government. For example, laws relating to matters of legitimacy and putative widowhood,[8] the minimum age of marriage,[9] and divorce[10] were substantially changed (Esposito 1980, 222-223; 230). Despite the erroneous appraisal by the JI regarding non-interference with the family laws by the colonial government, this appraisal contributed to the fear that what was not done by the colonial government was being attempted by the Pakistani government in an effort to implement the Commission's recommendations. Therefore, the resistance of the JI was marked by a dual function of hope and fear: the hope of furthering its agenda of an Islamic state and the fear of interference in a protected sphere of Islamic law, i.e. the family laws. The JI's uncompromising stance regarding the Commission's recommendations and the MFLO cannot be viewed in isolation from these factors.

Let us discuss some differences of opinion between the contending parties. One of the suggestions of the Commission was to increase the minimum age of marriage for the prevention of child marriages. The JI was not willing to allow any change in this regard through the legislative process (Islahi 1958, 110-121).

[8] It was an effect of the enactment of the Evidence Act, 1872.

[9] The Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929.

[10] The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.

Its official stance was that any legislative amendment in the minimum age of marriage would be against Islamic principles and the only way to address this issue was through education of the masses (Islahi 1958, 116). This strict stance of the JI appears to be different from Maududi's previously expressed opinion regarding the regulation and control of child marriages.

In his book *Haquq uz Zojjain,* written before the partition of the Indian Subcontinent, Maududi (1943, 117) once suggested that child marriages could be controlled and regulated. The issue he was dealing with then pertained to the non-availability of the option of puberty[11] for girls when their marriages were solemnized by their fathers or grandfathers. According to the classical or older law practiced in Indian Subcontinent before the promulgation of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939, there was no option of puberty for a girl whose marriage had been solemnized by her father or grandfather during her minority provided that the same was manifestly disadvantageous to the minor (Mulla 1995, 409: Fyzee 2008, 73). Maududi was of the opinion that because of the widespread immorality among boys, if a girl was married by her father or grandfather without an option of puberty, she would be exposed to unaccountable hardship. Having this in mind, Maududi (1943, 117) suggested that child marriages should be controlled strictly so as to prevent girls from such sufferings. If that was not possible, then these girls should be provided the option of puberty regardless of the fact that their marriages were solemnized by their fathers or grandfathers. In this pre-partition debate, Maududi categorically displayed his preference for restricting child marriages as an option. But as far as the JI's stance on the Commission's recommendation for increasing the minimum age of marriage was concerned, that was without any such an option.

The JI's stance on the minimum age of marriage in response to the Commission's recommendations was logically inconsistent. On the one hand, it demonstrated flagrant resistance to any legislative measure to control child marriages and on the other, it suggested that this problem should only be addressed by educating the people. The importance of education cannot be denied in dealing with social problems like this, but the JI ought to have been cognizant of the fact that legislative measures are also meant to have specific educational implications. Legal prohibitions are designed to generate and inculcate behavioral change. Thus, these are an inalienable part of the process of educating people.

[11] Option of puberty is the right available to the minor to repudiate such a marriage on attaining majority which was solemnized during his/her minority by his/her guardian (Fyzee 2008, 73).

Let us go back to the process of the Commission's investigation into the issues it charted out for analysis/recommendation. During this process, the Commission publicly circulated a questionnaire for broad-based consultation on selected issues. Maududi, in response to the questionnaire, agreed to the proposal for the registration of marriages but was of the opinion that it should be kept optional and not made compulsory (Maududi 1955, 02). In the same reply, Maududi (1955, 04-06) categorically stated that prohibition of child marriage and the introduction of similar rights of divorce for the wife in the marital contract would be against Islamic injunctions. After publication of the Commission's report, the JI had acknowledged that there were issues which ought to have been addressed, e.g. issues of three consecutive divorces, polygamy and the inheritance rights of orphaned grandchildren from their grandparents (Islahi 1958, 212-220).[12] These issues were addressed by the Commission but the problem was that the JI was not satisfied with its recommendations.

The JI's public stance was very critical of the Commission's recommendations. It was based on the perspective of futility that enacting any law on the basis of the Commission's recommendations would not be effective in resolving unresolved issues and simply lead to more problems.[13] For instance, presenting the JI's version, Islahi (1958, 102-103) pointed out that the compulsory registration of marriage would resolve some existing issues of litigation regarding proof of marriage, but at the same time, the mechanism of registration would provide an opportunity to those who might fabricate registered documents without a real marriage and harass the victims in this way. Similarly, the proposed compulsory registration of marriage would also be troublesome for those who might have gone through the traditional process of marriage without getting it registered (Islahi 1958, 102-103).

There is no doubt that every measure has its positive and negative aspects. For example, the proposed compulsory registration was going to affect those who had not been able to register their marriages under the law as pointed out by the JI. Similarly, keeping this aspect unattended as it was at that time was also bound to affect those who were or would be going through judicial proceedings for proving their marriages. Therefore, opting for one set of victims, either the

[12] Maududi's (1959, 29-44) article on the inheritance of the orphaned grandchildren may also be referred to this effect.

[13] Futility has been regarded as one of the three rhetoric of reaction by Hirschman (1991).

victims of the compulsory registration of marriage as per the JI or victims of the non-registration of marriage as visualized by the Commission, was not reflective reading of the divine but was instead influenced by the strained relationship of the parties. Both parties - the JI and the Commission - were of the opinion that their approach was more in line with the divine even though nothing has specifically been provided in the divine regarding the registration of marriage (Islahi 1958, 99-101).

Issues like this ought to be debated, while going beyond the realm of religious permissibility and impermissibility, as a legitimate law-making exercise by the state. As far as the divine is concerned, protecting the parties in a marriage is what the divine says, and registration is one of the modalities to realize this protection. But the fact of the matter is that both parties – the JI and the Commission - primarily got themselves involved in the religious uprightness of their respective stance which served to harden their positions rather than generate any space for mutual concession. As if both were bearers of the divine in their own way.

In addition to the debate for and against the Commission's recommendations and the MFLO, the political space of Pakistan was divided into the pro- and anti- camps of General Ayub, and the JI was situated in the latter camp. There were a few factors contributing to and strengthening the JI's perspective regarding General Ayub's Martial Law. General Ayub abrogated the Constitution of 1956 which had been declared "satisfactory and acceptable" by the consultative body of the JI (Muhammad 2001, 108). The JI's stance regarding the abrogated Constitution of 1956 was informed by the insertion of Islamic provisions in the Constitution and the declaration of Pakistan as an Islamic state (Nasr 1994, 143).

The JI also won a significant number of seats in municipal elections held in Karachi in April 1958 before the imposition of Martial Law by General Ayub (Muhammad 2001, 120).[14] This result was important due to the fact that Karachi was the capital of Pakistan at that time. It raised the hopes of the JI for a better performance in the national election scheduled to be held at the end of 1958 (Nasr 1994, 145-146). However, due to the imposition of Ayub's Martial Law, the scheduled national election did not take place. The Martial Law regime halted the electoral process and all political parties were banned including the JI. The expectation of having more political clout from a favourable result in the

[14] Out of its 23 candidates 19 won their seats.

scheduled national elections and the unexpected disappointment caused by Ayub's Martial Law contributed to push the JI into the pro-democracy camp.

The selection of issues by the *Tarjumanul Quran* and its manner of elaboration during that period was significant as there was consistent reference to democracy and democratic norms. This was because of the JI's hope that if democracy was allowed to persist it would gain a significant share in the political space. This opinion was also emphasized by the JI in the very first meeting of its consultative body after the lifting of Martial Law in 1962 (Siddiqui 1962, 02-13). The JI then viewed the dictatorial system of General Ayub as a tool in the hands of the secularists to serve their interests.

General Ayub relied continuously on the secular forces during his rule and also made efforts to lessen the influence of the JI (Nasr 1994, 150-155). For example, women belonging to APWA[15] were at the forefront of the campaign for enactment of the MFLO and they were given opportunities to meet the President during his official tours within the country (Rehman 1997, 3). Conversely, this scenario was contributing to and hardening the resistance of the JI to the enactment of the MFLO, as the President's patient hearing was only available to those who were in favor of its enactment. After the enactment of MFLO, the resistance of the JI did not subside and continuously demonstrated by rhetorical pronouncements. Thereafter, the government had to take strict measures to contain the resistance, including the imprisonment of some of the JI's leaders and workers (Rahman 1997, 4-6: Muhammad 2000, 495). Thus, the relationship between the JI and General Ayub was characterized by antagonism and suspicion; this aspect was also part of the JI's overall attitude towards the latter. In this loaded and hostile socio-political context, it is hard to assert that the JI's opinion regarding the Commission's recommendations and the enactment of MFLO was exclusively based on religious interpretations, as one could not understand the severity of its opinion and magnitude of its resistance without taking into consideration the political space of Pakistan at that time.

3. The JI's Support for Miss Fatima Jinnah as a Candidate for the President of Pakistan:

In chronological sequence, this is the second example of how authenticity in the gender discourse of the JI has been constructed by the socio-political

[15] All Pakistan Women Association. Islahi (1950) articulated the JI's perspective regarding APWA which displayed the pervasive distrust of the JI regarding the latter's activities in general. This book was written by Islahi when he was one of the central leaders of the JI.

context. As far as the "standard" stance of the JI is concerned, it is of the opinion that women's sphere of activity is different from that of men. Women are not only required, according to religious dictates, to do work inside their houses but are also naturally engineered for this job. Their participation in activities outside their homes is meant to cater for exceptional situations (Maududi 1943; 2010). It is pertinent to mention that in 1951, the JI represented by Maududi was one of those political parties and religious scholars who proposed that the head of an Islamic state should be a Muslim man (Muhammad 2001, 73). It was one of the unanimously articulated points out of 22 presented by the renowned religious scholars of that time (Muhammad 2001, 72-74). Keeping in view the "standard" stance of the JI, it is perplexing how it managed to support Miss Fatima Jinnah as the Presidential candidate of the country in 1965.

This shift in stance can be fathomed if we analyze the relationship between the government of General Ayub and the JI. Some of the factors which shaped their mutual relationship characterized by antagonism and suspicion have been discussed in the previous section. Their strained relationship touched new heights of hostility during the period between the lifting of Martial Law in June 1962 and the well-known Pakistan-India war of September 1965 (Muhammad 2000; 2001), and formed the basis of the JI's support of Fatima Jinnah for the Presidential candidate against General Ayub. Let us analyze these events.

The JI was a forerunner in the campaign against the recommendations of the Commission on Marriage and Family Laws as elaborated in the preceding section. Its campaign was premised on the binary categorisation of religion and secularism. Supporters of implementation of the Commission's recommendations were perceived to be the secular segments of society. Such a perception attained more currency after the enactment of the MFLO by General Ayub, hence it was sufficient proof to categorize him as a secularist. This perception was further strengthened by the extension of constitutional protection to the MFLO by the government (Rehman 1997, 46).

The Constitution of 1962 originally did not provide for Fundamental Rights; these were incorporated later on. This incorporation exempted some laws from the application of Fundamental Rights and one of them was the MFLO. The reason for extending this sort of exemption to some laws including the MFLO was to protect them from judicial review on the touchstone of Fundamental Rights. Rehman (1997, 46), a leading jurist influenced by the ideology of the JI, opined that this protection "amounts to suspension of the Fundamental Right to profess, practise, and propagate one's religion."

In addition to the continuous rift between the government and the JI with respect to the MFLO, the Constitution of 1962, a brainchild of General Ayub, was different from the previous Constitution of 1956 in many respects. The JI was critical of some of those aspects, e.g. (1) the declaration of Pakistan as a republic instead of an Islamic republic, (2) the non- incorporation of the Fundamental Rights as provided in the Constitution of 1956, and (3) the inclusion of indirect elections instead of a universal adult franchise (Muhammad 2001, 146). The first meeting of the consultative body of the JI after the restoration of democracy and implementation of the Constitution of 1962 labeled the new Constitution as a dictatorial arrangement disguised under democracy (Muhammad 2001, 146).

Due to significant differences between the two Constitutions – the one of 1956 and the one of 1962 - many political parties, including the JI, raised a hue and cry. The government accepted some of the demands and introduced an amendment to the Constitution to incorporate Fundamental Rights and Pakistan was also declared to be an Islamic republic in January 1964. The acceptance of the demand for substituting the name as an Islamic republic has been termed by Joshi (2003, 65) as proof of "the potential of fundamentalist forces" in Pakistan. To be fair, there were certain other demands which had not been acceded to by the government. Therefore, acceding to some demands by the government did not merely demonstrate the political potential of the protesting groups including the JI; rather, it emphasized how far the government's approach was utilitarian in its selection. For instance, the demand of the opposition parties including the JI for direct elections was not heeded by the government, as it was in conflict with its interest to rule the country without submitting itself to public accountability.

In addition to the binary categorization of religion and secularism, there was another binary categorization running through the political space, i.e. democracy and dictatorship. Democracy was perceived to be aligned with religion and dictatorship was annexed to secularism (Siddiqui 1962, 02-13). The government of General Ayub was viewed as a dictatorship by the JI even after the lifting of Martial Law and implementation of the Constitution of 1962. The coupling of General Ayub with dictatorship was a persistent theme of the JI's monthly journal *Tarjumanul Quran*. There was no substantial difference in this regard during the Martial Law period and after the implementation of the Constitution of 1962.

The standard illustration of the above approach of the JI appeared in one of the editorial articles published by *Tarjumanul Quran* (Siddiqui 1963, 02-16) in which the author elaborated upon the specific psychological mindset of dictators,

relying on the examples of Alexander the Great and Hitler. This exercise was not meant to be just academic; it had definite political implications for its context and was carried out in order to make a connection with General Ayub. Thus, there was an ever-growing aversion to General Ayub, which was ultimately reflected in Maududi's announcement that "even if Convention Muslim League [General Ayub's party] nominated an angel [in future elections] the Jamaat would oppose him" (Nasr 1994, 154).

Associating the government with dictatorship after the implementation of the Constitution of 1962 was supplemented by the self-portrayal of the JI as an unconditional supporter of democracy. The JI's support for democracy was criticized by its opponents as an undue reliance on Western democratic norms (Siddiqui 1965b, 02). The JI's stance was not without reason; the JI was hopeful that democracy would provide an opportunity to it to establish an Islamic state. The JI virtually romanticized democracy as the only available mode of human salvation in the political arena at that time, describing the evolution of constitutional means of change as a victory of humanity over anti-human forces (Siddiqui 1964, 10).

The JI was also given a tough time by state authorities due to its untiring struggle against the government. The political activities of the JI were hampered on different pretexts. For example, the JI scheduled an annual meeting in October 1963 but were not given permission to hold it at its scheduled venue, i.e. the famous Minto Park[16]; the JI had to shift to *Bhatti* Gate, which was not an appropriate place to organize such a gathering (Muhammad 2000, 504). Meanwhile, the government also enacted an Ordinance to prohibit the use of loudspeakers in public places. One of the purposes of such an enactment was to create hurdles in the smooth running of that scheduled meeting, according to the JI (Muhammad 2001, 154). Despite such preventive arrangements, the JI decided to hold its scheduled meeting. The meeting was attacked and even a few shots were fired as Maududi was addressing the opening session; one of the JI workers was killed during the incident (Nasr 1994, 154).

The JI's attitude against the government was also hardened by a series of events which took place at the beginning of 1964. The official permission to publish *Tarjumanul Quran*, the JI's monthly journal, was withdrawn on 3rd January 1964. On 6th January 1964, the JI was proscribed. These events occurred just before the President's assent to the first amendment of the Constitution on

[16] Now *Minar-e-Pakistan*, Lahore.

10th January 1964 (Muhammad 2000, 505), introducing Fundamental Rights into the Constitution of 1962. According to the JI (Muhammad 2001, 156), the President's assent to the first constitutional amendment was deferred to avoid judicial scrutiny of discriminatory governmental measures taken against the JI so that the latter could not get any relief on the basis of Fundamental Rights through courts. The proscription of the JI was immediately followed by imprisonment of its entire consultative body including Maududi (Nasr 1994, 154).[17]

The main leadership of the JI was still in prison when the Combined Opposition Parties decided to contest the forthcoming Presidential election in January 1965. The meeting of the Combined Opposition Parties to deliberate on the election was not attended by the frontline leadership of the JI, though some of its representatives were present in that meeting (Muhammad 2000, 510). After the deliberations, the opposition requested Fatima Jinnah to contest as a candidate for the President of Pakistan. Maududi was later contacted in prison and was "convinced...of the urgency of the situation and the necessity of giving Fatima Jinnah unwavering support" (Nasr 1994, 155). The proposal of the Combined Opposition Parties was accepted by the JI albeit with some hesitation and, thereafter, the latter jumped into the political arena with religious vigour to support Fatima Jinnah as a presidential candidate. The hesitation was expressed due to the fact that the JI had time and again asserted that an Islamic state should only be ruled by a Muslim male. After his release from prison, Maududi announced in a public meeting that there was no merit in General Ayub except that he is a man and there was no demerit in Fatima Jinnah except that she is a woman (Muhammad 2001, 162).

The JI's support of Fatima Jinnah led to a religiously-motivated debate as to whether a woman can become a head of an Islamic state or not. The irony of the situation was that General Ayub was supported by a significant segment of the traditional *ulama*; they were supporting him because he was a man whilst also producing a series of *fatwas* against the JI for its support of a woman (Nasr 1994, 155). The response of the JI would have been straightforward and simple, had it proclaimed that it supported Fatima Jinnah for political reasons exclusively. But the JI's perspective on Islam, that it encompasses all aspects of life, placed it at

[17] According to Nasr (1994, 155) forty-four members were arrested in that anti-JI move by the government. But as per the general secretary of the JI the total number of detainees was fifty-four (Muhammad 2001, 156).

the centre of the controversy as to whether supporting a woman candidate was a religiously commendable act or not.

Both sides of the debate had arguments to support their respective stances[18] and were referring to similar religious texts and material for substantiating exactly opposite positions. One group was supporting a man as a candidate eligible for headship of an Islamic state and the so-called secularist General Ayub was the sole beneficiary of this stance. The other group was trying to portray the position that in exceptional circumstances, a woman could become leader of an Islamic state.

