

## Language Planning: An overview

By Abbas Zaidi

### 1. The problem of terminology

In this paper the term *language planning* has been preferred to *language planning and language policy*. Cooper (1989), Schiffman (1996), and Kaplan and Baldauf (2003) argue that language policy and language planning are two different concepts: language policy is about decision-making and goal-setting; language planning is about implementing policies to obtain results. On the contrary, Rubin (1971) argues that language policy is a part of language planning. According to her, language planning is comprised of four phases: fact-finding, policy determination, implementation, and evaluation. Fishman, Das Gupta, Jernudd, and Rubin (1971) support Rubin's preference for the term *language planning*. They argue that the process of language planning has four major divisions: "policy formulation, codification, elaboration, and implementation" (Fishman, *et al*, 1971: 293).

Many linguists prefer the term *language planning* to *language policy* or *language planning and language policy* because they take 'planning' to be inclusive of policy. For example, Ashworth (1985), Wardhaugh (1986), Fasold (1987), and Ferguson (2006) prefer language planning. In *Sociolinguistics: A reader and coursebook* (Coupland and Jaworski, 1997), there is not a single entry on "language policy"; the term *language planning* is used in the chapter that deals with language planning and language policy. Mansoor (2005) too subsumes *language policy* under *language planning* in her discussion of the history of language education in Pakistan. Carroll (2001) sums up her discussion of the issue by saying the term language planning is the most widely accepted "umbrella term for the broad range of activities seeking to change language and its use" (Carroll, 2001: 13).

## 2. Understanding *Planning*

It is important to clarify *planning* itself because as a concept it cuts across disciplines and occupies an important place in subjects like architecture, economics, human resources management, sociology, tourism, and urban planning. Since planning is basically societal (see below for discussion), language planning cannot be discussed in isolation from its social context, and since planning, in Faludi's words, is associated with organizations, one must draw upon social sciences to understand the very concept (Faludi, 1973).

In her discussion of language planning, Joan Rubin (1971) deals with the very notion of planning itself before defining language planning. She acknowledges the role of management sciences.<sup>1</sup> "The definition of planning", according to Rubin,

has ranged from one specifying an activity that includes the broadest kind of human problem-solving or decision-making to a more limited one specifying an activity that is initiated and supported by some formal body. The more limited definition (of what is still a very complex activity) views planning as an activity whereby goals are established, means are selected, and outcomes predicted in a systematic and explicit manner. (Rubin, 1971: 217-218).

Other disciplines have taken a similar approach to defining planning. For example, Schermerhorn, Hunt and Osborn understand planning as a "process of setting objectives" (Schermerhorn *et al*, 1997: G-3) in which "rules and procedures" are developed (Dressler, 2000:2) to achieve those objectives. There are a few more relevant definitions of planning taken from various disciplines. For example, David (1997) regards planning as plotting of a course of action. Hilgert and Leonard (1997), Robbins, Bergman, and Stagg (1997), and (Fletcher, 1998) unanimously view planning to be about what should be done in the future: it consists of setting goals or objectives and establishing an overall strategy for achieving these goals.

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<sup>1</sup> See her citation of Bicanic's work: Rubin, 1971: 236.

All the above citations have one thing in common: whatever the field of investigation, planning is about *formulating a future/futuristic strategic course of action to deal with a given problem*. This point seems relevant and valid. However, beyond this point, these definitions suffer, just like the definitions found in specialist dictionaries, encyclopedias, and textbooks, from what Basin in his discussion of the nature of definitions calls “the general epistemological semantic idealism” (Basin, 1979: 228). By this expression Basin seems to mean that understanding of a concept is often conditioned by “formalist essence” which diminishes its contextual-social significance (Basin, 1979, especially his concluding chapter).