Both these positions were basically the human understanding of religious evidence and how it might be applied to specific circumstances. Both groups were of the opinion that as per the general rule, a man should be a leader of an Islamic state and their basic difference pertained to whether the prevailing situation was sufficient to warrant resorting to the exception of supporting a woman for that post. Thus, the question which needed to be settled was whether existing circumstances on the political scene justified a departure from the norm. The JI was willing to regard them as such and attempted to justify its position while relying on various principles derived from Islam (Siddiqui 1965a, 02-16; 65-72). For example, it argued that any change in time, circumstances and intentions was likely to change a rule (Siddiqui 1965a, 06) and that the end justifies the means (Shehadeh 2003, 47). The JI's approach was severely criticized by one of its ex-comrades, Islahi[19] (2000, 219-249). Islahi (2000) was of the opinion that "dire

[18] The Conventional Muslim League (General Ayub's party) published many pamphlets to show the inconsistencies and contradictions in the JI's stance. For example, "*Mohtarmaa* Miss Fatima Jinnah *aur* Jamaat-i-Islami" and "*Aurat aur Mansaba* e *Saddaarat.*" The first had highlighted the contradictions between the JI's standard stance on political participation of women and its support for Fatima Jinnah, while the second had compiled numerous *fatwas* from *ulama* across the country to demonstrate the irreligious nature of the JI's support. The Combined Opposition Parties also reciprocated in the same manner. One of the most important pamphlets published by it had collected the opinions of *ulama* to substantiate its stance of supporting Fatima Jinnah (*Kiya Aurat Muslamanoun ki Serbaraah ho sakati hai*?).

[19] It is pertinent to mention that Islahi was one of the important leaders of the JI till he went his separate way in 1958. Islahi was of the view that the constitution of the JI confers dictatorial powers to its president/*ameer* (Muhammad 2000, 387). Islahi (2000, 53-78) has himself written about the series of events which culminated in his resignation from the JI. The rift between him and Maududi started when the latter pressured a central committee, constituted for a particular purpose by the consultative body of the JI, to resign from its task. Islahi was of the opinion that Maududi as president/*ameer* of the JI could not ask such a committee to resign which had been constituted by the JI's consultative body.

circumstances" cannot justify conversion of any prohibited act into a permitted one.

The JI then faced a perplexing situation: on the one hand, it was trying to demonstrate that its opinion had not been influenced by its strained relationship with the government, and on the other, it was asserting that the exigency of the situation had warranted treating the prevailing situation as exceptional (Siddiqui 1965a, 03). This manner of argument by the JI was contradictory on the face of it. If we accept that the JI was not influenced by the prevailing circumstances in reading the divine, then we have to presuppose that it was situated outside the political context of that time. If the last presupposition is accurate, then how was it possible for the JI to evaluate the exceptional nature of the circumstances?

Such a perplexing situation demonstrates the dilemma of the religiously-oriented politics of the JI, as it had to demonstrate unequivocally, even to its own supporters, that its religious stance was not influenced by its political circumstances and motives. This objective was difficult to achieve without relativizing the human aspect of its reading of the divine and deemphasizing the peculiarity of its socio-political context. This is what the JI exactly did. The fact of the matter is that the JI experienced a tough time due to the various discriminatory measures of the government and these measures contributed in pushing the JI to support Fatima Jinnah. Were it not for the strained relationship between the JI and the government, there would have been negligible possibility of supporting Fatima Jinnah in the presidential election. So the prevailing socio-political context constituted as a significant component in shaping the authenticity of the JI's stance regarding the headship of an Islamic state by a woman.

4. Hudood Ordinances, 1979 (HOs):

This section looks at the political scenario and context of Pakistan a decade later in order to appreciate the JI's stance on the HOs. The JI's stance in this regard cannot be properly understood without an appraisal of the prevailing circumstances and goodwill between the JI and Zia-ul-Haq's government. This analysis underscores the significance of that particular context in shaping the authenticity of the JI regarding the HOs.

Pakistan was engulfed in a political crisis after the national elections of 1977. As a consequence, the then Chief of Army Staff General Zia-ul-Haq imposed Martial Law on the country. General Zia was known for his religious devoutness before his usurpation of power, and his personal inclinations had influenced his way of governing the country (Nawaz 2008, 359). Political

developments in the country at that time also provided every opportunity for employing the slogans of Islam. These developments were partly contributed to by the *Nizam-e-Mustafa* (system of the Prophet Muhammad) campaign of the Combined Opposition Parties against the government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. These parties contested the national elections of 1977 under the alliance known as the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). The elections were won by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Thereafter, the alliance leveled allegations of massive vote rigging against the incumbent Prime Minister Bhutto and launched a protest campaign (Rizvi 1988; Nawaz 2008). This campaign was later on transformed into a demand for the enforcement of *Nizam-e-Mustafa* in the country (Rizvi 1988, 233).

Thus, in addition to Zia's personal religious inclinations, a religiously-motivated political campaign laid down the framework and strategy of how to prolong his stay in power. The international community was not very critical of the rise in religious fervor of the country as such heightened religiosity was necessary for containing the imminent threat of the USSR in the region (Nawaz 2008).

The JI was one of the component political parties of the PNA and also significantly instrumental in bringing the campaign of *Nizam-e-Mustafa* to a climax. After the imposition of Martial Law, the JI had to make a choice between the pro-democracy alliance led by the PPP and Zia's regime. The list of grievances held by the JI against the PPP's previous government was enough to keep it from standing hand in hand with the pro-democracy alliance. The then president/*ameer* of the JI Main Tufail Muhammad was arrested and put behind the bars (Muhammad 2001, 259). One of its prominent leaders, Dr Nazir,[20] was murdered during that period (Muhammad 2001, 265). There were numerous other incidents reported by the JI of maltreatment, imprisonment and killing of its workers and of throwing hand grenades at its public meetings (Muhammad 2001, 259; 265-267). Even families of the JI's leaders were not spared. For instance, Mian Tufail Muhammad's (*ameer*/president of the JI) wife and son were arrested and put behind the bars by the PPP's regime (Muhammad 2001, 267). Bhutto's regime tried to shut down the JI's newspaper *Jasarat* and arrested its editor Syed Salahuddin and mistreated him during his imprisonment (Muhammad 2001, 240; 251). According to the JI, these incidents could not have been successfully staged without the involvement of the PPP's government (Muhammad 2000; 2001). The

[20] Member of the Parliament.

JI termed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's regime as a "black period" in Pakistan's political history and specifically condemned the latter's discriminatory attitude against the former (Siddiqui 1978b, 03-05). Therefore, the JI's option was simple and made easier by regular pronouncements of General Zia to initiate a comprehensive policy of Islamization in the country.

The democratic rhetoric, an essence of the JI and its journal *Tarjumanul Quran* during its struggle against General Ayub, was noticeably invisible during Zia's Martial Law. Nasr (1994, 189) states that this change of heart in the JI's stance created disharmony between the JI's ideological position of Islamizing the country and its political aims which were hitherto dependent on the continuity of the democratic process. This shift was negotiated by the JI through prioritizing its ideological position and political aims. The ideological position was an end and the political aims of achieving it through democracy were a means to that end. But if the end was likely to be achieved through other means, i.e. Martial Law, then there was no harm in opting for that. The contradiction inherent in this shift was blurred by highlighting the dictatorial way in which the democracy was run during the Bhutto-led PPP government (Siddiqui 1978f, 06).

General Ayub's Martial Law and its initiatives were viewed by the JI as suspicious and supportive of secular segments of the country. In this new scenario under the Islamized leadership of General Zia, the selection of words and phrases had undergone an enormous transformation particularly during the initial few years of Zia's government. There was widespread optimism and jubilation within the JI regarding Zia's initiatives to Islamize the country and insistence on the bone fide intentions of Zia's government in this regard (Siddiqui 1978a, 02-08; 1978c, 02-08). In an editorial of *Tarjumanul Quran*, the Martial Law team, including its civilian component, was regarded as the first team ever in Pakistan's history with bona fide intentions and the requisite qualifications to implement Islamic law (Siddiqui 1978f, 02). In the same editorial, the JI's stance regarding Martial Law was justified as it was more important to implement Islamic laws rather than fruitlessly support democratic government in the country.[21] It was pointed out in some editorials of *Tarjumanul Quran* how coercive force was

[21] There were scores of other editorials/articles/interviews suggesting how to Islamize different social and institutional aspects of the country. For example, how to revive Islamic system pertaining to *salat*, *zakat*, oath, expenditures and *Ramadan* (Siddiqui 1978d, 02), how to Islamize the education system (Siddiqui 1978g, 02), and how to bring Islamic reforms to the taxation system (Maududi 1979, 10-12).

important for bringing about any change in society (Siddiqui 1978c, 05-06; 1978e, 05-06). Such debates reflected the relevance of the socio-political context in which the JI was constrained to make concessions to a military government, especially in the face of the expected coercive measures of Zia's Martial Law. This was also meant to prepare the minds of its supporters for such measures.

This attitudinal change represents a consistent thread of the JI's romanticism regarding state-oriented institutions to transform a country. In General Ayub's Martial Law, these institutions were viewed as tools in the hands of secular segments and therefore worthy of condemnation, but in General Zia's regime these institutions were supportive of the Islamic agenda and hence appreciated and viewed positively.

For instance, in General Ayub's period the constitutional protection of the MFLO from judicial review on the touchstone of Fundamental Rights was conclusive proof of the secular tendencies of the government. The same kind of protection of the MFLO from judicial review on the basis of the touchstone of Islam from the newly-constituted Shariat Benches was "astonishing" but did not constitute sufficient proof to shake the JI's belief in Zia's bona fide intentions (Siddiqui 1979a, 07). The protection extended to the MFLO by Zia's government from the Shariat Benches was a more serious issue as compared to General Ayub's constitutional protection, due to the fact that the former government was making big claims for the Islamization of the country, and the sole purpose of establishing the Shariat Benches was to ensure all laws should conform to Islamic dictates through the judicial process. Thus, it ought to have been severely criticized as to why the MFLO was extended protection from this scrutiny despite claims of thorough Islamization, but the JI did not do that.

Given this background, the JI's unconditional support of the HOs ought to be viewed as a continuous reflection of its excessively positive attitude towards Zia's Martial Law (Siddiqui 1979b, 02). The JI's approach to Islamic criminal law and particularly *hudood* punishments has been explicitly spelled out by Maududi in his writings (Maududi 2001, 320-329; 1962, 54-59). According to his approach, the implementation of *hudood* punishments without properly preparing a society for that purpose would amount to *zulm* or injustice.

Maududi (2001, 320-321) has observed that without massive social reforms, we cannot resort to implementation of *hudood* punishments. For

example, before resorting to *hadd* of *zina*,[22] a society should establish separate social spheres for men and women. It should also discourage other factors which may have an encouraging effect on the commission of *zina*. It ought to have a standard system of marriage and divorce as per Islamic dictates. On the other hand, if the commission of *zina* is made easier and all sorts of encouragement for its commission are widespread in a society, then there is no justification for resorting to *hudood* punishments (Maududi 2001, 320-321).

Maududi (2001, 321-322) has contended that if *hadd* of theft is intended to be introduced without eliminating those factors which tempt someone to commit it or without having established an Islamic system of financial regulation, then its implementation would not be justified. According to him, the Islamic system of financial regulation is characterized by implementation of *zakat*, elimination of interest, and the fair distribution of wealth. Moreover, there ought not to be an excessive imposition of taxes and the necessities of life should not be beyond the reach of common people due to exorbitant prices (Maududi 2001, 321-322).

Maududi (1962, 59) has also distinguished between two situations which ought to be kept in view regarding any debate on *hudood* laws: the first where a *hudood*-based system is working, and the second where it is planned to be introduced. He (1962, 59) opines that the latter situation requires a more prudent approach. It implies that the delay in the introduction of a *hudood*-based system is affordable in the latter situation, and in the meantime, efforts should be made for the prevention of socially encouraging factors for the commission of *hudood* offences, rather than introducing the system of *hudood* first and then trying to focus on such social factors.

Having read the above elaboration of Maududi, if one analyzes the JI's stance on the HOs of General Zia (Siddiqui 1979b, 02), one is bound to be surprised as there is a wide gap between the theory and the practice. The JI extended its unconditional support to the HOs (Siddiqui 1979b, 02) without considering the prerequisites as laid down by Maududi. A question ought to have been raised from within the JI as to whether society was brought to the level specified by Maududi where such punishments could be enforced. If the prerequisites were not met, then what sort of necessity was there to

[22] *Hadd* literally means limitation but in Islamic Criminal Law it is employed to refer to the maximum penalty prescribed for some offences in the Quran and Sunnah. *Hadd* of *zina* means maximum penalty for illicit sexual intercourse.

unconditionally support the HOs? This situation illustrates how the political exigencies of the period drove the JI to rearticulate its authentic version regarding *hudood*.

The gap between the "standard" stance and its practical manifestation was attributable to many factors. One of them, i.e. goodwill between the JI and Zia's government, has already been referred to earlier in this section. No doubt one cannot understate the part played by the JI in deviating from its own "standard" approach, but at the same time it needs to be emphasized that it was facilitated by a particular context. At the time of the Zia's coup, the JI was a part of the opposition alliance (PNA) and this alliance joined Zia's government (Muhammad 2000, 357). On the one hand, the JI was aiming to "share the credit" of the government's policy of Islamization (Rizvi 1988, 236). On the other, it was apparently tired of its overwhelming oppositional politics during General Ayub and Prime Minister Bhutto's regimes (Nasr 1994) and might be expecting to have some respite during Zia's so-called Islamic Martial Law.

Zia's government was actually steered by the army and the civilian component was often bypassed by the military on significant policy decisions (Rizvi 1988, 236). General Zia was apparently very focused on his objective of how to prolong his stay in power. He capitalized on the religious sensibilities of the people and in this manner, expanded the power and capacity of the state and his government (Nasr 2001). On the eve of the coup, his government initially promised to hold free and fair elections, but then it started to shift its emphasis to Islamization and accountability in search of legitimacy (Rizvi 1988: Nawaz 2008). To this end, the government was playing its cards very shrewdly. For instance, the HOs were promulgated on the same day as Muslims were celebrating the Prophet's birthday. This religiously-charged atmosphere made it unlikely for the JI to apply a critical gaze on the HOs on the touchstone of Islam.

The JI cannot be exonerated from its part in heightening religious sentiment to this level as its role was pivotal in the campaign of *Nizam-e-Mustafa*. Thereafter, the JI itself became a victim of this heightened religious atmosphere which masked the shift that took place in its own stance. Neither did the JI observe the loopholes in the HOs, nor did the former think the latter worthy of being critically scrutinized as in the case of the MFLO. In the case of the MFLO, the stained relationship between the government and the JI facilitated the latter to critically go through the law and point out its loopholes. But as far as the HOs were concerned, the scenario was dominated by goodwill. Therefore, the JI restricted its role to advising the government in order to keep an eye on the

implementation of the HOs so that their implementation would not be hampered by the secular segments of the country (Siddiqui 1979b, 04-05).

In its quest for Islamization, the JI basically sidelined those factors which Maududi underlined as necessary preconditions for initiating a *hudood*-based system. The authenticity of the JI regarding the HOs was partly due to its location in a religiously-heightened atmosphere and partly because of its excessively positive attitude towards General Zia's policy of Islamization. Thus, the political context of the country contributed to shape its authenticity and there seems little reason to equate its stance on the HO's with comprehensive representation of the divine.[23]

5. Protection of Women Act, 2006 (PWA):

The process leading to the enactment of the PWA during Musharraf's regime (1999-2008) represents an important episode regarding the confrontation over women's rights in Pakistan by different political parties. This law was meant to address the loopholes of Zia's HOs, amending some of its provisions. Although the enactment of this law did not fulfil the demand of the human rights activists of totally repealing the HOs, it was a significant step towards minimizing some of the hardships experienced by women victims (Lau 2007, 1307; 1313).

The PWA has repealed the *hadd* penalty for rape and exclusively brought it within the domain of *tazir*[24] offences. It has also reduced the penalty for a voluntary sexual relationship. Moreover, a strict procedure has been introduced for the initiation of any proceedings which might lead to infliction of the *hadd* penalty.

For our analysis, this section forms the other half of the same debate undertaken in the preceding section. In that section, it has been elaborated how the JI deviated from its previously held authenticity regarding the enforcement of *hudood* laws and extended its unconditional support of the HOs due to the specificity of the socio-political context. This section analyzes how the socio-political context of the PWA made it difficult for the JI to review its stance on the

[23] There are many scholars who have critiqued the HOs or punishments provided there from an Islamic perspective, e.g. Quraishi (2003), Farooq (2006), Cheema and Mustafa (2008-2009), Ghamidi (2009, 35-136). That is why it would not be a straightforward inference to say that the HOs in its original form were a mirror representation of Islamic dictates on *hudood* laws.

[24] *Tazir* is a right of a state to criminalize any act and to prescribe its punishment. *Tazir* is different from *Hadd* whose punishment is provided by *Shariah* itself.

HOs. In other words, it highlights the circumstances which contributed to harden the JI's stance in favour of the HOs and against the PWA.

Given the fact that the JI's support of the HOs does not reflect its "standard" opinion as explained in the previous section, one would have expected the JI not to go too far in its efforts to protect the HOs. But the JI branded the efforts of Musharraf's government for enacting the PWA as a "war against *Hudood Allah"* (Ahmad 2006). The religious segment of the country including the JI was apprehensive that the enactment of the PWA would lay down the foundations of a free-sex society and the westernization of the country (Lau 2007; Ghauri 2006). Bearing in mind the strict stance of the JI against the PMA, let us analyze the role of socio-political context for constructing the JI's authentic version.

When the Pakistani Army dislodged the civilian government of Nawaz Sharif on 12th October 1999 under the leadership of General Musharraf, the JI was not very sceptical of the coup. The consultative body of the JI appreciated the coup and demanded that an interim government ought to be put in place for the purpose of carrying out a process of thorough accountability (Ahmad 1999, 03-05). The coup was also generally welcomed by the public (Malik 2001, 357). The editor of *Tarjumanul Quran* regarded the public jubilance on the coup as a "public referendum" (Ahmad 1999, 05).

General Musharraf's coup was a counter-coup designed to prevent excessive interference in the military by Nawaz's government, and it was not planned in the same way as previous military coups in Pakistan (Malik 2001, 358). After General Musharraf's takeover in October 1999, the Martial Law regime was hard-pressed to find a way to provide legitimacy to its unconstitutional assumption of power as the international response to the coup was not favorable, particularly from the democratic West (Malik 2001, 358; Butler 1999). For instance, the Commonwealth suspended Pakistan's membership from all its organizations and also debarred it from attending the forthcoming summit in South Africa (Black 1999: Deans 1999).

Keeping in view such an unfavorable response, Musharraf thought it appropriate to portray his soft image of an enlightened moderate as a strategy to fill the legitimacy void. The first instance of this kind was his appearance before foreign journalists with his two Pekinese dogs (Burke 1999). The Independent's London reporters regarded it as "another offensive [by Musharraf] to win over international opinion" (Bennett-Jones, O. and Peter Popham 1999). In another effort of the same kind, General Musharraf proclaimed in an interview with *The Guardian* that Attaturk Mustafa Kamal Pasha was his ideal (Burke 1999). Such

efforts of General Musharraf might have had a softening impact regarding his image in the West, but these efforts laid down the basis of a suspicious relationship between General Musharraf and the religious parties, including the JI. These incidents started to dispel whatever goodwill there was between the JI and General Musharraf.

In this scenario, the *Tarjumanul Quran* republished Maududi's critical review of a book written on Attaturk six decades ago (Maududi 2000, 51-55). The review presented the standard version of the JI regarding Attaturk. In the review, Maududi condemned Attaturk's efforts to secularize Turkey by abolishing Islamic law and introducing Western legal codes. Maududi also rebuked him for banning the purdah and encouraging a Western style of liberty for women. Without leaving anything for speculation, the editor of the *Tarjumanul Quran* specifically attributed the re-publication of the review to General Musharraf's idealization of Attaturk (Maududi 2000, 51). So, the stage was once again set for a similar relationship to that of General Ayub and the JI, with the substitution of General Ayub by General Musharraf as far as the secular segment of the society was concerned, while the JI had been consistently occupying the pro-Islam camp.

Thus, the brief period of unspoken concessions between General Musharraf and the JI was soon overtaken by seeds of suspicion. This uneasy relationship was aggravated after the disaster of 9/11, when General Musharraf unreservedly supported the notorious war on terror while the JI unequivocally criticized it. This new situation started to categorize people into pro- and anti-war camps in Pakistan. Given this new categorization, those who were situated in the other camp were liable to be viewed as suspicious because of their support of the enemy. The JI and General Musharraf were in opposing camps and their respective positions made it difficult to accommodate each other. This divide was so decisive and categorical that it did not only influence their war-related perspectives; it started to penetrate every aspect of their mutual relationship. The editorials and articles published in *Tarjumanul Quran* during this period were consistently broadening the scope of the war on terror to connect it to other issues, e.g. identity politics, the nuclear assets of Pakistan (e.g. Ahmed 2004), and the educational system of the country. The frequency of such writings had been definitely on the rise ever since 9/11.

Let us briefly go through some of the editorials and articles dealing with religious education published during the period of the war on terror and the enactment of the PWA. These writings demonstrate how far the war on terror was instrumental in shaping the response of the JI. In one of the editorials of

Tarjumanul Quran, captioned "Weapon of Mass Destruction of New Crusade: Assault on the Education System", Ahmad (2004a) elaborated upon how education was brought into focus when the map of the war was drawn after 9/11. As per the author's point of view, one of the main objectives of such a remapping of the war was to destroy the religious education of Muslims. Ahmad (2004a) stated that the educational system was a main source of the ideological training of Muslims, purifying their individual character and sensitizing them to the unity of *ummah*. But these characteristics are regarded by the present American leadership as a major stumbling block in the realization of its interests (Ahmad 2004a). The JI's then *ameer*/president, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, equated any effort for bringing change to the education system as part of America's imperially assertive right of pre-emptive attack (Ahmed 2005). The employment of terminologies such as 'weapons of mass destruction' and 'pre-emptive strikes' with respect to the education system by leaders of the JI exposes the infiltration of the war on terror into a sphere which is beyond actual warfare.[25]

Efforts meant to reorient the education system were facilitated by General Musharraf through the legal and institutional mechanisms of the country as per the JI (Khalid 2004b).[26] This line of reasoning can also be viewed in Ahmed's (2004) editorial article where General Musharraf was criticized for his measures to implement the educational, cultural and civilizational agenda of the West. Thus, according to the JI, the sympathies of Musharraf were becoming clearer in that his agenda was driven not by a genuine need, but rather by the interests of Western powers.

The above manner of argumentation channelled through Western cultural and civilizational agenda can be traced in Ahmad's (2006) editorial of the *Tarjumanul Quran* which equated any interference with the HOs as waging war against *hudood Allah*. Ahmad (2006, 03-06) highlights the similarities between Bush's sponsored war on Iraq and Musharraf's war against *hudood Allah* while making the point that there is a difference between the declared objectives and real targets of the two. The declared objective of enacting the PMA is the

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[25] One may observe similar kinds of analysis to strengthen the fear that America was determined to reorient the education system to serve its own purposes under the garb of promoting peace (Khalid 2004a).

[26] Khalid (2004b) analyzed the attitude of the government regarding Agha Khan Board to substantiate how Musharraf's government facilitated the efforts to change the education system of the country.

protection of women's rights but its real target is the secularization of the society and depriving the country of its Islamic identity (Ahmad 2006, 04).

This politics of suspicion and fear between General Musharraf and the JI was also deepened by another well-entrenched ideological difference that pertained to their views on Islam. General Musharraf portrayed Islam as an enlightened moderate religion. On the other hand, such a portrayal was regarded by the JI as another dimension of Western, and particularly America's, new imperial agenda. Ahmad (2004b), in his editorial article captioned "Enlightened Moderation or New American *Deen-e-Illahi*", described the standard version of the JI in this regard. The employment of the phrase *Deen-e-Illahi* is significant per se. It refers to the Great Mughal Emperor Akbar's construction of a religion known as *Deen-e-Illahi,* developed by mixing elements from religions other than Islam. From this perspective, the emphasis on an enlightened moderate Islam by General Musharraf was another episode reminiscent of similar efforts carried out by Akbar earlier. Musharraf's efforts, in this regard, are part of a broader project of introducing a new world order and paving the way for the imposition of an American value system in all spheres of life (Ahmad 2004b).

The JI's view of dominance of the Western value system contributed in shaping its opinion regarding the unequivocal protection it extended to the HOs. Having this perspective in mind, the then *ameer*/president of the JI warned the government that there must not be any interference with *hudood* and the blasphemy laws (Ahmed 2004, 04).

This was the socio-political context wherein General Musharraf was making efforts to enact the PWA and the JI was trying its best to resist its enactment. It is submitted that this context contributed to hardening the JI's position on the divinity of the HOs, to the extent that it refused to participate in a parliamentary committee to discuss the draft of the PWA (Lau 2007, 1306). Ultimately, this scenario led to its rhetorical declaration that the legislation of the PWA was equivalent to waging war against "*Hudood Allah*" (Ahmad 2006).

It has been elaborated in the preceding section that the JI rearticulated its authenticity regarding the HOs while influenced by the prevailing goodwill context during Zia's Martial Law. In case of the PWA, it was the context of pervasive suspicion and distrust between the JI and General Musharraf which facilitated the JI to bluntly criticize any effort to amend the HOs and enact the PWA, despite the fact that the former was not consistent with its standard stance regarding *hudood* laws. So in one way or another, the socio-political context was important in shaping the authenticity of the JI.

6. Election of Women Members of the JI to Reserved Seats of Parliament:

This is the final example of the construction of authenticity in the JI's gender discourse under the influence of the socio-political context in the present paper.

On 21 August 2002, General Musharraf introduced a Legal Framework Order (LFO) which brought some changes to the Constitution of 1973 (Mirza 2009, 2). The LFO restored a joint electorate in the country and increased the total number of seats in all assemblies, including the upper house of Parliament, i.e. the Senate. It also provided for a representation of 17% women on reserved seats in both houses of Parliament and provincial assemblies (Mirza 2009, 2). One of the objectives of the LFO's promulgation was to condone all previous actions of General Musharraf. Another was to conduct national elections under this new arrangement, scheduled to be held in 2002.

This legal arrangement left the parties with a choice: to opt for contesting the elections under the LFO, or not to contest at all. General Musharraf had already got himself elected through a controversial referendum held in April, 2002 (Mirza 2009, 1). It was certain at that time that General Musharraf would remain as President for the next five years. In such a situation, opting out of the elections would amount to a political demise. Even those political parties such as the Pakistan People's Party and the Muslim League (Nawaz) which were victimized by General Musharraf during the initial years of his rule decided not to leave the political space open for the President and his allies.

The issue for religious parties including the JI was not about a political demise only. Rather, these parties were hoping to make some electoral gains due to the involuntary exile of the leadership of two main political parties of the country, i.e. Pakistan People's Party and the Muslim League (Nawaz). To fill this political gap, six religious parties including the JI constituted an alliance as Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA).

The MMA's expectancy of making political gain was also strengthened by events taking place in the region after 9/11. After 9/11, America and NATO commissioned their forces in Afghanistan. The MMA was the most vocal political alliance to condemn the presence of foreign forces in the region. Historically an alliance of religious parties, the MMA managed to have reasonable public support in areas situated near the borders of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan provided another opportunity for the MMA to stir up and capitalize on anti-American sentiments. The MMA played its cards well and gained historic results by winning 18% of the seats in Parliament (Nawaz

2008, 532). These seats were mostly won from the above-mentioned areas, i.e. the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (previously known as NWFP), and Balochistan.

After the elections, the religious alliance including the JI had to choose from going for election to the reserved seats of women as provided by the LFO, or to simply leave the space for other contenders. Politically, the situation was not very complex but due to the pronounced stance of the religious parties on the political participation of women, it was made difficult. For instance, it was explicitly disapproved by Maududi (n/d, 100) for women to sit in mixed parliaments and councils.

For the JI, the issue was not new. Previously in Zia's hand-picked Parliament, one of its women members was nominated and served as a member of the Parliament. So, the psychological barrier of contradicting its "standard" position had already been crossed by the JI during Zia's period. But, thereafter, it did not nominate any woman to contest the reserved seats in any house of Parliament and that sole nomination was part of a fading memory. So, it was General Musharraf's initiative of introducing a substantial number of reserved seats for women which brought this issue to the forefront again.

The JI, along with its alliance of religio-political parties, opted for a more politically pragmatic approach to contest the reserved seats so that it would not lose any opportunity to have more seats in the Parliament. As far as the political implications of this decision were concerned there was no viable objection to it, since it was every political party's legitimate right to desire and strategize to gain the maximum number of seats in legislative assemblies. What is important to highlight here is how politics shapes a particular understanding of religion. As per the "standard" discourse of the JI, there ought to be different spheres for men and women, but due to non-realization of this ideal, religion did not prevent the JI taking a different route, irrespective of the fact that it was likely to expose women to mixed gatherings and violation of a number of other forms of purdah, including purdah of eyes and listening to strangers.

This scenario demonstrates the predicament of a complex relationship between religion and political goals. How is religion to be employed for political goals or how is politics to be pursued for religious ends? Contesting elections and gaining maximum seats in assemblies is politically understandable despite the fact that these seats come through reorienting previously pronounced authenticity. But whenever one tries to justify such contradictions in religious terms, one has to employ dichotomies of means and end on the one hand, and on the other, general

rule and exceptional circumstances (Maalik 2005, 61-62). For instance, establishing an Islamic state/system is an end and to gain maximum seats is a means to that end according to the JI. As a general rule, women are allocated a different sphere from men according to the JI, but if it is difficult to realize the general rule then for the time being, exceptional circumstances/necessity grants women permission to become a part of mixed sphere of activity.

Thus, the opinion of the JI regarding the participation of women in political space is not substantiated by its reading of the divine, as its reading of the divine emphatically divides spheres between men and women. Rather, it is a product of that specific context anchored by General Musharraf's policy of enhancing the number of reserved seats for women in the Parliament which softened its stance on women's participation in mixed parliament and councils. Thereafter, the JI attempted to substantiate its authenticity in religious terms by prioritizing political ends over means and reinforcing it by logic of necessity. Had the opportunity of enhanced seats for women not been provided by the socio-political context, the JI would not be in a position to rearticulate its authenticity afresh in this regard.

7. Conclusion:

The paper has explored the relevance of the socio-political context in the construction of authenticity in the JI's gender discourse. While doing so it has problematized the assumption that authenticity is exclusively shaped by the divine rather it is influenced considerably by many factors and one of them is socio-political context. This is so because readings of the divine cannot be carried out in a vacuum; these are always done in different contexts. These contexts infiltrate into our readings in many ways. For instance, specificity of a particular context may make us realize that it ought to be regarded as exceptional. This was one of the main arguments of the JI when it supported Fatima Jinnah as a presidential candidate of the country. Sometimes the context may facilitate how to prioritize between means and ends. It was this mental confrontation which lured the JI to support the Islamization of General Zia and nominate its women members to contest the reserved seats for women in the Parliament during General Musharraf's regime. Therefore, the lesson of the paper is that before equating the human interpretations with the divine, we need to question ourselves inquisitively as well as persistently so as to ascertain how far these interpretations are influenced by the specificity of their socio-political contexts.

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Hasan Askari: Bringing Urdu Criticism to the Metropolitan Readers

By Ambrina Qayyum

Farooqi, Mehr Afshan. *Urdu Literary Culture: Vernacular Modernity in the Writing of Muhammad Hasan Askari*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 304 Pages. ISBN: 978-1137009029. $74.97.

Unlike most scholarly works about the so-called global periphery that take up, as an object of study, works of poetry, drama or prose, Farooqi's *Urdu Literary Culture* is focused primarily on the miscellaneous prose works of Mohammad Hassan Askari, one the of the greatest Urdu critics. This book thus fills a huge gap in postcolonial and South Asian studies as it introduces, to the metropolitan, scholars, the range and depth of critical scholarship in Urdu.

The seven chapters along with an introduction and detailed notes at the end of the book prove Farooqi's diligent effort of analyzing and introducing Askari's contribution to Urdu criticism. . She not only interprets his works but also studies them with reference to the events of his life. The book therefore has an underlying chronological scheme where the first chapter traces the life of young Askari who joined the Allahabad University in 1943. The later chapters discuss his short stories and his critical essays published in the literary journal *Saqi*. She explains his ideas about the role of literature in society and particularly in the newly established state of Pakistan. The final chapter explroes the last few years of Askari's life and his religious turn. Farooqi reconstructs Askari's life from the accounts of his different friends and acquaintances but the most reliable of her sources is the collection of letters Askari to his friend Dr. Aftab Ahmed from 1945 to 1977.

The first chapter gives an overview of the fifty nine years of Askari's life. Farooqi explores the environment of Allahabad University during 1930 and 1940s in order to explain how it contributed in shaping Askari's authorial subjectivity. In the same chapter she mentions his various jobs ranging from translating works of Gorky and Lenin to working as script writer at all India Radio in Delhi to teaching in different colleges till the Partition of India which she believes split his life into two. The second phase of his life began with his arrival in Lahore where he stayed and taught till February 1950 when he moved to Karachi. There he first

pursued a short career in journalism and then taught at Islamia College until his death in 1978. In the same chapter Farooqi introduces her readers to an interesting aspect of Askari's life and that is his relationship with his teacher at Allahabad University and a well-known Urdu poet Firaq Gorakhpuri. She discusses their personal and literary relations in detail in her second chapter.

In the second chapter, Farooqi dicusses different articles written by Askari about Firaq's critical essays and poetry including *Firaq Sahib ki Tanqid*, *Firaq Sahib ki do Nazmein* and *Kuch firaq Sahib ke Barey Mein*. However a major part of the second chapter consists of information about Firaq's reputation at Allahabad University as a homosexual Farooqi's own interpretation of Firaq's poetry and his concept of love, lover and beloved. She refers to different critics including Shams-ur-Rehman Farooqi, Muzaffar Ali Sayyed and Abul Kalam Qasimi who did not consider Firaq a poet worth the praise showered by Askari on him. Despite these digressions, Farooqi proves that Firaq was a major formative influence on Askari's literary career. She points out that Firaq led Askari to identify and appreciate the Urdu literary tradition that existed prior to the influence of the British colonialism and therefore contributed to his development as a literary critic. Askari's critical views are discussed in the third chapter along with his fictional works.

Askari's eleven short stories were published in two collections of his works namely *Jazeray* (1943) and *Zikar-e-Anvar* (1947). Farooqi claims that Askari's short stories, often written in the stream of consciousness style, "tread the slippery terrain of sexuality in ways that complicate reading." His contemporaries like Ismat Chughati were writing on similar topics. However, unlike Chughati, Askari failed to maintain his popularity as a fiction writer. Farooqi attributes his failure as a fiction writer to his elevated prose and allusive style of writing.. She compares Chughati's famous short story *Lihaf* about lesbian love with Askari's short story *Phislan,* which is also about the topic of homosexuality. The former, she believes, contains the "social realism" whereas the latter confirms Askari's "anti-realist" approach, which he developed under the influence of French symbolists.

While discussing Askari's critical views, Farooqi asserts that he was impressed by the symbolist movement because of the mystical element in it. He thus developed a literary theory which required literature to be "a mirror of human condition, unfolded through its particular cultural sensibility using language in its most heightened, creative way, imbuing words with new affects and abstractions.".He applied this theory to the works of the nineteenth century literary artists including Saiyyed Ahmed Khan, Altaf Hussain Hali and Mohammad Hussain Azad and concluded that they failed to produce significant

literary works since they severed their connection with the Urdu literary tradition of the past and produced "weak replicas of English-literary genres in Urdu."

Farooqi particularly mentions two essays of Askari the "Fear of Metaphor" and one about an almost forgotten Urdu poet Mohsin Kakorvi. In the former essay Askari criticized Hali for developing a distaste for metaphor and thus lowering the standard of Urdu literary works. In the latter Askari compared the poetry of Hali and Kakorvi. He commended Kakorvi's work for his sincerity and above all his indigenous style of expression. Farooqi refers to these essays in different chapters and employs them to prove that Askari strongly disapproved the ideas of Hali and his contemporary scholars and considered them responsible for rupturing the tradition of Urdu literature. She admires Askari's views for his identification and questioning of the issues produced by the "cultural dilemma of a postcolonial society." She sees him as one of the fore-runners of the postcolonial theory. His awareness about the cultural problems created due to the colonial rule later led him to demand a pure Pakistani literature. He repeatedly made this demand in his column "Jhalkiyan". Farooqi presents a thorough analysis of Askari's most popular essays published in *Saqi*.

The longest chapter of the book is entitled "Jhalkiyan" and Farooqi divides it into two parts. The first part contains a discussion of the essays published from 1944 to1947 while the second deals with essays written from 1948 to 1957. The essays he wrote during the pre-Partition phase exhibit his knowledge of western as well as Urdu literature. His essay "*Hindustani Adab ki Parakh*" published in 1946 is about the need to set parameters for assessing Indian literature especially after it has been affected by Western literature. It proves his postcolonial sensibility in spite of the fact that he was then a twenty-seven year old young man. In addition to literary topics he wrote about contemporary politics as well. His essay "Pakistan" is particularly mentioned and analyzed by Farooqi and she declares it the "romantic" view of "a precocious, idealistic youth."