It may be argued that ‘planning’ is not a neutral, hygienic concept, but a practice aimed at changing or affecting states of affairs or a course of action. The above definitions are semantically descriptive and imply developmental organicity, but they do not seem to define what new realities the working of planning creates (or tries to create), and the role of politics and ideology that underlie planning. Understanding planning without understanding socio-political-economic realities and agendas behind it causes confusion and reduces it to an ambiguous “meta-narrative” (Allmendinger and Chapman, 1999: 3). Planners deal with issues that affect organizations and societies (or polities) in which human beings interact. It is but natural that at times planners have their own views, self-interest or bias, or are ideologically motivated: What they plan ‘for the people’ can actually run counter to the interests of those whose lives are supposed to be improved through planning. For example, government-backed urban planners can acquire a piece of land in the name of progress and development, but in reality their purpose is to grab prime land by driving away squatters or indigenous people. Tollefson narrates such an incident in which urban planning and language planning based upon hidden micro-capitalist agenda are subtly interwoven.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Tollefson’s account is about a poor Filipino taxi-driver who because of his low socio-economic status could not get quality language education for his children and at the same time was threatened with eviction from his slum dwelling in the name of urban planning and development (Tollefson, 1991: 137-139).

Planning purports to change a state of affairs, and since change brings about consequences, it always affects people either favorably or unfavorably. This brings in the dynamics of power. Change and power dynamics are so closely interrelated that one can define *power* the way one defines *change*: Power, argues Luke, is about “bringing about consequences” (Luke, 1978: 634). Hence, planning serves and protects the interests of the powerful. Planners, whether working on behalf of the powerful or on their own, wield a lot of “political-economic power” (Eastman, 1991: 135) because of different resources at their disposal, and their power to effect changes in a polity, organization, or system. It is this fact that has led scholars like M.J. Minnett to assert that planning is concerned with “manipulating things, not only understanding them” (cited by Faludi, 1973: 14). The role of planners and ideologues becomes indistinguishable given the political (or manipulative) nature of their jobs: Planning is no different from ideology because both serve interests of the powerful. Allmendinger and Chapman (1999: 4) have also noted this fact,

Planning now encompasses such a variety of issues that one could include everything from saving the planet to where swings should go in a children’s playground. . . . *Planners themselves are having their technical and apolitical stance challenged by the increasingly political and inclusive nature of the subject.* (Emphasis added.)

The bottom line of the above discussion is that while examining the very term *planning* one must not just be content with its given meaning(s), but try to understand its consequences too, and also the hidden agenda, power relations, conflicts, and ideological interests behind those consequences. Lovejoy’s approach to understanding the world we live in supports this view: “In the whole series of creeds and movements going under one name, and in each of them separately, it is needful to go behind the superficial appearance of the singleness and identity, to crack the shell which holds the mass together, if we are to see the real units [of meaning]” (Lovejoy, 1964: 6).

### **3. Defining language planning**

As mentioned above, planning is an issue that plays an important part in a number of disciplines and subjects, but the *modus operandi* of planning may differ when applied in different contexts.<sup>3</sup>

Rubin and Jernudd's definition of language planning is not very different from Weinstein's (see the footnote below); they call language planning a deliberate change in a language by an organization set up to bring about the change. They argue that language planning in all cases is "future-oriented; that is, the outcomes of policies and strategies must be specified in advance of action taken" (Rubin and Jernudd, 1971: xvi). Wardhaugh (1986: 336) defines language planning as "an attempt to interfere deliberately with a language or one its varieties". In Wiley's opinion, "language planning entails the formation and implementation of a policy designed to prescribe, or influence, the language(s) and varieties of language that will be used and the purposes for which they will be used" (Wiley, 1996: 107-108). For Fasold, "Language planning is usually seen as an explicit choice among alternatives. This, in turn, implies that there has been an evaluation of alternatives with the one that is chosen having been evaluated as the best" (Fasold, 1987: 246). Fishman says that language planning is done at the national level and defines it as "the organized pursuit of solutions to language problems" (Fishman 1974: 79).

All the above definitions of language planning imply *de jure* legitimacy behind language planning. A democratic government that does language planning is authorized to legislate through popular will and consent. Hence, the Galbally Report (1978), the Senate Committee Report on National Language Policy (1984), and the Lo Bianco Report (1987) in Australia, and the Bullock Report (1975) and the Swan Report (1985) in the UK had government authorization and political legitimacy.