Askari's post-Partition essays mostly deal with the role of literature and literary artists in the newly formed state. His initial excitement about the new nation began to diminish soon and was reflected in his essays. Farooqi refers to essays like "*Pakistani Hakumat aur Adib*" which reflected his disappointment with the government's approach to writers and their role in society. She, however severely criticizes the essay "*Taqsim-e-Hind ke Ba'd*" where he asserted that only Urdu can serve the purpose of representing the Indian Muslims. Farooqi rightfully challenges this narrow approach and criticizes Askari's negligence of the large communities of Bengali and Tamil-speaking Muslims and their contribution to the Muslim culture in South Asia. But his writings in 1950s indicate his realization about the need to create and strengthen Urdu literature's relation with the

indigenous languages and their literatures. The fourth chapter of the book expounds on this phase of Askari's life and his works.

The essays he wrote during 1948 to 1955 were published under the title "*Sitara ya Badaban*." According to Farooqi this series of essays reflects the influence of various western critics and philosophers including T. S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, Mallarme and Martin Heidegger. Moreover, these essays were written with the fervor "to create Pakistani literature in Urdu as a model for the nation's cultural identity." He criticized Urdu literature's different deficiencies such as a lack of "analytic prose" and the excessive use of short sentences. Farooqi admires these ideas presented by Askari but at the same time points out that his "critique of Urdu prose lacks a historical perspective." Another objection against Askari's view of Muslim culture is his failure to incorporate local cultures of various regions of Pakistan into it. She discusses this drawback in her sixth chapter "Indo-Muslim Cultural Consciousness."

Farooqi mentions Askari's problems in adjusting in Lahore after the Partition and his realization that the culture of the immigrants in Pakistan differed from the local cultures. However, a major portion of this chapter consists of discussion about Askari's views about the significance of tradition. She refers to his essay "What is Tradition?" in which he criticized the western scholars for making tradition subordinate to culture. He believed that every society had one basic tradition, which manifested itself in cultural, religious or literary forms. He identified this basic tradition in Islam as "*Deen*." These interpretations of Askari's philosophical thoughts are really very valuable for the students of Urdu criticism because reading Askari's philosophical essays, without such explanations, usually confuse the readers as they fail to comprehend the crux of his ideas. Even Farooqi admits that Askari's "explanations and clarifications" appear "almost in a throw away fashion."

The rest of the chapter discusses Askari's views about two contemporary Indian Muslim scholars Dr. Mohammad Iqbal and Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanavi. The writer provides elaborate explanations about the views of both these stalwarts. Since Askari's wrote very little about Dr. Iqbal, Farooqi, therefore, uses Salim Ahmed's work "*Iqbal kay Sh'er*" for referring to Askari's ideas. She believes that since Askari was Salim Ahmed's mentor, therefore, his ideas about Iqbal were a representation of the mentor's views. The reader, however, finds it hard to attribute Ahmed's views to Askari.

Askari's views about the need to maintain tradition were rooted in Rene Guenon's philosophy based on his rejection of the influences of the Enlightenment. Farooqi discusses this aspect of Askari's views in the final chapter "Resuming the Past". She refers to his severe criticism of Western thought in the last years of his life. She ends the last chapter with her discussion of Askari's

growing inclination towards religion and particularly his interest in the *Deobandi* school of thought. She mentions that he even began "working with and writing for the *ulama* and students of *Deobandi* School."He thus moved from a literary circle to a religious one.

On the whole this book is a must read for the students of Urdu literature as it informs them about Askari the critic as well as Askari the creative prose writer. In fact, Farooqi's interpretations and elaborate explanations of Askari's ideas does a great service to Urdu scholarship by making comprehensible the complex works of one the greatest Urdu critics. The book, therefore, is a great resource both for lay audiences and scholars.

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Uzma Aslam Khan's *Thinner Than Skin*

Reviewed by Andrew Tolle

Thinner Than Skin. Uzma Aslam Khan. Northampton, Massachusetts: Clockroot Books, 2012. 346 pages. ISBN 978-1-56656-908-8.

Uzma Aslam Khan intersects love, espionage, legend, and history in her fourth novel, *Thinner Than Skin*, to contemplate the lasting impact of colonialism on Pakistan's disputed northern borderlands. *Thinner Than Skin* explores the region's geopolitics, religious identities, gender roles, and environmental concerns in unassuming yet exquisite prose, capturing the landscape's beauty while evoking the new political tensions brewing in a land once part of the ancient Silk Route.

Nadir Sheik, the novel's protagonist, is a Pakistani-American photographer living in San Francisco, where he struggles to sell landscapes of California's deserts. He falls in love with Farhana, an American glacier expert with Pakistani ancestry. Farhana yearns for Nadir to taker her "back" to Pakistan, ostensibly to study its glaciers. (Outside the poles, Khan informs us, Pakistan contains more glaciers than anywhere on Earth.) Already annoyed by Farhana's refusal to accept that a pilgrimage to his country would not, for her, be a "return," Nadir grows more frustrated with news that Farhana's colleague, Wes, will be joining their voyage. So Nadir's childhood friend, Irfan, who nurtures deep connections with the indigenous communities on their itinerary, comes along as well, and the four journey toward Kaghan Valley. But a suspected hotel bomber's arrest in Peshawar spurs rumors that an accomplice—a spy, even—is now travelling along the group's path. When the foursome arrives at Lake Saiful Muluk—a place of mythical jinns, fairies, and glaciers conceived by mating ice—their tragic encounter with a nomad named Maryam upends their well-laid plans.

Like the old Silk Route, which comprised a collection of paths rather than a single road, Pakistan's disputed northern borders lie in the middle of a "new" Silk Road, which also lacks clear definition (320). The indigenous communities of Central Asia know this fact too well: every day, the encroaching influence of new occupiers from China, Russia, India, Iran, and the United States further destabilizes their rhythmic ways of life. But to the Gujjar tribes of Pakistan, "Central Asia [is] divided not into states, but into mountain and steppe, desert and oasis" (138). Because the Gujjars do not conform to what they see as arbitrary borders, they are outsiders in the eyes of foreign institutions, the Pakistani government, and the region's more sedentary tribes.

In fact, each character in Khan's novel suffers from his or her own sense of unbelonging. Nadir cannot sell his beloved California landscapes because, as one agent explains, Americans expect Pakistani photographers to show the "misery" of their war-torn country (11). Because his American landscapes somehow lack "authenticity," Nadir must exploit his access to Pakistan to capture its "horror." Farhana, on the other hand, "long[s] for a country": she does not feel completely American despite having been raised in California, but neither has she experienced her Pakistani father's homeland (38). Meanwhile, in the Gujjar community of northern Pakistan, Maryam finds herself shunned for continuing the "pagan" rituals of her animist mother. And as for Ghafoor, Maryam's platonic lover and an emerging activist for Central Asia's indigenous tribes, "it had been…a very long while indeed, since he felt he had a country" (144).

Throughout the novel, Nadir and Farhana's passionate and fragile love reflects the mounting pressure of events developing in Kaghan Valley. Their relationship's ups and downs parallel intense progressions in the spy subplot, in Maryam's narrative of the travelers' impact on her community, and in Ghafoor's unintentional connection to Islamic extremists. As the Gujjar community begins to consider Nadir a murderer, Farhana and Wes exhibit signs of a possible affair. And the arrival of new forms of colonial influence (e.g., Chinese industry, the Taliban, Pakistani government agents) reinforces the tension looming over the lovers' relationship. Nadir nods at the analogy between external events and his relationship with Farhana when he imagines the two of them "running toward each other while people blew themselves up around us, and a bird swung circles in the sky" (241). The bird that Nadir envisions in the sky over his disastrous embrace with Farhana summons the American drones that routinely "gaze" over the region with "stupid eyes" from a "Playstation in Cactus Springs," Nevada (100-103).

Thinner Than Skin engages Western readers by providing a tourist's view of Pakistan alongside a Pakistani community's perspective of Western visitors; as a result, the novel punctures many common ethnic and religious stereotypes. When Farhana experiences cold feet before departing for Pakistan, she frets about violence reported on the news and decides that women cannot "survive" in such a country. Nadir responds by asking her if she considers the 85 million women in Pakistan "unsurviving" (103). Due to Farhana's preoccupation with hostilities in Pakistan, Nadir half-expects a news article on border kidnappings to be about his home country—that is, until he realizes that the article refers to Arizona's border with Mexico (104). "Are we too obsessed with al-Qaeda to care about our own backyard?" he provokingly wonders. Farhana's anxiety over visiting Pakistan contradicts the very premise of her fear when juxtaposed against Maryam's strength and resilience.

Characters are as religiously diverse as they are ethnically and linguistically, and these complex depictions enhance Western readers' understandings of South and Central Asian culture. Although Islamic militants often successfully exploit the memory of martyr Syed Ahmad to recruit Gujjar boys who resent the Pakistani government's compliance with Chinese industry and American drones, Maryam struggles to protect her young son from these "wrongly-turbaned men" (253). She may share their opposition to the government's disruption of nomadic lifestyles, but she acknowledges the contradictory nature of their fundamentalism: "[t]he voice on the radio always said radio was sin" (292). Maryam and other indigenous nomads do not pray regularly at the mosque or make the pilgrimage to Mecca because their mobile lifestyles prevent it; but they identify as traditional Muslims in public due to social pressure. Ghafoor, whose activism against foreign influence often places him on the side of fundamentalists, is nevertheless ambivalent to religion and hesitates discussing Islam with strangers because the "Muslim of the steppe…was too animist for the Muslim of the town, and the Muslim of the town, for the Soviets and the Chinese, was just too Muslim" (143). And while Nadir may consider himself culturally Islamic, in California he is "more often mistaken for Latino than A-rab, even by Latinos," and when asked by an American if he was "Moozlim or what?" he chooses the more equivocal "or what?" (10). One of the novel's most positive portrayals of Islam comes from a shopkeeper who reminds Nadir that the prophet Muhammad emphasized the importance of the *ghuraba*, which he translates as "the strangers." "Blessed are the outsiders," he quotes; and with this reference, Khan demonstrates why this land of outcasts finds comfort in Islam—even those unable to conform fully to its strictures.

Thinner Than Skin offers many dynamic examples of strong Pakistani women, and the fact that a male narrator's voice provides most of the story only strengthens the novel's consideration of gender issues. Like Nadir, Khan grew up in Pakistan before relocating to the United States; and for both Khan's fiction and Nadir's photography, Pakistan continues to provide a wealth of inspiration. By delivering Nadir's perspective in first-person but Maryam's in third-person, Khan distances herself from the self-sufficient Maryam while connecting herself more closely to Nadir's sensitive introspection. But the poignant feminist moment that gives the novel its title fittingly occurs in Maryam's narrative, when she teaches her daughter to disembowel a goat. Her daughter asks if her own skin is as thin as the goat's, and Maryam replies that it is thinner: "if a goat can be shred so easily, so could a woman" (124). Maryam's daughter must "grow a second skin to protect the thin one," but the second skin must remain hidden in order to work. Without mentioning the veil, Maryam rejects it by offering an emotional—but equally spiritual—alternative.

David Waterman

Women's NGOs in Pakistan

Reviewed by David Waterman

Women's NGOs in Pakistan. Afshan Jafar. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 192 pages. ISBN: 978-0-230-11320-6.

Among the many publications that deal with NGOs, and transnational civil society more generally, Afshan Jafar's contribution to the debate – *Women's NGOs in Pakistan* – manages to escape the dichotomies that characterize the subject (state versus non-state, for example) and "instead place[s] the activities, visions, and agendas of women's NGOs in their historical, political, cultural, and social context" (2). No easy task in a country like Pakistan, where the formula as concerns women in the public sphere is very complicated indeed, and where outspoken women risk apathy and criticism at best, and frequently ostracism and violence if they continue their activities. Idealism must confront realities on the ground, compromises must be agreed to if progress is to be made in conservative societies, and a balance must be found between feminism on the one hand and religion on the other; opting out of the religious question in The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is simply not possible. Professor Jafar, a sociologist at Connecticut College, does an admirable job of presenting the specificities – women, NGOs, and Pakistan – of women's NGOs in Pakistan.

Jafar begins with a long introduction, setting the context of NGO evolution in a world in which the state is less and less involved in matters like education and health care, as well as the necessary growth of human rights advocacy NGOs amid a resurgence of conservatism and nationalism is spite of globalization's promises. For the reader unfamiliar with contemporary Pakistani history, Chapter 1 provides an overview since Partition, although the real shift in the treatment of women began not in 1947, as Jafar rightly suggest, but in 1977, with Zia ul-Haq's accession to power. Although the condition of women in pre-1977 Pakistan was not ideal, the foundation of the All-Pakistan Women's Foundation and the passage of the Family Law ordinance, as well as the United Nations Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, show that women's voices were being heard in the political sphere (25-26). Speaking out, however, would become more difficult under Zia, whose political islamization of the country would be catastrophic for nearly everyone, but women in particular. Vigilante vice squads, the Hudood Ordinances, deepening philosophies of women as

property and the guardians of male honor, all would target women in the name of Islam. Jafar notes that, paradoxically, women's activism peaked during the Zia regime, notably under the banner of the Women's Action Forum (39). Prime ministers after Zia, even Benazir Bhutto, have done little or nothing to improve women's lot, and Nawaz Sharif is singled out for his anti-NGO stance (43). Since September 11, 2001 and the war on terror, many fundamentalist groups have been increasing their memberships with anti-American rhetoric, and NGOs often suffer in the crossfire, being seen as representing American interests (46).

Chapter 2 then places feminism in the context of fundamentalism, and the various strategies that must be adopted in response, keeping in mind that women and girls who seek education and an active role in society are most often the target of the extremists' wrath. Jafar lists six of the possible responses of women's NGOs to fundamentalism: reinterpreting the Quran; networking and establishing ties with the religious community; using religion strategically; becoming isolated and self-censoring; joining fundamentalist organizations; using and advancing secular thought and arguments (58). The following chapter then outlines some of the campaigns aimed at increasing women's political participation, beginning with the Aurat Foundation, which operates at all three levels: grassroots, community and policy making. At the grassroots level, the AF's mission is to "develop women's control over knowledge, including knowledge about resources and institutions and focuses primarily on the information needs of the women of the low income households" (76). AF also supports citizen's action committees and legislative watchdog groups, but must adapt to local traditions; for example, in some areas publications cannot be mailed directly to a woman, as it is considered improper to put a woman's name on an envelope (77; 81). Another way that women's NGOs have to "package" their message and become trustworthy among the locals is by not addressing women's issues all by themselves, but instead link women's issues with education, income generation and health care (91).

Sexual harassment is the subject of the next-to-last chapter, using the rights-based approach of Action Aid as an example, an NGO that operates in social, legal, economic and political rights as well as community development (99). Jafar reports that Action Aid, because it addresses the sensitive issue of sexual harassment in the workplace, is the most radical of the NGOs she encountered in Pakistan; she also remarks that there is no exact word or phrase in Urdu for sexual harassment, thus highlighting the fact that such harassment is not seen as extraordinary (100-101). Ultimately AA's hard work paid off in a policy document entitled "Code of Conduct for Gender Justice in the Workplace,"

followed up by workshops designed to dispel myths regarding sexual harassment, including the mentality of blaming the victim, or seeing sexual harassment as normal from a cultural point of view (104). The final bill against harassment of women in the workplace was signed by President Zardari in 2010 (123). The final chapter then examines the unfulfilled promise of NGOs, especially in their complex and sometimes contradictory relation with the State. NGOs not only suffer from external challenges, especially in a conservative country like Pakistan, but Jafar also calls attention to other challenges faced by NGOs, whether in Pakistan or elsewhere: charges of elitism, unhealthy competition and rivalries (especially between advocacy and service NGOS), lack of networks and such, not to mention natural catastrophes which have struck Pakistan in recent years. Jafar ends on a cautiously optimistic note, showing that although some statistics for literacy and infant mortality are headed in the right direction, there is still much work to be done, and much of this work must be done by NGOs. The question is not only how to advance the cause of women, but how to do so in the context of poverty, political instability and traditional patriarchal and religious customs. Professor Jafar then concludes her book with a detailed note on her methodology and fieldwork, with an annex of the Workplace Act and extensive bibliography. Afshan Jafar's *Women's NGOs in Pakistan* will be of interest not only to scholars and students, but activists at all levels, from grassroots to federal policymaking, especially as proof that women's NGOs can and do flourish in some of the most improbable places.

The Parchment of Kashmir

Reviewed by David Taylor

Nyla Ali Khan ed., *The Parchment of Kashmir: History, Society, and Polity*, New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

A whole generation of young men and women has grown up in Kashmir since the beginning of the present troubles in 1989. For them, the omnipresence of security forces on the streets and in the countryside has always been the backdrop to their lives, as has the chaotic situation in neighboring Pakistan, unable to resolve its own internal struggles over its political values and processes. These harsh realities and the accompanying political and diplomatic stalemates have led many, especially but not only outside South Asia, to assume that the only lasting solution has in some sense to be based on the status quo, i.e. on the contingent outcome of the recurrent armed conflicts and present stand-off between India and Pakistan. The line of control may once again be renamed, as it was in 1972, and greater movement from one side to the other permitted, but in essence realpolitik will have determined the outcome. Yet at the same time, all the parties to the conflict, including the Indian and Pakistani states, try to capture and reinvent ideas about the past in order to ground and justify their current positions. Most strikingly, in the last few years there has been a contest to appropriate and own the idea of Kashmiriyat and turn it to partisan advantage. Several of the essayists in the present volume note this, and their pieces refine our understanding of the term and its use and misuse in current discourse. All of the contributors to the volume are Kashmiri intellectuals and writers, and with two exceptions are currently resident in the state. These are the editor herself, who is an expatriate Kashmiri based in North America, and one contributor from the Pandit community who is currently teaching elsewhere in India. The contributions therefore emerge very directly from debates among people who have lived together for centuries and who are trying to find a basis to continue to do so.

Several chapters cover the perhaps familiar ground of devotional religious traditions and their roots in Sufism and Shaivism and, even earlier, in Buddhist thought. Nund Rishi and Lal-Ded are together the focus of the chapters by M. H. Zaffar and Neerja Mattoo. As Mattoo puts it, 'syncretic creativity is the outcome of a reciprocal process of symbiosis', a process exemplified by the long tradition of Kashmiri mystical poetry. A more personal contribution by Mohammad Ishaq Khan pays tribute to the vitality of that tradition in the period before 1989, and to

its twentieth-century exponents whom he had known, men such as Hazrat Mohammad Ahsan Shah of Pampore. In perhaps the most thought-provoking piece in the volume, Rattan Lal Hangloo, conscious that many of his fellow-Pandits reject the concept of Kashmiriyat as a cover for Muslim-majority dominance in the Valley, subjects the concept to a rigorous examination. He shows clearly that there are distinct religious and cultural elements to it. While the former emerge from the mystical traditions discussed by Zaffar and Mattoo, writers such as T. N. Madan see Kashmiriyat as the outcome of quotidian interactions, economic, social, cultural and political, over a long period of time within a constricted geographical and ecological space that have led to a sense of mutual recognition and togetherness. Hangloo prefers the latter approach (which in fact can encompass the first). Strong regional traditions that transcend narrow religious boundaries are of course common across South Asia, but an understanding of the specific historical context in Kashmir helps us to understand why Kashmiriyat, in its various guises, has had such a strong hold on the popular imagination.

Kashmiriyat could also be the basis of a distinctive political approach. Since the 1930s a new middle class leadership emerged in the Vale of Kashmir, typified by Sheikh Abdullah himself. The idea of a strong, indigenous political and cultural identity could easily be used to protest against the arbitrarily imposed rule of the Dogra dynasty. Rekha Chowdhary's valuable piece emphasizes how the relatively radical demands made by the National Conference, including the land reform measures implemented immediately after 1947 which went further than anything contemplated in India at that time, reinforced the sense of the region's distinct identity. Accession to India, in the eyes of Sheikh Abdullah and his followers, was to be a way of facilitating further economic and social reform for the people of the state within a federal union. Kashmiris could move at their own pace and not be held back by less progressive parts of the country.

External ideologies, based on communally constructed identities, have increasingly challenged and undermined the strength and coherence of the concept of Kashmiriyat, and some of the younger generation reject it altogether as a device to reinforce their subordinate status. It has also, as a number of the contributors emphasise, been undermined by the actions of the Indian state, not simply its policy since 1989 of using overwhelming force to repress political dissent, but its earlier attempts to manipulate local political processes, starting from the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953 and his replacement by renegade members of his own party. As in other parts of the world, manipulation of the political process for short-term advantage leads in the end to the rise of more powerful and more irreconcilable challengers.

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Twin Poets who Lived Apart: Nazim Hikmet and Faiz Ahmed

By Qaisar Abbas

It looks like a classic Bollywood movie of long-lost twins who were similar but lived apart from each other. Faiz Ahmed Faiz and Nazim Hikmet belong to the same tribe of the twentieth –century poets who excelled in romanticism with a touch of ideological rendering in their poetic discourse. It is not only this juxtaposition of romanticism with an ideological commitment of their poetry but amazing similarities in their life-long experiences that bring them close intellectually while they lived in different parts of the world altogether.

Nazim Hikmet, a Turkish playwright, poet and novelists, is also known as a romantic revolutionary of his time who is famous for his lyrical and musical poetry deeply intertwined with love for his homeland, romantic devotion mixed with revolutionary idealization.

A poet of higher level of intellect who loved his people and culture, Nazim ironically spent most of his life either in jail or in exile and when he died he was better known in Europe than in his homeland Turkey.

Like Fiaz, Nazim also came from an influential family but he opposed class differences and economic disparities in his society. Nazim Hikmet was born in 1902 in Greece which was part of the Ottoman Empire at the time. His father was a government official in the Turkish foreign service in Greece. He started publishing poetry when he was 17.

He was raised in Istanbul but left the city after World War I to live in Moscow. He returned to Turkey after independence in 1924 and soon he was arrested for working for a left leaning journal but somehow he escaped to Russia again.

He came back to Turkey in 1928 after a general amnesty was announced where he published eight books of poetry working as a journalist, proofreader and translator. He was arrested again. It was his uncompromising struggle against the ruling elite that compelled him to escape dramatically from Turkey taking refuge

in the Soviet Union, never to come back again this time as he died in Moscow in 1963.

Most of his poetic work has been translated in English in six anthologies and biographies of known Turkish intellectuals “Portraits of People from My Land” published in 1936.

Reflection of his internal agonies of life, unconditional love for his people and homeland, opposition to tyrants of his society, and a selfless commitment to romance are the major themes of Nazim Hikmet’s poetry. His poem “After Release from Prison” poignantly looks at his life divided between prison, exile and his homeland:

Awake.
Where are you?
At home.

Still unaccustomed-
awake or sleeping-
to being in your own home.
This is just one more of the stupefactions
of spending thirteen years in a prison.

Who's lying at your side?
Not loneliness, but your wife,
in the peaceful sleep of an angel.
Pregnancy looks good on a woman.
What time is it?
Eight.

That means you're safe until evening.
Because it's the practice of police
Never to raid homes in broad daylight.

(Translation: Randy Blasing and Mutlu Konuk).

Romanticism is the soul of poetic reveries for both Nazim Hikmet and Faiz Ahmed Faiz where the reader can feel astounding similarities in the depth of their poetic imagery and their mastery over the lexicon and the metaphor they used.

Nazim in his poem "I think of You" fantasizes companionship of his beloved who, he thinks, is somewhere around him. But then he wakes up from the dream and realizes it was just his wishful thinking as there still exists a glass of distance between him and the beloved:

I kneel down and look at your hands
I want to touch your hands
but I can't
you are behind a glass
sweetheart
I am a bewildered spectator of the drama
that I am playing in my twilight.

(Translation: Anonymous).

Faiz was born in the undivided India near Sialkot in Punjab where his father came back from Afghanistan after serving the Afghan government as High Commissioner to the United Kingdom.

With master's degrees in English and Arabic he started teaching for colleges. His multifaceted personality and talent took him to a variety of professional responsibilities ranging from a professor of English to Editor of English and Urdu newspapers and journals to Prime Minister's Advisor on Education. He published nine poetry books and numerous articles and books in Urdu and English.

His poem "Dasht-e Tanhai" or "Desert of Solitude" depicts the same kind of emotional intensity, loyalty and high level of imagery that is also a hallmark of Nazim's poetry:

Through the desert of my solitude

The waning vision of your lips

In the waste of my solitude.

And beneath the dust and ashes of separation

blossom the jasmines and roses of your touch.

(Translation: Anonymous).

Both, in these two poems, feel the torment of separation from their beloveds and create an imaginary space to unite with them using an analogous poetic imagery and ecstasy.

Nazim and Faiz both struggled against tyrannies of their time and the ruling elite of their societies. Both joined armed forces of their country and then got out to be part of the ongoing political struggle for freedom in their societies. Nazim worked for Mustapha Kamal Pasha's freedom movement and left it. Faiz, on the other hand, joined the British Army to fight against fascist regimes of Mussolini and Hitler and left the institution to go to his homeland to witness freedom from the colonial power. Earlier, he played a pivotal role in the Progressive Writers' Movement in India which became a paramount intellectual force for freedom fighters.

Nazim went to Moscow to study economics and sociology and came back to his homeland to be imprisoned for his revolutionary thoughts. His poem "A Sad State of Freedom" recognizes the immense agonies of his life where freedom becomes a fallacy, only to be imprisoned again:

You love your country
as the nearest, most precious thing to you.
But one day, for example,
they may endorse it over to America,
and you, too, with your great freedom--
you have the freedom to become an air-base.

You may proclaim that one must live
not as a tool, a number or a link
but as a human being--
then at once they handcuff your wrists.
You are free to be arrested, imprisoned
and even hanged.

There's neither an iron, wooden
nor a tulle curtain
in your life;

there's no need to choose freedom:
you are free.
But this kind of freedom
is a sad affair under the stars.

(Translation: Taner Baybars).

Faiz witnessed the freedom movement and finally saw the end of colonialism in India but he became extremely disenchanted with his rulers after independence. Nazim also became disillusioned with the insensitivities of rulers to their masses after achieving freedom from imperialism.

In the poem, "You Tell Us What to Do" Faiz looks distastefully at the newly acquired freedom after national independence:

When we saw the wounds of our country
appear on our skins,
we believed each word of the healers.

Besides, we remembered so many cures
it seemed at any moment
all troubles would end, each wound heal completely.

That didn't happen: our ailments
were so many, so deep with in us
that all diagnoses proved false, each remedy useless.

Now do whatever, follow each clue,
accuse whomever, as much as you will,
our bodies are still open.

Now tell us what we should do,
you tell us how to heal these wounds. (Translation: Agha Shahid Ali).

Nazim was imprisoned several times in his country but his arrest in 1940 became a worldwide outcry by the known intellectuals of his time like Pablo Picasso and Jean Paul Sartre. Nazim's poem "Since I have been in Jail" narrates his ordeal and distrust toward the system:

They whose number is as great
as ants on earth
fish in the water
birds in the sky
are fearful and brave
ignorant and learned
and they are children.
And they who destroy and create
It is only their adventure in these songs
And for the rest,
for example, my lying there for ten years,
It's nothing.
(Translation: Anonymous).

In a new country, Pakistan, which came into being in 1947, Faiz was arrested and imprisoned for four years just after independence in 1950 for his alleged coup attempt against the government.

He was arrested again during the first Martial Law in 1958. He opted to leave the country, however, when the second dictatorial regime of Genral Ziaul Haq came to power. He lived in Beirut where he edited the Afro Asian quarterly journal, Lotus, from 1978 to 1983. When he returned back to his homeland, he died there in 1984.

Amazingly, Faiz also felt the same kind of distrust toward his rulers in one of his poems he wrote in the prison. Looking out of the prison window at night the poet appears to be thrilled with the moonlight coming down the staircase of stars conveying the message of tranquility. He continues:
Bluish shadows coming down
to reach green bends of my heart.
Creating waves of agony each time
I remember my lover.

The life looks so lovely at this moment.

And those tyrants pouring poison into life

might command darkness

to march to the alleys where lovers meet

but tell me

can they snuff the moon?

(Translation: Qaisar Abbas).

The World Council of Peace gave Nazim Hikmet the International Peace Prize along with Pablo Picasso, Pablo Neruda and other renowned intellectuals. Faiz was the first Asian poet to receive the Lenin Peace Prize, awarded by the Soviet Union in 1963. He was also nominated for the Noble Peace Prize before his death.

A product of the era when Soviet Union emerged as an unchallenged champion of socialist and progressive ideologies, both poets had an unprecedented and romantic commitment to this philosophy. In this sense they had amazing similarities in their life and work. These similarities can be seen not only in their struggle against colonialism but resistance to their own governments after independence. Their poetry, therefore, became a chronicle of this duel resistance.

Despite their similarities of thought and life experiences, however, both selected different structural formats for their poetic discourse. While Faiz continued and popularized a traditional format within the structural limitations of Ghazal, Nazim gave away the syllabic-meter style for free-a verse structure. But he never lost touch with lyrical and rhythmic traditions of Turkish poetry giving a unique musical grandeur to his poetry.

Comparison: Life and Work of Faiz Ahmed Faiz and Nazim Hikmet

Faiz Ahmed Faiz	Nazim Hikmet
Born in 1911 in undivided India in an influential family	Born in 1902 in Greece as part of the Turkish Empire, in an influential family
Died in 1984 in Pakistan at the age of 73	Died in 1963 in Soviet Union at the age of 61

Father was an Afghan ambassador to U.K.	Father was a Turkish diplomat in Greece
Joined the British army but resigned later	Joined the army of Mustapha Kamal Pasha but resigned later
Studied Arabic and English in Lahore	Studied Economics and Sociology in Moscow
Wrote 9 poetry collections and other books which were translated in several languages	Wrote 8 poetry collections and other books which were also translated in several languages
Used traditional syllabic-metric structure in poetry	Used a modern, free verse structure in poetry
Favorite poetic themes include romance, resistance, freedom, human rights, poverty, homeland and incarceration	Favorite poetic themes include romance, resistance, freedom, human rights, poverty, homeland and incarceration
Worked on multiple positions including journalist, professor, advisor to prime minister, government administrator	Worked on multiple positions as proofreader, translator, writer and teacher
Imprisoned in 1951 and 1958 and self-exiled to England and Beirut	Imprisoned in 1924 and 1928 and self-exiled to Moscow 3 times
Received Lenin Peace Prize from the Soviet Union and several international awards	Received International Peace Prize from the World Council of Peace and several international awards

When Faiz was entering into the realm of poetry, Nazim was already an established poet at par with other world-renowned writers and poets. By the time Faiz became a known Urdu poet of the Subcontinent, Nazim was touching the mirage of his popularity in the socialist hall of fame.

When Nazim died, the poetic and intellectual atmosphere in the Subcontinent was ready for a Nazim Hikmet of its own.

Faiz filled this void perfectly with his charm, poetic finesse and intellectual maturity. He used traditional heritage of Urdu poetry to create literary marvels suitable for his time while adjusting to the modern pathways of English poetry.

Faiz admired Nazim Hikmet as a stalwart poet and a charismatic role model of his time. He paid glowing tributes to him by rendering Nazim's poem "A Letter from Prison" into Urdu, which was also his own life story:

My love, let me share
This most delicate matter with you:
A man is altered by a new home.

Here I've begun to fall in love with my dreams:
for at night when sleep,
with her warm, compassionate hands, opens the gate,
the prison walls collapse at my feet.

At that moment I 'm drowned in my dreams
the way a ray falls into still waters.

I walk out and roam free,
filled with relentless joy-
how freely I roam
In wide, lit up spaces
where no word is found for sorrow and pain,
no word for prison.

"Then how crushing it will be
for you to wake up?"

No, that isn't to-my love!
Let me tell you one more thing:

with sheer strength, with stubborn will,

I bestow only those dreams on my sleep

that it has already claimed,

the ones that are its necessary share.

(Translation: Agha Shahid Ali)

The twin poets still remain the twentieth century icons of romantic and revolutionary poetry who continued their political struggles through unmatched poetic discourse and exemplary ideological commitment throughout their life.

Such was the resemblance of twin poets who lived apart from each other, in a different world but singing a similar song against atrocities and inequalities of their time.

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A Note on the Poetic Aesthetic of Faiz

By Aysha Munira Rasheed

Faiz's poetry is replete with motives founded on two kinds of "*Ishq*". "*Ishq*" is passion, joy, misery, ecstasy, storm and zeal and much more. For want of a better word in English, 'Love' may be used as a translation of "Ishq". Love for the beloved as well as for the proletariat, working class or the slaves makes his poetry as enigmatic and bifocal as it can be. Faiz's espousal of a classless society has a robust conscious voice in his poetry. Initiated into Marxism at an early stage of life, Faiz champions the cause of the deprived, the underdog "yeh galion ke awara bekar Kutte"[1] in a vindictive and relentless tone marked with a burning spirit of revolution. His voice is robust with optimism, courage and strength. It is evidently the voice of a man who has the taste of hard work and sweat in his protoplasm. Faiz himself recounts that his father was made to work hard not only as a shepherd at the tender age of five in his village KalaQadir and but also as a porter at Lahore. Sultan Bakhsh (later called Sultan Mohammad Khan) survived as the fittest in the Darwinian world and later turned into a Barrister and ambassador of Afghanistan in England [2]. Faiz's initiation into Marxism marks a turning point in his life from educated elite with the awareness of the plight of the poor to a vehement advocate of the rights of the masses. Nevertheless, Faiz could never root out his Oriental romanticism from his heart (as it could be fatal for a poet of the East for the simple reason that it the raison d'être of Oriental poetry). Thus, he turned into a poet who feels the perpetual dilemma and a kind the tug-of-war taking place in his heart and mind between his twin predilections. V. G. Kiernan with a marked Orientalist contempt, comments:

> Two images jostled each other in his mind: the famished pauper dying of disease in the gutter, the languishing mistress with stained eyelids and powdered cheeks gazing at herself in the mirror of the feudal romanticism. In them he saw life's two opposing magnets, the one

[1] FAiz Ahmad FAiz. *Nuskha Hai Wafa*. New Delhi: educational Book House. 2009. P.71

[2] Raees, Dr. Qamar "Faiz ke Do Ishq". *Shabistan* vol 207 208, New Delhi: Shama. P.69

> drawing him by his positive, progressive self, the other by his backward, unregenerate self".[3]

Despite having a strong proclivity for egalitarian values, Faiz's literary instinct could not contemplate writing in an "Urdu coarsened and merged with Hindi into a 'Hindostani' lingua franca of marketplace"[4]and he chose to follow the beautiful yet "winding" road of Persian vocabulary, that led into the heart of Central Asia and into luxurious dream-world of goblet and minaret, rose and houri [sic]"[5]. The language used in Faiz has in no way any aspiration to be simple in the spirit of Wordsworth's "poetic diction"; his imagery is oriental, full of sensuousness; his allusions are drawn on Semitic tradition with revolution envisioned as apocalypse and his vision of the ideal society Marx-inspired. It is aesthetically appealing and rhetorically most inspiring poetry that embalms and soothes a reader, sick and tired of the mundane and gives her/him one of the best aesthetic experiences available in Urdu, on one hand, and stirs and moves her/him into a revolutionary zeal, on the other.

Faiz's attempt is to sensitize not only the class of people who are trained and groomed to appreciate and value what is considered aesthetic and cultural capital[6], but also the real proletariat including the lowest strata e.g. the factory workers and Tonga puller. The message for the downtrodden proletariat to rise up and raise voice against centuries of oppression, exploitation and tyranny is encoded in a language that is an admixture of the simple and the complex. Ironically, it is very much unlikely if not impossible for the proletariat to have the required taste and knowledge to unpack the real potent of Faiz's message.

It will draw very few instances of empirical contestation to say that taste is a matter of one's class and one's social place and that it is an acquired disposition.

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[3] Kiernan, V. G. (tr.) *Poems by Faiz Ahmad Faiz*. New Delhi: People's Publishing House (Pvt) Limited. 1958. P.8

[4] Ibid. p.7

[5] Ibid. p.7

[6] Bordieu *Forms Of Capital.* 1984. Source. *Knowledge Policy*. in J. Richardson (Ed) HAndbookof Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education (Nw York, Greenwood),pp 241-258. Tr. By Richard Nice. http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/bourdieu.htm. accessed on 08.11.2009.