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<sup>3</sup> It would be interesting, for example, to note that although urban planners and language planners have more or less the same goals (*viz.*, change and/or development), the strategies applied by these two groups of planners can be very different. Urban planning is "a form of state intervention in a development process dominated by the private sector" (Adams, 1994: 2). The private sector usually is not the prime mover in language planning; hence Weinstein's (1980:56) definition of language planning as "a government authorized, long term, sustained, and conscious efforts to alter a language's future in a society for the purpose of solving communication problems".

Just as I have discussed in the case of planning, language planning too is not a straightforward practice: Governments are guided by their own assumptions and ideologies in planning language. Language planning can create as many problems as it intends or claims to solve. More often than not, it is seldom that language policies affecting minorities are welcomed by them, and in the case of Pakistan it would be interesting to note that language planning has seldom been friendly to the majority (in fact, majorities) of the population (for details, see Rahman, 1999 and 2002; Mansoor, 2005; Zaidi 2011). Although some linguists like Putz (1997) have argued that an adequate language policy program must take account of the various opinions and beliefs of the speakers belonging to a social or ethnic group, many sociolinguists have shown that language planning which is supposed to benefit minorities actually makes them feel being discriminated against (for details, Wardhaugh, 1986; Fasold, 1987; Tollefson, 1991; Martin-Jones and Saxena, 1995; also see section 7 below).

#### **4. Language planning: *raison d'être***

Language planning (hence LP) is a phenomenon that can be called post-colonial (Pakistan, India, Malaysia, Algeria after World War II), post-revolutionary (the Soviet Union in 1917, socialist Ethiopia in the 1980s), or post-independence (Norway in the early 19th century, Central Asia republics after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991). Not all language planners of these “post” countries had the same objectives: some of the newly independent countries decided to continue to use the language of their erstwhile colonial masters (e.g., English in Singapore, India, the Philippines, and Papua New Guinea). They had their reasons: the colonial language meant administrative continuity; it was extremely helpful in functioning on the international scene also, and it could keep a lid on ethnic divisiveness that the introduction of new local languages (at the perceived cost of other languages) could have brought on. In the case of many newly independent countries, a new national language was synonymous with a new nation.

It has been claimed that LP is an official/governmental long-term, sustained attempt to solve the communication problems of a community by studying the various languages and dialects it uses (see, e.g., Ashraf, 1994; Davis, 1994; Amienyi, 2005; Simpson, 2007). Most sociolinguists agree that in the postcolonial

world, newly independent nation-states feel need to unify their peoples, often a set of ethnicities, for the purpose of nation building (Holmes 1992; Williams 1992; Daoust 1997; Wiley 1996). Since LP is held to be an instrument towards achieving destiny of a nation, policies that have been adopted at national or territorial levels claim to be geared towards contributing to nation-building (Ingram, 1994). Thus, since language policies are part of national agenda of development and “entry into the modern world” (Eastman 1983: 31), they are goal-oriented and involve decision-making (Cobarrubias 1983; Cooper 1989), and since LP involves “an explicit choice among alternatives” (Fasold 1987: 246), language planners are supposed to be mindful of the choices they make. Selection of one language or dialect, known as *status planning*, can be perceived as a threat to other languages and/or dialects if the speakers of the latter come to see the selected language/dialect to be thriving at the cost of their own. Tollefson (1991) calls it language hegemony. Minority languages, in Williams’ words, are supposed to be at risk because one important feature of “minority languages is that they tend to be systematically separated from those domains which are crucial for social reproduction, domains such as work, administration, etc.” (Williams 1992: 147).

### **5. Approaches to Language Planning**

Understanding an issue depends upon how people approach it. “What language planners,” says Williams, “seek to do will derive largely from how they perceive language change” (Williams, 1992: 123). Tollefson (1991) identifies two approaches to LP: *neoclassical* and *historical-structural* by which he means methods employed to do LP. His discussion of the approaches can be summarized thus:

The neoclassical approach puts emphasis on individual choices where “the rational calculus of individuals is considered to be the proper focus of research” (Tollefson, 1991: 27). He also says that the neoclassical approach is synchronic as it deals with current language circumstances. Also, it is a-historical and amoral, and assumes that people involved in LP are apolitical.