Pierre Bordieu in *Distinctions: A Social Critique of the Judgement of the Taste* (1984) says:

> Taste is a practical mastery of distributions which makes it possible to sense or intuit what is likely (or unlikely) to befall — and therefore to befit — an individual occupying a given position in social space. It functions as a sort of social orientation, a 'sense of one's place', guiding the occupants of a given place in social space towards the social positions adjusted to their properties, and towards the practices or goods which befit the occupants of that position".[7]

Without any validation for essentialist explanation of the class and taste, it definitely warrants acceptance that inculcation and acquisition of taste is a matter of social orientation according to one's social space where an individual moves, acts and hinges as a social agent, a part of the social system. The aesthetic taste is not primarily dependent on an individuation process but rather upon a 'sense of one's place'.

With this approach to the aesthetic taste, reading Faiz or any aesthetic thinker/ practitioner lead to the birth of certain problems. Faiz's "Intesab"[8] with its special tribute to those belonging to the lower strata in the social hierarchy namely the moribund clerks, the postmen, the Tonga puller, the engine drivers, the factory workers, the kingly and divine representative farmers and the sleepless mothers of hungry children enunciates his sincere concern for and occupation with the underdog (pun intended including the literal and figural meanings corresponding to the literal translation of the English phrase into Urdu). Faiz's burlesque on Iqbal's "Tarique ki Dua", "Kutte"[9] reveals the metaphorical association of the dogs with the hard-working labourers, hardly sentient and cognizant human beings, similar to Arnold's men living in "a brazen prison", "With their heads bent o'er their toil, they languidly / Their lives to some

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[7] Bordieu, Pierre. "Classes and Classifications". Source. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of the Taste.* (1979) tr. Richard Nice, published by Harvard University Press, 1984, 604pp. – selected from pp. 466-484. http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/bourdieu.htm accessed on 08.11.2009.

[8] Faiz, "Dedication". *Nuskha Hai Wafa*. New Delhi: educational Book House. 2009. P.79

[9] Faiz, "Dedication". *Nuskha Hai Wafa*. New Delhi: educational Book House. 2009. p.79.

unmeaning taskwork give, / Dreaming of nought beyond their prison wall"[10]. In the oriental context, dogs are chiefly looked at with contempt. The pun with the word 'underdog' is easily discernible. The play between the sign and the signified privileges the former for the elite aesthete and Faiz comes out with flying colours when rendered into music or even in a common leisurely read or recitation. On the other hand, the full potent of his message escapes the attention of a significant part of his audience. '*Dahqan'* in all probability is unmindful of the fact that he is '*dahqan*' (farmer) and '*naib fi arzillah*' (vicegerent on earth)[11]. That history has witnessed changes/revolutions in the hands of such people, in no way, warrants a complete shift or transformation in the distribution of aesthetic judgement as a form of capital. As capital is also "accumulated labor"[12] and not only a fickle and freaky incident possible in relation to hard work and chance.

Any hope and prospect about revolution is based upon a Utopian assumption of a "world without inertia, without accumulation, without heredity or acquired properties, in which every moment is perfectly independent of the previous one, every soldier has a marshal's baton in his knapsack, and every prize can be attained, instantaneously, by everyone, so that at each moment anyone can become anything"[13] barring that aesthetic value inextricably embedded in the Faiz's message is a part of what is beset with "the set of constraints, inscribed in the very reality of that world, which govern its functioning in a durable way, determining the chances of success for practices"[14]. The set of constraints which is not dependent on chance as much as it is on durable practice may hinder access to Faiz's poetry for a large part of his audience. It is a form of capital that does not depend on accidental occurrences as may happen in a world without any link to the past, a world "without inertia" and "accumulation". It is a matter of gradual acquisition that may -though not necessarily always- span even lives of generations sometime. If it does not involve generations, at least the luxury of moments of leisure is what is necessary for an individual, busy pursuing, imbibing and internalizing aesthetic taste which is defined by the already elite class people.

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[10] Arnold, Matthew. Whispering Reeds: An Anthology of English Poetry. Ed. D. K. Barua. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 1975. p.79.

[11] Faiz *Nuskha Hai Wafa*. New Delhi: educational Book House. p.394

[12] Bordieu, *Forms of Capital.*

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

Education and aesthetic sense are a part of what Bordieu calls cultural capital. Aesthetic sense cultivated and refined has the ability to convert into a form of capital easily in social field. This embodied form of capital gives fame, respectability and position which results in a more transcendental form of capital with more longevity. Set against Philistinism and Barbarianism[15], this refinement carves a durable niche for the social agents. Faiz Ahmad Faiz's Poetry, following the Oriental tradition of beauty and sounds, winding, meandering, and labyrinthine in its signification, in brief, displays a kind of aesthetic which may appeal to the literati and aesthetes of the East. As a matter of fact, this is true about all literature and its definition of an aesthetic. What is considered aesthetic of a time and culture is valued and acquired, endorsed, perpetuated and maintained as aesthetic of the future, blurring the mark between subjective and objective. Thus its acquisition demands more sustained labour and pays in terms of more durable and transcendental capital.

Aesthetic sense is a marker of class, with its close liaison with education and other cultural refinements. Major Is'haaq, Faiz's fellow inmate compares his assignment of writing Preface to Faiz's *Roodad-e-Qafas* with having been given a white elephant, a task too formidable and ambitious for the status of the son of a peasant:

> Ek kisan aur khas kar nau aabadiyati mulk ke kisan ke bete ki tarbiyat hi kya hoti hai. Dehati schoolon ki taleem aur woh bhi tawahhum parasti aur jehalat ke ghenaune saayon tale' aise mahol mein jis tarah ghurbat o naadari ke tufail parhne likhne ki nisbat hal ki lakeer seedhi rakhna' dhurdhnagar ki negahbani karna aur bailon ke liye chara lana zyada qadar ki nigah se dekha jata hai... [16]
>
> What can be the standard of cultivation of the son of a farmer and especially a farmer of a newly established country? Education in rustic schools and that too under the darkness of detestable superstition and ignorance, where owing to abject poverty, ploughing and tilling in the right direction and grazing the cattle is perceived as

[15] Arnold, Matthew. Culture and Anarchy: An Essay in Political and Social Criticism. 1989. http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4212. accessed on 9.9.10.

[16] Is'haaq, Major Mohammed. "Deebacha". *Nuskha Hai Wafa*. Faiz Ahmad Faiz. New Delhi: Educational Book House. 2009. P. 9-10.

> more valuable and important works than reading and writing... (translation mine)

Thus the association of Faiz's poetry with high culture and arts sounds formidable for the humble lesser beings (in which the above quoted writer is definitely not included, for all his modesty).

Nevertheless, in Faiz, there is a celebration of not only the intellect which is often a prerogative of the upper class that can afford time and energy to spend on and devote to the acquisition of intellectual prowess and aesthetic taste; but there is also a bonhomie about physical strength that the proletariat are more associated with as theirs is a real struggle of the body and its sustenance. Hands, mouth and lips, voice, a tall and erect body accustomed to hard work are the main sources of power. This celebration of body with its various manifestations of power, its moment of glory under the sun, its assertion in the form of sweat and blood is also reminiscent of Aristotelian idea that *metics* were ruled by minds whereas slaves by bodies. [17]

Faiz's use of the allusion to the Semitic idea of apocalypse in a figural signification of a complete revolution of the proletariat is an evidence of Derrida's proposition "iterability alters"[18]. Drawn on the concept of Judgement Day, this apocalypse, a day of revolution is customized by the writer as a day of reward and punishment for the oppressed and the oppressor respectively. The poem with the Quranic tiltle "*Wa Yabqa Wajho Rabbik...*"[19] and the entire description of the event seems to have put forth the concept of Doomsday akin to the Quranic description (e.g. *Quran* 81:3, 99:1) as a more "universal", "normal" and "central"[20] case while the Revolution may be considered "peripheral", marginal or "derivative" from the concept of the Day of Judgement. This day of Devine Judgement is a promise given by Quran which may prove a source of great consolation for the deprived underdogs of the human world with an idea of a life

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[17] Day, Gary. *Class*. London and New York: Routledge. 2007.p.3.

[18] Derrida, Jaques. *Limited Inc*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 1977.p.62.

[19] Quran 55:27

[20] Balkin,JackM."Deconstruction." http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/articles/deconessay.pdf> accessed on 05 Feb2011.

hereafter. However, keeping the ideological orientation of the writer in mind, this privileging of the former meaning over the latter dissolves and an earthly and human revolution emerges as more privileged meaning in Faiz's text than the Revelations. The former meaning conflicts with the idea of an earthly and secular day of retribution making the fault lines apparent between the conflicting voices. At the same time it provides with a model for its figural, rhetorical and graphic effects.

As a denouement to this discussion, this is to add that Faiz's poetry enthuses many and is appreciated by many. Some of his poems are in Punjabi aiming at the Punjabi peasantry. However, the question whether Faiz's appeal is really universal, cutting across language, religion and class borders cannot be answered in absolute terms. The aesthetic peculiar to Faiz that he perhaps shares only with Ghalib to a degree, involves an amalgamation of high and low styles and dictions. His conversational style admixes with Arab-Persian lexical chunks, demanding a sustained and durable effort at unpacking the meaning. It is something inevitable for his lack of control of the language that draws its aesthetic conventions from an atmosphere of intellectual hybridity resulting from its historical contact and association with Arabic and Persian, once languages of the intellectual as well as emotional make-up of the learned class of this subcontinent. A reading of his poetry against its grain reveals the fault lines inherent in his aesthetic. It is ironic that crux of his message is for the proletariat of the society who cannot read him with felicity as they lack the pre-requisite literary competence and are beyond the purview and leisure of reading sessions. Major Mohammed Is'haaq's "Roodad-e-Qafas" (Faiz *Zindan Naama* 9), epitomises warring nature of the ideology, theme and aesthetic that inheres Faiz's poetry. Mohammed Is'haaq's sense of honour associated with the task of writing an introduction to Faiz's poetry, his self-alleged plebeian background and his hyperbolic confession of nervousness for the said task (in a language that again belies the said words) affirms the opposing threads of potential interpretations that make apparent that the unity of his voice and theme remain elusive and indeterminate. The question whether Faiz may infuse the real underdogs with the real zeal, ardour and passion, as he talks about the uplift of their lot demands an attempt to affirm an answer or lack thereof. The paper is an experiment with the trailing of the fissures and gaps that leave any interpretation of Faiz's poetry indeterminate without undermining the effect it has on a particular class that controls, defines and patents aesthetic sense.

Faiz Ahmed Faiz's Salvific Ethics and the Uneven World

By Shabir Hussain Ganaie

gul hui jati hai afsurdah sulagti hui sham

dhul ke nikle gi abhi chasma-e mahtab se rat

aur … mushtaq nigahun ki suni jayaigi

aur … un ke hathoon se mas hoongai yeh

tarsai huvai haath

……

Yeh hasin khet phata padta hai joban jin ka

Kis liyai in mein faqat bhook uga karti hai

Yeh har ik simt pur asrar kadi divarein

Jal bujhe jin mein hazaroon ki javani ke charag

Yeh har ik gam pe in khwaboon ki maqtal gahein

Jin ke partau se charagan hain hazaroon ke damagh

……

Yeh bhi hain aisai kayi aur bhi mazmoon hoongai

Laikin us shokh kai aahista sai khultai huvai hoant

Haa-e us jism ke kambakht dilaavez khutoot

Aap hi kahiye kahin aisai bhi afsoon hoongai

Apna mauzoo-e –sukhan in ke siva kuch aur nahi

Tab-e – shayir ka vatan in kai siva aur nahi [i](best of faiz..p..39-41)

(This evening. Forlorn – its embers smouldering,

Out of the moon's spring will emerge night, cleansed –

And my eager eyes will be rewarded

As my impatient hands touch yours.

……

These luscious corn-fields bursting with youth –

Why do they yield hunger alone?

These impregnable, mysterious walls all around –

Within which

Were snuffed out the lamps of conutless young,

Hearts.

At every step, these abattoirs of dreams

Whose reflections have ignited the minds of multitudes.

All these themes are there indeed – and many nmore;

But the gently parting lips of that beauty –

And oh, the alluring contours of her body –

Now tell me yourself, could there be such witchery elsewhere?

Well, for me this is it –

A poet's mental province can be none other than this.) (Kumar 40- 42)

I have started this paper by quoting a few lines from the poem Mauzoo-e-sukhan. This is the poem where Faiz in his favorite way uses the love of his beloved to highlight the pain and misery of people around him. Seemingly it is romantic love which emerges as a dominant theme in this poem but this poem with its enchanting music and rhythm draws our attention to the hunger, social injustice,

oppression and the extreme sufferings of the common people. Faiz's ethics as they emerge in this poem are secular in nature. Love of his beloved helps him to cope with the uneven world but this does not mean escape from the reality. It induces a mood of contemplation in him, as he thinks about his country's emancipation from slavery (of different sorts).

Faiz was a secular saint concerned with the salvation of masses here and now. He thought that it is useless to separate oneself from the world of day to day affairs because it is this world which colors our dreams and aspirations. He was a citizen of the world and his poetry is very much embedded in the labors of the world here and now. He believed that the self of a human being is a tiny speck. It gets meaning as it relates itself with the myriads of selves inhabiting this vast universe. Though he had close association with several saints of his time and was a confirmed follower of Sufism, he had no beliefs and doctrines except the one that proclaims the coming age in which the disempowered/underprivileged and the oppressed class can live in peace and prosperity. He had progressive social and political beliefs and he gave voice to the voiceless in his poetry. In his poems he goes deep into the conscience of the suffering masses and lets his personal sorrow drink deep in the world sorrow. His poetry reflects his intellectual antipathy and battle against an unjust and outmoded social order and he discards it on logical grounds as anti-human; however his rebellion is sans bitterness. He symbolized the collective human struggle against the oppression and abhorred the injustice of all kinds as practiced by man upon man. His poetry expresses the desires, anguish, pain and suffering of humanity at a universal level. It also articulates his unrelenting determination to create a better and just society. He had a deep understanding of human existence in its entirety and wholeness. Faiz believed in the ethics of love, brotherhood, humanity, peace and mutual understanding. The fact is that Faiz sought to transform individuals and societies on the basis of love and affection. He symbolized all that is humane, noble, gracious, daring and challenging and he strove hard for the noble cause of making the world a better place to live. In the words of Shiv k Kumar,

"An irrepressible rebel, Faiz never submitted himself to any form of tyranny – political, social or religious. As a poet thinker, he believed that art should never be divorced from social reality."[ii]

He was deeply concerned about the health of his society in particular and for the whole humanity in general. He was the emissary of the soul and the feelings of people. For him salvation was in rebellion against the unjust order and he adopted the cause of masses as a poet of revolution. But his voice was distinct from other revolutionary voices. According to Khalid Hassan,

" Faiz was a Marxist, but what differentiated him from this often joyless and doctrinaire crowd was his profound humanism, steeped as it was in the rich tradition of the subcontinent's culture, literature and spiritual continuum. His poetry is a celebration of life and an affirmation of the law of change. He was man singularly devoid of prejudice. He fought bigotry, not with bigotry, but with tolerance." [iii]

In his poetry the concept of love and Revolution are merged together in one unity. But at the same time he believes love is not the salvation till the gap between have's and have not's is not bridged and the discrimination on the basis of wealth and class is not abolished. "Muj sae pahli se mohbat mere mehboob na mang" underscores the point that life can't be lived on the manna of transcendence provided by love. Life is a struggle, a power game where unless you keep watch you will be preyed upon by all kinds of vultures. There are other pains than the pain of love.

Anginat sadyon ke tarik bahimana tilsm

Resham-o-atlas-o-kimkhwab mein bunvayei huvai

Ja baja bikate huvai koocha o bazar mein jism

Khak mein lithdai huvai khoon mein naihlayei huvai

Jism nikle huvai amraz ke tannooron se

Peep baihti huvi galtai huvai nasooron se

Laut jati hai udhar ko bhi nazar kya kijey

Ab bhi dilkash hai tera husn magar kya kijey

Aur bhi dukh hain zamane mein mohabat ke siva

Rahatein aur bhi hain vasl ki rahat ke siva[iv]

(If there are spells of those dark, savage, countless centuries –

Bodies robed in silk, satin and velvet –

Then aren't there also bdies

Traded down streets and alleyways –

Bodies smeared in dust, bathed in blood

Bodies emerging from ovens of sickness

Bodies with the pus oozing from chronic sores?

If these images also seize my eye

Even though your beauty still enthralls.

It's because there are sorrows other than heartache,

Joys other than love's rapture

Sp ask me not for that old fervour, my love.) (Kumar 22)

The world must be made safe for love; until then the salvation lies in keeping head high in the world that demands none shall hold his head high and asks for the servility, submission and surrender of human freedom to keep the capitalists and feudal lords in comfort. He craved for the transformation of modern individual's psyche as he saw him wallowing in the mire of materialistic comforts. Faiz wishes that modern man realize the power of love and fellow feeling. He is involved with the experience of the human soul in the long and strenuous voyage of revolutionary struggle. Faiz saw and felt the pain of common people who were virtually living the life of dogs.

Yeh galyoon ke aavarah bekar kutai

Ki bakhsha gaya jin ko zauq-e-gadayi

……..

Jahaan bhar ki dhutkar in ki kamayi

Na aaraam shab ko na rahat savaire

……

Yeh har aik ki thokarein khanai walai

Yeh faaqoon se ukta kai marjanei walai [v]

(Tramping about the streets aimlessly, these dogs,

Born to the prerogative of beggary –

Their only treasure is the world's scorn

……..

Their only wages, the world's reproof.

Not a moment's respite, day or night –

……

They who suffer everybody's kicks,

Who'd tire and die of starvation. (kumar 36)

Capitalists threw a few crumbs of bread in order to let them survive so that they guard them (the way people in arms secure lives of ruling elite at the cost of their life, their family life, their dignity, their creative pursuits), feed them (the way farmers who despite being the real producers work for the rulers who are only parasites) and do other works for them. Faiz while working as an army officer met money lenders and land lords and saw how corrupt and rapacious a man can be. Faiz was witness to the bloodshed that followed partition. He saw human bestiality as man saw no sin in killing his own brethren. These episodes reinforced his belief that justice and love were the only remedy for making humankind live amicably and peacefully. Faiz highlights the agony of mankind and raises his voice in opposition to oppressive forces but he does it by playing the sweet melody of love. There is no hatred in his revolt. He doest not hate the oppressor. He hates the oppression. He fights evil by his moral courage. His message of love and justice has a universal appeal. It transcends the boundaries of culture and nationhood as it is available to all regardless of religion, race and color. His revolution is sans violence. It has no bloodshed accompanying it.