The historical-structural approach, on the contrary, emphasizes centrality of socio-historical factors in LP, takes into account past relationships between the groups who will be affected by LP, and claims that people have strong political views. Tollefson distinguishes the historical-structural approach from the neoclassical approach by arguing that while “the neoclassical approach emphasizes the rational decisions of individuals, the historical-structural approach emphasizes the origins of the costs and benefits confronting individuals and groups” (Tollefson, 1991: 31-32).

The neoclassical approach cannot not be ignored, however. Given that it focuses on formal properties of language and on the importance of an individual’s motivation in learning a language, the neoclassical approach can guard scholars against putting too much emphasis on the macro factors in LP. The historical-structural approach is not perfect, and behind its claimed critical stance may lurk ideologies and group interests. A good challenge for a researcher is to combine both factors, individual and political-societal, in dealing with an LP scenario in hand.

To a question like which of the two approaches is better, one can only say that it would be difficult to altogether reject one approach in favor of the other. However, a few observations can be made. For example, despite its seemingly scholarly dispassionateness, the neoclassical approach has a few problems. If we look at the societies/countries where LP was done, we find a lot of controversy and protests followed in the wake of LP. India’s example, a huge mosaic of languages and ethnicities, is instructive. Shortly after independence, India wanted to realize its pre-independence nationalist dream of having “an Indian language” in place of English which was supposed to be “a symbol of slavery” (Nayar, 1967: 12). The government decided to make Hindi the official language India which led to extreme violence in the Southern states, especially in Tamil Nadu. Das Gupta (1970) details how a Madras State Anti-Hindi Conference on January 17, 1965, a week before the January 26 date scheduled for Hindi’s ascent to the role of sole official language of India, was organized to protest against “Hindi imperialism”. The campaign against Hindi cost sixty-six lives, which included two persons who committed suicide. The result was that the government had to devise the Three Language Formula of education which stipulated that non-Hindi



speakers would study their regional languages, Hindi, and English (or another European language), and Hindi speakers would study Hindi, English, and another language. According to Sridhar, the Three Language Formula was “a compromise between the demands of the various pressure groups and has been hailed as a masterly—if imperfect—solution to a complicated problem. It seeks to accommodate the interests of group identity (mother tongues and regional languages), national pride and unity (Hindi), and administrative efficiency and technological progress (English)” (Sridhar, 1989: 22).

## **6. Language planning: Haugen’s model**

There are more than one LP models available to researchers. For example, in his discussion of what he calls *language development* with reference to language planning, Ferguson (1968) comes up with his three-category model: *graphization* (choice of an alphabetic system, spelling, punctuation, and capitalization), *standardization* (developing the so-called ‘best’ variety that will be the language of a speech community), and *modernization* (expansion of the lexis of a chosen variety so that it can keep up with the ever-increasing needs of society). For Cobarrubias (1983), there are four ideologies which can have great impact on decision-making in language planning in a particular society: *linguistic assimilation* (everyone in society should learn its dominant language), *linguistic pluralism* (the recognition that more than one language can be given its due status), *vernacularisation* (restoration or revival of an indigenous language for national or official purposes), and *internationalism* (implementation of a non-indigenous language as official language). Ferguson’s and Cobarrubias’ models have received good attention from scholars researching LP. However, it is the Haugen Model that has dominated discussions on LP since it was first enunciated by Einar Haugen in the mid 1960s. Haugen is a pioneer in the field of LP.

In one of his earliest works on LP, Haugen deals with what he calls the “taxonomy of linguistic description” which is “greatly hampered by the ambiguities and obscurities attaching to the terms ‘language’ and ‘dialect’” (Haugen, 1997 [1966]: 341). After clarifying the difference between *language* and

*dialect*,<sup>4</sup> he almost imperceptibly introduces his model of standardization by saying that a so-called “underdeveloped” language is the one which “has not been employed in all the functions that a language can perform in a society larger than that of the local tribe or peasant village (1997 [1966]: 344). After giving examples of the development of different languages, he defines his model: (1) selection of norm, (2) codification of form, (3) elaboration of function, and (4) acceptance by the community.

*Selection* refers to a language or a variety, which will be developed for broader communication. *Codification* (also known as corpus planning) refers to “developing the form of a language, i.e. its linguistic structure, including phonology, grammar, and lexicon” (1997 [1966]: 348). *Elaboration* refers to the scale of the utilization in writing. Both *codification* and *elaboration* are distinct. Haugen gives the distinction thus: “As the ideal goal of a standard language, codification may be defined as *minimal variation in form*, elaboration as *maximal variation in function*” (1997 [1966]: 348; italics in the original). Because the codification of form is inherently delimiting, Haugen argues that the elaboration of function counterbalances it.

Expanding on *selection of norm*, Haugen claims that it is very important because the success of *codification* or *elaboration* is dependent upon it. He is careful enough not to lose sight of conflict, politics, power, and ideology in the selection of a language as norm. In his own words,

Where a new norm is to be established, the problem will be as complex as the sociolinguistic structure of the people involved. There will be little difficulty where everyone speaks virtually alike, a situation rarely found. . . . To choose any one vernacular as a norm means to favor the group of people speaking that variety. It gives them prestige as norm-bearers and a head start in the race for power and position. (1997 [1966]: 349).

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<sup>4</sup> In his words, “Language is always superordinate and dialect subordinate; dialect is regional; as a social norm, dialect is a language that is excluded from polite society, etc.” Haugen, 1997 [1966]: 341-342.

The last part of Haugen's model, *acceptance*, is "part of the life of a language" (1997 [1966]: 350). A norm must be accepted by a "body of users", and the most important factor in the acceptance is that it (the norm) "must somehow contribute to the well-being of the learners" and also "offer its users material rewards in the form of power and position" (1997 [1966]: 350).

Haugen concludes his essay by saying that *selection of norm* and *codification* "refer primarily to form" and *elaboration of function* and *acceptance by community* to "the function of language" (1997: 350). *Selection of norm* and *acceptance by community* "are concerned with society", and *codification* and *elaboration of function* are concerned "with language" (1997 [1966]: 350-351).

Haugen believes in the validity and strength of his model that he presented in 1966. Writing in 1983 he claimed that he had seen "nothing in the literature [on language planning] to make me reject the model as a framework for the starting point of language planners everywhere" (Haugen, 1983: 269).

The strength of Haugen's model is that it tries to combine the neoclassic model with the historical-structural model. He brings in the neoclassic model when he claims that LP is about systematizing a language in which the written word, which is taught, has complete precedence over the spoken word; to him a language must be based on its literary form (Haugen, 1972 [1962]). But he is aware of the importance of norms of society and their influence on language and language planning when he says that if "dialects are to be tolerated, the teaching of tolerance must begin with other and more basic features of inequality in society than the purely linguistic one" (Haugen, 1972 [1962]: 253). In another place Haugen says, "Wherever language problems have appeared, there has been some form of what we have chosen to call 'language planning', a form of social planning" (Haugen, 1985: 7).

## **7. Language planning: Critical issues**

Who plans language? Why? For who? Is LP cement that binds people (nation-building)? Is it divisive? Are there hidden ideologies in LP? Is LP hegemonic? Does it create a class of subalterns? Is LP only a macro phenomenon (affecting a

Abbas Zaidi

society, country, or state), or is there a micro dimension to it too (the family as a language planner)? Is there such a thing as family/home LP enforced by those members of the family who wield power (e.g., parents)? Is LP is a result of ideology? Does it have anything to do with, say, language attitudes and diglossia? Does LP empower anyone? If yes, who?

Language, says Terdiman, is “always engaged with the realities of power” (Terdiman, 1985: 38). In the post-World War I scenario, German in the United States was almost wiped out from schools: between 1915 and 1948, students studying German dropped from 25 to 1 percent (Leibowitz cited by Wiley, 1996: 132). Commenting on this, Wiley says that in order to understand this event “a historical-structural analysis is necessary” (Wiley, 1996: 132).