In the uneven world salvation is tied to removal of structural injustice. A hungry man has nothing to do with transcendence. He can't afford love and creative pursuits. In Zindan (prison) it is absurd to talk of heaven. The workers - you n me - must break the prison constituted by the walls of classes and ideologies in order to breathe in free air. In a world where loneliness and prostitution of body and soul crushes human personality there can be no scope for the perfection of ego that mystics or the poets like Allama Iqbal see as the meaning of salvation. But what is the alternative vision with the help of which to counter the uneven world? For him it is truth which can save us from the corrupt world. Truth can never die.

Humanity will prevail when truth gets its just place in the minds and actions of people.

Boal ki lab azaad hain terai

Boal,zaban ab tak teri hai

Tera sutvan jism hai tera

Boal ki jaan ab tak teri hai

……..

Boal, yeh thoada waqt bohat hai

Jism-o-zabaan ki maut se paihle

Boal, ki sach zinda hai ab tak

Boal,jo kuch kehna hai kehlai [vi]

(Speak up, for your lips are not sealed

And your words are still your own.

This upright body is yours –

Speak, while your soul is still your own.

……..

Speak up now, for time's running out.

Before your body and mind fade away,

Tell us, for truth is not yet dead.

Speak

Whatever you have to say! (Kumar 38)

These verses express Faiz's belief that we can overcome all the hurdles and that salvation constituted by life of creativity, love and freedom is possible and even on the cards. He is determined to hold his head high. Of course the fate or

historical forces may be stronger than the passion of the individual but in the words of Faiz:

Ham daikhain gai

Laazim hai ki ham bhi daikhain gai

……..

Jab zulm-o- sitam kai koh-e-giraan

Rooyi ki tarah ud jayein gai

……

Ham ahle safa, mardoode haram

Masnand pe bithayei jayein gai

Sab taaj uchaalai jayein gai

Sab takht girayein jayein gai

……..

Aur raaj karai gi khalq-e –khuda

Ham deikhain gai

Laazim hai ki ham bhi deikhain gai ..[vii]

(we shall live to see,

So it is writ,

We shall live to see,

……..

The day when the mountains of oppression.

Will blow away like wisps of cotton;

……

We, the rejects of the earth,

Will be raised to a place of honour,

All crowns'll be tossed in the air,

All thrones'll be smashed,

……

We, the people will rule the earth

We shall live to see,

So it is writ,

We shall live to see. (City 230-233)

These verses show imminent kingdom of heaven in the imagination of Faiz.

Faiz feels the life giving wind that fills buds with color and sings:

Guloon mein rang bhare bad-e naubahaar chale

Chale bhi aavo ke gulshan ka karobaar chale.

Faiz has no eschatological vision in the conventional sense but if heaven has to be won here and now as mystics assert, it consists in life of unconditional love, unbounded freedom and joy of creativity and it has to be realized in the world of space and time by action. No otherworldly salvation is possible as long as people continue to suffer in the external chains of slavery, hunger and oppression and the internal chains of desire and lust and continue to live in their own cocoons. For Faiz salvation has to be collective, unlike the concept of Mahayana Buddhism which demands postponing of salvation by arhant until the whole world conquers suffering. For him struggle must go on, the effort is salvation. Keeping hope is salvation.

Nahi wisal mumkin to aarzoo hi sahi

Namaze shoq tou wajib hai bewazoo hi sahi……..

Faiz has firm belief in the coming age of peace and prosperity, an age where there will be no scope for oppression. It will bring an end to the misery and despair of people.

chand roaz aur meri jaan faqat chand hi roaz

Zulm ki chaoon mein dam lainai pe majboor hain ham

……..

Laikin ab zulm ki miaad ke din thoadei hain

Ik zara sabr ki faryaad ke din thoadai hain

……

Arsa-e-daihr ki jhulsi huvi virani mein

Ham ko rahna hai, pa yoonhi tou nahin rahna hai

Ajnabi haathoon ka benaaam giranbaar sitam

Aaj saihna hai hamesha tou nahi sehna hai[viii]

(A few days more, my love, just a few days –

Are we fated to live in tyranny's shadow.

……..

But now the days of tyranny are numbered.

Just a little patience,

Since the days of entreaty are nearly done.

……..

In the scorched wasteland of life,

We'are destined to live, but not like this.

This nameless, heavy oppression of alien hands,

We may have to endure today, but not forever. (kumar 34)

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[i] Shiv K Kumar, trans; *The Best of Faiz* (New Dehli:UBSPD,2001),p. 39-41.

[ii]Shiv k Kumar, Preface to *The Best of Faiz*. p. viii.

[iii] Daud Kamal and Khalid Hassan, trans. ed. *O City of Lights: Faiz Ahmed Faiz* (Oxford: Oxford university press,2006) , p. 4.

[iv] *The Best of Faiz*. P.21.
[v] Ibid. , p. 35.
[vi] Ibid. , p. 37
[vii] *O City of Lights*. P. 231-233.
[viii] Best of Faiz. P. 33

Snow-pact

(Angel of North, Gateshead)

By Rizwan Akhtar

We made a pact on a blinding page of snow
under that giant shadowless angel
a myth of booming mettle
listens to our receding huffs
we pretend indifference, mundane gods
sneaking past its steeled life
our dwarfed existence complains
a surreal nod of time scatters love
in snapped landscapes
where emotions are flurries
we melt their ephemeral lives
one by one until it is over
a bird panics the activity
in the nearby tree
something makes them flap and mate
with a single beak and drenched feathers
so we are not alone, some woods, paths
bushes, homeless ,silent and wet
wait for our footsteps, our stories, our language
mutely taking notes on each side of the road
clasped by snow-sprinkled trees
authoring our exit
sealing it with a kiss
burrowing out lipped moments
with pick-ice barks and twigged scythes
against that fist of weather
squelching, puffing, rooting
reading that random matrix
of impressions on the covered earth
wind blotting out footprints
nudged by haze of centuries

holding it out to fantasies
and fears of loosing hands
denied of wings.

The Punjabi humor*

(in memory of Taufiq Rafat)

By Rizwan Akhtar

(i)

The sun is a burning ball with spikes
earth salt-white crumbling mask
the river Chenab avoids crowding hands
twirling his moustache like a harlequin
the farmer mounts on a tractor
sputtering the dumb-showof his life
chafing his sweating beard
belching mango-pickle-breath
with a chipped-teeth smile.

(ii)

The goats and dogs like stray troupes
graze passing patches of grass
sprinkle droppings and coiled turds
there mime is slow but sure
like the train crawling through fields
smoky beauty honking dazed buffaloes
and complicit electricity poles.

(iii)

Huddled on a scrubby charpoy
mouths sank in bowls of curdling
no longer old men consider medicines
cough phlegm on a brown soil
the breeding stage of their anecdotes
crackling and sleepy.

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Heer-Ranjha: A Folk Tale from Pakistan

Translated by Muhammad Sheeraz

About *Heer-Ranjha*:

For centuries, the Chenab River has been flowing through the soils of the Punjab, the land of five rivers, and its fast and furious waves have told tales of love and romance. *Heer-Ranjha* is one of the tales told in unison by the waters of the Chenab. The eternal season of love arrived in the Indian subcontinent a few years before the arrival of the Mughals in India in the early 16th century. Some of the tale-tellers assert that it belongs to Behlol Lodhi's era during the second half of the 15th century, but whichever era it belongs to, the timeless tale of *Heer-Ranjha* is told and heard with the same keenness today. This romance happened in the city of Jhang situated near the River Chenab. It is said that the river flowed nearer to the city in the past than where it is today.

The celebrated legend of *Heer-Ranjha* remained a part of the glorious oral literature of the Punjab. It was immortally recounted in Punjabi, popularly as *Heer Waris Shah*[1] by Sufi poet Waris Shah (1722-1798). Waris Shah's poetic version of the tale was translated into English by Charles Frederick Usborne (1874 – 1919) as *Waris Shah: The Adventures of Hir and Ranjha*[2].

The folk tale has also been made into several memorable Pakistani and Indian films in the Urdu, Hindi and Punjabi languages, with different titles such as *Heer*, *Heer Ranjha* and *Heer Sial*, etc.

The major source text for the present translation, however, was the Urdu prose version of Shafi Aqeel, included in his book called *Pakistan kee Lok Dastanain* (Folk Tales of Pakistan) published in 2008 by National Language Authority Pakistan.

[1] See http://folkpunjab.com/kalam/waris-shah/
[2] See http://www.apnaorg.com/books/english/heer-ranjha/heer-ranjha.pdf

Translation:

ONCE upon a time, when Jhang used to be a small town, people belonging to a caste called Siyal resided there. Mahr Choochak was the *chaudhary*[3] of the town. The heroine of the romance was none other than his loving daughter, Heer, who is alive in many warm hearts even today. In this town of Siyals, Heer and Ranjha fell in immortal love, here the tale of their romance started, here their love reached its climax, here it met its tragic end.

The tale was actually initiated in District Sargodha, the birth place of Deedu Ranjha – the hero. In this district, there was a town called Takht Hazara where Moazzam, known as Moju, was the *chaudhary*. Moju was a noble landlord belonging to a caste called Ranjha Jat. He had eight sons with Deedu being the youngest of all. Owing to his caste, Deedu is known as Ranjha. All of his seven brothers were married but Ranjha was single yet. Moju Chaudhary had great love for Ranjha, partly because of his being single, partly because of being his father's old-age child, and mainly because of his beauty and innocence. Therefore, Ranjha was brought up by Moju Chaudhary with great love and care. Unlike his brothers, Ranjha didn't take any interest in farming. So he neither learnt how to plough nor how to sow and reap. He knew just one thing and that was playing magic with his musical instrument –the flute. With continuous practice, he got such a mastery over it that whosoever heard it was hypnotized. He would go from place to place and entertain the people of his town with the sweet melodies of his flute. His brothers loved him, yet they wanted him to help them in the fields. They would often complain:

"We work hard the whole day, and he wastes all his time on his flute."

However, until their father, Moju, was alive, Ranjha's brothers and their wives kept their mouths sealed and couldn't harm him, but as soon as Moju breathed his last, their tongues were unlocked and they said to him:

"You have eaten much on charity, now you will have to do farming with us."

[3]Chief of the town

Although his sisters-in-law greatly liked him, they also didn't approve of his idleness and rather said:

"Why does he sit home and eat free bread? Now, he must also work."

In the beginning, they would say all this in a relatively polite manner but gradually their tone changed and they started taunting and snubbing him. Finally, one day, his brothers distributed the lands in the presence of some elderly figures of the town for the sake of authenticity. Deedu Ranjha was given barren and uneven lands. After being ostracized from his own house, he tried to work hard on his piece of the land. But his upbringing was different from that of his brothers. His gentle hands were unable to do work on the hard lands in harsh weathers. His feet swelled after a brief labor on the fields. On the other hand, he had to listen to the harsh words of his brothers and their wives too, which was unbearable for him. He was feeling helpless now.

Eventually, one day, he said to himself: 'Now I can't live here; this town of Takht Hazara will not feed me anymore.'

At that time, he was young and famous for his attractive personality all around the region; on the other hand, there were many stories of the beauty of Heer from Jhang Siyal. Ranjha had also heard of her. One day, his eldest sister-in-law said sarcastically:

"Bring Siyals' Heer if you are so manly."

This challenging statement, somehow, got permanently imprinted on his mind. It induced a strange desire in his heart. In fact, the hour of his departure from his native town, Takht Hazara, had arrived. He picked his beloved flute, put a blanket on his shoulder, cast a farewell look at his house, and, invoking Allah's blessings, set on a journey towards Chenab – towards his love, towards Jhang, towards troubles. His exuberant youth and wavy locks, that touched his neck, made him look more beautiful than ever before. In the upcoming days of exile, the only companion to be was his flute, which he kissed, and left the town playing gloomy tunes on it. He had no destination, no particular path to follow. He came out of Takht Hazara, and then started moving southwards, lovewards.

On the way, whenever he felt tired, he would sit in the shade of some tree to take rest, play sweet melodies on his flute to feed his soul with some energy, and then proceed. Night fell when he was still on his way. Seeing a village nearby, he thought to himself: 'Why not pass the night in this village? I will resume my journey in the morning.'

He went straight to the mosque of the village, and found it so comfortable that he decided to stay there for a few days before going ahead. Unfortunately, he indulged in a quarrel with the Maulvi Sahib[4]on the first night of his stay there. An even worse blow to his plan was when some village girls visited the mosque in the morning to fetch water from its well. They saw Ranjha from Takht Hazara with their own eyes and fell in love with him. One of these girls was so madly in love with him that she went home and announced before her mother:

"I won't marry anyone in my life but this stranger staying in the mosque."

Finding her daughter under a serious love fever, the mother came to Ranjha and begged him to marry her daughter. But he was going to explore a different world – an unseen world, the world of Heer. He couldn't marry any girl other than her. So he had to refuse the proposal, and when the woman left for home, dejected, Ranjha thought: 'If I stay here anymore, I'll be caught in some trouble soon.'

So, very quietly, Ranjha left that village, and headed towards the River Chenab. He reached a place near the river where there was the *ghaat*[5]. Ranjha sat on one side to take some rest. From there, he could see houses, minarets of the mosques, and temples. On the other bank of the river, there stood Jhang, Heer's town, Ranjha's destination. After having taken some rest, he started playing his flute. The sweet voice of the flute, coupled with the mastery with which Ranjha played the tune, put even birds resting in the trees into a kind of ecstasy. In the meanwhile, a boat came towards the *ghaat* where Ranjha was sitting. The passengers in the boat had heard his sweet melody, and were as if under its spell. The boat drew nearer, and among other passengers, there were five saints on the boat. Happily, it is said, these five saints blessed Ranjha with Choochak's Heer!

[4]The religious figure who looks after the mosque and leads all the practices performed there.
[5]The point where people take boats to cross the river; a mini port; ora broad flight of steps leading down to the bank of a river

People started sitting on the boat as it was now ready to go to the other bank of the river. Ranjha went to the sailor and said innocently:

"I also want to go to the other bank of the river".

The sailor, whose name was Ludon, inquired:

"Have you got money to pay the fare?"

Ranjha said:

"No, I don't have any money", and then indifferently said, "Well, no matter, I'll swim across the river."

Upon hearing this, the passengers requested Ludon to let Ranjha get on the boat. Ludon also felt sympathy with him, and reluctantly nodded. As soon as the sailor started rowing and the boat started floating on the waves of the river, Ranjha began to play his flute. His melodies transformed the mood of the atmosphere. The passengers were so lost in the trance that they didn't even realize that they had reached the other bank. Ludon was also very pleased. When all the passengers had left, Ranjha asked Ludon:

"Who is this bed for?"

Ludon politely replied:

"This bed is for Mahr Choochak's loving daughter, Heer. She owns the boat, too. She does boating in this river once in a while."

Ranjha was tired of the long journey from Takht Hazara to the suburbs of Jhang. So he decided to take some rest on Heer's *palang*[6]. He was aware of the kind of spell that his flute had cast on the sailor. 'Why shouldn't I take some rest here on this boat,' he thought to himself.

He requested Ludon: "Allow me to sleep on this bed for a while. I'm dead tired."

Ludon knew if Heer arrived there to find Ranjha sleeping on her bed, she would mind it. He knew about her wrath very well. But Ranjha had also proved to be a

[6] A purpose made colorful bed, similar to charpoy

special guest. So he allowed Ranjha to sleep on her bed in the boat. Tired of walking a long distance on foot, Ranjha went into a deep sleep while Ludon got busy with his other work. It was a mere coincidence that just when Ranjha fell asleep on her bed, Heer reached the river with her friends. When she saw a stranger lying on her bed, she lost her temper and started shouting at Ludon.

"Who is sleeping on my bed? How dare you let a stranger do that?"

Heer and her friends had sticks in their hands which they used to hit Ludon. After that, it was Ranjha's turn to be punished. Swinging her stick in the air, Heer went towards her bed where Ranjha had got up due to the noise created by the girls.

"Who are you, and how dare you go to my bed?" angrily asked Heer. In response, they say, Ranjha simply lifted his head and placing his chin on his right wrist, looked into her eyes and kept calm. Exuberant youth, long, wavy and black shiny hair, pink face, and captivating smile on his lips were a feast for Heer.

"I'm a passenger. I was tired of the long journey to your town, so I slept on your *palang* for a while – but I'm sorry for this mistake", he said after a while.

But now, there was no need to apologize for the 'mistake'. Heer had surrendered herself to the magnetic charm of handsome Ranjha. Her fury was replaced with love. At that moment, she loved everything: the river, the jungle, the boat, the *palang*, her friends, and even Ludon. Ranjha had also reached his destination. Throwing her stick towards the bushes on the bank, Heer inquired sweetly:

"Who are you? Where have you come from? And where are you going?"

Ranjha was to go nowhere now as he had already reached his ultimate destination. Heer also realized this. She sent her friends away and sat with Ranjha on their bed. This way they loved each other – it was love at first sight. For a long time, they kept talking to each other as if they had been two complementary souls parted long ago. When Heer was about to leave, she said to him:

"I'll request my father to give you some job at my home. That will minimize the distances between us."

Mahr Choochak had many buffaloes and he was actually in search of a good servant. Heer, his beloved daughter, recommended Ranjha. Mahr Choochak at once appointed him to look after his cattle. So, Heer, very wisely, made it possible for them to meet with each other regularly. Now it was a matter of routine that Ranjha would shepherd the buffaloes everyday to the jungle on the bank of the Chenab River, and Heer, accompanied by her friends, would also reach there, and talk with him. A time arrived when, addicted to each other's sweet company, they were unable to live without each other. Heer would bring *choori*[7] with her that she would herself put in Ranjha's mouth with love. He, in turn, would play his flute and entertain her.

Love and fragrance can't be concealed, they say.

Their love also couldn't be kept hidden. Gradually, the romance started becoming the talk of the town. In the beginning, people mentioned it sotto voce but then they openly talked about it. Among them, Mahr Choochak's limping brother, Qaidu, was playing the leading role. He was a devil who did nothing but backbiting. He would spy on them every day. Eventually, one day, he spotted them sitting together in the woods. He came home and said to his brother Mahr Choochak: "Heer and Ranjha meet in the jungle. Their activities are shameful." Choochak had already received such complaints a couple of times but never believed in them as he trusted his daughter more than anyone else. He was not ready to pay attention to any such accusation. But, this time, the informant was his brother Qaidu. So, for the first time, Mahr Choochak was doubtful about his daughter. Still, he needed proof which Qaidu provided very soon.

One day, when Heer made choori for Ranjha and took it to him, Qaidu followed her in the disguise of a beggar and hid in the jungle away from them. When Heer went to fetch a glass of water for Ranjha, Qaidu went to her and begged for some *choori*, which she gave to him. He ran towards home and angrily threw the *choori* before Choochak, saying:

"Here take the proof. This *choori* is made only in your house and Heer takes it to Ranjha every day. I took some of it as alms. Don't you believe what I say?"

[7]A dessert made with chapatti, sugar and ghee.

Having seen the *choori*, Choochak was furious. But what could he do? It was his daughter's affair. His honor was at stake. He was afraid of the bad name that people would give to their family. In consultation with Qaidu, he fired Ranjha from his job immediately.

Mahr Choochak's buffaloes were now almost addicted to Ranjha's flute. Everyday he would play the flute and the buffaloes would follow him. Likewise, they used to come back to home on his flute-call. It is said that the buffaloes stopped grazing after Ranjha's departure, and rather were getting out of Choochak's control. On the other hand, Heer was in shock as she could never imagine parting ways with Ranjha. She would neither talk to anyone nor eat anything. She remained quiet all the time. Eventually, her mother took pity on her, and talked to Mahr Choochak:

"The enemies are blaming our daughter for nothing."

After a week, she diverted her husband's attention towards his buffaloes: "All the buffaloes are getting sick now. I suggest you should re-recruit Ranjha. He might not have left Jhang yet. You will never find such an obedient, selfless servant again."

Choochak was already repenting his decision of firing Ranjha. On the other hand, Ranjha, too, couldn't go away from Jhang. So, one day, Choochak sent for Ranjha and asked him to resume his duties the same day. Ranjha started shepherding Choochak's buffaloes again. But Heer's parents were on their guard now, watching Heer-Ranjha's activities carefully. Qaidu was again spying on them. Mahr Choochak, however, didn't pay much attention to what Qaidu reported. But it was their hard luck that one day Mahr Choochak himself saw Heer and Ranjha together in the jungle.

Seeing is believing.

What he saw was intolerable for him. At once, he invited all the elderly figures of the clan to his home and, with their consent, immediately accepted the marriage proposal for Heer, which he had already received from a clan called Kherras. Jubilant, all started preparing for Heer's wedding. But when Heer came to know about this arrangement, she became very sad. Among all the glow and glitter and

musical demonstrations that were being made ahead of the wedding day, Heer cried bitterly from dawn to dusk and told her mother blatantly:

"I'll marry Ranjha and nobody else. That's my decision."

But now nobody was going to pay heed to what she said or did. Her only companion who could have listened to her was Ranjha but he had been fired again by Choochak, and had left the town.

In Muzzaffargarh region, there was a small town called Rungpur, where Chaudhary Aju was the chief of Kherra clan which was also related to the Siyal Rajputs of Jhang. It is said that one of the forefathers of the Siyal Rajputs, called Rai Siyal, had embraced Islam in the hands of respected Chishti Sufi saint Hazrat Baba Fareed Ganj-e-Shakar in 1258 AD. A man called Mal Khan is believed to have established Jhang. Aju Chaudhary also belonged to a sub-caste of Siyals and his son Saeda Kherra was going to marry Heer of Siyals. Heer's parents were trying to marry her away as soon as possible and had, therefore, fixed a date for the wedding ceremony in haste. The Kherras were preparing to bring their Barat– the wedding party – with a lot of pump and show. Heer cried; she begged that she should not be married off in such a hurry; swore her life – but it was too late now. On the due date, the Kherras arrived with a lot of arrangements to take their daughter-in-law, Heer, with them to Muzzaffargarh. All the people of Jhang joyfully took part in Heer's wedding ceremony. Both the parties were overjoyed. Heer's clan was happy because their daughter was going to be a part of the Chaudhary Aju's family, whereas the Kherras were happy because they were going to have the beauty of the town as their daughter-in-law. However, while all of them were enjoying themselves with the ceremonies, Heer was in a wretched state. There was no one to sympathize with her, no one to console her and nobody asked what she wanted, except when the Qazi came to her before reciting the Nikkah[8] of Saeda Kherra and Heer Siyal:

"Do you accept Saeda Kherra, the son of Aju Chaudhary, to be your husband?" asked the Qazi as a formality.

[8]Religious obligation of public announcement using the given words bonding man and woman into a new relationship of husband and wife

"No, I don't. My *nikkah* has already been recited. It was when five *peers*[9] had given my hand to Ranjha while he was still on the other bank of the Chenab."

But her rejection was of no use because the *nikkah* registrar, instead of fulfilling his religious obligation, was following his master, Mahr Choochak's orders. Heer kept on crying but forcefully she was married off to Saeda Kherra. Her cries were buried under the noise made by the people who were greeting Mahr Choochak and Saeda Kherra. The Kherras put Heer in the *doli*[10] and with a lot of festivity departed for Rungpur. Part of her, however, remained in Jhang, for Ranjha. Ranjha's life was also destroyed when the Kherras took Heer away from him. His mind stopped working. He was left with nothing – no charm in life, no aim, no destination, no reason to stay alive. First, he thought of going to Rungpur after Heer but it would do no good except for adding troubles to his Heer's life. So, embracing Heer's love, he kept wandering about in Jhang for few days. This madness was not without method though. He stayed in Jhang to have ready access to some news, whatsoever, about Heer. However, one day, he became very gloomy and left for his own town, Takht Hazara.

His brothers and sisters-in-law had written many letters to Heer and requested her to send their brother back to Takht Hazara lest he was harmed by the Siyals of Jhang; yet, when he actually returned home, Ranjha was not received warmly by his brothers and sisters-in-law. It was so perhaps because they had also come to know about Heer's wedding with Saeda Kherra and couldn't accept the loss. They wanted to see Heer with Ranjha. Ranjha realized that there was no place on earth left for him in which to live. He was sick of this life. He was alive because the incense of Heer's memory was still burning in his heart. But reaching her still seemed impossible.

At last, one day, driven by some unknown force, he started moving towards Jhelum wherein a village called Tilla of Jogis, there lived the most famous *jogi*[11]

[9] Sages, dervish
[10] A small sedan purposefully well decorated to carry the bride
[11] Ascetic, sadhu

of that time, Guru Ball Nath, who used to bless people visiting him with his *jog*[12]. Ranjha went to see the Guru and requested him:

"Guru Ji, I want to become your *chela*[13]."

The Guru read Ranjha's beautiful face and concluded that he was brought up in a much pampered manner.

"One needs to bear a lot of hardships in order to become a chela, has to undergo tough tests. How can a gentle creature like you face all such troubles?"

Ranjha narrated his sad love story and told him how he had undergone many sufferings already. Guru Ball Nath, after having listened to his tale, thought to himself: "He has already experienced the bitter realities of life. He has already trodden those dangerous paths which are necessary to qualify for jog."

He ordered Ranjha to come close, placed his hand on Ranjha's head, gave his blessings, and accepted him as his chela. Immediately, thereafter, Ranjha's ears were pierced and earrings were put in them. His Self was dyed in the color of the jog. Ranjha was lucky to have got this jog in a few minutes. For some days, he stayed at his Guru's *asthan*[14], and then with his Guru's consent, left for Rungpur, the real motive behind his jog.

In the suburbs of Rungpur, there was a garden called Kala Bagh –the black garden. Ranjha decided to camp in the garden. He made a small hut and started practicing his jog. On the second day, he took his *kashkol*[15] in his right hand and started walking in the streets of Rungpur with a mission to locate and have access to Heer. The news of a beautiful young *jogi*'s arrival in Kala Bagh started spreading in Rungpur. It also reached Heer's sister-in-law, Sehti, who was Heer's confidante. Out of curiosity, Sehti went to visit Kala Bagh along with her friends. There, she witnessed Ranjha's captivating beauty in the guise of a *jogi* – a young man wearing the *jogi* costume but behaving differently from other *jogis*. She

[12] The practice of being a jogi
[13] A follower, a servant
[14] Place, ascetic's household
[15] Begging bowl

started talking to him with an intention to extract the truth behind this jog. She even argued with him to know the *jogi*'s reality.

On her return, Sehti expressed her doubt before her sister-in-law, Heer, at home telling her that there was a wonderful *jogi* staying at Kala Bagh, and that it seemed as if he did so in order to hide his identity. Heer, having firm faith in Ranjha's love, started thinking that it could be Ranjha in the disguise of a *jogi*.

On the other hand, Ranjha didn't know where Aju Chaudhary's house was, and he could not inquire anyone about it. So, he had to wander about all the streets of Rungpur, scanning all the houses for Heer. Eventually, one day, his fortune brought him to Aju's doorstep. He raised a jogi slogan and then begged.

"Give some food to this *faqeer*[16] in Allah's name; He will give you the best return."

Hearing the *alakh*[17] slogan, Sehti went to the door and opened it. She was stunned to find the *jogi* from Kala Bagh standing in front of her. Impulsively, she brought some grains, and put them into Ranjha's begging bowl. But Ranjha was not there for alms. He was there to have a look at his Heer – his life, his world. His eyes were in search of someone, Sehti noted. Cheerful and lovely Sehti finally said softly:

"You got the alms; now go away."

But how could Ranjha leave without having the alms of Heer's sight? He dropped his bowl deliberately. Everything in the begging pot was scattered in the lawn, and Ranjha started shouting at her:

"You have dropped the alms of this poor beggar. You are so proud of your beauty …You don't fear Allah… Fear this beggar's curse, I warn you."

No doubt Sehti was beautiful but she wasn't proud of her beauty. She was proud only of her love – Murad Baloch. At first, she was perplexed by the accusations of

[16] A mendicant dervish
[17]The Invisible, the Creator; a slogan to announce His oneness

the *jogi*, but then she also replied angrily, and started quarrelling with the *jogi*. After all, Choudharys' blood ran through her veins too.

Noticing the noise, Heer came out of her room. This was what Ranjha had longed for. His dramatic act made his dream come true. Heer saw the *jogi* while his eyes drank from the lavish sight of Heer. Both identified each other, exchanged smiles. Ranjha extended his bowl towards her, she squeezed herself as if trying to pack her in the bowl. Sehti could see Heer-Ranjha's souls in love with each other.

Ranjha's plan had perfectly worked. He went back happily to his hut in Kala Bagh, and Heer got another life. Since her arrival in Kherra's house, Heer was alive because of the belief that Ranjha would, one day, come to Rungpur and take her away from there. And now he had come. All this while, Heer had not allowed Saeda Kherra to even touch her. Her sister-in-law, Sehti, had been a great support. She was her trusted friend. So Heer told Sehti the truth:

"He's not a *jogi*; in disguise, he's my Ranjha."

Sehti could understand as she was herself in love with Murad Baloch. She also needed Heer's help to reach Murad Baloch. So she started arranging secret meetings for Heer and Ranjha. One day, she did a do-or-die act. She took Heer to the fields, along with her other friends. There, Heer's foot fell on a thorn and started bleeding. Sehti manipulated it into an opportunity and started shouting that a snake had bitten Heer's foot. She convinced Heer as well to perform the act flawlessly. Obedient to her trusted friend, Heer pretended to have lost her senses. Sehti applied some *haldi*[18] to Heer's face which gave it a pale look. Then, all the friends hurriedly brought Heer home where all the family members were also concerned. They started thinking of the best ways to extract poison out of Heer's body. Eventually, when they decided to go to Ved Hakeem to bring some medicine, Sehti came up with a suggestion:

"A *jogi* is staying in a hut in Kala Bagh. He is believed to be the perfect healer as he knows how to cure the snake bite. Go and bring him quickly."

[18] Turmeric

Some of the men immediately went to Kala Bagh and brought the *jogi* to Aju's home. Ranjha, in *jogi*'s disguise, raised his *alakh* slogan, and looked around as if sensing the seriousness of the situation. Heer opened her eye slightly to look at her Ranjha. In the meanwhile, Sehti came forward and begged the *jogi*:

"Guru Ji, have mercy on us and save our *bhabhi*'s[19] life; heal her wound, please. A poisonous snake has bitten her."

Ranjha uttered some words in an undertone as if saying some *mantar*[20]. He felt her pulse, looked critically at her face, opened her eyes (Again! her soul smiled), looked at her heels, and then said in a sad tone:

"Seems it was a very dangerous snake." He took a deep breath. Then raising his voice, he addressed them all:

"All of you, leave this room; only a virgin girl may stay inside. Be quick."

Obviously, the virgin girl to stay there was Sehti. Ranjha and Sehti were left in the room to do away with the 'venom'. Sehti locked the door. They bloomed with joy, as their drama was a success so far. Sehti told her family that the *jogi* would say the *mantar* in solitude and it would take him a couple of days to completely remove the poison from Heer's body. No one but Sehti would be allowed to go into their room during the healing days. At any cost, the family wanted Heer to stay alive so they faithfully acted upon the *jogi*'s advice.

Heer, Ranjha and Sehti wanted to take maximum advantage of this wonderful opportunity. They had a detailed discussion, and started thinking of the ways to escape from there. Sehti had also sent for Murad Baloch, who reached there on a camel. At midnight, they broke out of the room by digging a big hole into its back wall. In the dark of the night, Heer and Ranjha ran to one side, and Murad and Sehti, on camel, went in another direction. The next morning, when the Kherras brought breakfast for them, and knocked at the door to call Sehti to open it and take breakfast, they got no reply. They kept on knocking at the door for quite some time but to no use. Eventually, they broke the door open, and to their bewilderment, the room was empty. The inmates –Heer, Sehti or the *jogi* – had

[19]Sister-in-law
[20] Sacred utterances that are repeated for certain effects such healing, etc.

disappeared. They could only see the big hole in the wall. At first, they were confused. They were shocked and infuriated. Then, they discussed the matter and concluded that the *jogi* had taken their Honor away. Heer and Sehti were the honor of the whole town.

Run, run, run. Catch them. They mustn't have gone far yet, they shouted.

At once, the Kherras rode fast horses and went to chase the escaping couples. In different battalions, they went in all four directions. Sehti and Murad Baloch were on camel so they had gone far away. Even then, the Kherras chased them, and were about to attack them when men of Baloch tribes came for their rescue and forced the Kherras to retreat. So Murad succeeded in taking his beloved away with him. Another party of the Kherras found Heer and Ranjha fast asleep in a jungle –Ranjha's head resting on Heer's lap. Seeing this, the Kherras were infuriated. They arrested them, beat Ranjha brutally, and leaving him half dead there, took Heer away from him back to Rungpur. Ranjha, after having regained his senses, went to the court of Raja Adli and begged for justice.

"Who are you and why do you cry?" asked the Raja.

"I have heard much about your justice, O Raja. But in your jurisdiction, the Kherras have looted me of my love. They have taken my Heer away from me," said Ranjha, weeping bitterly.

Raja Adli ordered his force to arrest the Kherras, and present them before him.

When they were brought to his court, they also begged for justice.

"Maharaj, this *jogi* is a fraud. In the disguise of a healer, he came to kidnap our daughter-in-law. He took our honor away with him. We beg you to penalize him."

The Raja was unable to reach the truth behind all this. He saw a dervish in Ranjha's person. However, he dismissed his court and ordered the Qazi of the region to hear both the parties and give his decision.

After a proper hearing, the Qazi gave his verdict:

"Ranjha is a cheat and fraud. So, Heer should stay with the Kherras."

In this way, Saeda Kherra got Heer again. Ranjha went away, crying bitterly. He prayed to God:

"O Allah, Adli Raja did injustice to me. I beg you to be Just to me and inflict Your wrath on his town."

Ranjha's request was promptly heard by God, in a few moments, the whole town was surrounded by a fierce fire. People were scared to death. When Raja Adli came to know about it, he ordered:

"Arrest the Kherras immediately and find the *jogi*. Bring that woman too."

After a few hours, the Kherras and Heer were again present in Raja Adli's court. The Raja gave Heer's hand to Ranjha, saying:

"O *jogi*, please forgive us. Heer belongs to you. Here, she goes with you."

The Kherras were left with no choice but to obey. Ranjha and Heer were now united. Where should they go?

"Let's go to my town Takht Hazara," said Ranjha.

"No, your brothers will not accept us and will curse me for eloping with you. Now that Raja Adli has ordered us to be united, no one will object to our marriage. So let's go to Jhang Siyal first, and get married honorably."

So they went to Jhang Siyal. There, they were warmly welcomed by Heer's parents, who said to Ranjha:

"Now we have no objection to your marriage. But it should happen respectably. So it will be better that you go to Takht Hazara and bring your wedding *barat*[21] formally. We want to celebrate Heer's marriage with all zeal and zest."

Ranjha had no objection to it. He was rather happy to share the memorable moments of his life with his family. He left Heer at her parents' home and left for Takht Hazara. On his way back to his home town, he thought how happy his brothers and sisters-in-law would be to hear about his imminent marriage to Heer.

[21]A wedding party

Lost in similar thoughts, he reached his home, where his brothers received him very happily. His sisters-in-law were also very happy to have seen him after a long time. Their excitement had no bounds when he narrated the whole account to them. They started preparing for Ranjha's marriage to Heer of Siyals. The whole town of Takht Hazara was in a kind of festivity.

But Heer's father Mahr Choochak was not that kind-hearted. He had, in fact, tricked Ranjha. After he left Jhang Siyal, Mahr Choochak started thinking of plans to finish Heer. He invited all the decision makers of his family to his home and said:

"The story of Heer and Ranjha is the talk of the town now. If we allow Heer to go away with Ranjha, we will be named and remembered as *be-ghairat*[22] everywhere from Jhang to Muzzaffargarh. We must prevent this infamy of giving in to an ordinary servant."

They decided unanimously that Heer be poisoned to death.

So, Heer – Ranjha's love and life – was killed by Siyals. However, what they told other people was that she was sick and had died. They even sent a messenger to Takht Hazara to deliver the news of Heer's death. Ranjha, along with his *barat*, was about to set off for Jhang, when the messenger reached him and delivered this paralyzing news. They say, after hearing of Heer's death, Ranjha could labor for only a few long breaths and then fell on the ground. His brothers leapt forward to pick him. But he had already breathed his last, in order to go to where his Heer was already.

Their tragic death saddened everyone from Takht Hazara to Jhang Siyal. It was then, they say, that the Chenab River distanced itself from Jhang, disowned it. Its waves tell the tale of Heer-Ranjha, and cry. Then the whole atmosphere echoes with the melodious sound of Ranjha's flute. The waves go dancing to its tunes. *We belong to Heer's palang*; *we belong to Ranjha's flute*; *we belong to their love*; *not to Jhang, nor to Kherras*, they say.

[22] Cowards having no honor and sense of self respect