The nexus between LMLS and language planning is very strong. David (2008) has put it thus,

There are several reasons for language shift and death. Apart from natural disasters resulting in the death of a speech community, many man-made factors can cause such disasters. One of these man-made factors that can cause language shift and death is language policies. (David, 2008: 79).

The issue of identity and social standing of who plans language for who is also an important one. At times LP is done by those who have very few stakes in a language and its speakers. Harlech-Jones, for example, says that in Africa language planning,

is done by people who have been thoroughly unrepresentative of the polity on whose behalf they have affected to speak. They have been the unelected decision-takers and politicians of one- and no-party states, relying for power at first on a brief and vacuous populism following decades of repression, dedicated to nothing more noble than the enhancement of their personal positions and the enrichments of their own pockets. (Harlech-Jones: 1997: 224; also see, Kaplan and Baldauf).

Many linguists view LP to be an instrument through which inequality and powerlessness are bred. This is because LP works with, and not against,

prevailing “social currents” (Romaine, 2002: 19), an argument anticipated by Haugen who called LP “a form of social planning” (Haugen, 1985: 7). Tollefson perceptively argues that language policies are both the outcome and arena of power struggle (Tollefson, 1995). Pennycook, Garcia, and Watson-Gegeo and Gegeo in their respective studies in *Power and Inequality in Language Education* (1995) try to unravel the hidden agenda in language policies. English, says Pennycook, has become a very powerful means of inclusion and exclusion. He gives the example of Kenya where despite Swahili’s status as the official national language, the dominance of English in Kenya’s “economic and legal spheres. . . has sought more to prepare an elite for higher education than to educate a citizenry capable of maintaining a policy of socialist self-reliance” (Pennycook, 1995: 41). The situation seems even worse in the Solomon Islands where Watson-Gegeo and Gegeo found that English is spoken by no more than 10 to 15 percent of the population, and yet it is required for all middle to higher jobs in private and public sectors, which in the words of these scholars contributes to “the undermining of traditional sources of knowledge, growing inequalities between urban and rural areas, and the emergence of social classes” (Watson-Gegeo and Gegeo, 1995: 66).

Scholars like Auerbach and Martin-Jones and Saxena have drawn attention to the micro-sites of the ideologies as they are played out in the name of ESL or bilingualism: the classroom. Auerbach (1995) claims that an ESL classroom is one place where powerlessness is reinforced through the exclusion of the learners’ knowledge, life experience, and language resources. Martin-Jones and Saxena (1995) argue that in England, despite all the rhetoric about the benefits of supporting bilingualism, the very marginalization and inferior status of bilingual support teachers greatly reduced learning opportunities for bilingual children: policies, power asymmetries and pedagogical practices led to containing rather than supporting bilinguals. In his study of schools in Australia, Bullivant has found that the classroom reproduces the interests of the ruling class, and the result is that the working class students’ life chances are reduced because they end up in “low-paid, repetitive, and unrewarding jobs” (Bullivant, 1995: 61).

Tollefson's *Planning language, planning inequality* (1991) also supports this view of the planning as a term, concept, and practice. On the use of descriptive terms and definitions in the area of language planning, his remark is worth quoting,

It is the language research itself that dehumanizes and depersonalizes. . . . Thus research investigates the impact of 'plans' which are 'formulated' and 'implemented' upon 'subjects' and 'populations' by means of 'empirical' research involving 'studies', 'data', and 'generalizations'. . . . In the impersonal language of research, people do not exist as living, breathing, feeling human beings. . . these terms are not characteristic of people at all: they are fictions that limit, restrict, determine, and disempower. (Tollefson, 1991: 205)

Last, a realistic research on LP must take into account the LP done in the home domain. Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas have argued, "Language policy is a super-ordinate category, within which fall operational concerns such as language planning and, as one form of normative regulation, language legislation" (Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas, 1997: 116). This is true in terms of the macro view of LP, but there is another, micro, aspect of LP. Kaplan and Baldauf call it "micro-planning" (Kaplan and Baldauf, 1997: 88). Omoniyi uses the term "microlanguage literacy planning" for it (Omoniyi, forthcoming). The home is a quintessential site for micro-language planning; it is the last bastion of language maintenance. What happens if, say, parents do LP in the home forbidding use of one language and making sure that another language is spoken? For instance, the Urhobo of the Niger-delta part of Nigeria are ashamed of Urhobo, their mother tongue, and generally are not willing to speak it to their children. They prefer the English pigeon spoken in their area (for details, see Ojaide and Aziza, 2007). Implications of such LP in the home can be extremely destructive for the language, which has been forbidden.

## **8. Language planning and postcoloniality**

LP is a postcolonial phenomenon as most of the nations who implemented LP were former colonies of various Western powers. Post-independence linguistic fervor in countries like Tanzania, Namibia, Malaysia, and Somalia can be cited

where new national identity-seeking slogans aimed at building new nations argued in favor of local languages at the expense of the languages of the colonizers (Fierman 1991: Chapter 1). One could hardly distinguish between language planners and politicians; hence the validity of Fierman's contention that language planners are politicians who do not always reveal the motivations or goals which underlie their actions; their "actions frequently produce unexpected results and the environment in which their policies are implemented may include factors which they did not adequately anticipate" (Fierman, 1991: 5). However, it may be pointed out here that this phenomenon is not a matter of being able to "anticipate" or not. *New-nation-new-language* can be a manipulative move by the ruling elites (the beneficiaries of the former colonial master's legacies and policies) to continue to hold on to power. The people, the masses, are given a (new) national language in which they are educated in government schools, but the colonial language remains the truly important language through its official status. Thus despite Swahili's promotion as Kenya's national language, Tagalog in the Philippines, and Malay in Malaysia, English has remained the language of prestige and political-economic mobility in which the ruling elite educate their children (Watson 1983; Zuengler 1985; Tollefson 1986).

Walker (1984) observes that the elite in newly independent countries realize that a status reduction of the former colonial language will ultimately undermine their own status and "put them much more on a par with other speakers" (Walker, 1984: 172). Scotton (1982) too makes more or less the same observation when he says, "The fostering of the colonial language is held in check because it best serves the elite's socio-economic interests, and they do not mind even if the national-official language divide is brought about at the cost of limiting national integration" (Scotton, 1982: 69).

## **9. Conclusion**

It may be argued that planning language is planning inequality in socio-linguistic-economic terms if one language is elevated at the cost of another language(s). LP is done on certain so-called nationalist principles. Thus, the French language is supported and promoted because it stands for being French, Breton, Provençal,

and as a result, many immigrant languages such as Arabic and Vietnamese are casualties. The problem is that a national language is more than an official language because it is “the symbol of people’s identity” (Fasold, 1987: 247). However, identity is *per se* frictional, indeed conflictual, aspect of social functioning. Language standardization is an instance of invasion on and exclusion of minority and/or native languages in the name of national unity. This is why, LP has not been a smooth sailing for language planners in most of the countries of the world because it is, in Wardhaugh’s words, a deliberate “human intervention into natural processes of language change, diffusion and erosion” (Wardhaugh, 2010: 379). One might add to Wardhaugh’s claim by saying that LP often results in subalternization of certain languages and privileging of the language spoken by powerful elites even if it is done with the best of intentions. Jomo Kenyatta promoted Swahili at the cost of his own Kikuyu and many other languages. Now all these languages are slowly becoming extinct.

It is certainly the case that in our world where there is a scramble for ever-shrinking resources, sociolinguistic Darwinism is an unpleasant fact. Nevertheless, this does not have to lead to the flourishing of some languages and the others going the way of extinction.<sup>5</sup> In any polity, possibilities exist to promote minority and native languages on communal, if not national, levels. In order to do so, the communities themselves have to take the initiative. However, how far minority communities are independent and powerful is a moot point. Sociolinguistic situations often hide histories of hegemony, power struggle, and suppression.

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“... an adequate language policy program must take account of the various opinions and beliefs of the speakers belonging to a social or ethnic group” (Putz, 1997: xvi).



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Abbas Zaidi

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